“Pennsylvania’s judicial districts, including their probation and parole departments, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”
How later courts described this case
- “Pennsylvania’s judicial districts, including their probation and parole departments, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”
- holding that there is no medical-necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act’s prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing marijuana
- To prevail under a class-of-one theory, plaintiff bears the burden of showing he “was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated . . . and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”
- capable-of- 4 repetition doctrine is narrow mootness exception that “applies only in exceptional situations” where “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DLD-179 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 21-1192
___________
AMRO ELANSARI,
Appellant
v.
MAITE RAGAZZO, (Individual Capacity);
15TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT; CHESTER COUNTY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-06170)
District Judge: Honorable Joel H. Slomsky
____________________________________
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Affirmance
May 13, 2021
Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 24, 2021)
_________
OPINION *
_________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Appellant Amro Elansari, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from
an order by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, we will
summarily affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the
important facts and procedural history. Elansari was arrested and convicted in 2015 for
various marijuana-related offenses. He was again arrested in 2017 and was sentenced to
probation, which he began serving in Centre County, Pennsylvania. At some point in
2018, Elansari moved, and his probation was transferred to Chester County,
Pennsylvania. Elansari alleged that after he moved, defendant Maite Ragazzo, a Chester
County probation officer, told him that the office was going to continue to drug test
probationers regardless of Pennsylvania’s 2016 law legalizing the use of medical
marijuana. Elansari states that he moved to Philadelphia because of this conversation.
In December 2020, Elansari filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that
his equal protection rights were violated by Ragazzo’s comments and that the county
maintained an unconstitutional policy as to probationers who used marijuana for medical
purposes. 1 Elansari seeks declaratory judgment, compensatory and punitive damages,
and injunctive relief against Ragazzo, the 15th Judicial District, and Chester County. 2
1
In June 2020, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a state parole office’s policy
of prohibiting probationers from the active use of medical marijuana violated
2
Counsel for defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Elansari opposed the motion and filed a
motion to amend the complaint to add unnamed supervisors to the action. The District
Court dismissed Elansari’s complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) explaining that his
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot, that the 15th Judicial District and
Chester County were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, that Elansari had failed
to state an equal protection claim, and that the claim against Ragazzo was time-barred. 3
The District Court denied Elansari’s motion to amend his complaint, except to the extent
that he moved to strike claims related to comments made by a state court judge, and
concluded that further amendment would be futile. Elansari timely filed his notice of
appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District
Court’s dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
Pennsylvania law. Gass v. 52nd Judicial Dist., Lebanon Cty., 232 A.3d 706, 715 (Pa.
2020).
2
Elansari subsequently filed a state court action against Ragazzo to recover
compensatory damages for his move to Philadelphia. He alleged that his filing and court
proceedings made the state court judge “furious” and stated that the judge informed him
that he was going to report the matter to the Centre County probation authorities.
Elansari’s § 1983 complaint initially alleged that the state court’s actions were
impermissible retaliation that violated the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Elansari
subsequently moved to strike any aspect of his complaint related to the state court
proceedings, and the District Court granted the motion.
3
The District Court also found that it did not have jurisdiction over any state law claims,
although those appear to have been dismissed pursuant to Elansari’s motion.
3
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Dismissal is appropriate where a complaint has not alleged
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). We accept all factual allegations in the complaint
as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Fleisher v.
Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012), and because Elansari is proceeding
pro se, we construe his complaint liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam). We may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial
question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
III
We agree with the District Court’s assessment that Elansari’s complaint was
insufficient to state a civil rights action against defendants. As the District Court
explained, Elansari’s claims for unspecified prospective relief against the 15th Judicial
District and Chester County were mooted by his move to Philadelphia and the
corresponding transfer of his parole, as he “no longer has any present interest affected by
[their] polic[ies].” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148 (1975). Moreover, because
Elansari has not alleged that he intends to move back to Chester County or that the parole
office has continued its alleged policy following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2020
decision, he cannot demonstrate that the alleged wrong is “capable of repetition yet
evading review.” Hamilton v. Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 2017) (capable-of-
4
repetition doctrine is narrow mootness exception that “applies only in exceptional
situations” where “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated
prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party will be subject to the same action again.”) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna,
523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)).
We further agree with the District Court that the claims for damages against the
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit and Chester County are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“Pennsylvania’s judicial districts, including their probation and parole departments, are
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”) (citing Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa.,
426 F.3d 233, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2005)); Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d
Cir. 2000) (“The Pennsylvania legislature has, by statute, expressly declined to waive its
Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).
Additionally, we agree with the District Court that Elansari’s allegations regarding
defendant Ragazzo’s comments failed to establish either a constitutional violation or a
plausible equal protection claim. See Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d
Cir. 2006) (“To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant, acting
under color of state law, deprived him or her of a right secured by the Constitution or the
laws of the United States.”). Setting aside Elansari’s failure to allege that he obtained a
medical marijuana card, the ability to access medical marijuana is not a “right secured by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Id. (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
5
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999)); see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005)
(Controlled Substances Act provisions criminalizing manufacture, distribution, or
possession of marijuana to intrastate growers and users of marijuana for medical purposes
did not violate Commerce Clause); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’
Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001) (holding that there is no medical-necessity
exception to the Controlled Substances Act’s prohibitions on manufacturing and
distributing marijuana); Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir.2007) (no
fundamental right to use marijuana prescribed by a physician to alleviate pain). 4
We also agree with the District Court that Elansari’s claim fails under a traditional
theory of equal protection because he has not shown that he obtained a medical marijuana
card or, even if he had, that an individual who uses medical marijuana is a member of a
protected class. See Keenan v. City of Phila., 983 F.2d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1992).
Moreover, the District Court correctly determined that Elansari’s claim fails under a
class-of-one theory because he has not demonstrated that he qualified for or obtained a
medical marijuana card, was not charged with violating his probation for using marijuana
for medical reasons, and did not allege he was treated differently from other probationers
who obtained or intended to obtain a medical marijuana card. See Phillips v. Cty. of
4
This Court has rejected Elansari’s arguments in prior cases alleging similar violations of
his rights arising out of his use of marijuana. See Elansari v.United States, 823 F. App’x
107, 111 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (marijuana users are not members of a protected
class); Elansari v. United States, 615 F. App’x 760, 762 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
(Elansari unlikely to show success on claim that marijuana prohibition is
unconstitutional).
6
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 244 (3d Cir. 2008) (To prevail under a class-of-one theory,
plaintiff bears the burden of showing he “was intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated . . . and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”).
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Elansari leave to amend his
complaint where the court aptly evaluated his response to the defendants’ motion to
dismiss and his proposed amended complaint and concluded that it would not cure the
defects from his complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d
Cir. 2002). 5
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we grant the motion for
summary affirmance and will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
5
The District Court also correctly determined that the claims against Ragazzo were time-
barred and that Elansari did not raise a particularized claim against the unknown
supervisors alleged in his proposed amended complaint. Elansari’s state law claims were
dismissed upon Elansari’s own motion to strike, given that the claims were rooted in the
dismissed allegations.
7