SHARRON TASHA FORD v. CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

SHARRON TASHA FORD,

Appellant,

v.

CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH,

a Florida municipal corporation,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-3664

[May 5, 2021]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach

County; G. Joseph Curley, Jr., Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2010-CA-016550-XXXX-

MB.

Samuel Alexander of Alexander Appellate Law P.A., DeLand, for appellant.

Michael T. Burke and Jonathan H. Railey of Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch,

Burke, Piper & Hochman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff appeals a final summary judgment on her false arrest claims.

She argues that law enforcement did not have probable cause to arrest her for

intercepting oral communications and obstruction without violence. We disagree

and affirm.

• The Incident

Law enforcement arrested the plaintiff’s minor son for trespassing at a

theater. The officers called the plaintiff to come and pick him up. She drove to

her son’s location.

When she arrived, her son and the police officers were on a public sidewalk

directly across the street from the movie theater entrance. The sidewalk

bordered the edge of the parking lot. As pedestrians are going to and from the

theater, they walk within feet of the location where the police officers were

holding the plaintiff’s son. At various times, twenty to fifty people milled around

the theater entrance.

When the plaintiff arrived, the officers were standing on the sidewalk about

twenty feet from where her son was being detained by shopping center security

guards. She approached the officers with her cell phone on record. One officer

told the plaintiff she needed his permission to videotape him. In response, she

said, “[he] knew that when [she] came up here with the camera.”

The lead officer asked for the plaintiff’s identification. He then asked for her

address, which she could not provide. She explained they had recently moved

here and were staying with her mother. She did not know the address.

On multiple occasions, the officers asked the plaintiff to stop recording their

statements and conversations. She ignored their requests and continued to

video and audio record them as they processed her son and attempted to gather

relevant information as part of their investigation.

The officers advised the plaintiff that she needed their consent to audio record

them. At one point, one officer asked her if she was still recording him. She

falsely told him that she was not recording him when in fact she was. The

plaintiff admitted she never had the officers’ consent to audio record them.

The plaintiff also recorded a citizen who stopped to speak to one of the officers.

The citizen did not know the plaintiff, did not know he was being recorded, and

never authorized her to audio record his conversation with the officer. The

plaintiff also admitted she never obtained the citizen’s consent to audio record

him.

The officers made numerous requests to the plaintiff to stop recording them,

which she ignored. The plaintiff was confrontational in her approach and

refused to comply with the officers’ instructions.

She was permitted to speak to her son, who told her that he had sneaked into

the movie theater without paying, was caught, and ordered to leave. He was

leaving when he was stopped. Believing the officer to be a security guard, the

son asked the officer, “You’re not the police so what is this necessary for?” He

stated the officer then forcibly arrested him by slamming him against the hood

of a car.

After the plaintiff finished speaking to her son, the lead officer began to

explain the next steps. The plaintiff asked the officer why he arrested her son

and why he “slammed” him on a car for trespassing when he had already left the

premises. At this point, the interaction became a little more heated and another

officer approached the plaintiff. She explained that she “[was] just asking

questions” because she was “a mother and a concerned parent” and that she

“ha[d] that right.”

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The lead officer explained why they had called her. She responded that she

was “in shock” when they called and that “[the police officers] were aggressive

towards [her].” She felt that they were ready to “throw [her] in handcuffs.” The

officer asked if she was ready to talk and asked if she was still filming. When

she said nothing further, the lead officer proceeded to explain why they called

her.

At this point, the plaintiff panned the camera around her, and a mall security

guard or an officer off to the side put his hand up and said, “No ma’am, I don’t

want you to take my picture.” She moved the frame away from him. Another

officer asked her whether she was recording with audio. She responded, “Oh

now you’re gonna [sic] arrest me.” The officer stated that “it was against the law”

in the State of Florida to record police officers doing their job on audio and video.

He told her that he did not mind her taking pictures, but that she should not

continue recording with video and audio.

The plaintiff continued recording, and repeated again, “[s]o now you’re going

to arrest me . . . and now you’re going to harass me. Now you want to intimidate

me.” The officer told her that he would tell her if he was going to arrest her. At

that point, the video cuts off.

After a pause, the recording began again, showing an interaction between the

plaintiff and an officer who told her again to turn the camera off. She continued

to record and said: “So I escalated it? And, so he wasn’t being arrested for that

but now I escalated it?” When ordered to turn the camera off again, she stated,

“This is a public forum.” The video then cuts off.

The video resumes once more with the plaintiff speaking to an officer as he

explains how they were going to give her son a trespass warning, instead of

arresting him. Because she chose however to disobey their requests to end the

recording, they chose to go with a different option.

