holding that trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees where an equitable distribution of the marital property has been achieved and the trial court has equalized incomes through its alimony award
How later courts described this case
- holding that trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees where an equitable distribution of the marital property has been achieved and the trial court has equalized incomes through its alimony award
- reversing the award of attorney’s fees to the former wife where “the trial court’s order shows that the former husband’s salary is $5,500 pér month, that the former wife’s net income is $1,033, and that the former wife will receive $3,500 per month in alimony” because “[a]fter the allocation of alimony from the former husband to the former wife, the former husband is in no better position to pay attorney’s fees than the former wife is”
- finding abuse of discretion in award of fees where husband had $5500 per month salary and paid wife $3500 in alimony, on top of wife’s $1033 net monthly income; husband was in no better position to pay attorneys’ fees than the wife
- “We reject the suggestion by the trial court that a party who is meeting a current alimony obligation is required to set aside additional funds to meet future alimony obligations, in anticipation of a potential loss of income.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BENTON, C.J.,
concurring in judgment.
I concur in reversing and remanding the alimony modification order for reconsideration in light of the parties’ current circumstances. The trial court’s rationale in awarding the amount of alimony it did is necessarily time-limited: The savings the trial court reasoned Mr. Galligar could and should have set aside could not cover even his reduced alimony obligation indefinitely. After it had ruled, moreover, Mr. Galligar represented to the trial court that his new employer had stopped paying him and that he would have “no income for the foreseeable future.”
As for attorney’s fees, “a trial court has the discretion to award attorney’s fees in modification proceedings after considering the parties’ financial resources.” McQuaig v. McQuaig, 36 So.3d 801, 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (2008)). The trial court should take into account any alimony awarded on remand, in determining the financial positions of the parties for fee award purposes. See Pelton v. Pelton, 617 So.2d 714, 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).