Mattson v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 19-1113T

Filed: April 15, 2021

)

ANDREW P. MATTSON, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) Tax Refund Claim; RCFC 12(b)(1);

v. ) Subject-Matter Jurisdiction; I.R.C. §

) 6061; I.R.C. § 6065; Signature

THE UNITED STATES, ) Verification Requirement; Waiver.

)

Defendant. )

)

Kathryn Magan, Counsel of Record, Magan Law, PLLC, North Richland Hills, TX, for

plaintiffs.

Courtney M. Hutson, Trial Attorney, Mary M. Abate, Of Counsel, David I. Pincus, Chief,

Richard E. Zuckerman, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, United States Department

of Justice, Tax Division, Court of Federal Claims Section, Washington, DC, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRIGGSBY, Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In this tax refund action, plaintiffs, Andrew P. Mattson and Lindsey J. Mattson, seek a

refund of certain federal income tax paid during tax year 2016, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7422.

Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 3, 50-51. The government has moved to dismiss this matter for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction, upon the ground that plaintiffs failed to duly file their tax refund

claim before commencing this action, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States

Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). See generally Def. Mot. For the reasons set forth below, the

Court GRANTS the government’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES the amended complaint.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1

A. Factual Background

This case is one of several tax refund matters before the Court alleging that the Internal

Revenue Service (“IRS”) has waived the signature verification requirement for a tax refund

claim. In this case, plaintiffs, Andrew P. Mattson and Lindsey J. Mattson, seek a refund in the

amount of $21,190.00 of certain federal income tax paid during tax year 2016, based upon the

foreign earned income exclusion under Section 911 of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”),

plus interest, attorney’s fees and other costs. See generally Am. Compl.

As background, plaintiffs are United States citizens who are married. Pl. Ex. A at 2.

Plaintiffs reside in Alice Springs, Australia and they are employed by the Raytheon Company at

the Joint Defense Facility Pine Gap. Am. Compl. at ¶ 36.

In 2015, plaintiffs signed a closing agreement as a condition of their employment with

the Raytheon Company. Id. at ¶ 27. It is undisputed that this closing agreement provides that

plaintiffs waive the right to claim the foreign earned income exclusion pursuant to I.R.C. Section

911. Id.; Def. Mem. at 5.

On April 10, 2017, plaintiffs timely filed their original Form 1040 U.S. income tax return

for tax year 2016. Am. Compl. at ¶ 37. In connection with this tax return, plaintiffs paid

$21,191.00 in income taxes for tax year 2016. Id. at ¶ 38; Pl. Ex. A at 2.

Plaintiffs subsequently retained the services of a tax accounting firm—Castro & Co.,

LLC (“Castro & Co.”)—to prepare an amended tax return for tax year 2016. Am. Compl. at ¶

39. Castro & Co. concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to claim the foreign earned income

exclusion on their amended tax return.2 Id. at ¶ 40. And so, Castro & Co. timely filed a Form

1 The facts recited in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are taken from the amended complaint (“Am.

Compl.”) and the exhibits attached thereto (“Pl. Ex.”); the government’s motion to dismiss (“Def. Mot.”)

and memorandum in support thereof (“Def. Mem.”) and the exhibits attached thereto (“Def. Ex.”);

plaintiffs’ response and opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss (“Pl. Resp.”); and the

government’s reply in support of its motion to dismiss (“Def. Reply”). Unless otherwise noted herein, the

facts recited are undisputed.

2Section 911 of the I.R.C. permits qualified individuals to exclude foreign earned income from their

gross income and to exempt such income from tax. 26 U.S.C. § 911(a)(1).

2

1040X amended tax return for tax year 2016 on behalf of plaintiffs, which claimed this

exclusion.3 Compare Pl. Ex. B at 6 with Def. Ex. 3 at 003; see also Def. Mem. at 4 n.4. It is

undisputed that this amended tax return was the only amended tax return that plaintiffs filed with

the IRS for tax year 2016. Def. Mem. at 7; see generally Pl. Resp. (showing that plaintiffs do not

dispute that they only filed one amended tax return for tax year 2016).

