stating that “[t]here is no constitutional requirement that a deadly weapon finding be made by the jury; if it is a sentencing factor, the sentencing court may make that finding”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[t]here is no constitutional requirement that a deadly weapon finding be made by the jury; if it is a sentencing factor, the sentencing court may make that finding”
- holding that there is no specific group targeted- by the legislation because “those with two convictions ... can avoid the enhanced sentence by not committing the third offense”
- holding a trial court could enter a firearm enhancement based on a deadly weapon verdict when the judge determined that the weapon was a firearm
- explaining that the POAA "is essentially a sentence enhancement statute which is based on the past criminal history of a defendant"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled — as noted by a later court
Likewise, because Smith and Wheeler are premised on Thorne and a pre-Blakely and pre-Cunningham understanding of the right to jury trial, they are no longer good precedent on this issue.
medium confidenceAbrogated on other grounds by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
129 Wn.2d 736, 775 , 921 P.2d 514 (1996), abrogated on other grounds by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L. Ed. 2d 403
Abrogated by State v. Recuenco, 154 Wash. 2d 156 (2005)
Recuenco III was decided over a vigorous dissent and reversed prior precedent. 163 Wash.2d at 442, 180 P.3d 1276 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting); State v. Meggyesy, 90 Wash.App. 693, 708-09, 958 P.2d 319 (1998) (citing State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 921 P.2d 514 (1996) (holding a trial court could enter a firearm enhancement based on a deadly weapon verdict when the judge determined that the weapon was a firearm), abr…
Abrogated on other grounds by a later decision
129 Wn.2d 736, 782 , 921 P.2d 514 (1996), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Reynolds, 2 Wn.3d 195 , 209-10, 535 P.3d 427
other groundsmedium confidence
The opinion
Sanders, J.
(dissenting) — I join Justice Madsen’s dissent, however, write separately to restate my view expressed in my dissenting opinion in State v. Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697 , that the "Persistent Offender Accountability Act,” also known as "Three Strikes and You’re Out,” unconstitutionally imposes cruel punishment contrary to Washington Constitution article I, section 14, and is therefore invalid on its face.
Reconsideration denied October 24, 1996.