explaining that deference is more appropriate where the interpretation is one of "long standing"
How later courts described this case
- explaining that deference is more appropriate where the interpretation is one of "long standing"
- courts “must defer to an agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers, as long as that interpretation is reasonable and not plainly wrong or inconsistent with its legislative purpose” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
- “It would be incongruous to accord substantial weight to an agency’s interpretation of a statute where the record is barren of any indication that the agency gave any consideration at all to the statutory language or to the structure or purpose of the provisions which were ostensibly being construed.”
- remanding for “meaningful input” where Board failed to provide a reasoned construction of the statute to support its actions
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PRYOR, Senior Judge,
concurring:
It is certain that the D.C.Code provides specific procedures governing the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board’s response to petitions in opposition to the grant of a license to sell alcohol. It is also evident that the provisions of the statute are intended to give residents a voice in Board decisions which will affect the community.
In this instance, the petitioner, in opposing the license application, declared and distributed deliberate and blatant false statements. Our responsibility in this court is, of course, to review the Board’s decision in terms of the pertinent statutory provisions. It is settled that a governmental agency should have broad authority and reasonable latitude to perform its function. The precise tension which has arisen in this case relates to the fact that the statute does not expressly authorize the Board to dismiss a protest petition, and the Board has given a terse explanation of its action. Given the varied, sometimes divergent, interests which the majority opinion has carefully identified, I agree that this is an important concern. The Board is obliged to explain itself. Thus, I do not seriously oppose the remand. Yet, I think it must be said that the statutory provisions in question were likely drafted on the premise that protest applications, like legal pleadings, must be accurate, non frivolous, and asserted in good faith. It would seem implicit, though not expressly written, that the Board has the authority to dismiss a petition. I think the Board concluded that this was such a case, and that they were treating it appropriately. However, for the longer term, the requirement of clarity is probably wise.
I reluctantly concur.