The plaintiff then interrupted the officer to indicate she was only asking

questions. The officer responded that he approached her in a very polite manner

and that she did not even give him the common courtesy to explain what was

going on. She continued to express that she has the right to ask questions and

the video ends.

The police took the plaintiff’s camera and placed her under arrest. At the

police station, she was booked for intercepting oral communications and

obstruction without violence. No charges were ever filed.

• The Lawsuit

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The plaintiff filed a multi-count complaint against the City and the officers for

false arrest, declaratory relief, and for violating her civil rights under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The City removed the case to federal court where the civil rights claims

were dismissed. The state law claims were remanded back to state court.

There, the City moved for summary judgment, arguing the material facts were

not in dispute and the police had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for

intercepting oral communications and for obstruction without violence. The

plaintiff responded that the relevant parties lacked any expectation of privacy,

so the wiretapping statute did not apply, and her arrest for obstruction without

violence was based on the police officers’ erroneous belief that she was illegally

recording them.

The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. In support of its

decision, the court found the recorded parties had a subjective and reasonable

expectation of privacy in their communications so that probable cause existed to

arrest the plaintiff for violating the wiretapping statute. The trial court also

found the plaintiff lied about recording them and obstructed them in their

detention of her son, finding probable cause for her arrest for obstruction

without violence. The trial court decided that its finding on the existence of

probable cause mooted the declaratory judgment claim.

• Probable Cause to Arrest for Obstruction of Justice

The standard of review for an order granting summary judgment is de novo.

Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000).

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. “Summary judgment

may be granted only where the facts are so crystallized that nothing remains but

questions of law.” Vander Voort v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 127 So. 3d

536, 538 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing McCabe v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 68 So. 3d

995, 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)).

Probable cause is an affirmative defense to a claim of false arrest. Mailly v.

Jenne, 867 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). We have held:

To show probable cause in a false arrest situation, it is not necessary

that the arresting officer know facts that would absolutely prove

beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the person charged; probable

cause exists when the circumstances are sufficient to cause a

reasonably cautious person to believe that the person accused is

guilty of the offense charged.

Id. (quoting Fla. Game & Freshwater Fish Comm’n v. Dockery, 676 So. 2d 471,

474 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)). “Probable cause is judged by the facts and legal state

4

of affairs that existed at the time of the arrest.” Id. It is a matter of law for the

court; an appellate court is not bound by the trial court’s legal conclusions.

Dockery, 676 So. 2d at 474.

The issue then is whether law enforcement had probable cause to arrest the

plaintiff for obstruction without violence under section 843.02, Florida Statutes

(2019).

Section 843.02 provides: “Whoever shall resist, obstruct, or oppose any

officer . . . in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any

legal duty, without offering or doing violence to the person of the officer shall be

guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .” § 843.02, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The crime

requires proof of two elements: (1) the officer was engaged in the lawful execution

of a legal duty; and (2) the action by the accused constituted obstruction or

resistance of that legal duty. Jay v. State, 731 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA

1999).

The plaintiff argues that she did not violate section 843.02 because “her

conduct was limited to a verbal exchange with the police” and “she in no way

physically obstructed or impeded the police’s detention of her son. . . .” But,

physical obstruction is not required to violate the statute. The plaintiff’s attempt

to narrowly read the record, the statute, and the case law is flawed.

A review of the recorded incident reveals the plaintiff’s approach to the officers

was designed to impede what should have been a short, uneventful exchange of

her son’s custody. Having been stopped for sneaking into a movie theatre

without paying admission, law enforcement sought to avoid the juvenile’s arrest

by contacting his mother to come and get him. Rather than discuss the

circumstances leading to her son’s detention, she immediately became

confrontational and began recording the officers.

When directed to provide her address, she was unable to do so. When

directed to stop recording, she refused to do so. And when the officers calmly

asked to speak with her, she accused them of escalating the situation. The

plaintiff consistently and persistently failed to comply with the officers’ direction

and requests. In short, she obstructed their investigation and processing of her

son’s detention—a lawful execution of their duty.

The trial court reviewed the video in its entirety and found probable cause for

the plaintiff’s arrest for obstruction without violence. We have done the same.

We too find probable cause. Because probable cause existed to arrest the

plaintiff on the obstruction without violence charge, we affirm the summary

judgment. There is therefore no need to address whether probable cause existed

to arrest the plaintiff on the violation of the wiretap statute. Thomas v. State,

395 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (“Where, by objective standards,

5

probable cause to arrest for a certain offense exists, the validity of an arrest does

not turn on the fact that an arrest was effected on another charge.”).

Affirmed.

