Opinion

People of Michigan v. Anthony Ackley

Court
Michigan Court of Appeals
Filed
Apr 15, 2021
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 15.3%

The opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED

April 15, 2021

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 347345

Livingston Circuit Court

ANTHONY ACKLEY, LC No. 17-024485-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and GLEICHER and STEPHENS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a bench trial, the circuit court convicted Anthony Ackley of assault of a prison

employee, MCL 750.197c(1), and sentenced him to a prison term of three to 10 years. This trial

should never have occurred. The circuit court improperly permitted the prosecutor to rescind the

plea agreement he made with Ackley, and Ackley’s trial counsel ineffectively failed to demand

specific performance of that agreement. We vacate Ackley’s conviction and sentence and remand

for further proceedings before a different trial judge.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties agree that Ackley is mentally ill and cognitively impaired. By age 23, when

he committed the assault on a prison guard giving rise to this case, he had spent most of his adult

life in prison. According to his counsel, Ackley was repeatedly raped while in the custody of the

Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and did not feel safe within the prison. On the day

in question, Ackley rushed a guard, punching and scratching him because he wanted to call his

family and was frustrated that he had lost his phone privileges.

While awaiting trial on the assault charge, Ackley was evaluated by a psychologist at the

Center for Forensic Psychiatry and by an independent psychiatrist consulted by his counsel. The

psychologist determined that Ackley was competent to stand trial and later opined that he was not

criminally insane at the time of the assault. The psychiatrist found Ackley mentally ill, borderline

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in intellectual function, and not criminally responsible. The psychiatrist’s opinions likely

incentivized the prosecutor to enter into the parties’ plea deal.1

Defense counsel and the prosecutor negotiated a plea agreement permitting Ackley to plead

guilty but mentally ill and to serve a one-year sentence in the county jail followed by a period of

probation. On the day Ackley entered his plea, his counsel articulated that it had been his “goal

throughout this” that Ackley would serve his sentence in jail so that he did not have to return to a

prison setting. The assistant prosecuting attorney, Scott Ehlfeldt, concurred with the court’s

recitation that the parties had entered into “a sentence agreement of one year in the Livingston

County Jail” with a possible term of probation to be determined by the court. After establishing

Ackley’s competency to plead guilty to both the underlying charge and to fourth habitual offender

status, the court inquired, “Is everybody satisfied?” Ehlfeldt replied, “I am your Honor. I do want

to make one thing clear. And I did not write it on the form, I should have done that.” The

prosecutor proceeded to explain that “[w]hen we say one year - - it’s just prior experience when I

say one year Livingston County Jail that’s with no early release.” Defense counsel concurred.

During the plea colloquy, the trial court asked Ackley to describe his understanding of the

plea agreement and Ackley responded, “One year in the county jail.” The judge confirmed

Ackley’s awareness that the court did not have to follow the plea agreement, and advised him that

he would be allowed to withdraw his plea if the court imposed a sentence greater than one year in

jail. At the end of the hearing Ehlfeldt asked Ackley additional questions to nail down Ackley’s

fourth habitual offender status. With that, Ackley’s plea of guilty was formally accepted by the

court.

One month later, the parties appeared for sentencing. Ehlfeldt began the hearing by

backing out of the plea agreement:

Mr. Ehlfeldt: There are contents of the [preliminary sentence investigation]

report that I didn’t necessarily have in play at the time I made this bargain so I guess

I need to know quite honestly if the court’s not gonna adopt it I prefer we deal with

it at this point in time because he nut up [sic].

The Court: He might what?

Mr. Ehlfeldt: Kind of lose it a little bit.

Before the court answered, defense counsel entreated that the court abide by the agreement:

Defense Counsel: I’m hoping the Court will be understanding [sic] the

context of this multiple rape victim in the [MDOC] and his profound mental illness.

He would be - - and recognizing that we had a similar case on the of [sic] criminal

1

Plea deals benefit the prosecution by reducing the economic and manpower burdens associated

with trials and appeals, not to mention eliminating the uncertainty inherent in every jury-tried case.

