invalidating on similar grounds a subsequent amendment to the statute limiting prohibited statements to those made about a candidate for public office
How later courts described this case
- invalidating on similar grounds a subsequent amendment to the statute limiting prohibited statements to those made about a candidate for public office
- striking down Washington’s political false-statements law, which required proof of actual malice, but not defamatory nature
- “ In a political campaign, a candidate’s factual blunder is unlikely to escape the notice of, and correction by, the erring candidate’s political opponent” [quotations and citations omitted]
- applying strict scrutiny to Washington false-statement law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
¶28
Alexander, C. J.
(concurring) — In my view, the majority goes too far in concluding that any government censorship of political speech would run afoul of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that defamation is not protected by the First Amendment. Bose Corp. v. Consum *857 ers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 , 104 S. Ct. 1949 , 80 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1984); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 , 72 S. Ct. 725 , 96 L. Ed. 919 (1952). The government, thus, may penalize defamatory political speech. The statute at issue here, however, prohibits nondefamatory speech in addition to defamatory speech. Thus, I concur in the majority’s conclusion that RCW 42.17.530(1)(a) is unconstitutionally overbroad.