MAY and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

WARNER, J., dissents with opinion.

WARNER, J., dissenting.

This appeal arises out of a familiar scene on the news at night: the videotaping

of the police during an arrest. In appellant’s appeal from a final summary

judgment in favor of the City and its officers based on her complaint alleging

false arrest, appellant contends that the court erred in finding that the police

officers had probable cause to arrest her for intercepting oral communications

in violation of the wiretap statute, section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2009), and

for obstructing without violence in violation of section 843.02, Florida Statutes

(2009). The alleged violations occurred when appellant was videotaping the

officers as they were detaining her son. I would reverse on both issues. The

officers had no reasonable subjective expectation of privacy when they were

conducting the detention, so they did not have probable cause to arrest her for

violating the wiretap statute. And, appellant did not physically obstruct the

officers but only asked questions, which did not provide probable cause to arrest

her for obstruction.

Facts

One evening in 2009, Boynton Beach police officers arrested appellant’s

minor son on suspicion of trespassing at the Muvico Theater in Boynton Beach.

The officers called appellant to come and pick up her son. As requested by the

officers, appellant drove to her son’s location.

When she arrived, her son and the police officers were on a public sidewalk

directly across the street from the entrance to movie theater. 1 The distance from

the sidewalk to the movie theater was the width of three driving lanes. The

sidewalk bordered the edge of the parking lot, and throughout the course of a

near-eleven-minute-long video segments, pedestrians walked within feet of the

officers and appellant’s son to get to and from the theater. At various times

throughout the course of appellant’s interaction with the officers, approximately

twenty to fifty people milled around the entrance to the theater.

Appellant approached the officers with a video camera. The officers stood on

the sidewalk about twenty feet from where her son was being detained by

1The facts set forth are gleaned from viewing the video segments recorded by appellant

during this incident.

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shopping center security guards. One officer told her that by law she needed his

permission to be videotaping him. In response, she said that “[he] knew that

when [she] came up here with the camera.”

The lead officer asked if appellant had identification, which she did. She then

said, “Oh, I’m recording. I just wanted to let you know that I’m recording.” The

officer said, “Um, yeah you can. Um, may—maybe.” He then discussed her

identification, and then told her whenever she was ready, he would talk to her

about her son’s situation. She replied that she was ready to talk. She was

allowed to speak to her son, who told her that he had sneaked into the movie

theater without paying, was caught, and ordered to leave. He was leaving when

the lead officer in the detention stopped him. Believing the officer to be a security

guard, the son asked the officer, “You’re not the police so what is this necessary

for?” He stated that after that the officer forcibly arrested him by slamming him

against the hood of a car.

After appellant and her son finished speaking, the lead officer then began to

explain the next steps. Appellant asked the officer why he arrested her son and

why he “slammed” him on a car for trespassing when he had already left the

premises. At this point, the interaction became more heated and another officer

approached appellant. She explained that she “[was] just asking questions”

because she was “a mother and a concerned parent” and that she “ha[d] that

right.”

The lead officer explained why they had called her. She responded that she

was “in shock” when they called and that “[the police officers] were aggressive

towards [her].” She continued that she felt that they were ready to “throw [her]

in handcuffs.” The officer asked if she was ready to talk and asked if she was

still filming. When she said nothing further, the lead officer proceeded to explain

why they called her.

Appellant spoke to her son again briefly and then stood to the side, still

recording. Five female teenagers were standing nearby watching. The lead

officer again explained what they were doing, noting it was not to embarrass the

boy, but was the result of his actions. He explained they were almost done and

would let him go soon.

Appellant panned the camera around her, and a mall security guard or an

officer off to the side put his hand up and said, “No ma’am, I don’t want you to

take my picture.” She moved the frame away from him, as he repeated his

request. Another officer asked her whether she was recording with audio. She

responded, “Oh now you’re gonna [sic] arrest me.” The officer stated that “it was

against the law” in the State of Florida to record police officers doing their job on

audio and video. He told her that he did not mind her taking pictures, but that

she was not to continue recording with video and audio.

7

Appellant continued videotaping, and repeated again, “[s]o now you’re going

to arrest me . . . and now you’re going to harass me. Now you want to intimidate

me.” The officer told her that he would tell her if he was going to arrest her. At

that point, the video cuts off.

The video resumes and appellant speaks with the lead officer about her

address. A man and a woman who apparently knew the lead detective interrupt

appellant’s conversation with the officer and exchange a few words with the

officer. The man has his back to the camera for most of the conversation, and

the conversation is unintelligible.

