stating that “[p]rop-erly applying the Macias prejudice presumption rule,9 the trial court did not err in allowing the [insureds] to prove to the jury that [the insurer] was not prejudiced by [the insureds’] failure to substantially comply with the proof of loss condition”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[p]rop-erly applying the Macias prejudice presumption rule,9 the trial court did not err in allowing the [insureds] to prove to the jury that [the insurer] was not prejudiced by [the insureds’] failure to substantially comply with the proof of loss condition”
- concluding that because the jury found the insurer was not prejudiced by the insured’s failure to submit a sworn proof of loss form, “there was no material breach of the contract”
- holding that the trial court did not err in allowing the insureds to prove to the jury that the insurer was not prejudiced by their failure to submit a proof of loss
- stating Florida courts have consistently interpreted proof of loss obligations coupled with similar no-action clauses to be conditions precedent, i.e., an obligation to be performed before the contract is effective
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BERGER, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority because I believe this court’s decision in Starling v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 956 So.2d 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) controls the outcome of this case. The plain language of the policy requires there be full compliance with policy terms before a lawsuit may be filed. Since the jury found that the Farmers failed to comply with a condition precedent-namely, that they provide a signed and sworn proof of loss-I would reverse the final judgment entered in their favor. Accordingly, I dissent.