concluding that testimony of the victim’s allegations was “not offered for the truth of the allegations, but to show what the witnesses did next,” including filing police reports and beginning an investigation, and “to provide a basis for their testimony”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that testimony of the victim’s allegations was “not offered for the truth of the allegations, but to show what the witnesses did next,” including filing police reports and beginning an investigation, and “to provide a basis for their testimony”
- holding that “disclosures made nearly a year later cannot reasonably be considered ‘timely’”
- because sex crimes “ ‘are rarely[,] if ever[,] committed under circumstances permitting knowledge and observation by persons other than the accused and the complaining witness,’ . . . it is permissible to instruct the jury that there is no corroboration requirement,” and it does not amount to a comment on the evidence
- holding “any 4 No. 83946-2-I/5 child” as used in RCW 5.60.060(1) means the child of either spouse, regardless of age
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Becker, J.
¶39 (concurring) — If the use of the noncorroboration instruction were a matter of first impression, I would hold it is a comment on the evidence and reverse the conviction. I agree with the committee on pattern jury instructions that the matter of corroboration is really a matter of sufficiency of the evidence. Many correct statements of the law are not appropriate to give as instructions. But we are bound by State v. Clayton, 32 Wn.2d 571 , 202 P.2d 922 (1949), to hold that the giving of such an instruction is not reversible error. State v. Zimmerman, 130 Wn. App. 170, 182-83 , 121 P.3d 1216 (2005). Accordingly, I must concur.
Review denied at 184 Wn.2d 1023 (2015).