When the lead officer resumes his discussion with appellant, he asks her if

the camera was still on. She falsely claimed that it was turned off. Other officers

approach her and tell her that her son is under arrest. The tone of appellant’s

voice on the video indicates that she is agitated. The lead officer then tells her

to “hang tight” and he did not want to hear another word from her until they

were finished with the paperwork at which point she could leave.

After a pause in the video, it resumes with an interaction between appellant

and an officer who tells her to turn the camera off. She continues to state that

she is asking a question, “So I escalated it? And so he wasn’t being arrested for

that but now I escalated it?” When ordered to turn the camera off again, she

stated, “This is a public forum.” The video then cuts off.

The video resumes with appellant speaking to a police officer as he explains

how they were going to give her son just a trespass warning, instead of arresting

him and giving him a trespass warning. Because appellant chose not to listen

to what they were saying, they chose to go with different options. Appellant

interrupts and states that she was just asking questions. The officer continues

and says that he approached her in a very polite manner and that she did not

even give him the common courtesy to explain what was going on. She continues

to say that she has the right to ask questions and the video ends.

The police took appellant’s camera and placed her under arrest. At the police

station, she was booked for intercepting oral communications and obstruction

without violence. No charges were ever filed.

Appellant filed a multi-count complaint against the City and the officers for

false arrest, declaratory relief, and counts for violation of her civil rights under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City removed the case to federal court, where the civil

rights claims were dismissed, and the state law claims were remanded to state

court.

Back in state court, the City filed a motion for summary judgment arguing

that the material facts were not in dispute, and that as a matter of law the police

had probable cause to arrest appellant for intercepting oral communications and

8

for obstruction without violence. In her response, appellant argued that the

relevant parties lacked any expectation of privacy, so that the wiretapping statute

did not apply, and that her arrest for obstruction was based on the police officers’

erroneous belief that she was illegally recording them.

The court granted summary judgment on both counts of the complaint. In

support of its decision with regard to Count I, the court found that the recorded

parties had a subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy in their

communications, so that probable cause existed to arrest appellant for violating

the wiretapping statute. The trial court also found that appellant obstructed the

police in their detention of her son and lied to the police about recording them,

so that probable cause existed to arrest her for obstruction without violence.

With regard to appellant’s Count II declaratory judgment claim, the court found

that the City was entitled to judgment because the existence of probable cause

for her arrest rendered the claim moot.

Analysis

The standard of review for an order granting summary judgment is de novo.

Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000).

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. “Summary

judgment may be granted only where the facts are so crystallized that nothing

remains but questions of law.” Vander Voort v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,

127 So. 3d 536, 538 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing McCabe v. Fla. Power & Light

Co., 68 So. 3d 995, 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)).

Probable cause is an affirmative defense to a claim of false arrest. Malley v.

Jenne, 867 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). The test for probable cause

is:

To show probable cause in a false arrest situation, it is not necessary

that the arresting officer know facts that would absolutely prove

beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the person charged; probable

cause exists when the circumstances are sufficient to cause a

reasonably cautious person to believe that the person accused is

guilty of the offense charged.

Id. (quoting Fla. Game & Freshwater Fish Comm’n v. Dockery, 676 So. 2d 471,

474 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)). “Probable cause is judged by the facts and legal state

of affairs that existed at the time of the arrest.” Id. It is a matter of law for the

court, and an appellate court is not bound by the legal conclusions of the trial

court. Dockery, 676 So. 2d at 474.

9

Because as a matter of law, I conclude that the officers could not have had a

reasonable subjective expectation of privacy, there was no probable cause to

arrest appellant for violation of the wiretap statute. Further, because appellant’s

conduct was verbal and not physical, and her lie about recording did not interfere

with the performance of a legal duty, I also conclude that the officers did not

have probable cause to arrest her for obstruction. Therefore, I would reverse the

summary judgment.

Whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Ford for violation of

Florida’s wiretapping statute, section 934.03, Florida Statutes

Section 934.03, Florida Statutes (2009), as it existed in 2009 is

substantively the same as today’s version. Titled “Interception and disclosure of

wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited,” the statute contains a

general prohibition on the interception of oral communications. It provides:

1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any

person who:

(a) Intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any

other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept . . . any . . . oral .

. . communication;

....

shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) [imposing criminal

liability].

§ 934.03(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). “Intercept” is defined as “the aural or other

acquisition of the contents of . . . oral communication through the use of any

electronic, mechanical, or other device.” Section 934.02(3), Fla. Stat. (2009).

“Oral communication” is defined in the statute as “any oral communication

uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is

not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such

expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a

public meeting or any electronic communication.” § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2009)

(emphasis added). The statute provides a list of specific exceptions to the general

prohibition in section 934.03(1). § 934.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). One of these

exceptions is for situations in which all parties to the conversation have given

prior consent. § 934.03(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2009).

