Justin Castelino v. Rose-Hulman Institute of Tech

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 19-1905

JUSTIN CASTELINO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROSE-HULMAN INSTITUTE OF

TECHNOLOGY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division.

No. 17 CV 139 — William T. Lawrence, Judge.

SUBMITTED* SEPTEMBER 29, 2020 — DECIDED JUNE 3, 2021

Before ROVNER, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

*

The court ordered that oral argument in this case be vacated after

appellant’s counsel was granted leave to withdraw. The case is therefore

submitted on the briefs and record.

2 No. 19-1905

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Justin Castelino was suspended from

Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology for a semester for

academic misconduct. When he applied to return the following

spring, Rose-Hulman denied his requests for readmission and

also informed him that he would not be permitted to reapply

in the future. Castelino then sued Rose-Hulman, alleging that

his suspension violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), and also asserting claims

against Rose-Hulman for breach of contract, defamation, false

advertising, invasion of privacy, and malice. The district court

entered summary judgment for Rose-Hulman on all counts

and also granted Rose-Hulman’s motion for sanctions based on

Castelino’s failure to comply with a scheduling order.

Castelino appeals, but we affirm.

I.

We note at the outset that Castelino’s brief falls short of

compliance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 in

many respects.1 Thus, although we construe the facts in the

light most favorable to Castelino, we rely for the details on

Rose-Hulman’s brief and the record, which more clearly,

objectively, and accurately set forth the factual background. In

the fall of 2012, Castelino enrolled as a transfer student at Rose-

Hulman Institute of Technology, a private engineering,

mathematics, and science college in Terre Haute, Indiana. As

a student at Rose-Hulman, Castelino received certain accom-

1

In addition to the more substantive deficiencies, which we will describe

where relevant, Castelino’s brief contains numerous hallmarks of careless-

ness, such as improper case citations and the misspelling of his name both

in the caption (“Castelion”) and elsewhere in the brief (“Castleino”).

No. 19-1905 3

modations based on what he identifies in his brief on appeal as

a “documented auditory processing disorder.” Specifically,

Castelino provided Rose-Hulman with a neuropsychological

report diagnosing him with attention-deficit/hyperactivity

disorder (“ADHD”) and a learning disorder. Rose-Hulman

granted Castelino an accommodation that allowed him to

receive 100% extended time on tests and quizzes, which he was

allowed to take in a distraction-free environment.

While at Rose-Hulman, Castelino was reprimanded several

times for academic misconduct. In 2013, one of Castelino’s

professors, Dr. James Hanson, saw him copying from another

student’s homework. Dr. Hanson issued a letter of academic

misconduct following the incident. Castelino appealed the

letter to the college’s Rules and Discipline Committee, but the

Committee allowed the letter to remain in Castelino’s file. The

following year Castelino received another letter of academic

misconduct. This time he and another student submitted

duplicate work in a course taught by Dr. Jeremy Chapman. The

head of the Civil Engineering Department, Dr. Kevin Sutterer,

met with Castelino about the incident. After hearing his

explanation, Dr. Sutterer decided it was possible that Castelino

had submitted the duplicate work as the result of a misunder-

standing. Thus, although the Civil Engineering Department

ordinarily requests a student’s suspension after a second

incident of academic misconduct, Dr. Sutterer did not refer

Castelino for suspension. Instead, Dr. Sutterer warned

Castelino that he risked dismissal from Rose-Hulman if any

further incidents of academic misconduct occurred.

The third and final incident of alleged academic misconduct

occurred in April 2015. At that time, Castelino was taking

4 No. 19-1905

Dr. Chapman’s course again after having dropped it the

previous year. In the interim, Dr. Chapman had changed his

policy regarding the use of notes on exams. Although he had

previously allowed students to use typed notes when taking

exams, he began requiring hand-written notes after discover-

ing students were often simply using course slides that they

had cut and pasted. Dr. Chapman announced this policy at the

beginning of the quarter, and then reminded students of the

policy on Thursday, April 2 in anticipation of an exam the next

day.

After class, Castelino asked if he could use his typed notes

from the previous semester and assured Dr. Chapman that

they were not cut and pasted course slides. After Dr. Chapman

rejected that proposal, Castelino met with the Director of

Disability Services, Karen DeGrange, and Dr. Sutterer about

the situation. He explained that his poor handwriting would

make the hand-written note requirement too difficult for him.

