Jordan, R. v. Jordan, R.

J-S07004-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

RAMONA JORDAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

RICHARD JORDAN :

:

Appellant : No. 827 WDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered August 25, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Civil Division at

No(s): 275 of 2018 D

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED: MAY 11, 2021

Richard Jordan (“Husband”) appeals from the order entered August 25,

2020, granting a decree in divorce, granting in part and denying in part

Husband’s exceptions to the Master’s Findings of Fact, Recommendations, and

Report, and equitably distributing the marital property of Husband and

Appellee, Ramona Jordan (“Wife”).1 After careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 A divorce decree was entered on August 25, 2020. Husband filed his notice

of appeal on August 6, 2020, before the entry of the divorce decree. However,

on September 4, 2020, Husband filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to Include

Divorce Decree in which he appealed from the July 7, 2020 order and the

divorce decree. Although at the time Husband filed his initial appeal, the

divorce decree had not been entered, the appeal was properly before this court

because the divorce decree was entered while the appeal was pending.

Schenk v. Schenk, 880 A.2d 633, 638 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing Campbell

v. Campbell, 516 A.2d 363 (1986) (stating “although Orders of property

distribution are not appealable until entry of a final divorce Decree, case law

holds that an award of equitable distribution is appealable where a divorce

Decree is entered while an appeal is pending.”)).

J-S07004-21

The trial court set forth the following:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A Master’s hearing was held on January 13, 2020[,] and the

Master’s Findings of Fact, Recommendations and Report were filed

on February 26, 2020. On March 13, 2020, [Husband] filed

Exceptions to the Master’s Report. Briefs were timely filed and oral

arguments were heard on July 7, 2020. This court entered an

order on July 7, 2020 addressing [Husband’s] Exceptions. The

[c]ourt’s disposition follows.

On August 6, 2020, [Husband] filed a Notice of Appeal and

on August 7, 2020, this court entered an order directing

[Husband] to file his Concise Statement of Matters Complained of

on Appeal pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate

Procedure, specifically [R]ule 1925(b). [Husband] filed his

Concise Statement on August 27, 2020. It is noted that

[Husband] filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to include the

Decree in Divorce. [Husband’s] Amended Notice of Appeal was

filed on September 4, 2020.

STIPULATIONS OF THE PARTIES

1. The date of separation is December 26, 2017. (N.T. January 13,

2020, pg. 123 lines 4-9).

2. The current market value of the marital residence, located at

2517 Braddock Avenue, Lower Burrell, Pennsylvania, is

$138,000.00. (N.T. January 13, 2020, pg. 24 lines 23-25, pg. 25

line 1)

3. The mortgage payoff amount for the marital residence, as of

the date of the Master’s hearing, is $94,500.16. (N.T. January 13,

2020, pg. 28 lines 17-20, pg. [29] lines 4-5).

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. [Wife] was born on September 2, 1957[,] and was 62 years[,]

5 months old at the time of the Master’s hearing. (N.T.

January 13, 2020, pg. 7 lines 18-22). See also Master’s Report,

February 26, 2020, pg. 2.

-2-

J-S07004-21

2. [Wife] resides in the marital residence located at 2517

Braddock Avenue, Lower Burrell, Pennsylvania. (N.T. January 13,

2020, pg. 16 lines 12-16).

3. [Wife] is employed at Bayer Corporation as a Facility Technician

and has been so employed for over thirty (30) years. (N.T January

13, 2020, pg. 17 lines 2-3, pg. 53 lines 15-19).

4. [Wife] will be 66.5 years old in March of 2024.

5. [Husband] was born on March 15, 1955[,] and was 64 years 10

months old at the time of the Master’s hearing. (N.T. January 13,

2020, pg. 101 lines 14-15). See also Master’s Report,

February 26, 2020, pg. 2.

6. [Husband] currently resides in Florida. (N.T. January 13, 2020,

pg.116 lines 5-7).

7. [Husband] suffers from Cyclic Vomiting Syndrome and started

receiving Social Security Disability in 2006. (N.T. January 13,

2020, pg. 103 lines 1-3, 23-24).

8. Prior to his disability, [Husband] had a variety of jobs, including

working as a celebrity impersonator of Ozzy Osbourne and briefly

owning his own auto detailing business. (N.T. January 13, 2020,

pg. 91 lines 21-22, pg. 98 lines 1-2, pg. 99 lines 19-21).

9. The parties were married on February 7, 1976. (N.T.

January 13, 2020, pg. 16 lines 8-9).