It is also undisputed that plaintiffs did not sign their amended tax return and that an

employee of Castro & Co.—Tiffany Michelle Hunt—signed the amended tax return on

plaintiffs’ behalf. Pl. Resp. at 4; Def. Ex. 3 at 003. It is similarly undisputed that plaintiffs did

not include a power of attorney authorizing Tiffany Michelle Hunt, or any other representative of

Castro & Co., to sign their amended tax return. Pl. Resp. at 10; Def. Mem. at 4.

On or about November 14, 2018, Castro & Co. sent the IRS a Form 2848 stating that

three of its employees—John Anthony Castro, Tiffany Michelle Hunt, and Kasondra Kay

Humphreys—had the authority to represent Andrew Mattson before the IRS with respect to,

among other things, plaintiffs’ 2016 tax return. Def. Mem. at 4; Def. Ex. at 4. Tiffany Michelle

Hunt initialed the Form 2848 on behalf of Mr. Mattson. Def. Mem. at 4 (citing Def . Ex. 4 at 3).

But, the box on line 5a of the Form 2848, which would authorize John Anthony Castro, Tiffany

Michelle Hunt and Kasondra Kay Humphreys to sign plaintiffs’ amended 2016 tax return, was

not checked on the form. Def. Mem. at 5; Pl. Resp. at 4.

On or about April 26, 2019, the IRS sent plaintiffs a letter commonly known as a Letter

569, stating that the IRS examined plaintiffs’ tax refund claim and proposed to fully disallow the

claim for the following reason:

Our records show that as an employee of Raytheon E Systems living and

working in Australia, you may have entered into a closing agreement with

the U.S. Internal Revenue Service irrevocably waiving your rights to claim

the Foreign Earned Income under Internal Revenue Code section 911 (a).

This waiver covers any income that was paid or provided to you as a

consideration for services provided by your employer (Raytheon)[.]

3 The parties disagree about the date on which Castro & Co filed plaintiffs’ 2016 amended tax return.

Plaintiffs represent that their amended tax return was filed “on or about February 22, 2019.” Am. Compl.

at ¶ 41. The government represents that the IRS received plaintiffs’ amended return on October 3, 2018.

Def. Mem. at 3.

3

In return for agreeing not to claim the section 911 exclusion, the government

of Australia has entered into an agreement with the United States

Government not to subject the income earned by the taxpayer to the

Australian taxes. Therefore, you are not allowed to claim the Foreign

Earned Income Exclusion under Internal Revenue Code section 911(a).

Pl. Resp. Ex. 1 at 1-005. In addition, the Letter 569 states that:

If you don’t agree with our findings, you may request a meeting or

telephone conference with the supervisor of the person identified in the

heading of this letter. If you still don’t agree with our findings, we

recommend that you request a conference with our Appeals Office. If you

request a conference, we will forward your request to the Appeals Office

and they will contact you to schedule an appointment.

Id. at 1-003, 1-008.

On May 28, 2019, John Castro submitted a Form 12203 Request for Appeals Review of

the IRS’s disallowance to the IRS on plaintiffs’ behalf. Def. Mem. at 6; Def. Ex. 5. It is

undisputed that plaintiffs did not sign the Form 12203. Id.; Pl. Resp. at 3. On May 30, 2019, the

IRS sent plaintiffs a Letter 907 requesting that plaintiffs consent to extend the assessment statute

expiration date with respect to the 2016 tax year. Def. Mem. at 6; Def. Ex. 6. Plaintiffs did not

respond to the Letter 907. Def. Mem. at 6.