Further, plea bargains permit the prosecutor to play an active and leading role in determining the

defendant’s sentence by offering a recommendation that courts generally follow.

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responsibility with opposing findings by the Forensic Center and my psychiatrist

that we came to a compromise with the guilty but mentally ill agreement with an

understanding that he would do a solid one year in the Livingston County Jail.

Mr. Ehlfeldt: That’s correct.

Defense Counsel: And it was a compromise. And my goal as - - I think I

made clear to you even before [Ehlfeldt] was on this case was my job is to do

everything I - - in my power to keep him from going back to MDOC. He’s maxed

out of that place. He’s - - obviously one of the most profoundly mentally ill

defendants that I’ve seen in my career. And I think that the - - we have given you

a sufficient basis for going along with the prosecutor’s recommendation. And I’m

hoping you will. [Emphasis added.]

Defense counsel thereby objected to the prosecutor’s effort to get out from under the plea

deal. Essentially, defense counsel begged the court to abide by the deal.

The trial court turned to Ehlfeldt and inquired, “Are you asking me to go along with this?”

Ehlfeldt responded, “I’m really really conflicted.” He expounded, “The issue that I’m having is

that there are - - the amount of misconducts that he had while in MDOC is kind of staggering.”

Ehlfeldt admitted that “there are issues of criminal responsibility I get it.” He expressed concern

that “we’re gonna see him again,” and stated that he was unaware of “[a] lot of his juvenile stuff[.]”

Defense counsel responded:

Sending him back to the environment where he’s been raped repeatedly is - - he has

all of these special offender notices in this file. Everywhere he goes in MDOC. I

didn’t prepare a sentencing memorandum for the Court in light of the fact that we

had a prosecutor’s sentence agreement. And I had provided you with

information . . . . Sending him back to where [he] was raped is like the worst thing

that could happen . . . . [A] year in the county with him on meds he hasn’t caused

[sic] meds while he’s been incarcerated in Manistee or here. And it’s a resolution

of the case without having a trial.

This was a second objection to the prosecutor’s effort to breach the plea agreement, and a second

request that the court disallow the prosecutor’s attempt to breach the contract.

Ehlfeldt then asked defense counsel, “Where’s he gonna live when he eventually gets out?”

After some discussion of that subject, the following critical colloquy occurred:

Defense Counsel: . . . And I know you have a lot of experience in that

before you were on the bench with the Community Mental Health. I recall that.

The (indecipherable) of not following through with the agreement that we

contemplated would be a trial. And the outcome is not certain. And as it is

plausible that the Court could find yourself in a situation of having to sentence a

person found guilty to an MDOC sentence and that option is, is trouble. I think we

found the compromise. And I want you to, to agree to sentence him in accordance

with what the prosecutor recommended at the time of the taking of the guilty but -

-

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The Court: Well I guess that - -

Defense Counsel: - - mentally ill - -

Mr. Ehlfeldt: The problem that I’m having is –

The Court: I guess my question here is are you asking me to follow this

plea - -

Mr. Ehlfeldt: And here’s where - -

The Court: The only way I’m going under the guidelines in this situation is

by plea agreement. [Emphasis added.]

Defense counsel’s request that the court sentence Ackley in accordance with the plea bargain was

a third objection to Ehlfeldt’s maneuvering.

Ehlfeldt continued to explain why he wanted to get out from under the plea agreement,

insisting that he was unaware of the extent of Ackley’s juvenile record and the number of

misconducts in his MDOC history. Defense counsel pointed out that Ehlfeldt had spoken about

the plea deal with the Prosecuting Attorney for Livingston County; Ehlfeldt admitted to having

done so.

Defense counsel implored, “This has been contemplated for months and months.” Ehlfeldt

asked the court for more time “to kind of look at this.” The court and the parties then discussed

the options available for other pleas and for mental health treatment. The court indicated that it

was planning to sentence Ackley to “five years probation,” presumably to follow the one-year jail

term. Ehlfeldt expressed concern about what would happen when Ackley was “under community

supervision.” He continued, “[I]f we leave here today imposing this sentence and give him

probation are we all gonna have this pit in our stomachs saying . . . are we gonna hear of something

up in Roscommon?”2 Notably, the court never expressed any discomfort with the agreed-upon

sentence of one year in jail.