DeGrange then contacted the campus Learning Center to ask

if a tutor could transcribe Castelino’s notes for him.

Although there was a tutor in the Learning Center available

to transcribe Castelino’s notes then, by the time Castelino

arrived there close to 5 p.m., there was no one there to tran-

scribe for him. After Castelino advised DeGrange that he could

not get a tutor to transcribe his notes, she and Dr. Sutterer met

and concluded that Castelino would be allowed to use his

typed notes for this one exam.

Castelino took his exam in the Learning Center, and when

he turned in his notes afterward (as all students are required to

do), it came to light that they contained twenty-six cut and

No. 19-1905 5

pasted course slides. This prompted Dr. Chapman to write a

letter of academic misconduct explaining that by using the

course slides with his notes, Castelino had both violated Dr.

Chapman’s explicit instructions as well as lied to Dr. Chapman,

DeGrange, and Sutterer by claiming that his typed notes did

not contain cut and pasted slides. Dr. Chapman also noted that

the letter was the second of its kind in his course based on

Castelino’s unethical conduct.

Because this was Castelino’s third documented case of

academic misconduct, the Dean of Students, Pete Gustafson,

forwarded it to the Rules and Discipline Committee for review.

The Rules and Discipline Committee met on May 13, 2015 to

consider the allegations of academic misconduct against

Castelino. He claimed at the hearing that he had never told

Dr. Chapman that his notes did not contain any cut and pasted

course slides, only that his notes were not “just” cut and pasted

slides. Castelino’s fiancée, who had been waiting for him

outside the classroom when he spoke to Dr. Chapman, also

testified. When Dr. Chapman asked her whether she had

overheard Castelino tell him that “nothing was copy-and-

pasted,” she said “yeah” and explained that she had heard him

ask to use his notecard from the previous year because it

“wasn’t just copy and paste.”

Ultimately the Rules and Discipline Committee concluded

that Castelino was guilty of repeated acts of academic miscon-

duct. He was suspended for one quarter, after which he could

apply for readmission. The committee’s suspension decision

was upheld on Castelino’s appeal to the full faculty. As part of

that process, Castelino met with the President of Rose-Hulman,

James Conwell, to discuss the appeal procedures. Dr. Conwell

6 No. 19-1905

reported that during that meeting Castelino yelled and accused

him of unfairly configuring the disciplinary hearing. After

asking Castelino to calm down, Dr. Conwell had to ask him to

leave and not return in-person to his office.

Castelino applied for readmission multiple times. The

readmission process starts with a written petition to the Dean

of Students, Erik Hayes, who submits a recommendation to the

Admissions and Standing Committee. That Committee meets

with the student to consider his readmission request and

determine whether he can be a successful member of the Rose-

Hulman community. Castelino did not apply for readmission

when he first became eligible in the winter quarter 2015–2016,

but he did apply in January 2016. In his letter to the Admis-

sions and Standing Committee, Dean Hayes did not recom-

mend readmission. He based his recommendation on

Castelino’s failure to accept responsibility for his actions as

well as his long history of behavioral issues while at Rose-

Hulman. These incidents ranged from altercations and rude

conduct on campus to complaints by female students that he

was taking their photographs without permission.

At the hearing itself, Castelino was unable to say what

courses he would be taking if readmitted, despite the fact that

classes began the following day. The Committee denied

Castelino’s readmission request (along with three other

students requesting readmission that quarter), both because of

his failure to accept responsibility for his actions and because

there was no academic benefit for him to start that semester

instead of the next.

No. 19-1905 7

Castelino then applied for readmission and was rejected

again in June 2016. While Castelino was suspended, the

Committee had become aware that he had been arrested the

previous year in Connecticut for breach of peace, cultivation,

possession, and sale of marijuana, as well as operation of a

drug factory and possession of a hallucinogen. At his hearing,

Castelino provided a number of conflicting explanations for

the news article describing his arrest, ranging from the claim

that his fiancée had “stuff” on her to assertions that the article

was part of a cover-up for the fact that he was a confidential

informant. The Committee again rejected Castelino’s request

for readmission.

In March 2017, Castelino sued Rose-Hulman in federal

court, alleging disability discrimination in violation of Title III

of the ADA as well as state-law claims for breach of contract,

defamation, false advertising, invasion of privacy, and harass-

ment. He later amended his complaint, alleging malice and

requesting punitive damages.