10. The parties separated on December 26, 2017. (N.T.

January 13, 2020, pg. 123 lines 4-9).

11. The parties were divorced on August 25, 2020.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/20, at unnumbered 1-3. (footnote omitted).

The Master’s Report contained the following recommendations and

findings relevant to this appeal:

-3-

J-S07004-21

8. The Marital Residence: The Master recommends that Wife

receive this asset and that she refinance the current mortgage so

as to remove Husband from that obligation. If she cannot, the

residence should be sold. The Master finds that the marital estate

value of the equity is $33,839.84. In the event the residence is

sold, Husband is awarded the lesser of one-half of the net proceeds

of sale or $16,919.92. This amount is to be adjusted downward

by $2,124.27 representing the “payment” to Wife to balance the

equitable distribution as described in Number 12 below. The

parties stipulated to a current market value of $138,000.00 and

they agreed that this value should be reduced by 7% to reflect the

sales commission and transfer tax cost that would be incurred

should the property be sold. Wife raised a claim for a further

adjustment to reflect a sanitary sewer repair that is common in the

City of Lower Burrell. Wife did not have the sewer line visually

inspected to determine that it must be replaced (Tr. 75: 2-18). To

further reduce the value would be speculative. The Master

recommends that Wife’s request for additional reduction be denied.

9. Retirement Assets: The Master recommends that the marital

portion of this asset be divided equally with a Qualified Domestic

Relations Order and the costs shared equally. This

recommendation is made considering the factors in 25 Pa.C.S.

§3502. This division would give Husband immediate access to

liquid funds.

10. The Motor Vehicles: The Master recommends that Husband

retain the Dodge Magnum automobile and the Johnny Pag

motorcycle. Wife shall continue to possess the vehicle she leases.

The Master determined the value of the Dodge automobile is

$1,500.00 and the value of [the] motorcycle is $2,749.50 which is

dividing the difference between the parties’ asserted values.

11.Personal Property and Furnishings: The Master

recommends that Husband’s personal belongings listed in his

Pretrial Statement be awarded to him and the remainder to Wife

with the division considered an equal division.

12. Marital Debt: The Master recommends that Wife assume the

liability for the marital debt including the New York judgment, the

RSP loan and, except as set forth above, the mortgage on the

marital residence. One half of the balance owed shall be charged

to Husband. This is represented in the calculation leading to the

equitable distribution payment described below.

-4-

J-S07004-21

13. Equitable Distribution Payment: The Master recommends

that Husband transfer to Wife $2,124.75 to equalize each party’s

share of the marital estate.

14. Permanent Alimony: The Master recommends that Husband

be awarded alimony in the amount of $500.00 per month through

March, 2023 when Wife reaches retirement age. This

recommendation is based on the consideration that Husband will

draw from his share of the [Retirement Savings Plan (“401(k)” or

“RSP”)], the age of the parties, the unlikelihood that either can

increase income from other sources, and the relative needs of the

parties. The end date of the alimony obligation is based on Wife’s

testimony that she plans to retire at her full Social Security age,

66.5 years.

Attorney Fees and Expenses

In light of the availability to Husband of liquid assets, the

Master recommends that the parties each pay their own attorney

fees and that they share equally in the Master’s fee and the costs

of the hearing.

Masters Findings of Fact, Recommendations and Report, 2/25/2020, at 6-9

(emphases in original).

In its July 7, 2020 order, other than changing Wife’s retirement date

from March of 2023 to March of 2024, the trial court denied Husband’s

exceptions to the Master’ Report. Order, 7/7/20. Husband filed a timely

notice of appeal on August 6, 2020. As noted above, both Husband and the

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Husband presents the following questions for our review:

1. For a complete and accurate analysis of the marital property,

and for an appropriate division of the marital estate, must the

trial court consider whether the overall Equitable Distribution

decision is equitable to both Wife and Husband?

2. For a complete and accurate analysis of marital property, and

for an appropriate division of the marital estate, must the trial

-5-

J-S07004-21

court consider whether a 50/50 division or some other

division is appropriate to achieve equitable distribution?

3. For a complete and accurate analysis of alimony, and for an

appropriate calculation or determination, must the trial court

provide a proper explanation or reason for the length of time

and the amount ordered was arrived upon and how it is

equitable?

4. For a complete and accurate analysis of marital property, and

for an appropriate division of the marital estate, must the trial

court consider whether the overall Equitable Distribution

decision regarding the marital home, marital debt, assets, as

well as attorneys fees and expenses is equitable?

Husband’s Brief at 6-7.