Ultimately, the court and the attorneys agreed to adjourn the sentencing. Ehlfeldt

elaborated that the adjournment was “quite frankly . . . absolutely the People’s request. There are

as we discussed at the bench some troubling thing[s] that appeared [in the] presentence report that

have frankly added an additional layer on top of an already complicated situation.” Defense

counsel agreed to the adjournment.

The parties reconvened two months later. Ehlfeldt began as follows:

Your Honor, it’s - - as the Court may recall we adjourned this for several

weeks to kind of take a good hard look at where this case is at and the appropriate

sentence for the defendant. I know the Court gave some indication at the bench last

2

Ackley was from Roscommon.

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time we were here. After a lot of thought and a lot of conversation with my

supervisors I can’t ask the Court to honor the sentence agreement of one-year jail.

Defense counsel indicated that he had already discussed the matter with the prosecutor, understood

his position, and that Ackley understood “what his remedy is in light of this.” That remedy, the

court and counsel agreed, was to withdraw the plea. The court reiterated that “if this is no longer

a stipulated sentence or a sentence agreement I am not inclined to go along with it.”3

The court conducted a bench trial, found Ackley guilty but mentally ill, and sentenced him

to a minimum of three years in the Department of Corrections. Not surprisingly, the court selected

prison in part because it wanted to “keep[] the community safe”:

I think clearly Mr. Ackley suffers from mental illness. And I don’t necessarily agree

that the, that prison is the appropriate place for him, and that he’s necessarily gonna

get the appropriate treatment. But when I consider that together with the Court’s

responsibility in protecting the community and keeping the community safe. I think

ultimately the Court’s analysis of the community safety piece and the risk to the

community that I think Mr. Ackley poses whether it be unintentionally is too great

for this Court to consider a probationary sanction.

The court further supported its sentencing decision by referencing Ackley’s “conduct while he has

been incarcerated,” again echoing the prosecutor.

II. PLEA WITHDRAWAL

Ackley first contends that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to withdraw from

the plea agreement. We agree that permitting the prosecutor to disavow the plea agreement was

error. Our analysis is complicated, however, because Ackley subsequently agreed to precisely the

same remedy—plea withdrawal.

“[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.

Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and [94%] of state convictions are the result of guilty

pleas.” Lafler v Cooper, 566 US 156, 170; 132 S Ct 1376; 182 L Ed 2d 398 (2012). Four decades

before the United States Supreme Court issued this pronouncement, the Court similarly recognized

the central role played by plea bargaining and deemed the bargains worthy of constitutional

protection. In Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 262; 92 S Ct 495; 30 L Ed 2d 427 (1971), the

Supreme Court declared that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or

agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration,

such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello instructs that a defendant has a due process right to

enforce the terms of the agreement in the face of a prosecutor’s breach. Accordingly, the

3

Although not entirely clear, the court seemed to indicate that but for the prosecution’s withdrawal

from the plea agreement, it had planned to sentence Ackley to one year in jail and five years of

probation. It bears emphasis that at no point did the court express that it had planned to disregard

the plea agreement if the prosecutor went along with it.

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prosecutor’s refusal to honor the terms of the agreement he had forged with Ackley’s counsel was

an error of constitutional magnitude.

The first layer of our analysis is the simplest, because the trial court clearly committed a

constitutional error in permitting the prosecutor to withdraw from the plea agreement over the

timely and forceful objections of counsel. The court rules provide limited circumstances in which

a plea agreement may be withdrawn, but none exist here. When a plea has been accepted but the

defendant has yet to be sentenced, MCR 6.310(B)(1) permits plea withdrawal on the defendant’s

motion or with the defendant’s consent, and subsection (2)(a) permits the defendant to seek

withdrawal if “the court states that it is unable to follow” the agreed-upon sentencing parameters.

MCR 6.310(E) provides the sole basis for a prosecutor to vacate a plea agreement and is

inapplicable here: “On the prosecutor’s motion, the court may vacate a plea if the defendant has

failed to comply with the terms of a plea agreement.” The court rules provided no mechanism for

the prosecutor to change his mind.