In August, the case was referred to a magistrate judge for

a settlement conference. The settlement conference order

required Castelino to serve an updated settlement demand

fourteen days prior to the conference, and for the parties to

email the court a confidential settlement statement three days

before the conference. Despite a reminder e-mail from Rose-

Hulman, Castelino failed to do either until the day before the

settlement conference. After the conference, both parties

moved for sanctions. The magistrate judge recommended

granting Rose-Hulman’s motion for sanctions and denying

Castelino’s. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s

recommendation. Thereafter, both parties moved for summary

8 No. 19-1905

judgment. In considering the parties’ motions, the district court

observed that it had “been hindered by the manner in which

Castelino briefed his own motion and his opposition to Rose-

Hulman’s motion.” Notwithstanding this, the district court

thoroughly and carefully considered the parties’ arguments

and granted summary judgment to Rose-Hulman.

II.

On appeal, Castelino asks us to reverse the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to Rose-Hulman and grant

judgment in his favor. He also requests that we impose

sanctions against Rose-Hulman. We review the district court’s

ruling on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment de

novo, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable inferences in

favor of “the party against whom the motion at issue was

made.” Woodring v. Jackson Cty. Ind., 986 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir.

2021) (quotations and internal citation omitted). At the outset,

it is worth noting that, like the district court, our ability to

analyze Castelino’s claims is severely limited by his presenta-

tion of them. The district court noted that although Castelino

“points to a large number of exhibits throughout his briefs, he

often fails to articulate in any coherent manner how he believes

those exhibits, coupled with the applicable law, demonstrate

that he is entitled to (or Rose-Hulman is not entitled to)

summary judgment on an issue.” The district court’s observa-

tions apply with equal force to Castelino’s briefs on appeal.

Thus, we consider Castelino’s claims to the extent possible,

while echoing the district court’s reminder that, “‘It is not the

obligation of th[e] court to research and construct the legal

arguments open to parties, especially when they are repre-

No. 19-1905 9

sented by counsel.’”2 Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909 F.3d 182, 190

(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Beard v. Whitley Cty. REMC, 840 F.2d

405, 408–09 (7th Cir. 1988)).

ADA Claim

Castelino claimed Rose-Hulman violated Title III of the

ADA, which provides that “[n]o individual shall be discrimi-

nated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-

tages, or accommodations of any place of public accommoda-

tion[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). As relevant here, discrimination

under Title III of the ADA includes “a failure to make reason-

able modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when

such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services,

facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to

individuals with disabilities[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2)(A)(ii).

The district court first concluded that some of Castelino’s

claims under the ADA were barred by the statute of limita-

tions. Because the ADA does not contain its own limitation

period, “‘the most appropriate state limitations period ap-

2

Castelino takes issue with the district court’s comment, claiming that it

“rejected the responsibility to construct Castelino’s arguments, but it had

the authority. FRCP Rule 56(e)(3) obligates it to examine Castelino’s Motion

and all his supporting materials, regardless whether they support or

address an assertion of fact properly. That authorized the District Court to

construct arguments for a party, but not to decide, arbitrarily, what

evidence to consider and what to ignore.” First, Rule 56(e)(3) imposes no

such duty on the district court . Moreover, Castelino’s suggestion that the

district court somehow failed to properly consider his claims underscores

his fundamental misunderstanding of his obligation to construct coherent

arguments for consideration.

10 No. 19-1905

plies.’” Scherr v. Marriott Int’l, Inc. et al., 703 F.3d 1069, 1075 (7th

Cir. 2013) (quoting Soignier v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 92 F.3d

547, 550 (7th Cir. 1996)). Thus, we apply Indiana’s two-year

statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Ind. Code

§ 34-11-2-4(a) (West 2013); Soignier, 92 F.3d at 551 n.3. As the

district court recognized, this means that Castelino’s ADA

claims based on events occurring prior to March 28, 2015

would be time-barred based on his complaint filed on March

28, 2017.

Although Castelino’s brief mixes and matches his various

claims indiscriminately throughout, it is clear that his ADA

claim is premised on what he characterizes as a failure to

accommodate his disability by both Dr. Hanson and

Dr. Chapman. As described above, Dr. Hanson issued a letter

of academic misconduct in 2013, well outside the applicable

statute of limitations. Likewise, the May, 2014 report of

academic misconduct by Dr. Chapman falls outside the statute

of limitations.