On or about July 15, 2019, plaintiffs received a second Letter 569 from the IRS stating

that the IRS proposed to disallow plaintiffs’ tax refund claim for the same reasons stated in the

IRS’s original Letter 569. Pl. Resp. Ex. 1 at 1-008-1-010. After plaintiffs commenced this tax

refund action on July 31, 2019, the IRS issued a legal notice of full disallowance of plaintiffs’

tax refund claim on February 7, 2020. Id. at 1-011; see also Compl.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs commenced this tax refund action on July 31, 2019. See generally Compl. On

March 3, 2020, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. See generally Am. Compl.

On March 4, 2020, the government filed a motion to dismiss this matter for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1). See generally Def. Mot. On April 1,

2020, plaintiffs filed a response and opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss. See

generally Pl. Resp. On April 24, 2020, the government filed a reply in support of its motion to

dismiss. See generally Def. Reply.

4

On October 21, 2020, the government filed a joint status report on behalf of the parties

requesting that the government be permitted to file a supplemental brief in support of its motion

to dismiss on the issue of whether the waiver doctrine set forth in Angelus Milling Co. v. C.I.R.,

325 U.S. 293, 296 (1945), can apply to the signature verification requirement for tax refund

claims. See generally JSR, dated October 21, 2020. On the same date, the Court issued a

Scheduling Order permitting supplemental briefing on this issue. See generally Scheduling

Order, dated October 21, 2020.

On November 4, 2020, the government filed a supplemental brief in support of its motion

to dismiss. See generally Def. Suppl. Br. On November 23, 2020, plaintiffs filed a response to

the government’s supplemental brief. See generally Pl. Suppl. Resp.

On April 5, 2021, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file additional authority in

opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss, which the Court granted on April 6, 2021.

See generally Pl. Mot.

These matters having been fully briefed, the Court resolves the pending motion to

dismiss.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Jurisdiction And RCFC 12(b)(1)

When deciding a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the Court does not possess

subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), this Court must assume that all

undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the

non-movant’s favor. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); RCFC 12(b)(1). But, plaintiffs

bear the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction and they must do so by a

preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748

(Fed. Cir. 1988). And so, should the Court determine that “it lacks jurisdiction over the subject

matter, it must dismiss the claim.” Matthews v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 274, 278 (2006).

In this regard, the United States Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction

and “possess[es] only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . . .” Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The Tucker Act grants the Court

jurisdiction over:

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[A]ny claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution,

or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or

upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for

liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).

The Tucker Act is, however, “a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive

right enforceable against the United States for money damages. . . . [T]he Act merely confers

jurisdiction upon [the United States Court of Federal Claims] whenever the substantive right

exists.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976) (citation omitted). And so, to pursue

a substantive right against the United States under the Tucker Act, plaintiffs must identify and

plead a money-mandating constitutional provision, statute, or regulation; an express or implied

contract with the United States; or an illegal exaction of money by the United States. Cabral v.

United States, 317 F. App’x 979, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d

1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)); see also Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1302

(Fed. Cir. 2003). “[A] statute or regulation is money-mandating for jurisdictional purposes if it

‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of the

breach of the duties [it] impose[s].’” Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1173 (quoting United States v. Mitchell,

463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983)).

B. Tax Refund Claims And The Signature Verification Requirement

Title 26, United States Code, Section 7422(a) provides the money-mandating source of

law for bringing a tax refund claim in this Court. Dumont v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 425, 427-

28 (2009). Specifically, Section 7422 provides that:

No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of

any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally

assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected

without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any

manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly

filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard,

and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.

26 U.S.C. § 7422(a).

In addition, I.R.C. Section 6061 provides that “any return, statement, or other document

required to be made under any provision of the internal revenue laws or regulations shall be

6

signed in accordance with forms or regulations prescribed by the Secretary.” 26 U.S.C. §

6061(a). I.R.C. Section 6065 further provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by the

Secretary, any return, declaration, statement, or other document required to be made under any

provision of the internal revenue laws or regulations shall contain or be verified by a written

declaration that is made under the penalties of perjury.” 26 U.S.C. § 6065.

