recognizing that the phrase "single family residential purposes only," and "other similar phrases, has engendered many conflicting opinions across the country as to whether the language restricts the types and number of structures that may be erected on the property, the use to which those structures may be put, or both"
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that the phrase "single family residential purposes only," and "other similar phrases, has engendered many conflicting opinions across the country as to whether the language restricts the types and number of structures that may be erected on the property, the use to which those structures may be put, or both"
- holding that "property is used for 'residential purposes' when those occupying it do so for ordinary living purposes" and therefore "so long as the renters continue to relax, eat, sleep, bathe, and engage in other incidental activities ... , they are using the cabin for residential purposes"
- explaining that the cabin at issue is “used for ‘residential purposes’ anytime it is used as a place of abode, even if the persons occupying the cabin are residing there temporarily during a vacation”
- rejecting inter- pretation of ‘‘residential purposes’’ that would mean that owner’s intermittent use of property as vacation home was in violation of restrictive covenant
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PITTMAN, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concurred in the main opinion on original deliverance, and I likewise concur in the opinion on rehearing. My doing so, however, should not be interpreted as supporting the proposition that the Association timely raised any conflict between the court’s decision in this case on original deliverance and the decision in Reetz v. Ellis, 279 Ala. 453 , 186 So.2d 915 (1966). See Putnam v. City of Huntsville, 48 Ala.App. 33, 36 , 261 So.2d 754, 756-57 (Civ.App.1972) (declining to consider new supporting arguments presented on rehearing); accord, Ex parte Lovejoy, 790 So.2d 933, 938-39 (Ala.2000).