Castelino attempts to salvage his time-barred claims with

two unpersuasive arguments. He first suggests that his claims

are governed not by Indiana’s two-year personal injury statute

of limitations, but by the four-year catch-all statute of limita-

tions for federal claims found in 28 U.S.C. § 1658. In 2004, the

Supreme Court held that § 1658 applies to claims “made

possible by a post-1990 enactment” as well as claims made

possible by a post-1990 amendment to an existing statute. See

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004)

(noting that “[a]ltering statutory definitions, or adding new

definitions of terms previously undefined, is a common way of

amending statutes”) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

No. 19-1905 11

Although the ADA was amended effective January 1, 2009 to

“carry out the ADA’s objectives” by “reinstating a broad scope

of protection,” see ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”),

Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008), Castelino fails to

explain how those amendments made his claim possible. He

states without elaboration that the ADAAA overturned Sutton

v. United Air Lines Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and redefined

“disability” and “major life activity” and that because of this

his perceptual disorder falls into the new categories. True as it

may be that the ADAAA rejected Sutton’s narrow definitions

of “disability” (rejecting disabilities that could be ameliorated

by medication, assistive technology, or adaptation) and “major

life activity” (requiring substantial limitations in multiple life

activities), Castelino fails in any way to connect those changes

to his claim.

Castelino also summarily contends that Indiana’s “continu-

ing wrong” doctrine would apply to toll the statute of limita-

tions because Rose-Hulman engaged in a “course of conduct”

that began while he was a student and continued to injure him

after his suspension. This claim, too, goes nowhere because it

is well-established that the statute of limitations starts to run

upon the “discovery of the original act of discrimination, not

future confirmation of the injury or determination that the

injury is unlawful.” See Soignier, 92 F.3d at 551 (emphasis in

original) (collecting cases); cf. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S.

250, 258 (1988) (“[T]he proper focus is upon the time of the

discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences

of the acts became most painful.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis

in original).

12 No. 19-1905

That leaves Castelino’s ADA claims premised on conduct

occurring after March 28, 2015. To avoid summary judgment

on his claim based on what he refers to as “the notecard

incident,” Castelino would need to demonstrate that Rose-

Hulman discriminated against him by failing to make a

reasonable accommodation for his disability. Instead of making

any attempt to explain why the exception allowing him to use

his typed notes failed to accommodate his disability, Castelino

makes a series of largely irrelevant attacks on the district

court’s opinion.

For instance, in response to the district court’s observation

that nothing suggested that Dr. Chapman intentionally omitted

the new policy about notes from the syllabus, Castelino points

to testimony from his disciplinary hearing that he claims

establishes that Dr. Chapman intentionally omitted the policy

from his syllabus. Castelino then asserts that Chapman had

“no authority to enforce the new policy on one day’s notice.”

Without explanation, Castelino points to 42 U.S.C.

§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) and Guckenberger v. Boston University, 947

F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass. 1997), as supposed support for his

assertion. The portion of the ADA he refers to simply prohibits

the provision of separate benefits to disabled individuals. And

Guckenberger is a class-action suit by university students with

ADHD. The page Castelino cites concludes that the university’s

strict eligibility criteria for professionals evaluating whether

students had a learning disability could screen out some

individuals with a learning disability. Neither of these citations

tends to show that Rose-Hulman or Dr. Chapman discrimi-

nated against Castelino on the basis of his ADHD (and other

diagnosed learning disabilities) by changing his testing policy

No. 19-1905 13

to require hand-written notes, and then allowing Castelino to

use his typed notecards when he could not find anyone to

transcribe them before the exam.