A tax refund claim must also comply with the Treasury Regulations that apply to a tax

refund claim. These regulations require that:

The claim must set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund

is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact

basis thereof. The statement of the grounds and facts must be verified by a

written declaration that is made under the penalty of perjury. A claim which

does not comply with this paragraph will not be considered for any purpose

as a claim for refund or credit.

26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-2(b)(1). The IRS has also promulgated regulations which require that a

refund claim may only be verified by someone other than the taxpayer if a power of attorney

accompanies the claim. Id. at § 301.6402-2(e). Such a power of attorney must contain a “clear

expression of the taxpayer’s intention concerning the scope of authority granted to the

recognized representative(s).” Id. at § 601.503(a)(6).

While the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has not addressed the

question of whether the signature verification requirement for tax returns and tax refund claims

can be waived by the Treasury Secretary, several other courts have considered this question. For

example, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that the signature

verification requirement cannot be waived in a tax refund case, because the IRS does not have

the authority to pay a refund claim to a claimant that is not the taxpayer, unless the claimant is

the duly authorized agent of the taxpayer. Turks Head Club v. Broderick, 166 F.2d 877, 882 (1st

Cir. 1948) (holding that the verification signature requirement “is not the kind of formal defect in

refund claims with respect to which the cases have recognized the possibility of a waiver by the

Commissioner”). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has also held , within

the context of a tax return case, that the signature verification requirement is statutory and cannot

be waived. Olpin v. C.I.R., 270 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The Code clearly states that,

in order to be valid, a tax return must be signed.”).

7

This Court has also addressed the signature verification requirement in several recent

cases. In Gregory v. United States, the Court held that “[t]he taxpayer signature requirement is

statutory in nature and thus the waiver doctrine is inapplicable.” Gregory v. United States, 149

Fed. Cl. 719, 724 (2020). In Brown v. United States, the Court similarly held that “the taxpayer

signature requirement is statutory and, therefore, cannot be waived,” because I.R.C. Sections

6061 and 6065 require taxpayers to sign their tax returns. Brown v. United States, 151 Fed. Cl.

530, 536 (2020). Most recently, the Court held in Quattrini v. United States that taxpayers who

fail to comply with the signature verification requirement have not “duly filed” their tax refund

claims, as required to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. Quattrini v. United

States, No. 19-1323T, 2021 WL 1085927, at *6 (Fed. Cl. March 22, 2021).

C. The Informal Claim Doctrine

Lastly, the informal claim doctrine allows the Court to consider a tax refund claim that

has been rejected by the IRS, when an amendment remedies the claim’s defects. Specifically, in

United States v. Kales, the Supreme Court held that a timely “notice fairly advising the

Commissioner of the nature of the taxpayer’s claim . . . will nevertheless be treated as [an

effective] claim where formal defects . . . have been remedied by amendment filed after the lapse

of the statutory period.” United States v. Kales, 314 U.S. 186, 194 (1941). Given this, an

informal claim may be “perfected” by an amendment fairly appraising the IRS of the basis for

the claim, notwithstanding a lapse of the statute of limitations before the amendment was filed.

Id. at 192; see also United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 72 (1933). The

Federal Circuit has held, however, that “the IRS’s jurisdiction over the claim necessarily

terminates on the date a refund suit is filed.” Computervision Corp. v. United States, 445 F.3d

1355, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that the informal claim doctrine did not apply where a suit

was brought before plaintiff’s claim was perfected). And so, the informal claim doctrine does

not apply once a suit is brought if the claim has not previously been perfected by an amendment.

Id.