In his first issue, Husband argues that the trial court abused its

discretion because the equitable distribution scheme improperly failed to take

into consideration “the remaining years of earning potential of Wife versus

Husband, as well as the disparity in social security retirement income of the

parties.” Husband’s Brief at 25. Husband takes issue with the fifty-fifty split

of assets and the award of $500.00 per month in alimony payments. In

support, Husband avers that his net income from Social Security disability is

$13,488.00 per year and Wife’s net income is $45,914.40. Id. at 17. He

further avers that Wife has the ability to increase her income via overtime,

increases in yearly pay, and her employer’s 401(k) match. Id. at 18.

Husband asserts that because of his low monthly income and reduced alimony

award, he will have to deplete the funds he received from Wife’s 401(k) in

approximately ten years. Id. at 24. Husband argues the parties were married

for nearly forty-two years, Wife is able to work while Husband is disabled, and

-6-

J-S07004-21

although Husband is retirement age, Wife will reach retirement age in 2024

and will “enjoy more than twice as much income as Husband during retirement

years.” Id. at 23. To that end, Husband asserts that in order to achieve an

equitable award, Husband must receive at least 70% of Wife’s 401(k) account,

a larger portion of equity in the home, and an award of alimony no less than

$1,000.00 per month while Wife is working. Id. at 25.

When reviewing an award of equitable distribution, we apply the

following standard:

[A] trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of

equitable distribution. Our standard of review when assessing the

propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution of

marital property is whether the trial court abused its discretion by

a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal

procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of discretion, which

requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. This Court

will not find an “abuse of discretion” unless the law has been

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,

bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record.

In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award,

courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We

measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of

effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a

just determination of their property rights.

Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting Morgante

v. Morgante, 119 A.3d 382, 386–387 (Pa. Super. 2015)).

“An abuse of discretion is not found lightly, but only upon a showing of

clear and convincing evidence.” Yuhas v. Yuhas, 79 A.3d 700, 704 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (en banc). Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court

to weigh the evidence and decide credibility, and this Court will not reverse

-7-

J-S07004-21

those determinations as long as they are supported by the evidence.

Sternlicht v. Sternlicht, 822 A.2d 732, 742, n.8 (Pa. Super. 2003). We are

also aware that “a master’s report and recommendation, although only

advisory, is to be given the fullest consideration, particularly on the question

of credibility of witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to observe

and assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.” Childress v.

Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455–456 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502, the following factors are relevant to the

equitable distribution of marital property:

(1) The length of the marriage.

(2) Any prior marriage of either party.

(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income,

vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs

of each of the parties.

(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training or

increased earning power of the other party.

(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of

capital assets and income.

(6) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not

limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.

(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the

acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the

marital property, including the contribution of a party as

homemaker.

(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.

(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the

marriage.

-8-

J-S07004-21

(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the

division of property is to become effective.

(10.1) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications associated

with each asset to be divided, distributed or assigned,

which ramifications need not be immediate and certain.

(10.2) The expense of sale, transfer or liquidation associated with

a particular asset, which expense need not be immediate

and certain.

(11) Whether the party will be serving as the custodian of any

dependent minor children.

23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1)-(11).

We have held that “[t]he weight to be given these factors depends on

the facts of each case and is within the court’s discretion. We will not reweigh

them.” Busse v. Busse, 921 A.2d 1248, 1260 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation

omitted). In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award we

must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. Mercatell v. Mercatell,

854 A.2d 609, 612 (Pa. Super. 2004). Finally, “we also remain cognizant that

‘we measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of

effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a just

determination of their property rights.’” Schenk v. Schenk, 880 A.2d at 644

(quoting Heyward v. Heyward, 868 A.2d 554, 557-558 (Pa. Super. 2005)).

The trial court set forth the following analysis regarding the equitable

distribution of the marital property:

The court believes that the Equitable Distribution decision

made by the Master and adopted by this court with the additional

one (1) year of alimony is equitable in light of the testimony and

evidence presented to the Master and reviewed by this court.

[Husband] worked random jobs during the course of the marriage

with his longest and most stable employment being the seven (7)

-9-

J-S07004-21

years he worked for Springdale Specialty Plastics. (N.T.

January 13, 2020, pg. 43, lines 24-25, pg. 44 line 1). [Husband]

made little financial contribution to [the] household during the

course of the marriage. [Husband] was only able to reference

household purchases he made as occurring after he started

collecting social security disability benefits. (N.T. January 13,

2020, pg. 114 lines 8-17).