The rest of Castelino’s arguments as to how he has shown

discrimination under the ADA are similarly inscrutable. He

points to the district court’s citation of Amaya v. Brater, 981

N.E.2d 1235 (Ind. App. 2013), for the proposition that the sole

function of the courts is to determine whether an educational

institution acted illegally, arbitrarily, or in bad faith. The

district court cited Amaya, a case setting out the standard under

Indiana law for a breach of contract claim against a university,

in analyzing Castelino’s breach of contract claim. Castelino,

however, inexplicably cites Amaya as support for his claim that

Dr. Chapman acted “arbitrarily and capriciously” (Appellant’s

Br. 21), by attempting to enforce his notecard policy, as did

Rose-Hulman and Dr. DeGrange by permitting him to use his

old typed notes. He reasons that the typed notecards “earned

him a -0- on the exam” and that Rose-Hulman’s “ratification of

those charges by its guilty finding in spite of Dr. DeGrange’s

guarantee … perpetuated Dr. Chapman’s discrimination”

which, taken together, lead to the “only justifiable conclusion”

that “Dr. Chapman’s enforcement of a new policy denied

Castelino of an accommodation which the district court found

reasonable.” (Appellant Br. 22)

Castelino’s argument, to the extent there is one, is rendered

nearly incomprehensible with reference to the wrong legal

standards (as recounted above) and unsupported legal

conclusions and factual claims. As described above, there is no

relationship between the “arbitrary and capricious” standard

14 No. 19-1905

applicable to contract claims and the question of whether an

accommodation is reasonable under the ADA.

Moreover, Castelino’s argument is based on a non-sequiter:

that it was being allowed to use his typed notecards (the

accommodation) that led to his failing exam score and subse-

quent discipline. Notably absent from Castelino’s argument is

any information calling into question the undisputed fact that

he used twenty-six cut and pasted slides on his notecard in

violation of what he now apparently concedes was a reason-

able accommodation. It was this prohibited use of cut and

pasted class slides that led to him receiving a zero on the exam,

not the fact that he was allowed to use typed notes when the

rest of the class had to write out their notes in longhand. In

short, Castelino fails to identify any facts in the record estab-

lishing that Rose-Hulman or any of its professors failed to

accommodate his learning disability. Instead, the undisputed

facts establish that he was suspended and then ultimately

denied readmission based on several instances of academic

misconduct and other behavioral issues that have no link to his

learning disabilities or need for accommodations from Rose-

Hulman. Summary judgment for Rose-Hulman was thus

proper on Castelino’s ADA claim.

Breach of Contract

Castelino approaches his breach of contract claim in largely

the same way as his ADA claim: he quotes the district court’s

opinion at length and then flatly asserts that it is erroneous

without any coherent explanation as to why. Castelino’s claim

generally is premised on his belief that Rose-Hulman failed to

follow its own rules and procedures when disciplining,

No. 19-1905 15

suspending, and ultimately denying him readmission. The

district court considered each of Castelino’s claims in detail

and concluded that he had failed to produce any evidence of

bad faith on the part of Rose-Hulman that would sustain a

cause of action for breach of contract. We assume for purposes

of this appeal that Castelino demonstrated the existence of an

implied contract between him and Rose-Hulman based on the

Student Handbook and Faculty Handbook. See Ross v. Creigh-

ton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1992) (“It is generally held

in the United States that the basic legal relation between a

student and a private university or college is contractual in

nature.”) (internal citations omitted).

Assuming the existence of such a contract, we turn to

Castelino’s claim that Rose-Hulman violated its terms by

failing to comply with its own policies in his disciplinary and

readmission hearings. Castelino claims in his brief that certain

citations to unspecified portions of the Rose-Hulman Student

Handbook and the Faculty Handbook identify “five material

contract promises that Rose-Hulman wrote down, provided to

Castelino, and broke.” (Appellant’s Br. 28.) What these five

promises are, however, is not at all clear. In considering a

motion for summary judgment the court is not “‘obligated …

to assume the truth of a nonmovant’s conclusory allegations on

faith or to scour the record to unearth material factual dis-

putes.’” Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 722–23 (7th Cir.

2018) (quoting Carter v. Am. Oil Co., 139 F.3d 1158, 1163 (7th

Cir. 1998)).

What is clear is that all of the alleged breaches of contract

identified by Castelino relate to what he characterizes as Rose-

Hulman’s failure to precisely comply with certain disciplinary

16 No. 19-1905

procedures in handling his alleged misconduct, suspension,

and ultimate denial of readmission. It may be that Rose-

Hulman failed to comply to the letter with its own policies, but

that itself does not establish a breach of contract. Indiana courts

take a flexible approach to the contractual relationship between

students and universities. See Sung Park v. Ind. Univ. Sch. of

Dentistry, 692 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2012). In an attempt to

avoid interfering with the “subjective professional judgment of

trained educators, courts have quite properly exercised the

utmost restraint in applying traditional legal rules to disputes

within the academic community.” Gordon v. Purdue Univ., 862

N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citation and internal

quotations omitted). Accordingly, “the sole function of courts

is to determine whether the educational institution acted

illegally, arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith.” Amaya, 981

N.E.2d at 1240; see also Gordon, 862 N.E.2d at 1251 (“[A]bsent a

showing of bad faith on the part of the University or a profes-

sor, the Court will not interfere.”) (quoting Note, Contract Law

& the Student-Univ. Relationship, 48 Ind. L.J. 253, 263 (1973)).