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The government has moved to dismiss this tax refund matter for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, upon the ground that plaintiffs have not “duly filed” the amended tax return upon

which they base their tax refund claim. Def. Mem. at 10-13. Specifically, the government

8

argues that plaintiffs neither signed their amended tax return nor provided a power of attorney

with the amended tax return, as required under the I.R.C. and the applicable Treasury

Regulations. Id. And so, the government maintains that plaintiffs’ failure to comply with this

signature verification requirement deprives the Court of jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ tax

refund claim. Def. Suppl. Br. at 1; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7422.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that they neither signed their 2016 amended tax return nor

provided a power of attorney with this amended tax return. Pl. Resp. at 4. But, they counter that

the Court may, nonetheless, consider their tax refund claim for two reasons. First, plaintiffs

argue that the IRS waived the deficiencies in their amended tax return by investigating the merits

of their tax refund claim. Id. at 3-10; see also Angelus Milling Co. v. C.I.R., 325 U.S. 293, 296

(1945). In this regard, plaintiffs contend that the signature verification requirement is a

regulatory requirement that can be waived by the IRS and that the IRS waived the requirement in

this case. Pl. Resp. at 5-6; Pl. Suppl. Resp. at 4-11. Second, plaintiffs argue that their amended

tax return is an informal tax refund claim that can be perfected by an amendment. Pl. Resp. at

10-11. And so, plaintiffs request that the Court deny the government’s motion to dismiss. Id. at

11.

For the reasons discussed below, a careful review of the I.R.C. and the relevant Treasury

Regulations shows that the signature verification requirement is a statutory requirement that

cannot be waived by the IRS. Because it is undisputed that plaintiffs failed to comply with this

requirement in connection with the filing of their amended tax return, plaintiffs have not “duly

filed” their tax refund claim as required under 26 U.S.C. § 7422. In addition, the undisputed

facts in this tax refund case show that the informal claim doctrine is inapplicable to plaintiffs’ tax

refund claims, because plaintiffs failed to file an amended tax return to correct the deficiencies in

their 2016 amended tax return before commencing this action. And so, for the reasons discussed

below, the Court GRANTS the government’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES the amended

complaint.

A. Plaintiffs Have Not Established Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, plaintiffs have not established that the Court possesses subject-matter

jurisdiction to consider their tax refund claim, because plaintiffs have not shown that they “duly

filed” their 2016 amended tax return. To establish subject-matter jurisdiction in this tax refund

9

case, plaintiffs must show that they have satisfied the requirements for bringing a tax refund

action in this Court. Specifically, title 26, United States Code, section 7422(a) provides that:

No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of

any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally

assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected

without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any

manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been

duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that

regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance

thereof.

26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (emphasis supplied). And so, a tax refund claim that has not been “duly

filed” with the Treasury Secretary cannot be considered by this Court. Id.; Chicago Milwaukee

Corp. v. United States, 40 F.3d 373, 374 (Fed Cir. 1994) (holding that compliance with section

7422 is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a tax refund suit).

To establish that they have “duly filed” their 2016 amended tax return, plaintiffs must

show that they complied with all applicable laws and regulations, including the signature

verification requirement. In this regard, title 26, United States Code, Section 6061 governs the

signing of tax returns and other documents and provides, in relevant part, that “any return,

statement, or other document required to be made under any provision of the internal revenue

laws or regulations shall be signed in accordance with forms or regulations prescribed by the

Secretary.” 26 U.S.C. § 6061(a). Title 26, United States Code, Section 6065 governs the

verification of tax returns and this statute provides, in relevant part, that “[e]xcept as otherwise

provided by the Secretary, any return, declaration, statement, or other document required to be

made under any provision of the internal revenue laws or regulations shall contain or be verified

by a written declaration that is made under the penalties of perjury.” 26 U.S.C. § 6065.

Plaintiffs’ tax refund claim must also comply with the Treasury Regulations, which

provide that:

The claim must set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund

is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact

basis thereof. The statement of the grounds and facts must be verified by a

written declaration that is made under the penalty of perjury. A claim which

does not comply with this paragraph will not be considered for any purpose

as a claim for refund or credit.