[Wife] has worked for the same employer for thirty (30)

years and has paid the mortgage, taken out loans against her

[401(k)] to get [Husband] a car and a motorcycle and paid for his

failed business endeavors throughout the course of the marriage.

At one point, [Wife] had to obtain a credit card machine for

[Husband] to use in his auto detailing business. [Husband] failed

to pay for the credit card machine which resulted in a judgment

being placed against [Wife] and in [Wife’s] name only. The

judgment is in the amount of $2,124.75 and is still in place today.

[Husband] has made no effort to pay that debt and clear it from

[Wife’s] credit report. (N.T. January 13, 2020, pg. 100 lines 13-

14). [Wife] has maintained the marital residence with no help

from [Husband] and has continued to pay the loans against her

[401(k),] thus providing [Husband] with a car and a motorcycle.

[Wife] currently leases a vehicle which she also pays for.

[Husband] was awarded one half of the value of the equity

in the marital residence ([one-]half of $33,839.84). If the

residence is sold, [Husband] is to receive the lesser of one-half of

the net proceeds of sale or $16,919.92. [Husband’s] amount was

adjusted downward by $2,124.75 which represents payment to

[Wife] for [Husband’s] credit card machine judgment. [Husband]

was also awarded his vehicle, an equal share of [Wife’s]

Retirement Savings Plan and an equal share of the parties’

property and furnishings. The combined marital debt (not

including the mortgage) was divided equally among the parties.

Based on [Husband’s] limited contributions to the marital

estate over the course of the marriage, the court finds that the

Master’s equitable distribution decision, with the additional year

of alimony, is more than equitable to [Husband].

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/20, at unnumbered 5-6 (footnote omitted).

- 10 -

J-S07004-21

In the instant case, the trial court underscored the fact that Wife’s

contributions to the marital estate were significantly higher when compared

to Husband’s limited contributions, even before he began collecting Social

Security disability benefits. After review, we do not find that the trial court

abused its discretion in its equitable distribution decision. Mercatell, 854

A.2d at 612 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital

estate and awarding sixty percent of the marital property to wife, who was

primarily responsible for building the marital estate by working several jobs

and husband was underemployed throughout the marriage). Further, as

discussed above, the weight to be given the statutory factors is within the

court’s discretion, and we may not reweigh them. Busse, 921 A.2d at 1260.

The equitable-distribution scheme set forth by the trial court was well

considered and within the realm of its discretion. We discern no reason to

disturb it.

In support of his second issue on appeal, Husband argues that the trial

court abused its discretion in finding that a fifty-fifty split of the parties’

retirement assets was equitable for Husband.2 Husband’s Brief at 25.

Husband avers that because he is disabled, “there is really no other source

by which Husband can acquire assets or income in which to maintain even

the reasonable standard of living that he enjoyed through the pendency of

____________________________________________

2 Although Husband refers to the parties’ retirement assets, Wife’s 401(k) is

the only retirement asset at issue.

- 11 -

J-S07004-21

the divorce.” Id. at 26. Thus, he argues, if he and Wife are to equally split

the equity in the home and Husband is to receive a lower monthly alimony

amount, “he must receive a much larger share of the 401(k) for equitable

distribution to be achieved.” Id. at 26-27. Husband argues that he worked

various jobs during the time that Wife was not working full-time from 1976

until 1990. Id. Husband further alleges “it is evident that Husband

contributed to the marriage and substantially to the marriage income at

various times throughout the marriage.” Id. Husband asserts that he must

be awarded at least 70% of Wife’s 401(k) and alimony of no less than

$1,000.00 per month while Wife is working, in order for equitable distribution

to be achieved. Id. at 29.

The trial court set forth the following discussion of Husband’s second

claim of error:

The court disagrees that a 50/50 split of [Wife’s] retirement

assets is not equitable to [Husband]. As previously stated,

[Husband] contributed very little to the financial resources of the

marriage. [Husband] seems to think that he should receive

additional compensation because he is receiving less social

security benefits a month than [Wife] will receive when she

retires. [Husband] believes he should receive a higher percentage

of [Wife’s 401(k)] to compensate him for the disparity.

[Wife] has maintained gainful employment throughout the

marriage and has worked for the same employer for the last thirty

(30) years. The testimony at the Master’s hearing was that [Wife]

maintained the marital residence and paid the marital bills with

little to no help from [Husband]. [Husband] has reaped the

benefits of [Wife’s] steady employment and payment of all the

household expenses for the length of the marriage and continues

to reap those benefits after the separation and divorce.

