Stecker, M. v. Goosley, M.

J-A01026-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MELLISSA A. STECKER, MARCELINO : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

CARLOS CARVALHO SANTOS, MARIA : PENNSYLVANIA

C. SANTOS, AND MARCELINO J. :

SANTOS :

:

:

v. :

:

: No. 1266 EDA 2020

MERCEDES R. GOOSLEY, JOSEPH :

GOOSLEY, AND WILLIAM GOOSLEY :

:

:

APPEAL OF: WILLIAM GOOSLEY :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 23, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Civil Division at

No(s): No. C-48-CV-2018-02733

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED APRIL 15, 2021

Appellant, William Goosley, appeals from the judgment entered on June

23, 2020 following a non-jury trial regarding the sale of a residential property.1

We affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as

follows. Mercedes R. Goosley was the owner of the subject residential

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 While Appellant purports to appeal from the denial of post-trial motions on

June 9, 2020, the appeal properly lies from the entry of judgment. See

Crosby v. Department of Transportation, 548 A.2d 281, 283 (Pa. Super.

1988)(“[An a]ppeal lies from the judgment entered and not the denial of

post-trial motions[.]”) We have changed the caption accordingly.

J-A01026-21

property located on Lynn Avenue in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Mercedes has

six adult children – Stephen, Joseph, William, Chrissy, Mitzy, and Ronald. On

October 21, 2013, Mercedes executed a notarized document giving Joseph

power of attorney. Mercedes moved into Joseph’s home in 2015 and lived

with him for two years, until she was briefly hospitalized. Thereafter,

Mercedes moved into Gracedale, a nursing home in Northhampton County, in

June 2017. At the time, Mercedes was 90 years old and Appellant was living

at the Lynn Avenue property.

Thereafter, acting under the power of attorney and as agent for

Mercedes, Joseph listed the property for sale with a real estate agent. The

Santos family2 subsequently toured the property with a real estate agent.

Joseph, Ronald, and Appellant were also present. During the tour, Appellant

specifically showed the Santos family the room where he was staying. The

Santos family made a formal offer to purchase the property and Joseph, acting

as agent under Mercedes’ power of attorney, accepted. The settlement date

for the proposed transaction was originally scheduled for March 5, 2018, but

changed to March 15, 2018, to allow Appellant time to move out of the

property. In the interim, on February 27, 2018, Mercedes conveyed the deed

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2 Melissa A. Stecker, Marcelino Carlos Carvalho Santos, Maria C. Santos, and

Marcelino J. Santos (collectively, the Santos family). The Santos family is not

related to the Goosley family.

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for the subject residence to Appellant, by notarized signature, at the Gracedale

nursing home.

On March 28, 2018, the Santos family filed a complaint in equity against

Mercedes, Joseph, and Appellant.3 On September 27, 2019, Appellant filed a

motion for summary judgment and supporting brief, arguing he was entitled

to judgment as a matter of law because Mercedes voluntarily conveyed the

deed to the subject property to Appellant before Joseph entered into an

agreement of sale with the Santos family.4 More specifically, and relevant to

the instant appeal, Appellant alleged:

[Appellant] previously resided with his mother at her residence []

for many years and served as caretaker for her.

When Mercedes [] entered Gracedale Nursing Home in 2017 she

had little, if any, funds to pay the monthly charge. Through

Gracedale, she applied for and was approved for Long Term Care

Medical Assistance with the Pennsylvania Department of Human

Services, and was granted Family Caregiver Exemption, which

would allow her to transfer her residence [] to her son[,

Appellant,] for his care of her.

Unbeknownst to Mercedes [], and under pressure from her other

children, Joseph [] listed the home [] for sale in January 2018.

The sale was not a [pre]requisite of [Mercedes] approval for Long

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3 Ultimately, after considering preliminary objections and the filing of two,

amended complaints, the trial court allowed two counts, breach of contract

and interference with contract, to proceed to trial. In lieu of monetary

damages, the Santos family sought an order of specific performance directing

enforcement of the agreement of sale for the subject property.

4 Defense counsel representing Appellant, Joseph, and Mercedes filed the

motion for summary judgment and supporting brief. Mercedes and Joseph,

however, are not parties to the current appeal.

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Term Medical Assistance, as the house was an exempt asset to be

transferred to the family caregiver, [Appellant].

On or about February 5, 2018, [the Santos family] entered into a

contract with [] Joseph [], who was purportedly acting on behalf

of [] Mercedes [] for the purchase of the property[.] The

agreement of sale […] simply listed the seller as “Mercedes

Goosley CO Joseph Goosley” and is simply signed as “Joseph

Goosley.” There is no indication or suggestion that Joseph was

acting as apparent agent for Mercedes[.]

