“Even a party able to intervene as a matter of right must obtain a court order allowing intervention. An order allowing intervention, albeit of the Attorney General, is no mere formality. A court has discretion in imposing any conditions on the intervenor necessary to preserve the original parties’ rights, inasmuch as ‘the rights of an inter-venor are subordinate to the rights of the parties.’ ” (citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- “Even a party able to intervene as a matter of right must obtain a court order allowing intervention. An order allowing intervention, albeit of the Attorney General, is no mere formality. A court has discretion in imposing any conditions on the intervenor necessary to preserve the original parties’ rights, inasmuch as ‘the rights of an inter-venor are subordinate to the rights of the parties.’ ” (citations omitted)
- “Even a party able to intervene as a matter of right must obtain a court order allowing intervention.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SWANSON, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur with the decision by the majority but wish to emphasize this case has been resolved on an issue of procedure, not power. This case does not serve as precedent to limit or curtail the power of the Attorney General. It is a well-settled principle of common law — a principle embodied by- statutes — that the Attorney General has broad authority to represent the people of Florida. Nonetheless, the Attorney General has to follow the procedural rules; something she failed to do here.
The dismissal of this appeal prevents us from reaching the merits of this case. Accordingly, this case also does not serve as precedent to define legislative power.