- 12 -

J-S07004-21

As stated above, [Husband] worked basically one (1)

legitimate steady job for a period of seven (7) years during the

entire course of the marriage. He was forced out of that position

due to his disability. While the court is empathetic to [Husband’s]

disability, the court also recognizes that the disparity in social

security benefits as well as available retirement assets is a

situation [Husband] created.

After considering the length of marriage, the age, health,

station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,

employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each party, the

opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets

and income, the sources of income of both parties, including, but

not limited to, medical, retirements, insurance or other benefits,

the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition,

preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property,

including the contribution of a party as a homemaker, the

standard of living of the parties established during the marriage

and the economic circumstances of each party at the time the

division of property is to become effective, the court finds that a

50/50 division of [Wife’s 401(k) account] Plan is equitable to

[Husband].

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/20, at unnumbered 8-9.

As with Husband’s first issue relating to the equitable distribution of the

parties’ marital property, we find no abuse of discretion in the second issue.

The trial court reviewed the factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a) and

determined that a fifty-fifty division of Wife’s 401(k) was equitable to both

parties. After review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion.

In his third issue, Husband avers that the trial court abused its

discretion or committed an error of law when it awarded Husband alimony in

the amount of $500.00 per month through March of 2024. Husband’s Brief

at 29. Husband argues that while Wife continues to work, “the disparity in

- 13 -

J-S07004-21

income is huge.” Id. at 32. According to Husband, Wife’s income per month

is $3,439.25 higher than his, even when she was paying $1,000.00 per month

in spousal support. Id. at 33. He further contends that neither the Master

nor the trial court provided an explanation for the reduction in alimony and

argues that it was chosen arbitrarily. Husband argues that Wife should

continue to pay him $1,000.00 per month until she retires, then pay a

reduced rate when she begins to receive Social Security, or Husband should

have been awarded a larger portion of Wife’s 401(k) account. Id.

We apply the following standard when reviewing an award of alimony:

Our standard of review regarding questions pertaining to the

award of alimony is whether the trial court abused its discretion.

We previously have explained that “[t]he purpose of alimony is

not to reward one party and to punish the other, but rather to

ensure that the reasonable needs of the person who is unable to

support himself or herself through appropriate employment, are

met.” Alimony “is based upon reasonable needs in accordance

with the lifestyle and standard of living established by the parties

during the marriage, as well as the payor’s ability to pay.”

Moreover, “[a]limony following a divorce is a secondary remedy

and is available only where economic justice and the reasonable

needs of the parties cannot be achieved by way of an equitable

distribution award and development of an appropriate employable

skill.”

Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 200 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Moran

v. Moran, 839 A.2d 1091, 1096-1097 (Pa. Super. 2003)) (emphasis in

original). When determining whether to award a party alimony and the

amount, duration, and manner of alimony, a court shall consider the following

factors:

(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the parties.

- 14 -

J-S07004-21

(2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional conditions

of the parties.

(3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not

limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.

(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.

(5) The duration of the marriage.

(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training or

increased earning power of the other party.

(7) The extent to which the earning power, expenses or

financial obligations of a party will be affected by reason of

serving as the custodian of a minor child.

(8) The standard of living of the parties established during the

marriage.

(9) The relative education of the parties and the time necessary

to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party

seeking alimony to find appropriate employment.

(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.

(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.

(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.

(13) The relative needs of the parties.

(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during the

marriage. The marital misconduct of either of the parties

from the date of final separation shall not be considered by

the court in its determinations relative to alimony, except

that the court shall consider the abuse of one party by the

other party. As used in this paragraph, “abuse” shall have

the meaning given to it under section 6102 (relating to

definitions).

(15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications of the alimony

award.

- 15 -

J-S07004-21

(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks sufficient property,

including, but not limited to, property distributed under

Chapter 35 (relating to property rights), to provide for the

party’s reasonable needs.

(17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable of self-

support through appropriate employment.

23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(1-17).

The trial court set forth the following analysis of Husband’s alimony

argument:

[Husband] alleges that the court erred in decreasing the

monthly alimony award to $500.00 and for terminating the

alimony payments upon [Wife] turning 66.5 years old. The court

relied on the Master’s report and recommendation as well as the

testimony and evidence presented at the Master’s hearing and

finds the amount of alimony awarded as well as the termination

of the alimony obligation when [Wife] becomes full retirement age

are fair and equitable given the age of the parties, the parties’

respective health, their station in life, their sources of income,

their vocational skills, their employability and their individual

needs. [Husband] argues that the Master properly states the

reasons for his award of alimony but that the Master’s reasoning

is flawed. As previously stated, the Master found the alimony

award of $500.00 per month until March 2024 to be fair and

equitable based on the consideration that [Husband] will draw

from his share of the retirement saving plan, the age of the

parties, the unlikelihood that either can increase their income from

other sources, and the relative needs of the parties.

