Morgan v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 21-996C

(Filed: June 10, 2021)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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DAVID BRIAN MORGAN, *

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Plaintiff, *

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v. *

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THE UNITED STATES, *

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Defendant. *

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OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff David Brian Morgan challenges his allegedly unjust

imprisonment by the State of Oklahoma. Compl. at 1 (ECF 1). Defendant’s motion to

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is ripe for decision.1 Because Mr.

Morgan seeks relief this Court may not grant, based on sources of law that do not

confer rights he can assert here, the Court does not have jurisdiction. Accordingly,

the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Morgan is serving a life sentence in Oklahoma state prison after being

convicted of several state-law crimes. Compl. at 1; Morgan v. Oklahoma, 814 F. App’x

353, 354 (10th Cir. 2020). His repeated petitions for writs of habeas corpus have been

denied. See Morgan v. Pettigrew, No. CIV-20-932-F, 2020 WL 7416933, at *2 (W.D.

Okla. Nov. 23, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-20-932-R, 2020

WL 7410103 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 17, 2020). He now asks this Court to (1) “credit all time

served,” (2) “waive all fees and encumbrances owed,” (3) grant “complete immunity”

from further prosecution, and (4) discharge him from state custody. Compl. at 8. He

also appears to request criminal charges against state officials and relief for a class

of similarly situated Oklahoma prison inmates. Pl.’s Resp. at 6.

This Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction — its authority to pass judgment on

the cases before it — is limited to specific types of claims against the federal

government, most commonly claims for money as provided by the Tucker Act. See,

e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed.

Cir. 1997) (“The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”). Perhaps

1 See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (ECF 10); Pl.’s Resp. (ECF 14); Def.’s Reply (ECF 15).

confusingly for pro se litigants, it is not a forum for “federal claims” generally. Claims

outside the Court’s jurisdiction must be dismissed. RCFC 12(h)(3). The matters Mr.

Morgan’s complaint raises are not among the subjects this Court may address.2

First, Mr. Morgan’s claims amount to a collateral attack on his state-court

convictions. State prisoners may pursue such claims in federal district court by

seeking writs of habeas corpus, as Mr. Morgan has done several times. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. But this Court, in contrast, cannot grant habeas relief. Ledford v. United

States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that the Court of Federal

Claims was not one of the courts authorized by statute to grant habeas relief); see

also Rolle v. United States, 752 F. App’x 1005, 1006–07 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (similar).

Relatedly, this Court also may not “review any of the judgments of the

[Oklahoma] state and federal courts with respect to [Mr. Morgan’s] criminal case[.]”

Jones v. United States, 440 F. App’x 916, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Joshua v.

United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims does

not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts or the clerks of district

courts relating to proceedings before those courts.”). That means this Court cannot

consider Mr. Morgan’s objections to the federal district court’s denial of his habeas

petitions. He must press those arguments, if at all, on appeal to the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

Second, even if Mr. Morgan sought relief within this Court’s power to provide,

he is a state prisoner, and his claims are directed ultimately at Oklahoma state

officers and entities. The United States, however, is “the only proper defendant for

any matter before this court[.]” See Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190

(2003). The complaint gives no reason why Mr. Morgan should be entitled to relief

against the United States. At most, Mr. Morgan alleges that the district court erred

in denying his habeas petitions — claims that this Court, again, has no power to hear.

See Joshua, 17 F.3d at 380.

Third, none of the sources of law Mr. Morgan mentions create jurisdiction in

this Court. Claims in this Court generally must be based on a “money-mandating”

law, i.e., a law that “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the

Federal Government for the damage sustained[.]” Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v.

F.A.A., 525 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463

U.S. 206, 217 (1983)). This Court “has no jurisdiction over criminal matters,” see

Jones, 440 F. App’x at 918, or over claims sounding in tort, see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).

2 “In determining jurisdiction, a court must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the

plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration,

Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795,

797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “Although a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is held to a less stringent standard than

those prepared by counsel, … pro se litigants are not excused from meeting jurisdictional

requirements.” Spengler v. United States, 688 F. App’x 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted)

(citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380

(Fed. Cir. 1987)).

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The laws Mr. Morgan relies upon fail that test. The Major Crimes Act, 18

U.S.C. § 1153(a), and the federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201, do not appear

to be money-mandating, and Mr. Morgan’s claims based on those statutes sound in

tort or federal criminal law. Cf. Kenyon v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 767, 774 (2016)

(dismissing Major Crimes Act claims as based on criminal law), aff’d, 683 F. App’x

945 (Fed. Cir. 2017). None of the constitutional provisions Mr. Morgan mentions

appears to be money-mandating either. Binding or persuasive precedent, in fact,

forecloses interpreting most (if not all) of them as money-mandating. See United

States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (First Amendment); Seely v.

United States, No. 15-786C, 2015 WL 7432747, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 23, 2015) (Grand

Jury Clause); James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 581 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Double Jeopardy

Clause); Omran v. United States, 629 F. App’x 1005, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Sixth

Amendment); Alston-Bullock v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 38, 44 (2015) (same);

LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Due Process and Equal

Protection Clauses); McCullough v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 1, 4 (2006) (same); Wall

v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 585, 598 (2019) (Privileges or Immunities Clause);

Trafny v. United States, 503 F.3d 1339, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Eighth Amendment).

No other basis for jurisdiction over any of Mr. Morgan’s claims appears to exist.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Mr.

Morgan’s complaint is DISMISSED, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction. See

Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[I]n the

absence of subject matter jurisdiction there can be no preclusive findings or

conclusions on the merits, and dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is without prejudice.”).

Plaintiff’s “Motion to Remit to the Court” (ECF 9), requests for counsel (e.g., ECF 17),

and motion for leave to file sur-replies (ECF 20) are, accordingly, DENIED AS

MOOT.

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Stephen S. Schwartz

STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ

Judge

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