noting that the narrowest ground on which a majority agrees represents the holding of the case
How later courts described this case
- noting that the narrowest ground on which a majority agrees represents the holding of the case
- “A warrantless search of an automobile is permissible under the search incident to arrest exception when that search is necessary to preserve officer safety or prevent destruction or concealment of evidence of the crime of arrest.”
- “The [SITA] exception ... arises from the necessity to provide for officer safety and the preservation of evidence, of the crime of arrest, and the application and scope of that exception must be so grounded and so limited.”
- addressing the search of an automobile incident to arrest
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Alexander, C.J.
¶41 (concurring) — I concur in the result reached by the majority. I do so solely on the basis that the officers who seized contraband from Jesus Valdez’s automobile exceeded the scope of a search incident to arrest when *780 they searched an area of the automobile that was not within the passenger compartment and thereby violated article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. See majority at 778. Consistent with reasoning this court set forth in State v. Patton, 167 Wn.2d 379 , 396 n.9, 219 P.3d 651 (2009), I would have us not reach the Fourth Amendment question “ [b] ecause we [can] resolve this case on independent and adequate state grounds under article I, section 7.” See also, e.g., Dreiling v. Jain, 151 Wn.2d 900 , 915 n.6, 93 P.3d 861 (2004) (“Because of our substantive resolution of these questions on state common law and constitutional grounds, we do not reach the [Seattle] Times’ federal theories.” (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d 30 , 640 P.2d 716 (1982))); City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wn.2d 260, 281-82 , 868 P.2d 134 (1994) (unnecessary to reach Fourth Amendment argument given determination that warrants at issue violated article I, section 7).