striking down a statute that prohibited knowingly false speech about ballot issues
How later courts described this case
- striking down a statute that prohibited knowingly false speech about ballot issues
- “RCW 42.17.530(1)(a) restricts political speech absent the compelling interest present in defamation cases . . . .”
- overturning statute banning deliberate lies in political campaigns
- “the State asserts McIntyre impliedly suggested laws prohibiting false political statements are constitutional. However the inference to be drawn from McIntyre is just the opposite”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Guy, J.
(concurring) — The judiciary has the duty to be *633 vigilant in protecting citizens from laws that chill political speech. Calculated lies are not protected political speech. The elected representatives of the people have a right to pass laws which make malicious lying illegal in political campaigns; we have no constitutional duty to strike down such laws. The statute before us requires actual malice regarding a false statement of material fact, and requires that such malice and materiality be proved in a court of law by clear and convincing evidence. RCW 42.17.530(2). I have an abiding belief in the value of “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 , 84 S. Ct. 710 , 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 , 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964). Intentional, malicious lies do not foster debate; they foster deception and manipulation of the voting public.
I agree with the majority and Justice Talmadge’s concurrence that the advertisement before us from the 119 Vote No! Committee does not violate RCW 42.17.530(l)(a). I disagree with the majority and Justice Madsen’s concurrence that the statute on its face violates the First Amendment.
Durham, C.J., concurs with Guy, J.