holding the trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony on the defendant’s inability to form specific intent in a first-degree murder trial deprived him of his constitutional right to present evidence in his own defense
How later courts described this case
- holding the trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony on the defendant’s inability to form specific intent in a first-degree murder trial deprived him of his constitutional right to present evidence in his own defense
- noting judges "must not abdicate our gatekeeping role by receding from . difficult decisions and letting the jury decide how much weight to give to evidence that is in fact irrelevant"
- declaring that the Edmon 1 foundational requirements are not absolute and not controlling
- using the phrase "specific intent" rather than "culpable mental state"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Bottrell, 14 P.3d 164 (2000)
The State responds that the Edmon factors were not satisfied, and that Ellis is inapposite because it involved a capital case.
The opinion
Durham, C. J.
(dissenting) — I agree with part A of Justice Talmadge’s dissent. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony in this case. Admissibility of such evidence should be determined under the rules of evidence and the principles of testimonial capacity *525 for expert witnesses. However, I do not agree with part B of the dissent. Abolishing the diminished capacity defense is not appropriate at this time.