The opinion
DORIS JEAN STALNACKER, )
)
Appellant, )
) No. SD36954
vs. )
) FILED: July 29, 2021
JUDGE DAVID DOLAN )
)
Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MISSISSIPPI COUNTY
Honorable Judge John H. Bloodworth
AFFIRMED
Doris Jean Stalnacker ("Stalnacker") appeals the trial court's dismissal of her
civil suit seeking damages against Judge David Dolan ("Judge Dolan") for false
imprisonment. Stalnacker's petition alleged that Judge Dolan was a circuit court judge
and presided over a case in which Stalnacker was charged with a criminal offense and
was placed on probation.1 In that case, Judge Dolan erroneously ordered that "[n]o
earned compliance credit ("ECC") in this case will be allowed[,]" revoked Stalnacker's
1 This criminal case is State v. Doris J. Stalnacker, Case No. 08MI-CR00080-01.
probation, and ordered her sentence to be executed after the probation period had
expired. As a result, Stalnacker served 26 months in the Missouri Department of
Corrections before a habeas court ordered that Stalnacker be released from
confinement.2 Stalnacker sued Judge Dolan for false imprisonment, seeking
$2,000,000 in damages, and alleged that Judge Dolan "lacked authority and
jurisdiction" when he disallowed ECCs, revoked her probation, and ordered her
sentence to be executed after her term of probation had expired.
Judge Dolan filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, arguing that Stalnacker's petition was barred by the doctrine of
judicial immunity. The trial court granted Judge Dolan's motion, finding Stalnacker's
claim against him was barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Stalnacker appeals
this judgment.
Stalnacker raises two points on appeal. In point 1, Stalnacker claims the trial
court erred in dismissing her petition for failure to state a claim because the petition
alleged facts that, if true, establish that Judge Dolan was not entitled to the affirmative
defense of judicial immunity. In point 2, Stalnacker claims the trial court erred in
dismissing the petition for false imprisonment by ruling Judge Dolan "was a Circuit
Judge who regularly oversaw probation matters" and "had jurisdiction to decide
probation matters" because there were no such allegations in the petition which was
dismissed. Finding no merit in either of Stalnacker's points, we affirm.
2 The Western District of this Court affirmed the habeas court's judgment and held "[t]he court lacked
the authority to revoke Stalnacker's probation here, because the term ended in 2014." State ex rel.
Hawley v. Chapman, 567 S.W.3d 197, 205 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018).
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Discussion
Both of Stalnacker's points challenge the trial court's dismissal of her petition.
We apply de novo review to the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss. Lang v.
Goldsworthy, 470 S.W.3d 748, 750 (Mo. banc 2015). "In determining the
appropriateness of the trial court's dismissal of a petition, an appellate court reviews
the grounds raised in the defendant's motion to dismiss." Id. Judge Dolan's motion to
dismiss alleged that Stalnaker failed to state a claim because her claim was barred by
the affirmative defense of judicial immunity.
When addressing an affirmative defense raised in a motion to dismiss, courts
may consider only the facts contained in the petition. Murray-Kaplan v. NEC Ins.,
Inc., 617 S.W.3d 485, 491 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). A trial court may dismiss a petition
based on an affirmative defense only if the face of the petition clearly and without
exception establishes the failure of that cause of action. Id. A motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim is solely a test of the adequacy of the plaintiff's petition.
Wyman v. Missouri Dept. of Mental Health, 376 S.W.3d 16, 18 (Mo. App. W.D.
2012). We review the petition in an almost academic manner to determine if the facts
alleged satisfy the elements of a recognized cause of action. Id. In doing so, we treat
plaintiff's averments as true and liberally grant the plaintiff all reasonable inferences.
Id.
Point 1
In point 1, Stalnaker argues the trial court erred in dismissing her petition for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because she alleged facts
which, if true, establish that Judge Dolan was not entitled to judicial immunity because
Judge Dolan acted without jurisdiction. Stalnaker's argument fails because it ignores
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the distinction between actions taken "in excess of [authority]" and actions taken
"wholly without jurisdiction."3 Even if we treat every allegation in Stalnacker's petition
as true, Stalnacker cannot recover because her petition demonstrates that Judge Dolan
had subject matter jurisdiction to decide probation revocation cases, and thus, the
doctrine of judicial immunity applies to shield him from liability.
Missouri has long recognized the doctrine of judicial immunity. Howe v.
Brouse, 427 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Mo. 1968). This immunity is absolute and protects
"[c]onduct which is 'intimately associated with the judicial phase' of the judicial
process." Bugg v. Rutter, 466 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (quoting
White v. Camden Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 106 S.W.3d 626, 633 (Mo. App. S.D.
2003). "Judges have absolute immunity not because of their particular location within
the Government but because of the special nature of their responsibilities." Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2913, 57 L. Ed.2d 895 (1978).
This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly[.] . . . His errors may be corrected on appeal,
but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him
with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on
judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking
but to intimidation.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). "Missouri
courts have embraced these propositions of law wholeheartedly." Long v. Cross
Reporting Serv., Inc., 103 S.W.3d 249, 253–54 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003).