The test to determine whether a person exhibits a subjective expectation of

privacy set forth in section 934.02(2), defining “oral communication,” is

substantially the same as the test enumerated in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.

735, 740 (1979), to determine a Fourth Amendment right to privacy. See

Jackson v. State, 18 So. 3d 1016, 1029–30 (Fla. 2009); State v. Inciarrano, 473

10

So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Fla. 1985); Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA

1994), approved, 655 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1995). “[F]or an oral conversation to be

protected under section 934.03, the speaker must have an actual subjective

expectation of privacy, along with a societal recognition that the

expectation is reasonable.” State v. Smith, 641 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1994)

(emphasis supplied).

A person exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy only when “the individual

has shown that ‘he seeks to preserve [something] as private.’” 442 U.S. at 740

(quoting Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). A party’s claim to a subjective

expectation of privacy in a conversation can be rejected when there is no evidence

the party “made any effort or otherwise took precautions to keep the conversation

private.” Stevenson v. State, 667 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also

McDonough v. Fernandez-Rundle, 862 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he

expectations of privacy needed to trigger application of [Florida’s wiretapping

statute] must be exhibited; in other words they must be ‘shown externally’ or

‘demonstrated.’”).

“A reasonable expectation of privacy under a given set of circumstances

depends upon one’s actual subjective expectation of privacy as well as whether

society is prepared to recognize this expectation as reasonable.” Inciarrano, 473

So. 2d at 1275 (citation omitted). I would hold that a law enforcement officer

has no reasonable subjective expectation of privacy in conversations he has with

the public or the arrestee in the performance of the officer’s duties in public

places. 2 They are performing a public duty at the time, and the public has a

right to hear their words. This is as true today as it was in 2009.

A rule otherwise would mean that everyone who pulls out a cell phone to

record an interaction with police, whether as a bystander, a witness, or a

suspect, is committing a crime. Given how important cell phone videos have

been for police accountability across the nation, I do not believe that society is

ready to recognize that the recording of those interactions, which include audio

recordings, are somehow subject to the officer’s right of privacy. If that were the

case, then had the individual who recorded George Floyd saying to the officers “I

can’t breathe” been in Florida, he would have been guilty of a crime.

There are few cases in Florida concerning whether a law enforcement officer

has a reasonable subjective right of privacy in his/her oral communications

during the performance of his duties with the public. The City cites to an

Eleventh Circuit unpublished opinion, Migut v. Flynn, 131 F. App’x 262 (11th

Cir. 2005), and this Court’s decision in State v. Keen, 384 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1980), to argue that the police officers had both subjective and reasonable

2 While there may be circumstances which may call for non-public disclosure of

conversations, such as with confidential informants or persons who wish to give

anonymous tips, this case does not deal with one of those situations.

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expectations of privacy. Keen does not discuss reasonable expectation of

privacy, and Migut, which is not binding on this Court, incorrectly relied on Keen

in its discussion about an officer’s expectation of privacy.

In Keen, the defendant was seen with a bugging device at a jail. 384 So. 2d

at 285. An officer approached the defendant and another individual who were

engaged in a conversation. Id. As the officer spoke to the defendant, he noticed

what he perceived to be tape recorder in his hand. The defendant then left, and

the officer put out a BOLO to stop the vehicle. Id. at 286. The vehicle was

stopped, and defendant was arrested at a later time for violating the wiretap

statute. The trial court found no probable cause to stop the vehicle and

suppressed the evidence found in the stop. This Court reversed, concluding that

the officers who stopped the vehicle had probable cause because one of them

had been informed by the officer who spoke with the defendant at the jail that

he had seen the recording device as he was talking to the defendant. Id. at 287.

The Court noted that the first officer had good reason to believe that his

conversation was being recorded, especially as he had prior knowledge that the

defendant was carrying a bugging device. Id. at 287. The Court did not consider

whether the conversation at the jail was reasonably subject to an expectation of

privacy. The officer involved, however, was not engaged in any performance of

his legal duties, as far as the facts show, when he was conversing with the

defendant. More importantly, Keen was decided well prior to State v. Smith which

held that section 943.03 required both an actual subjective expectation of

privacy as well as a societal recognition of that expectation.

