holding that the maximum sentence a judge can impose without finding additional facts for Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, purposes is “the top of the standard sentencing range”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the maximum sentence a judge can impose without finding additional facts for Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, purposes is “the top of the standard sentencing range”
- holding that Teague is ultimately "grounded in important considerations of federal-state relations", and that Teague does not limit a state court's authority to grant post-conviction relief based on a retroactive application of Blakely
- reversing felony murder; jury instruction allowed conviction on murder without finding he personally attempted or committed the robbery if it found he was only an accomplice to theft
- holding Blakely retroactive to date Apprendi decided
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
¶40 (concurring) — As a matter of logic and principle, I find it difficult to accept one’s constitutional right to a jury trial on sentencing factors may be abridged, without remedy, when the issue is first raised based on new case law in the context of a personal restraint petition. But a slim majority (5-4) of the United States Supreme Court in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 , 124 S. Ct. 2519 , 159 L. Ed. 2d 442 (2004), seems to say exactly that. What can I do but concur in the decision of our majority?
Sanders, J.