10

26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-2(b)(1). The Treasury Regulations also require that a tax refund claim

may only be verified by someone other than the taxpayer if a power of attorney accompanies the

claim. Id. at § 301.6402-2(e).

In this case, it is without dispute that plaintiffs have not complied with the IRS’s

signature verification requirement, because plaintiffs acknowledge that they neither signed their

2016 amended tax return nor provided a valid power of attorney for that amended tax retu rn. Pl.

Resp. at 4, 10; Def. Mem. at 4; Def. Ex. 3 at 003. Given this, the undisputed facts in this case

make clear that plaintiffs did not “duly file” their tax refund claim as required by 26 U.S.C. §

7422. And so, the Court must dismiss this tax refund case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

RCFC 12(b)(1).

B. The Waiver Doctrine Is Not Applicable

The Court is also not persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument that they may pursue this tax

refund case, because the IRS has waived the signature verification requirement. Pl. Resp. at 5-6;

Pl. Suppl. Resp. at 4-11. In Angelus Milling Co. v. C.I.R., the Supreme Court held that the

Commissioner of the IRS, acting through his agents, could waive the requirements of Treasury

Regulation 96 by investigating the merits of a defective tax refund claim and taking action upon

it. Angelus Milling Co. v. C.I.R., 325 U.S. 293, 296 (1945). Specifically, the Supreme Court

identified three requirements that must be met to show that the IRS waived the requireme nts of

the Treasury Regulations, namely, that: (1) the IRS must have “investigated the merits” of the

refund claim at issue; (2) the IRS must have “taken action” upon the refund claim; and (3) the

IRS’ determination to “dispense with” the formal regulatory requirements and to examine the

merits of the claim must be “unmistakable.” Id. at 296-98. But, the Supreme Court also made

clear that an explicit statutory requirement related to a tax refund claim cannot be waived. Id. at

296 (holding that, insofar as Congress uses its power to legislate to make explicit statutory

requirements, these statutory requirements “must be observed and are beyond the dispensing

power of Treasury officials.”).

The I.R.S’s signature verification requirement is such a non-waivable statutory

requirement. As this Court recently held is Quattrini v. United States, Sections 6061 and 6065 of

the I.R.C. mandate that a taxpayer sign a tax refund claim. Quattrini v. United States, 2021 WL

1085927, at *6. I.R.C. Section 6061 provides that “any return, statement, or other document

11

required to be made under any provision of the internal revenue laws or regulations shall be

signed in accordance with forms or regulations prescribed by the Secretary.” 26 U.S.C. §

6061(a) (emphasis supplied). I.R.C. Section 6065 further provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise

provided by the Secretary, any return, declaration, statement, or other document required to be

made under any provision of the internal revenue laws or regulations shall contain or be verified

by a written declaration that is made under the penalties of perjury.” 26 U.S.C. § 6065

(emphasis supplied).

The use of the word “shall” in theses statutory provisions makes clear that Sections 6061

and 6065 require that a tax return or other document filed with the IRS be signed and that a tax

return or other document must also be verified by a written declaration under penalty of perjury.

See, e.g., Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 432 n.9 (1975) (“‘shall’ generally

means ‘must’”); see also James v. C.I.R., 322 F. Appx. 503, 504 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that

“26 U.S.C. § 6065 . . . requires that returns be signed under penalty of perjury”); Olpin v. C.I.R.,

270 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The Code clearly states that, in order to be valid, a tax

return must be signed.”). And so, the Court reads Sections 6061 and 6065 to mandate the

signature verification requirement for a tax refund claim.