Migut is likewise distinguishable. It involved a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim by a

plaintiff arrested for violation of the wiretap statute. Under a section 1983 claim,

the officer is protected by qualified immunity, which a plaintiff may overcome

only if it is shown that the plaintiff had a constitutional right which was clearly

established. There, the plaintiff, a tow truck operator stopped by a deputy for

disobeying a stop sign, began to record his conversation with the deputy with a

handheld tape recorder. Id. at 263. Upon noticing the recorder, the deputy told

Migut to turn the recorder off. Id. Migut refused and the officer placed Migut

under arrest for intercepting an oral communication in violation of section

934.03. The court held that the deputy had “arguable probable cause” to believe

Migut was violating section 934.03(1)(a) when Migut taped their conversation

and where the deputy did not consent. Id. at 267. In its reasoning, the court

simply stated that “it was not unreasonable for [the deputy] to expect that the

conversation would be protected under § 934.03(1)(a),” citing to Keen. Id. Thus,

the plaintiff had not established a constitutional right to be free from arrest for

recording his interaction with the officer, based solely on Keen.

Migut’s reliance on Keen is misplaced because Keen never held that the officer

had a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy in the conversation being

recorded at the jail. However, as pointed out above, it is not clear in Keen that

12

the officer was engaged in the execution of his public duties at the time he was

having the conversation with the defendant. In Migut, however, the officer was

performing his duty in executing a traffic stop. Regardless, I would disagree with

the conclusion of Migut that the officer could expect his conversation with Migut

was somehow protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy. Moreover,

because the court failed to apply State v. Smith, it did not follow supreme court

precedent.

A Florida case more on point is Department of Agricultural & Consumer

Services v. Edwards, 654 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). There, Edwards was

employed as a law enforcement officer with the Department of Agriculture. He

secretly recorded a meeting between himself and several other officers, including

a major and a captain, about a grievance he had filed. Id. at 630. He was then

arrested for violation of the wiretap statute. Edwards was terminated because

of this violation. A hearing officer determined that the officers had no reasonable

subjective expectation of privacy in their investigatory interview with Edwards.

Id. Nevertheless, the agency terminated Edwards, and he appealed. The First

District relied on State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Fla. 1985) in

concluding that the officers did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy

which society would recognize:

We conclude that the hearing officer was justified in finding that any

subjective expectation of privacy held by Edwards’s supervisors was

not reasonable under the circumstances of this case. We reach this

conclusion based not on the officers’ suspicion that Edwards would

record their statements, but because of the number of persons

present when the statements were made, the place chosen for the

interview, and the very nature of that interview.

Id. at 632–33 (emphasis supplied). The “nature of the interview” in Edwards was

a disciplinary investigation into Edward’s grievances conducted by public officers

as part of their duties. Similarly, in this case a public officer was conducting an

arrest of an individual, the very core of the officer’s public functions. And, the

officer was performing this public function in the presence of several other

officers and at least twenty members of the public who passed by.

Under a similar statute, Pennsylvania has determined that an officer has no

reasonable subjective expectation of privacy in communications occurring

during the public execution of the officer’s duties. In Commonwealth v. Henlen,

564 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1989), the court held that the surreptitious recording by the

defendant of an investigative interrogation did not violate Pennsylvania’s wiretap

statute, because the officer had no reasonable subjective expectation of the

privacy of the interrogation.

13

In 2001, Massachusetts took the position that its wiretap statute did prohibit

the surreptitious recording of an officer’s conversations during a traffic stop. See

Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001). The statute in question,

unlike the Florida statute, did not limit the oral communication to which it

applied to ones in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Nevertheless, the First Circuit recently held the statute unconstitutional as a

violation of the First Amendment, because it prohibited the secret recording of

public officials discharging their public duties in public spaces. Project Veritas

Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813 (1st Cir. 2020).

While no First Amendment challenge is involved in the present case, the

Rollins court’s opinion provides insight into the issue of whether an officer’s

subjective expectation of privacy is reasonable. The court understood that the

accountability function of recording police officers performing a public function

was consistent with First Amendment news-gathering protections:

[A]s recent events around the nation vividly illustrate, such

undetected recording can itself serve “a cardinal First Amendment

interest in protecting and promoting ‘the free discussion of

governmental affairs,’ ” and “not only aids in the uncovering of

abuses . . . but also may have a salutary effect on the functioning of

government more generally.” Glik [v. Cuniffe], 655 F.3d [78,] [] 82–

83 [1st Cir. 2011] (quoting Mills [v. Alabama], 384 U.S. [214,] [] 218[]

[1996]); cf. Fields [v. City of Philadelphia], 862 F.3d [353,] [] 359 [3d

Cir. 2017] (“Civilian video . . . fills the gaps created when police

choose not to record video or withhold their footage from the

public.”).

....