The alleged “breaches of contract” Castelino discusses fall

well within the bounds of Rose-Hulman’s academic judgment.3

3

Castelino claims he is not challenging the professional academic

judgment, but rather the “practices and procedures that preceded the

decision to suspend him, because those differed from the procedures so

plainly expressed in the handbooks.” (Appellant’s Br. 30.) Instead of

explaining how the procedures used differed from the handbooks and why

those deviations were arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith, Castelino

provides the following: “For example, compare Dckt. #237 at 7 to Dckt. #56-

10 at 53 Art. III ¶ 4; #237 at 8 compared to Rule 6, Dckt. #56-10 pp 54–55;

(continued...)

No. 19-1905 17

For instance, Castelino seems to be arguing that the Student

Handbook prevented the Rules and Discipline Committee from

considering multiple acts of academic misconduct because the

Handbook provides that, “Guilt or innocence in a case shall be

determined solely on the merits of that case.” (Appellant’s Br.

33.). That same rule forbids the Committee from reviewing the

accused’s previous disciplinary record before the hearing or

permitting it to be introduced in the hearing. Student Hand-

book at 54, IV. Hearings Before the Institute Rules and Disci-

pline Committee, General Proc., 6. As Castelino sees it, the use

of the word “case” in Rule 6 prohibits the Rules and Discipline

Committee from considering multiple acts of disciplinary

misconduct in a single hearing.

Rose-Hulman provided evidence establishing the history

leading up to Castelino’s hearing: Castelino appealed his first

case of academic misconduct in 2013 to the Committee, which

upheld Dr. Hanson’s finding. Castelino was again accused of

academic misconduct in 2014 by Dr. Chapman, who did not

request a hearing. Then following the incident in

Dr. Chapman’s class in 2015, Dean Gustafson referred

Castelino to the Rules and Disciplinary Committee under a

portion of the Student Handbook providing that the Dean of

Students may bring a case to the Rules and Discipline Commit-

3

(...continued)

Dckt. #237 at 12, compared to Rules and Procedures Handbook, Dckt. #56-

18 pp 14–23; and #237 at 29–30.” This string of citations to the record,

without more, is completely unhelpful in demonstrating that Rose-Hulman

breached its contract with Castelino. We examined the listed citations and

saw nothing tending to prove that Rose-Hulman acted arbitrarily or in bad

faith in its handling of Castelino’s behavior.

18 No. 19-1905

tee if the student is “involved in more than one instance of

Academic Misconduct.” Id. at 53 III. Academic Misconduct,

Bringing a Case to the Rules and Discipline Committee, 3.

When Castelino discovered that he had been referred by Dean

Gustafson to the Committee for multiple acts of academic

misconduct, he asked to have both the 2014 and 2015 findings

of academic misconduct reviewed. Dr. Ditteon scheduled an

initial hearing to allow Castelino to appeal the individual acts

of misconduct and a second hearing to determine if additional

penalties were appropriate depending on the outcome of the

first hearing. Castelino himself then requested a single hearing,

which led to the May 13 Committee hearing.

At that hearing, Castelino presented witnesses and evi-

dence to support his version of events, but the Committee

voted to suspend Castelino for a quarter. Castelino cites several

cases (none in the educational context) for the unremarkable

proposition that contracts must be read in their entirety in an

attempt to harmonize differing contractual provisions. But

there is no logical reason to believe that the “General Proce-

dures” section of the Handbook describing permissible

evidence at a hearing somehow overrides the specific proce-

dures applicable when there are multiple acts of academic

misconduct as described elsewhere in the Handbook. More-

over, even assuming the Committee’s decision to consider

Castelino’s multiple acts of misconduct violated the Handbook

provision he identifies, he presents no evidence that the alleged

deviation was arbitrary, capricious, or undertaken in bad faith.