Plaintiffs’ argument that Sections 6061 and 6065 of the I.R.C. do not specifically require

that the taxpayer sign and verify a tax refund claim is also belied by the plain language of these

statutes. Pl. Resp. at 5-6. Section 6061 of the I.R.C. requires a signature verification for any tax

return, statement or other document “required to be made” under any provision of the internal

revenue laws or regulations. 26 U.S.C. § 6061(a) (emphasis supplied). Section 6065 of the

I.R.C. similarly provides that any tax return, declaration, statement or other document “required

to be made” contain or be verified by a written declaration that is made under the penalties of

perjury. 26 U.S.C. § 6065 (emphasis supplied). Because the only individual who is required to

file a tax return or tax refund claim is the taxpayer, the Court reads these two statutes to mandate

that the taxpayer sign and verify a tax return or tax refund claim. See I.R.C. § 6012(a)(1)(A)

(providing that tax returns shall be made by “[e]very individual having for the taxable year gross

income which equals or exceeds the exemption amount”).

As the Court recognized in Quattrini, the Court’s reading of Sections 6061 and 6065 of

the I.R.C. to mandate the signature verification requirement is consistent with several cases that

12

have considered this requirement in tax refund and tax return matters. Quattrini, 2021 WL

1085927, at *7. In Turks Head Club v. Broderick, the United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit held that the signature verification requirement cannot be waived in a tax refund

case, because the IRS does not have the authority to pay a refund claim to a claimant that is not

the taxpayer, unless the claimant is the duly authorized agent of the taxpayer. Turks Head Club

v. Broderick, 166 F.2d 877, 882 (1st Cir. 1948) (holding that the signature verification

requirement “is not the kind of formal defect in refund claims with respect to which the cases

have recognized the possibility of a waiver by the Commissioner”). The United States Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has also considered the signature verification requirement under

Sections 6061 and 6065 of the I.R.C., within the context of a tax return case, and held that this

requirement is statutory, and therefore, cannot be waived. Olpin v. C.I.R., 270 F.3d 1297, 1301

(10th Cir. 2001) (holding that “acceptance [by the IRS] cannot cure an invalid [tax] return”).

This Court has also held that the signature verification requirement is statutory and,

therefore, cannot be waived in several cases that are essentially identical to this case. See e.g.,

Gregory v. United States, 149 Fed. Cl. 719, 724 (2020) (holding that “[t]he taxpayer signature

requirement is statutory in nature and thus the waiver doctrine is inapplicable”); Brown v. United

States, 151 Fed. Cl. 530, 536 (2020) (holding that “the taxpayer signature requirement is

statutory and, therefore, cannot be waived”); Quattrini v. United States, 2021 WL 1085927, at *6

(holding that plaintiffs who fail to comply with the statutory signature verification requirement

have not “duly filed” their tax refund claims as required to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction under

the Tucker Act). As discussed above, it is undisputed in this tax refund case that plaintiffs have

not complied with the signature verification requirement set forth in I.R.C. Sections 6061 and

6065 in connection with the filing of the amended tax return upon which they rely to bring this

tax refund matter. Given this, plaintiffs have not “duly filed” their tax refund claim as required

by 26 U.S.C. § 7422. And so, the Court must dismiss this tax refund matter for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction. 4 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a); RCFC 12(b)(1).

4 The Court is also not persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument that the informal claim doctrine revives their tax

refund claim, because it is undisputed that plaintiffs did not file an amended tax return to correct the

deficiencies in their 2016 amended tax return prior to commencing this action. Pl. Resp. at 10;

Computervision Corp. v. United States, 445 F.3d 1355, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that the informal

claim doctrine did not apply where a suit was brought before plaintiff’s claim was perfected). Because

the Court concludes that the signature verification requirement is statutory and cannot be waived, the

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V. CONCLUSION

In sum, plaintiffs have not shown that their tax refund claim has been “duly filed” with

the Treasury Secretary, as required to invoke the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under the

Tucker Act.

And so, for the foregoing reasons, the Court:

1. GRANTS the government’s motion to dismiss; and

2. DISMISSES the amended complaint.

The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Lydia Kay Griggsby

LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY

Judge

Court does not reach the issue of whether the IRS investigated the merits of plaintiffs’ tax refund claim.

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