In sum, a citizen’s audio recording of on-duty police officers’

treatment of civilians in public spaces while carrying out their

official duties, even when conducted without an officer’s knowledge,

can constitute newsgathering every bit as much as a credentialed

reporter’s after-the-fact efforts to ascertain what had transpired.

The circumstances in which such recording could be conducted

from a distance or without the officers’ knowledge and serve the very

same interest in promoting public awareness of the conduct of law

enforcement -- with all the accountability that the provision of such

information promotes -- are too numerous to permit the conclusion

that recording can be prohibited in all of those situations without

attracting any First Amendment review. We thus hold that the []

Plaintiffs’ proposed recording constitutes a type of newsgathering

that falls within the scope of the First Amendment, even though it

will be undertaken secretly within the meaning of Section 99.2.

14

Id. at 832–33 (footnote omitted).

Because recording their communications is an essential tool in gathering

information about police conduct, the police can hardly have an expectation that

their communications during the performance of their duties can be subject to

their personal expectation of privacy. See also ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583,

606 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding Illinois eavesdropping statute violates First

Amendment and noting that conversations of police officers in public spaces

performing public duties are not conversations which carry privacy

expectations).

Turning now to cases involving non-public officials, courts look to a totality

of the circumstances approach to determine whether there is a reasonable

subjective expectation of privacy in a conversation to bring it within the wiretap

statute. Factors include the location of the conversation and the parties involved

in it.

As the First District has noted, a significant factor used in determining the

reasonableness of one’s expectation of privacy in a conversation is the location

in which the conversation or communication occurs. Stevenson v. State, 667 So.

2d 410, 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). For example, in Inciarrano, the Florida

Supreme Court found that there was no reasonable expectation in an office,

based on the factual circumstances including “the quasi-public nature of the

premises within which the conversations occurred, the physical proximity and

accessibility of the premises to bystanders, and the location and visibility to the

unaided eye of the microphone used to record the conversations[.]” 473 So. 2d

at 1274. This Court in Cinci v. State, 642 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)

held that a trial court properly admitted into evidence a tape recording of a

conversation that occurred in an apartment building courtyard. Likewise, in

Stevenson, the court found that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy

because the “communication was made in an open, public area rather than in

an enclosed, private, or secluded area.” 642 So. 2d at 412. Finally, the Fifth

District found no reasonable expectation where the communication occurred in

the parking lot of a shopping center. Ruiz v. State, 416 So. 2d 32, 33 (Fla. 5th

DCA 1982). Here, the conversation occurred on the sidewalk in front of a movie

theater and next to the parking lot where people were going in and out. It was a

very public place.

Further, the conversations occurred in front of several people, mostly other

officers, but also other random pedestrians who encountered the officers. Just

as in Edwards, the number of persons present when the statements were

recorded show that it was not a private conversation. Moreover, the officers own

language indicates that they did not “seek[] to preserve” their communication as

private, or take “precautions to keep the conversation private.” Smith, 442 U.S.

15

at 740; Stevenson, 667 So. 2d at 412. At one point, the lead officer directly called

attention to the situation, when he turned towards a family he apparently knew

and called out to them, “Hey, we’re doing our job! Look, isn’t this

[unintelligible]?” The fact that officer was quite literally asking them to look

indicates that he was not concerned about his privacy. Moreover, at the

beginning of appellant’s conversation with the lead officer she tells him that she

is recording, and he gives permission, “Um, yeah you can. Um, may—maybe.”

Where the officers communicated in an open public area, and knowingly exposed

their communication to third parties, there can be no reasonable expectation of

privacy.

The City also argues that they had probable cause to arrest her for violation

of the wiretap statute when she captured the encounter between the lead officer

and his friend during the son’s detention. While the friend testified that he had

“an expectation of privacy anywhere [he was],” I conclude that where he

approached an officer in the midst of an arrest or detention and engaged in

simple pleasantries, an expectation of privacy is not reasonable. The Project

Veritas court addressed the issue of a recording picking up conversations of

individuals in and around the police performing their public duties. In arguing

for the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute, the State argued that

civilians in and around the police had rights of privacy which may be implicated

when someone is recording the police. The court noted, “[T]he only individuals

who will be recorded by the [] Plaintiffs are those in public spaces who are within

earshot of police officers and choose to speak.” 982 F.3d at 839. In other words,

those civilians put themselves in the public space by seeking to engage the

officers. Similarly, where the lead officer’s friend engaged the officer while he

was in the middle of an arrest and detention in a public place with other law

enforcement officers and citizens milling around, he had no reasonable

expectation of privacy in the conversation. From a review of the recording, it is

clear that the friend did not take any precautions to keep his conversation with

the officer private, nor did he exhibit such an expectation. Stevenson, 667 So,

2d at 412; McDonough, 862 F.3d at 1319. And, in any event, under these

circumstances society would not have recognized any such expectation as

reasonable.