Castelino also characterizes it as a breach of contract for the

Committee to have considered his conduct while suspended

when he sought readmission (a second time) before the

No. 19-1905 19

Admissions and Standing Committee in June 2016. Moreover,

he claims that the presence of Dr. Conwell, the University

President, at that same hearing amounted to a breach of

contract. Tellingly, Castelino cites no specific Handbook

provisions preventing Dr. Conwell from attending the read-

mission hearing. He argues that Dr. Conwell “disregarded the

constitutional limits” of the Standing Committee’s authority by

describing Castelino’s arrest after his suspension. Without

citing anything in the record, Castelino insists that the Standing

Committee had “no authority” to consider that evidence, and

suggests that the “lengths” Dr. Conwell went to in an attempt

“to persuade the wrong committee to suspend Castelino

permanently when it did not have the authority to do so” is

“itself dishonest” and “must raise the question” whether

Dr. Conwell acted in bad faith. (Appellant’s Br. 44.) Not only

is Castelino unable to point to any policy preventing the

Standing Committee from considering his behavior while

suspended, he ignores Rose-Hulman’s citation to the section of

the Student Handbook explaining that it “values its reputation

for moral leadership” and “expects all persons associated with

it to maintain this reputation.” Nor can Castelino offer any

explanation as to why Rose-Hulman could not reasonably

apply its stated policy that it expects students “to be responsi-

ble and to behave at all times with honor and integrity” when

considering him for readmission.

Rose-Hulman presented evidence that Castelino consis-

tently engaged in aggressive behavior while a student, and his

arrest while suspended was in many respects simply a continu-

ation of the sort of poor judgment he had repeatedly shown as

a student. He also provides no evidence that any of his

20 No. 19-1905

behavior was related to his ADHD or perceptual disability.

Rose-Hulman’s assessment of whether Castelino should be

readmitted in light of his behavior while suspended is precisely

the sort of expert academic judgment to which we defer.

As noted in Amaya, judicial deference is warranted in light

of the institution’s duty to the public as well as the student. 981

N.E.2d at 1242. Given the underlying academic misconduct as

well as Castelino’s record of behavior both on and off campus,

Rose-Hulman was entitled to exercise its professional judg-

ment to conclude that Castelino was not entitled to readmis-

sion.

Finally, Castelino’s claim that “Rose-Hulman’s falling short

of any of its procedures is arbitrary or capricious, by defini-

tion” (Appellant’s Br. 38) finds no support whatsoever in the

case law. Instead, the cases establish that deviations from

University policy alone will not establish a claim for breach of

contract. See Amaya, 981 N.E.2d at 1241 (“[E]ven assuming that

IUSM failed to strictly follow the procedures outlined in all its

handbooks and codes or to publish its procedures in specific

accordance with accreditation standards as asserted by Amaya,

that does not automatically lead to a finding of breach of

contract on the part of IUSM.”) At best, Castelino provided

evidence of inconsequential deviations from various proce-

dures in the Student and Faculty Handbooks. He has failed to

identify any facts in the record that could plausibly lead to the

conclusion that Rose-Hulman undertook “the conscious doing

of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity”

or had “a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive

design or ill will.” Id. at 1242 (quoting Gordon, 862 N.E.2d at

No. 19-1905 21

1253). Rose-Hulman is thus entitled to summary judgment on

Castelino’s breach of contract claims.

Castelino’s remaining arguments are even more insubstan-

tial, and we consider them only briefly, bearing in mind his

failure to develop them in any meaningful way.

Defamation

Castelino argues (1) that including the word “suspended”

on his transcripts (shared with other schools) amounted to libel

per se; (2) that Dr. Chapman defamed him in the letter accus-

ing him of academic misconduct for using the cut and pasted

slides; and (3) that Dr. Sutterer defamed Castelino by lying to

the Rules and Discipline Committee about a signature on

Castelino’s course drop sheet.

The district court concluded that, assuming Dr. Chapman’s

letter was defamatory, it was protected by privilege. Under

Indiana law, qualified privilege is a defense to a defamation

action and applies to “communications made in good faith on

any subject matter in which the party making the communica-

tion has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty,

either public or private, either legal, moral, or social, if made to

a person having a corresponding interest or duty.” Bals v.

