holding that the legislature expressly directed that an ability to pay analysis not be considered when imposing victim restitution, victim assessment fees, DNA fees, and criminal filing fees
How later courts described this case
- holding that the legislature expressly directed that an ability to pay analysis not be considered when imposing victim restitution, victim assessment fees, DNA fees, and criminal filing fees
- holding that the legislature divested sentencing courts of the discretion to impose the mandatory LFOs of “victim restitution, victim assessments, DNA fees, and criminal filing fees”
- holding that the filing fee imposed by RCW 36.18.020(2)(h) is mandatory and courts have no discretion to consider the offender's ability to pay
- noting that, for these costs, "the legislature has directed expressly that a defendant's ability to pay should not be taken into account"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Johanson, A.C.J.
¶23 (concurring) — I concur with the majority opinion but write separately regarding Lundy’s legal financial obligation (LFO) challenge because I would follow our analysis in State v. Blazina, 174 Wn. App. 906 , 301 P.3d 492 (2013), petition for review filed, No. 89028-5 (Wash. July 8, 2013). I would decline to reach the merits of the LFO issue because Lundy did not object when the trial court found that Lundy had a present or future ability to pay LFOs and when the trial court imposed the LFOs. Accordingly, I would hold that Lundy did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review. RAP 2.5(a).