3 We have replaced the word "jurisdiction" with "authority" where courts have used the term
"jurisdiction" in cases that "do not question the court's subject matter or personal jurisdiction and really
go to the court's authority to render a particular judgment in a particular case." J.C.W. ex rel. Webb
v. Wyciskalia, 275 3d 249, 254 (Mo. banc. 2009) (stating "the courts of this state should confine their
discussions of circuit court jurisdiction to constitutionally recognized doctrines of personal and subject
matter jurisdiction") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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Judicial immunity applies as long as a "judge does not act wholly without
jurisdiction" Id. (quoting Nelson v. McDaniel, 865 S.W.2d 747, 748 (Mo. App. W.D.
1993)). In deciding if judicial immunity applies, we construe jurisdiction broadly. Id.
Missouri courts have held that "[a] judge with subject matter jurisdiction has judicial
immunity from all actions taken, even when acting in excess of his [authority]." State
ex rel. Raack v. Kohn, 720 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Mo. banc 1986); Long, 103 S.W.3d at
253 (emphasis added).
"Subject matter jurisdiction is simply a matter of 'the court's authority to render
a judgment in a particular category of case.'" Ground Freight Expeditors, LLC v.
Binder, 359 S.W.3d 123, 126 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (quoting State v. Molsbee, 316
S.W.3d 549, 552 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). "Subject matter jurisdiction is governed by
article V of the Missouri Constitution." J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 252. "Article V, section
14 sets forth the subject matter jurisdiction of Missouri's circuit courts in plenary
terms, providing that '[t]he circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction over all cases
and matters, civil and criminal.'" Id. at 253.
Howe is on point. There, a plaintiff filed a civil suit against a municipal judge
alleging that the judge's assessments of costs to him were "wholly and entirely without
jurisdiction[.]" 427 S.W.2d at 467. The municipal judge filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim because his action was in the performance of his judicial
function and barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 468. The trial court sustained
the motion to dismiss. Id. The Supreme Court of Missouri, in affirming the trial
court's grant of the judge's motion to dismiss, observed a distinction between acts
"which exceed the officer's [authority], and those performed by him entirely without
jurisdiction." Id.
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"Excess of [authority]," as distinguished from the entire absence of
jurisdiction, means that the act, although within the general power of the
judge, is not authorized, and therefore void, with respect to the particular
case because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of his
general power in that particular case are wanting, and hence
the judicial power is not in fact lawfully invoked.
Id. (quoting Pogue v. Swink, 284 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Mo. 1955) (emphasis added).
Because the municipal judge in Howe was presiding in a court established pursuant to
the Missouri Constitution and was exercising judicial power provided therein, he had
jurisdiction for purposes of judicial immunity. Id.
In a factually similar case, the Western District of this Court affirmed the trial
court's grant of a motion to dismiss finding judicial immunity applied to a judge who
erroneously revoked probation and sentenced a defendant. Nelson, 865 S.W.2d at 747.
The Western District found "a judge with subject matter jurisdiction has judicial
immunity from all actions taken, even when acting in excess of his [authority]." Id. at
748. "[The judge] acted in his capacity as a judge when he sentenced [the plaintiff]. . . .
Even if [the judge] incorrectly sentenced [the plaintiff], he did not act wholly without
jurisdiction." Id.
Howe and Nelson guide our analysis. Stalnacker's petition alleged that Judge
Dolan was a circuit court judge in Missouri who wrongfully revoked her probation and
ordered execution of her 15-year sentence. Stalnacker's allegations, if true, demonstrate
Judge Dolan acted in excess of his authority but not wholly without jurisdiction since he
had subject matter jurisdiction over probation revocation matters and was acting in his
capacity as a judge when he exceeded his lawful authority in revoking Stalnaker’s
probation. Point 1 is denied because Stalnacker's petition, taken on its face, has failed to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Judge Dolan.
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Point 2
Point 2 fails for similar reasons. In point 2, Stalnacker claims the trial court
erred in dismissing the petition for false imprisonment by finding that Judge Dolan
"was a Circuit Judge who regularly oversaw probation matters" and "had jurisdiction to
decide probation matters" because there were no such allegations in the petition.
Stalnacker's argument fails because she overlooks the fact that she alleged in her
petition Judge Dolan was a Missouri circuit court judge and was acting as such when he
erroneously revoked her probation and ordered her sentence to be executed. The
finding she contests—that Judge Dolan "had jurisdiction to decide probation matters"—
is a legal conclusion based on her factual allegation. "[W]here, as here, the facts are
uncontested, a question as to the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court is purely a
question of law[.]" Missouri Soybean Ass'n v. Missouri Clean Water
Comm'n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 22 (Mo. banc 2003). Because Stalnacker alleged Judge
Dolan was a Missouri circuit court judge, it was not an error for the trial court to make
the legal conclusion that Judge Dolan had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Article V, Section 14 of the Missouri Constitution to decide probation matters. Point 2
is denied.
Conclusion
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
MARY W. SHEFFIELD, P.J. – OPINION AUTHOR
NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, J. – CONCURS
DON E. BURRELL, J. - CONCURS
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