Verduzco, 600 N.E.2d 1353, 1356 (Ind. 1992) (internal quotations

and citation omitted). As a professor, Dr. Chapman was

obligated to hold students accountable for academic miscon-

duct and also obligated to provide certain Rose-Hulman

employees copies of any letters accusing a student of such

misconduct. Accordingly, such a letter would be protected by

qualified privilege absent some evidence that Dr. Chapman

wrote and published it without belief or grounds for belief in

22 No. 19-1905

its truth. The district court concluded that Castelino had

produced no such evidence, and thus his defamation claim

based on Dr. Chapman’s letter failed as a matter of law.

Castelino’s arguments about defamation ultimately amount

to his own conclusory statements that he was defamed. He

makes no attempt to explain why Dr. Chapman’s letter would

not be protected by qualified privilege, fails to elaborate on

why the word “suspended” on his transcripts was defamatory

(he had been suspended after all), or identify any specific

evidence tending to demonstrate defamation by Dr. Sutterer at

Castelino’s Rules and Discipline hearing. In short, he has

waived any contention that the district court erred by granting

summary judgment to Rose-Hulman on his state-law defama-

tion claim. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Universal Scaffolding & Equip.,

LLC, 839 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Perfunctory and

undeveloped arguments are waived, as are arguments unsup-

ported by legal authority.”).

Harassment

Castelino’s claim for harassment is likewise so undeveloped

as to be waived. Id. He asserts confusingly and without

authority that Indiana’s “criminal statute” imposed a duty and

a standard of care for what he characterizes as the Indiana tort

of “harassment.” He makes no attempt to provide any specif-

ics, and instead makes the blanket assertion that faculty

correspondence about him “proves that Rose-Hulman’s

substandard behavior proximately resulted in Castelino’s

suspension.” (Appellant’s Br. 47.) On the contrary, the record

establishes that Rose-Hulman substantially complied with its

No. 19-1905 23

own policies and procedures in its correspondence about

Castelino’s behavior.

False Advertising

Castelino advanced a claim of false advertising in the

district court based on an advertisement for Rose-Hulman

claiming that the university “offers individual and small group

tutoring.” Castelino’s claim hinged on his belief that advertis-

ing the availability of tutoring amounted to “fraudulent

inducement” because Rose-Hulman did not offer tutors for

upperclassmen. The district court concluded Castelino’s claim

fell “far short” of a “cogent, properly supported argument”

and granted summary judgment to Rose-Hulman.

Nothing Castelino says on appeal provides any reason to

revisit the district court’s conclusion that he waived this

argument by failing to properly develop it. He cites 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(a) (prohibiting false and misleading representations of

fact) in an attempt to shore up his claim, but fails to acknowl-

edge that the protections of the Lanham Act are not available

to consumers. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,

Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 132 (2014) (noting that Lanham Act does not

apply even when a consumer is “hoodwinked” into buying an

inadequate product).

Sanctions

That leaves the matter of the sanctions imposed against

Castelino under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f). We review the district

court’s imposition of sanctions only for abuse of discretion.

Koehn v. Tobias, 866 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 2017). As described

above, despite an e-mail reminder a week in advance from

24 No. 19-1905

Rose-Hulman’s counsel, Castelino’s counsel ignored the

district court’s scheduling order and waited until the night

before the settlement conference to serve Castelino’s updated

settlement demand on Rose-Hulman. Rule 16(f)(1)(c) autho-

rizes the district court to impose sanctions “if a party or its

attorney … fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order.”

Given Castelino’s admitted failure to comply with the schedul-

ing order, the district court was well within its discretion to

sanction his counsel. Castelino seems to admit as much, but

then argues inexplicably that the district court was obligated to

sanction Rose-Hulman as well. We see nothing in the record to

suggest sanctions were required or warranted against Rose-

Hulman. Indeed, we are inclined to sanction Castelino’s

attorney John Thrasher for his brief and arguments on appeal.

Rose-Hulman, however, has not requested sanctions, so we

will close with an observation and warning to Castelino’s

counsel that the brief he submitted was deficient, and that

future filings of this sort will result in an order to show cause

why he should not be sanctioned. See Veal-Hill v. Comm’r of IRS,

826 Fed. Appx. 565 (7th Cir. Oct. 14, 2020) (unpublished order)

(issuing order to show cause for attorneys’ briefs “practically

devoid of coherent legal argument”).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

grant of summary judgment.