“We hold that the factual basis for an exceptional sentence upward need not be charged, submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
How later courts described this case
- “We hold that the factual basis for an exceptional sentence upward need not be charged, submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
- quoted and cited in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. at 2537, for the proposition that had the judge imposed the enhanced sentence solely on the basis of Blakely's guilty plea, he would have been reversed
- declaring that Frye examines only whether evidence is based on novel scientific methodology
- declaring that Frye only examines whether evidence is based on novel scientific methodology
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Hughes, 154 Wash. 2d 118 (2005)
143 Wn.2d 288, 315 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001), overruled by State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 131
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Abd-Rahmaan, 154 Wash. 2d 280 (2005)
143 Wn.2d 288,302 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001) (declaring that Frye only examines whether evidence is based on novel scientific methodology), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 288
Superseded by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
Although Gore was superseded by Blakely as to a Sixth Amendment issue, it is the Washington Supreme Court’s intent in promulgating CrR 4.2 that we must discern in deciding the due process claim argued by Kennar.
The opinion
Alexander, C.J.
(concurring) — I agree with the result reached by the majority. I write separately simply to indicate that the majority opinion goes too far in implying that “preparation and planning” justifies an exceptional sentence for either first or second degree rape. As the majority points out, there are statutes that list a “ ‘high degree of sophistication or planning’ ” as a factor that justifies an exceptional sentence for major economic offenses or violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Majority at 320. There are, however, no statutes that provide that this factor justifies an exceptional sentence for any other category of offenses. This is significant because the legislature’s inclusion of “a high degree of sophistication or planning” as a factor justifying an exceptional sentence for a certain category of offenses suggests to me that it may not be considered in the sentencing of individuals for other offenses.
Although the majority cites decisions from the Court of *323 Appeals that stand for the proposition that extensive planning may justify an exceptional sentence-for offenses other than major economic offenses or major violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, this court has never reached such a conclusion. Absent clear direction from the legislature, we should refrain from recognizing “preparation and planning” as a proper basis for an exceptional sentence. That conclusion seems particularly compelling where, as here, recognition of the factor is unnecessary to our resolution of the case, since the findings do not show the degree of sophistication and planning that would justify an exceptional sentence even if that were a factor that could be considered by the sentencing court.
Sanders, J., concurs with Alexander, C.J.