At the time of appellant’s arrest for violation of section 943.03, the law was

well established that a person must have an actual subjective expectation of

privacy which society recognizes is reasonable. The facts of this case show that

no such reasonable expectation of privacy existed. Consequently, I conclude

that the officer had no probable cause to arrest appellant for a violation of the

wiretap statute. The court erred in entering summary judgment on this ground.

Whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Ford

for violation of Florida’s obstruction without violence statute,

section 843.02, Florida Statutes.

16

From a review of appellant’s video recording, the trial court also concluded

that the officer had probable cause to arrest appellant for obstruction without

violence. Section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2009), titled “Resisting officer without

violence to his or her person,” provides:

Whoever shall resist, obstruct, or oppose any officer . . . or other

person legally authorized to execute process in the execution of legal

process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty, without offering

or doing violence to the person of the officer, shall be guilty of a

misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s.

775.082 or s. 775.083.

The statute has two elements: “(1) the officer was engaged in the lawful execution

of a legal duty; and (2) the defendant’s action, by his words, conduct, or a

combination thereof, constituted obstruction or resistance of that lawful duty.”

C.E.L. v. State, 24 So. 3d 1181, 1185–86 (Fla. 2009) (citations omitted).

“With limited exceptions, physical conduct must accompany offensive words

to support a conviction under [section 843.02].” W.W. v. State, 993 So. 2d 1182,

1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting Francis v. State, 736 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1999)); see also Francis, 736 So. 2d at 98 (holding that falsely informing an

officer that everything was fine when someone was in need of medical attention

only became obstruction when the defendant also physically blocked the officer’s

path); H.A.P. v. State, 834 So. 2d 237, 238–39 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (upholding

defendant’s obstruction conviction not just for cursing and shouting profanities

while SWAT team officers were executing a narcotics search warrant, but for

refusing to leave the area and interfering with execution of the warrant);

Wilkerson v. State, 556 So. 2d 453, 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (holding that

defendant obstructed officers not by simply yelling and cursing at them, but by

refusing to leave an area where the police were attempting to make arrests). For

example, in W.W., we reversed a defendant’s conviction under section 843.02,

where the defendant lied to an officer about a suspect’s whereabouts during the

officer’s search for the suspect but “did not physically impede the deputy’s

investigation.” 993 So. 2d at 1186. The reason why words alone cannot

constitute obstruction in most cases is because to do so would violate the First

Amendment. See D.A.W. v. State, 945 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

Here, appellant asked the officers questions and raised her voice when she

discovered that they planned to arrest her son. She did not curse at the officers

(although cursing alone would never be sufficient to constitute obstruction). She

did not stand between her child and the officers so as to physically impede their

duties. She merely passionately expressed herself as any mother might do.

17

The trial court also mentioned that appellant had lied to the officer in saying

that she was no longer recording. But that information had nothing to do with

impeding the officers in the performance of their duties. While our court has

held that giving, or not correcting, a false name after being arrested or detained

constitutes an obstruction under the statute, we have not held the same where

a defendant provides other false information before an arrest and does not

physically obstruct the officers. Compare Fripp v. State, 766 So. 2d 252, 254

(Fla. 4th DCA. 2000) (defendant who gave false name to officer attempting to

investigate traffic infraction could be convicted of resisting arrest without

violence), and Simeon v. State, 778 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)

(defendant’s act of giving interviewing officer a false name and date of birth

constituted resisting an officer in execution of his duty to confine adult arrestees

in adult detention facilities), with W.W., 993 So. 2d at 1185 (lying alone

insufficient), and with Francis, 736 So. 2d at 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (lying

became obstruction only when accompanied by physical obstruction). One can

readily see that giving a false name could prevent the officer from processing the

arrest of an individual. Lying to the officer about whether one is recording the

encounter does not.

Again, the law regarding obstruction without violence was well established at

the time of appellant’s arrest. The officers did not have probable cause to arrest

the appellant for obstruction.

Conclusion

The facts of this case seem to be only too similar to so many police encounters

caught on video or cell phones. The officers had no reasonable expectation of

privacy in their conversations while performing their public duties, particularly

in public spaces. Given the prevalence of small video cameras and cell phones

in public spaces, society has definitively come down on the side of approving the

videoing of officers in the performance of their duties as a method of

accountability. Because I conclude that the court erred in finding that the

officers had probable cause to arrest the appellant for violation of the wiretap

statute or for obstruction of the justice statute, I would reverse the final

summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

18