[Husband] argues that the Master failed to consider that

[Husband] has to pay taxes on his portion of the retirement saving

plan and that while [Husband] is depleting his portion of the

retirement savings plan, [Wife] will be building up her portion of

the retirement savings plan. While it is not clear from the record

whether the Master considered the arguments raised by

[Husband], the court finds that the alimony award and duration

are equitable to [Husband].

- 16 -

J-S07004-21

[Husband] wants to ignore the fact that [Wife] has to work

overtime to be able to continue to pay him the $1,000.00 a month

that was previously ordered. (N.T. January 13, 2020, pg. 45 lines

2-11). [Wife] testified that was the only way she could survive

financially. (N.T. January 13, 2020, [pg. 45] line 5). The Master

and the court found [Wife’s] testimony to be credible. [Husband]

wants to argue for a higher alimony award for a longer period of

time but fails to consider [Wife’s] ability to pay. [Wife] has been

able to keep current on all of the bills and mortgage payments

because she has been able to work overtime. [Husband] is lucky

that [Wife] was able to work overtime as it provided her the ability

to preserve and maintain what few marital assets exist in this

case. There is no guarantee that [Wife] will continue to have

overtime hours available to her. [Husband] has been receiving

$1000.00 a month in alimony since February 7, 2018 in addition

to his monthly social security disability payments. He was also

ordered to receive a portion of the equity in the marital home, an

asset that [Wife] has paid for and maintained during the course of

the marriage and throughout the separation and a 50% portion of

[Wife’s] retirement savings account which [Husband] can start to

draw on should he need the money. While [Husband’s] alimony

amount was reduced to $500.00 per month, the court did extend

the payment of that amount one (1) additional year so that

[Husband] will continue to receive alimony payments until [Wife]

is age 66.5 years. The court believes that terminating [Wife’s]

alimony obligation at her official retirement age, in light of the fact

that she testified that she would not work past that age, is

reasonable and equitable especially given the parties’ age, station

in life, their respective contributions during the marriage and their

efforts to preserve the marital assets after separation.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/20, at unnumbered 12-14 (footnote omitted).

A review of the record in the instant case, as well as the trial court’s

opinion, clearly supports the trial court’s consideration of the factors set forth

in 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(b)(1-17) of the Divorce Code. As the trial court noted,

ability to pay is among the factors that a court should consider when

determining whether to award alimony. Brubaker v. Brubaker, 201 A.3d

- 17 -

J-S07004-21

180, 190 (Pa. Super. 2018). The Master recommended and the trial court

found that Wife testified credibly that she had to work overtime in order to

pay Husband $1,000.00 per month that was previously ordered. Further, the

trial court properly noted that Husband was awarded a portion of the equity

of the home, an asset paid for and maintained by Wife, as well as 50% of

Wife’s 401(k) account, as part of the equitable distribution of the marital

estate. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of alimony.

In his final issue, Husband avers that the trial court abused its discretion

or committed an error of law “in its calculation or determination for equitable

distribution regarding the marital home, marital debt, the motorcycle and

attorneys fees and expenses.” Husband’s Brief at 34.

First, Husband reiterates his earlier argument that his share of the

equity in the home should be greater. Husband’s Brief at 25. Husband also

states that the Master’s report, as adopted by the trial court, is worded in such

a manner that Husband will not receive 50% of the equity in the home if it

sells for more than $138,000.00. Id.

We previously set forth our standard of review for an award of equitable

distribution. Once again, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

awarding Husband his share in the marital home. Indeed, as the trial court

noted, Wife paid for and maintained the marital home with little to no help

from Husband. Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/30, at unnumbered 15. Further,

Husband cannot afford to pay the mortgage or maintain the home, and it was

- 18 -

J-S07004-21

through Wife’s actions alone that the home remained a marital asset rather

than becoming a marital debt. Id. We have thoroughly reviewed the record

in this case and find no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s

equitable-distribution scheme as it relates to the marital home.

Husband next contends that the trial court and Master erred related to

the marital debt. Husband’s Brief at 35. Specifically, Husband argues:

The Master made a finding that there were two loans: one

from Wife’s 401(k) with a date of separation balance of $6,444.22

and a “second debt secured by Wife’s RSP that was used to

purchase Husband’s automobile. Wife paid this debt off paying

$1,800.00.” (Masters Recommendation Page 5, paragraph 5).