The prosecutor’s wrongful conduct deprived Ackley of his due process right to

enforcement of the plea bargain. By the time the prosecutor got cold feet, it was simply too late

to back out of the deal he had made. The prosecution had no legal right and no legal authority to

withdraw from its agreement. By green-lighting the prosecutor’s conduct, the court compounded

the constitutional error. Accordingly, we have no difficulty concluding that as the events unfolded

in the courtroom on the day that had been set for sentencing, the trial court should have advised

the prosecutor that he could not withdraw from the plea because Ackley’s counsel objected.

But ultimately Ackley choose a remedy: he withdrew his guilty plea. In Puckett v United

States, 556 US 129, 137; 129 S Ct 1423; 173 L Ed 2d 266 (2009), the Supreme Court explained

that a defendant aggrieved by a Santobello error has either of two remedies: specific performance

of the plea agreement in the trial court, or plea withdrawal. Ackley opted for plea withdrawal.4

When he did so, he extinguished the error arising from the prosecutor’s breach and the court’s

failure to force the government to live up to its bargain.

Ackley’s appellate counsel contends that counsel performed ineffectively in subsequently

recommending and acquiescing to plea withdrawal, as the only appropriate remedy under the

circumstances was specific performance. We agree and turn to an analysis of that argument.

III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

To obtain relief under an ineffective assistance theory, a defendant must demonstrate that

his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that but for

counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that a different outcome would

have obtained. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).

Both conditions are met here.

4

An argument can be made that Ackley’s counsel sought specific performance in the trial court

and that remedy was denied. But counsel never used those words and cited no law, including

Santobello, that would have pointed the court in the right direction.

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Counsel made it abundantly clear that he did not agree with the prosecutor’s change in

position regarding Ackley’s sentence. By doing so, he preserved an objection to the prosecutor’s

unconstitutional conduct. That objection should have triggered the trial court to order specific

performance of the plea. And had defense counsel understood the law, he would have recognized

that the only appropriate course of action under the circumstances was to insist on specific

performance of the plea bargain. Concomitantly, he would have specifically demanded that

remedy. Consistent with Santobello, Ackley then would have been sentenced by a judge who had

not heard the litany of reasons offered by Ehlfeldt in support of a prison sentence. 5 While an

untainted sentencing court may not have abided by the sentencing agreement, Ackley’s position

would have been no worse than it would have been had the prosecutor not withdrawn from it.

After all, “the touchstone of Santobello is whether the prosecution met its commitment and not

whether the court would have adopted the government’s recommendation[.]” Cohen v United

States, 593 F2d 766, 772 (CA 6, 1979).

A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

In Santobello, the United States Supreme Court tasked the trial court with determining the

remedy for a breached plea agreement. The Court endorsed two potential remedies: specific

performance of the plea agreement, “in which case [the defendant] should be resentenced by a

different judge,” or the grant of an opportunity to withdraw the plea. Santobello, 404 US at 263.

The Supreme Court underscored the importance of the first remedy in Puckett, reiterating that

“rescission is not the only possible remedy; in Santobello we allowed for a resentencing at which

the Government would fully comply with the agreement—in effect, specific performance of the

contract.” Puckett, 556 US at 137. Specific performance is the preferred remedy in at least one

federal circuit. See United States v Clark, 55 F3d 9, 14 (CA 1, 1995).

Here, counsel’s ineffectiveness resided in his failure to insist on specific performance of

the plea agreement, with sentencing to be performed by a different judge.

Objectively, counsel’s decision to withdraw the plea qualifies as unreasonable. The record

supplies no evidence that the choice to go to trial rather than to enforce the plea deal was strategic.

Counsel never mentioned enforcement of the plea bargain; rather, he announced that Ackley

understood “what his remedy is in light of this,” signaling that he contemplated the existence of

only one remedy. Nothing in the record demonstrates that counsel understood the law governing

prosecutorial plea withdrawals, and that resentencing before a different judge was an option.

