affirming that a conclusion of law erroneously labeled as a finding of fact is nevertheless reviewed as a conclusion of law
How later courts described this case
- affirming that a conclusion of law erroneously labeled as a finding of fact is nevertheless reviewed as a conclusion of law
- “in a traditional ‘pass through’ scenario, the client has sole liability for an expense paid on its behalf and is responsible for advancing the cost to the taxpayer or reimbursing the taxpayer”
- “[T]here is no bar to this court considering issues not raised at trial when the interests of justice so dictate.” (citing RAP 1.2(c))
- "[T]here is no bar to this court considering issues not raised at trial when the interests of justice so dictate."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Alexander, C. J.
(concurring in the dissent) — I agree with Justice Sanders that we should affirm the trial court. I write separately simply to indicate that my agreement with Justice Sanders is based solely on the conclusion we both reach that the William Rogers Company, Inc., doing business as Evergreen Staffing qualifies for the “pass-through” *182 exemption set forth in Tacoma’s administrative rule 111. The facts of this case are essentially identical to those in Rho Co. v. Department of Revenue, 113 Wn.2d 561 , 782 P.2d 986 (1989), and the decision in that case should dictate our ruling here. I am not, however, prepared to join Justice Sanders’ conclusion that the funds representing labor costs do not constitute gross income. As the majority observes, Evergreen has not made that argument and, thus, we should not address it.
Madsen, J., concurs with Alexander, C.J.