holding that the appellate court “must defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the appellate court “must defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence”
- finding a startling event occurred based on the circumstantial evidence of the declarant being described as “ visibly shaken” and scared
- evaluating whether State opened the door to cross-examination on a prior suspect's possible motives to murder the victim
- stating that polygraph tests are unreliable
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Chambers, J.
(concurring) — I concur with the result reached by the majority on the grounds that, under Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 , 107 S. Ct. 1676 , 95 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1987), the State bears the burden of proving Covell Thomas was a major participant in the crime before the death penalty may be imposed. See also State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 503-04 , 14 P.3d 713 (2000). Instructional error relieved the State of this burden, and therefore, the death penalty must be vacated. However, instructional error in a “to convict” instruction may be harmless. See State v. Brown, 147 Wn.2d 330, 338-39 , 58 P.3d 889 (2002). I concur *877 with the majority that under the facts of this case, that error was harmless, and join in affirming Thomas’s first degree murder conviction.