A trial was an exceptionally poor remedy, given that Ackley had no choice but to admit his

guilt and to hope for a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity—a result rarely obtained. While

counsel had an expert regarding Ackley’s mental state at the time of the crime, it was an uphill

struggle. The prosecution, too, had an expert. And the evidence strongly suggested that the assault

was triggered by Ackley’s anger at not being allowed to make a phone call—a fact tending to

discredit an insanity plea. A reasonably effective attorney who appreciated the existence of the

5

See Santobello, 404 US at 263.

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specific performance route to relief would have taken it rather than embarking on a road likely to

lead to conviction.

Counsel’s legal investigation was incomplete and inadequate, resulting in his

ineffectiveness. Two months elapsed between the aborted sentencing hearing and Ackley’s

withdrawal of his plea. This was ample time in which to determine that specific performance

remained a viable remedy. “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts

relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less

than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional

judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Strickland, 46 US at 690-691. Legal

investigations are as critical as factual ones, particularly in unusual cases. See, e.g., Padilla v

Kentucky, 559 US 356, 367; 130 S Ct 1473; 176 L Ed 2d 284 (2010); United States v Mooney, 497

F3d 397, 403 (CA 7, 2007). The only meaningful course of action available to Ackley was to

insist that the plea agreement be honored. Counsel’s choice to forego that option was both illogical

and ineffective.

B. PREJUDICE

It is impossible to know with absolute certainty whether a different judge would have

honored the plea bargain had the prosecutor stuck to it. But that is not the test. If counsel had

insisted on specific performance, Ackley would have been sentenced by a judge untainted by the

prosecutor’s breach. Returning the situation to the status quo ante would have resulted in the

sentencing court’s acceptance of the bargain or sentencing by a different and untainted judge—

and that suffices to demonstrate prejudice.

The prosecutor entered into an affirmative agreement to recommend a one-year jail

sentence. A prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation often carries considerable weight, and the

record validates the critical importance of the prosecutor’s sentencing position. Instead of

honoring that agreement, the prosecutor deliberately disowned the deal he himself had made,

vigorously arguing against it. When the prosecutor breached the plea agreement, the court

essentially confirmed that it would have abided by the sentencing arrangement agreed to by the

parties had the prosecutor endorsed it: “The only way I’m going under the guidelines in this

situation is by plea agreement.”

The prosecutor later urged a prison sentence, and the same judge who heard the initial

recommendation of a jail sentence ultimately imposed a prison sentence. The judge had approved

the guilty plea incorporating the jail sentence, yet also listened as the prosecutor emotionally

retracted it while simultaneously detailing a host of reasons for sentencing Ackley to prison. At

sentencing, the judge echoed in large measure the sentiments expressed by the prosecutor when he

negated the agreement. By advocating for a prison sentence, the prosecutor intended to influence

the trial court, and his efforts bore fruit.

In every sentencing decision post-guilty plea, the court makes an independent judgment.

But that judgment is influenced and informed by the parties’ agreement. Here, the prosecutor

advised the court that a one-year jail sentence was inappropriate due to Ackley’s juvenile and

prison records. Not only did the prosecutor breach the agreement, the prosecutor persuasively

advocated for a prison sentence partly based on the prosecutor’s belated and speculative

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assessment that Ackley would commit crimes post-release. Manifestly, this argument colored the

court’s decision when it finally sentenced Ackley to three to 10 years’ imprisonment.

“The integrity of our judicial system requires that the government strictly comply with its

obligations under a plea agreement.” United States v Mondragon, 228 F3d 978, 981 (CA 9, 2000).

Permitting the prosecution to reap the rewards of its misconduct is a gross injustice to Ackley and

licenses the prosecution to play fast and loose with the rules. Only Ackley bore the burden of the

government’s error, despite that the prosecutor blatantly violated Ackley’s rights. For these

reasons, we vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence and remand for further proceedings before

a different trial judge.

Given our resolution of Ackley’s challenges surrounding the rescission of the plea

agreement, we need not reach his challenge to the evidence at his trial.

We vacate Ackley’s conviction and sentence and remand for further proceedings before a

different trial judge consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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