However, the value of all of the outstanding loans at the time of

separation was $6,444.22, which already included the $1,800

that Wife Paid off. (See 401(k) statement dated December 2107

and Defendant’s Exhibit 14.) “Plain error is found where the

decision is based on factual findings with no support in the

evidentiary or legal factors other than those that are relevant to

such an award.” Diament v. Diament, 816 A.2d 256, 270 (Pa.

Super. 2003)

Husband’s Brief at 36. Husband’s argument relating to marital debt is

confusing and unclear as to his claim that the trial court abused its discretion

or committed an error of law. We will not act as counsel for Husband and

develop arguments on his behalf. Irwin Union Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v.

Famous, 4 A.3d 1099, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2010). Thus, we find the issue

waived. Id.

Husband also posits that Wife testified there was a judgment against

her from Northern Leasing Systems in the amount of $2,485.62. Husband’s

Brief at 36. Husband avers that in the exhibit accompanying that testimony,

- 19 -

J-S07004-21

an offer to settle the debt for $1,491.37 was made. Id. Husband then

asserts, without citation to relevant testimony, that neither Wife nor her

counsel informed Husband of this offer. Although Husband has included a

copy of a document that he alleges was an exhibit in the Reproduced Record,

we note that he fails to state the exhibit number and set forth where in the

certified record the exhibit was entered into evidence. Following extensive

review of the transcript of the Master’s hearing and the exhibits entered

thereto, we are unable to locate where the exhibit was entered into evidence

or a copy of the exhibit.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119 addresses arguments in appellate briefs and

corresponding references to the record and provides, in relevant part, as

follows:

If reference is made to the pleadings, evidence, charge,

opinion or order, or any other matter appearing in the record, the

argument must set forth, in immediate connection

therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the place

in the record where the matter referred to appears ... .

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (emphases added).

It is not the role of this Court to develop an argument for a litigant or to

scour the record to find specific evidence to support an appellant’s arguments.

J.J. DeLuca Co. Inc. v. Toll Naval Assocs., 56 A.3d 402, 411 (Pa. Super.

2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Beshore, 916 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Pa.

Super. 2007)). Therefore, “[w]hen an allegation is unsupported [by] any

citation to the record, such that this Court is prevented from assessing this

- 20 -

J-S07004-21

issue and determining whether error exists, the allegation is waived for

purposes of appeal.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 979 A.2d 387, 393 (Pa.

Super. 2009) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c)).3

Next Husband asserts that the trial court erred when it awarded the

Johnny Pag motorcycle to Husband. Husband’s Brief at 37. Husband argues

that even though the motorcycle is titled in his name, he does not want it and

has no way to retrieve it. Id. Husband further avers, without relevant

citation, that because it will cost more than the value of the motorcycle to ship

it to Florida or allow Husband to retrieve it, it should have been awarded to

Wife. Id. Once again, we note that Husband’s argument is based upon facts

that are not in the record. Husband testified that he did not have the means

to transport the motorcycle to Florida. No testimony was presented regarding

the cost of doing so versus the value of the motorcycle. Further, we note that

although Husband testified that he believed the motorcycle was valued at

approximately $500.00, the master found it to be worth $2,749.50, an amount

Husband does not dispute. Master’s Report, 2/26/20, at 7.

The trial court set forth the following analysis relating to the motorcycle:

[Husband] claims that it is [a] hardship for him to retrieve

the motorcycle from the marital residence[,] and the costs of

____________________________________________

3 Husband also asserts that the Master improperly “indicated” that a lien was

filed against the marital home because of this judgment; he argues that there

was no testimony establishing this fact. Husband’s Brief at 37. This statement

is belied by the record. Wife specifically testified that a lien was taken against

the marital home because the judgment was not paid. N.T. (Master’s

Hearing), 1/13/20, at 26.

- 21 -

J-S07004-21

bringing the motorcycle back to Florida with him are overly

burdensome. The court finds that while [Wife] paid for

[Husband’s] motorcycle, it was never her vehicle. [Husband]

could have easily taken the motorcycle with him when he left the

marital residence in December of 2017. Additionally, [Husband]

has a number of options to dispose of the motorcycle including

selling it here in Pennsylvania. The court finds this to be another

example of [Husband] creating an issue and expecting [Wife] to

clean up his mess. [Husband] wanted the motorcycle and [Wife]

paid for him to have the motorcycle. Now, because [Husband]

decided to relocate to Florida, he feels that [Wife] should be

responsible for dealing with it. The court additionally notes that

[Husband] has requested numerous pieces of personal property

from the marital residence, including his grandmother’s stuff, his

grandfather’s stuff, jewelry, clothing, his Ozzy paraphernalia,

items that were his parents, childhood items, Glenn Turner books

and tapes and sports paraphernalia including his football jerseys.

