Opinion

Joel Truitt Management v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights

  • 646 A.2d 1007
  • 1994 D.C. App. LEXIS 140
Court
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Filed
Aug 25, 1994
Status
Published
Author
Pryor
On the bench
Farrell, Ferren, Pryor
Cited by
6 cases
Authority
More cited than 19.4%

affirming award of $35,000 in DCHRA case

How later courts described this case

  • affirming award of $35,000 in DCHRA case

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PRYOR, Senior Judge,

dissenting:

I think this case should be remanded so that the Commission, in a concise way, may *1011 explain more fully the procedural framework by which it reached its decision.

It appears the Commission has found, primarily on the basis of a memorandum written by petitioner, that there was “facial discrimination” in violation of the statute. Given the evidence which the Commission heard, it may well be an appropriate ruling. However, there is little explanation regarding the burdens of proof which were applied in this instance. It is, of course, customary in litigation that the obligation to present and rebut evidence be clearly allocated between the parties. Such burdens of persuasion are well understood in traditional civil and criminal cases. In employment discrimination cases, courts have devised procedural rules regulating the order of proof. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In non-employment assertions of discrimination, as here, the McDonnell Douglas rule required modification to meet different factual issues. Thus, in some instances, courts have referred to “direct evidence” in the case as the basis for decision. The meaning and import of this term in this context is not uniform. In Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 848 , 111 S.Ct. 137 , 112 L.Ed.2d 104 (1990), the court opined that, “direct evidence is evidence which in and of itself, shows a discriminatory animus. A similar discussion is found in Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1187 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 82 , 121 L.Ed.2d 46 (1992).

Understanding that our statute is not controlled by federal precedent, nonetheless, there are similarities. In this instance, the Commission essentially held, without elaboration, that the memorandum showed discrimination. Was this document treated as presumptive, thereby shifting the burden to proceed, or was it simply regarded as strong direct evidence?

It is not necessary that the Commission write an elaborate treatise; rather there should be an adequate explanation so an appellate court can trace the path of the decision. See Newsweek Magazine v. District of Columbia Comm’n on Human Rights, 376 A.2d 777, 784 (D.C.1977).

I think that is lacking here and would therefore remand the case.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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