affirming death sentence even though (1)"the death penalty has not been sought in cases at least as brutal," (2) the single aggravating circumstance of multiple victims as part of a common scheme or plan does not weigh either for or against finding of proportionality, (3) the defendant had minimal criminal history, and (4) the defendant suffered childhood abuse and had diagnosed personality disorders
How later courts described this case
- affirming death sentence even though (1)"the death penalty has not been sought in cases at least as brutal," (2) the single aggravating circumstance of multiple victims as part of a common scheme or plan does not weigh either for or against finding of proportionality, (3) the defendant had minimal criminal history, and (4) the defendant suffered childhood abuse and had diagnosed personality disorders
- acknowledging uncertainty over whether the legislature intended this court to include in the comparison database death penalty sentences later reversed, but resolving that "doubt" adversely to the defendant
- reviewing court asks whether the defendant's "representation has been irrevocably poisoned"
- juror properly excused due to his statement, "`I would have a hard time [sentencing a paraplegic to death]. I'm not sure I could be totally unbiased.'" (Alteration in original.
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
¶145 (concurring) — The majority opinion lavishes praise on the “highly respected, honorable, and thoughtful” prosecutor who negotiated an agreement whereby he did not seek the death penalty against Gary Ridgway in exchange for the serial killer providing certain information. Majority at 622. With equal fervor, the dissent asserts that there was “nothing rational” about the prosecutor’s plea deal with Ridgway. Dissent at 648 n.24.
Alexander, C.J.
*641 ¶146 This court should refrain from commenting on the qualities of individual prosecutors, as that is a matter properly within the purview of the public and not justices. Ridgway’s sentence, and the considerations that led to the sparing of his life, are not before us. Therefore, while I concur with the majority’s result, I write separately simply to express my view that both the majority and dissenting opinions needlessly and improperly delve into matters of prosecutorial discretion. While we may have personal views about controversies beyond our docket, such views do not belong in the decisions announced by this court.
Fairhurst, J., concurs with Alexander, C.J.