(N.T. January 13, 2020, pg. 121 lines 2-12). … [Wife] testified

that [Husband’s] items are all boxed up and sitting in the garage

of the marital residence waiting for him to retrieve them. (N.T.

January 13, 2020, pg. 40 lines 4-11).

It is the position of this court that it is not [Wife’s]

responsibility to ship [Husband’s] personal items to Florida

especially when [Husband] left those items behind and voluntarily

moved to Florida. The court believes that when [Husband] makes

arrangements to obtain his personal items from the marital home,

he can make arrangements to retrieve the motorcycle.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/20, at unnumbered 17-18. Given all of the above,

we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of the

motorcycle to Husband.

Finally, Husband argues that the trial court erred when it failed to award

him attorneys’ fees. Husband’s Brief at 38. As we previously have held:

We will reverse a determination of counsel fees and costs only for

an abuse of discretion. The purpose of an award of counsel fees

is to promote fair administration of justice by enabling the

dependent spouse to maintain or defend the divorce action

- 22 -

J-S07004-21

without being placed at a financial disadvantage; the parties must

be ‘on par’ with one another.

Counsel fees are awarded on the facts of each case after a review

of all the relevant factors. These factors include the payor’s ability

to pay, the requesting party’s financial resources, the value of the

services rendered, and the property received in equitable

distribution.

Counsel fees are awarded only upon a showing of need. In most

cases, each party’s financial considerations will ultimately dictate

whether an award of counsel fees is appropriate. Also pertinent

to our review is that in determining whether the court has abused

its discretion, we will not usurp the court’s duty as fact finder.

Brubaker, 201 A.3d at 191 (citing Busse, 921 A.2d at 1258).

In the instant matter, the Master recommended that each party pay his

own attorney fees and share equally in the Master’s fee and cost of the

hearing. The trial court adopted the Master’s recommendation for the

following reasons:

In the instant case, neither [Husband] nor [Wife] is … in a

great financial position. [Husband] is living on social security

disability payments and alimony and [Wife] is working, paying

alimony and paying the majority of the debt from the marriage.

[Husband] testified that he does not have enough money to cover

his expenses and [Wife] testified that she is working overtime

every chance she gets to make ends meet. (N.T. January 13,

2020, pg. 45 lines 2-11, pg. 113 lines 12-14). The court finds

that both parties testified credibly on this matter and that neither

[Wife] nor [Husband] is living extravagantly. The purpose of an

award of counsel fees and expenses is to financially equalize the

parties so that no one party has an advantage over the other

simply because one of the parties has more access to financial

resources. The court finds that [Wife] and [Husband] are on par

with each other financially and that both [Wife] and [Husband] are

barely making ends meet every month. For this reason, the court

agrees with the Master’s recommendation to deny [Husband’s]

request for counsel fees and expenses. Both [Husband] and

- 23 -

J-S07004-21

[Wife] had access to legal counsel and neither one of them was

prejudiced by their current financial position with regard to fully

litigating this matter.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/20, at unnumbered 19-20.

As has been repeatedly noted by the Master and the trial court, Husband

and Wife have limited means and a small marital estate. Indeed, although

there is a disparity in the total income of the parties, both parties testified that

they struggled to make ends meet and neither lives an extravagant lifestyle.

Wife testified that she works overtime in order to be able to afford to pay

Husband alimony. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that

both parties should pay their own attorney fees and split the cost of the

Master’s report and hearing. Teodorski, 857 A.2d at 201 (finding no abuse

of discretion where the trial court had a “reasonable rationale” for its decision

to award Wife less money for counsel fees than the Master recommended).

Husband is due no relief on these grounds. For all the foregoing reasons, the

order is affirmed.4

Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

4 We note that in her brief, Wife stated that she had been laid off by her

employer and, as of the time of the filing of her brief, was hospitalized due to

brain tumors. Although this Court is sympathetic to Wife’s current situation,

we did not, and indeed could not, consider facts that are not of the record in

upholding the trial court’s order. Johnson v. Johnson, 153 A.3d 318, 322

(Pa. Super. 2016).

- 24 -

J-S07004-21

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/11/2021

- 25 -