standard of review; discovery rulings “will not be disturbed except upon the 4 20-35315 clearest showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- standard of review; discovery rulings “will not be disturbed except upon the 4 20-35315 clearest showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
- “In religious matters, we take judicial notice of the fact that often the keenest disputes and the most lively intolerance exists among persons of the same general religious belief, who, however, are in disagreement as to what that faith requires in particular matters.”
- plaintiff alleging an equal protection claim must show that defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate based upon plaintiff’s membership in a protected class
- movant has initial burden to show no genuine dispute of fact
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 25 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UHURU’SEKOU KAMARA AJANI No. 20-35315
OBATAIYE-ALLAH,
D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00068-JR
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
HEIDI STEWARD, Assistant Director; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Jolie A. Russo, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted May 18, 2021***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Uhuru’sekou Kamara Ajani Obataiye-Allah appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his action alleging federal and state law claims
arising from denial of participation in Ramadan in 2018. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s decision on cross-
motions for summary judgment. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San
Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand.
The record reflects that the district court did not separately rule on plaintiff’s
free exercise claim for damages arising from the denial of participation in
Ramadan in 2018. Instead, the district court found that defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity “[t]o the extent any constitutional claims seeking money
damages survive.” However, resolving all factual disputes and drawing all
reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, defendants are not entitled to summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Plaintiff’s declaration established
that he has a sincerely held Nation of Islam religious belief and he informed
defendants that weekly prayer meetings were not required for Nation of Islam
Muslims. The right to free exercise was clearly established in 2018, such that a
reasonable official would have known that requiring attendance at weekly prayer
meetings as a condition to participate in Ramadan, without consideration of other
2 20-35315
alternatives to establish sincerity of belief, would violate the First Amendment.
See Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11-12 (2015) (per curiam) (discussing qualified
immunity; explaining that a clearly established right “is one that is sufficiently
clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
violates that right” and existing precedent must have placed the constitutional
question beyond debate); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987) (setting forth
the factors to determine whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir.
1987) (requiring prison officials to use “a reasonable method of determining
religious commitment” to avoid “prevent[ing] a legitimate adherent from following
the dictates of his faith”); see also Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“In religious matters, we take judicial notice of the fact that often the keenest
disputes and the most lively intolerance exists among persons of the same general
religious belief, who, however, are in disagreement as to what that faith requires in
particular matters.”).
We therefore vacate the district court’s judgment on qualified immunity and
on plaintiff’s free exercise claim for damages, and remand to allow the district
court to analyze this claim under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), in the first
instance.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff’s equal
3 20-35315
protection claim on the basis of race and religious preference because plaintiff
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was intentionally
discriminated against as a member of a protected class. See Furnace v. Sullivan,
705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff alleging an equal protection claim
must show that defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate based
upon plaintiff’s membership in a protected class).
However, as to his “class of one” claim, plaintiff provided a declaration
stating that he knew of other inmates, two of whom he identified by name, who did
not attend weekly prayer services but were allowed to participate in Ramadan.
Defendants’ evidence did not demonstrate the absence of a triable dispute as to
whether plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated, or whether there was a rational basis for the different treatment. See Vill.
of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (elements of “class of one”
equal protection claim); see also InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Holdings, Inc., 978
F.3d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 2020) (movant has initial burden to show no genuine
dispute of fact). We vacate the judgment on the equal protection “class of one”
claim, and remand for further proceedings.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to
compel discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)
(standard of review; discovery rulings “will not be disturbed except upon the
4 20-35315
clearest showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice
to the complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
In sum, we affirm the judgment as to race and religion-based equal
protection claim. We also affirm the denial of plaintiff’s motion to compel. We
vacate summary judgment on plaintiff’s (1) free exercise claim for damages on the
basis of qualified immunity and (2) equal protection “class of one” claim, and
remand for further proceedings on these claims only.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We reject as without merit plaintiff’s contention that the district court was
biased against him.
The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
5 20-35315