“[I]t would not have been ‘clear’ to every reasonable officer that the inmates had a valid claim under Helling.”
How later courts described this case
- “[I]t would not have been ‘clear’ to every reasonable officer that the inmates had a valid claim under Helling.”
- explaining the importance of framing of the right with specificity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 10 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM STAFFORD, No. 17-16087
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
1:15-cv-00038-LJO-GSA
v.
PAM AHLIN, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellee,
and
AUDREY KING; et al.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O'Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 19, 2020
Pasadena, California
Before: LINN,** RAWLINSON, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Richard Linn, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
William Stafford appeals the screening order dismissing his civil rights
complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Stafford alleged a Due Process
violation based on his heightened exposure to valley fever spores as a civil detainee
at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”). Because no clearly established law overcomes
the Defendants’ qualified immunity, we affirm.2
To overcome qualified immunity, Stafford must show that government
officials violated “clearly established … constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(citation omitted). “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that
every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right.” Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (citation omitted).
In Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2019), this Court
defined the specific right at issue with respect to prisoners at Pleasant Valley State
Prison (“PVSP”) as “the right to be free from heightened exposure to Valley Fever
spores.” Stafford contends that as a civil detainee at CSH, the right in question
should be characterized differently as the right to be free from exposure to a harmful
disease. Stafford argues but fails to persuasively explain how reframing the right as
1
We grant Stafford’s motion for judicial notice and Ahlin’s request for judicial
notice.
2
Qualified immunity is a pure question of law that may be considered for the first
time on appeal. Bibeau v. Pac. Nw. Resh. Found. Inc., 188 F.3d 1105, 1111 n. 5
(9th Cir. 1999).
2
Stafford suggests would in any way help answer “the dispositive question: whether
these officials, on these facts, should have known that what they did violated [a
Constitutional right],” even applying the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining the
importance of framing of the right with specificity).
Stafford argues that the 2013 Plata exclusion order, which excluded African-
American prisoners from being housed at PVSP, clearly established that Stafford
and other African-American civil detainees should have been excluded from
neighboring CSH. See Plata v. Brown, 427 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(“Plata Order”). We are not persuaded. Conditions at CSH and at PVSP as of 2013
were not the same. The Plata receiver explicitly distinguished the very high
incidence of Valley Fever at PVSP from the incidence of Valley Fever at CSH. See
Id. at 1218 and n. 6 (citing the Federal Receiver’s finding that that PVSP’s rate of
cocci infections was “‘six times the rate of the adjacent mental health facility,’
Coalinga State Hospital” and noting differences in the air conditioning systems at
CSH and PVSP). Even though Stafford, as a civil detainee, is “entitled to more
considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals,” Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982), whether the rate of infection at CSH violated
that heightened standard is uncertain. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said
3
that every reasonable official at CSH would have understood that keeping Stafford
at CSH violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Stafford contends that his risk of exposure to Valley Fever at CSH was at least
as high as the risk of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke in Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35–36 (1993). Stafford’s argument is misplaced and not
persuasive. The right to be free from heightened exposure to Valley Fever spores is
a factually and contextually different inquiry from that presented by exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke. Hines, 914 F.3d at 1232 (“[I]t would not have been
‘clear’ to every reasonable officer that the inmates had a valid claim under
Helling.”).
Stafford also has not shown “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive
authority [that] could itself clearly stablish the federal right [in question].” See City
& County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1778 (2015) (internal quotes
and citation omitted). The unpublished circuit opinions and district court opinions
cited by Stafford—even if considered—do not establish the necessary consensus,
particularly in light of other opinions to the contrary. See, e.g., Cunningham v.
Kramer, 771 F. App’x 827 (9th Cir. 2019); Smith v. California (“Smith II”), No. 13-
CV-0869, 2016 WL 398766 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2016).
Stafford’s contention that the district court erred in dismissing his ADA
claims lacks merit. First, he does not allege that his infection was the reason he was
4
denied the accommodation of being transferred, as required by the ADA. See
Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); 42 U.S.C. §
12132. Second, he has failed to show how transferring him or taking other measures
after he contracted the disease would have produced any beneficial result.
Finally, Stafford alleges that the district court erred in dismissing his state law
claims because “its decision to dismiss the federal claims was in error.” We find no
reason to question the propriety of the district court’s dismissal of Stafford’s federal
claim and, accordingly, affirm the dismissal of Stafford’s state law claims. See
Parra v. PacifiCare of Ariz., Inc., 715 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013). We note,
however, that when a court “dismisses the federal claim leaving only state claims
for resolution, the court should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss
them without prejudice.” Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t., 40 F.3d 1041,
1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Les Shockley Racing v. Nat’l Hot Rod Ass'n, 884 F.2d
504, 509 (9th Cir. 1989)). The district court here properly declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Stafford’s state law claims but should have dismissed
the state law claims without prejudice. Accordingly, while we affirm the district
court’s substantive determinations, we vacate the judgment and remand the case to
the district court with instructions to modify the judgment to make clear that the
dismissal of the state law claims is without prejudice. See id. (doing the same).
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
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AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART and REMANDED.
6