In October 2013, Joseph [] purchased a Power of Attorney [form]

online and had his mother sign it before a notary public. The

Durable Power of Attorney […] was a “springing” power of

attorney, meaning that it would only become operative and

effective upon the meeting of a condition, which in this case

required Mercedes [] to be “incapacitated or disabled so that as a

result [she was] not able to manage [her] financial affairs in which

case [the power of attorney] shall become effective as of the date

of [a] written statement to be provide[d] by a physician[.]

* * *

Mercedes [] wanted her son, [Appellant,] to live in the house and

admitted so during a competency evaluation performed by Dr.

Paige Van Wirt on March 7, 2018[.] Mercedes [], by her own hand,

signed a deed transferring the house to [Appellant] on February

27, 2018.

Brief in Support of Summary Judgment, 9/27/2019, at 2-4.

On November 12, 2019, the trial court entered an order denying

Appellant’s motion for summary judgment, stating:

Material issues of fact remain as to Mercedes[’] intentions

regarding the subject property; whether Mercedes [] granted

actual or apparent authority to Joseph [] to enter into the

[a]greement of [s]ale regarding the subject property; whether

[Appellant] had knowledge of the existing [a]greement of [s]ale

at the time the deed was transferred to his name; whether

[Appellant] exerted improper influence in obtaining the deed to

the [s]ubject [p]roperty; and credibility determinations of the

witnesses which can only be made by the fact finder.

Trial Court Order, 11/12/2019.

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The trial court held a non-jury trial on January 28, 2020 wherein

Appellant, Joseph, Stephen, and Ronald testified. Other trial witnesses

included the real estate agent involved with the sales agreement between

Joseph and the Santos family, the notary who was present for the deed

transfer from Mercedes to Appellant, and three members of the Santos family.

Appellant also presented the report of Dr. Paige Van Wirt, as mentioned briefly

above.

On February 10, 2020, the trial court entered an order “wherein the

conveyance to [Appellant from Mercedes] was declared null and void and the

equitable remedy of specific performance was granted to” the Santos family.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/2020, at 3. Appellant filed a timely post-trial motion

on February 19, 2020. At the conclusion of a conference on March 4, 2020,

the trial court issued an order that, inter alia, recognized that Mercedes

“passed away following the trial in this matter” and directed Joseph, as

Mercedes’ named executor, to probate her will. The order further directed the

parties to file briefs regarding Appellant’s request for post-trial relief. The

parties complied timely. On June 9, 2020, the trial court entered an opinion

and order denying Appellant’s motion for post-trial relief. On June 23, 2020,

Appellant filed a praecipe to enter judgment in favor of the Santos family.

This timely appeal resulted.5

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5 “[T]he proper, procedural course to pursue in perfecting an appeal from [a]

verdict is to reduce the verdict to judgment and take an appeal therefrom and

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On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

Is [Appellant] entitled to a new trial or other post-trial relief when

the trial court abused its discretion and/or misapplied the law by:

a. Determining the trial court did not err[] or abuse its

discretion in crafting the equitable decision that the deed

from Mercedes [] to [Appellant] was null and void ab

initio.

b. Determining that a new trial should not be granted.

c. Determining that the [a]greement of [s]ale [between

Joseph and the Santos family] was a valid enforceable

contract that could be completed.

d. Determining that the medical report from Dr. Paige Van

Wirt was not an expert report, and by failing to factor in

the report’s conclusions in its decision.

e. Determining that [] witnesses Steven [] and Ronald

Goosley were credible.

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

The thrust of Appellant’s claim asserts that he is entitled to a new trial.

Our standard of review is well-settled:

Our standard of review when faced with an appeal from the trial

court's denial of a motion for a new trial is whether the trial court

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not from an order denying post-trial motions.” Crosby, 548 A.2d at 283.

Moreover, a “verdict [does] not become final for purposes of appeal until

properly reduced to and entered as a formal judgment under Pa.R.C.P. 227.4.”

Crystal Lake Camps v. Alford, 923 A.2d 482, 488 (Pa. Super. 2007). Here,

judgment was entered on June 23, 2020 and because the appeal properly lies

from the entry of judgment, we have amended the caption accordingly.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on June 23, 2020. On June 26, 2020, the

trial court directed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied timely on July

16, 2020. On July 29, 2020, the trial court filed an opinion pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) that relied upon its earlier decision issued on June 9, 2020.

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clearly and palpably committed an error of law that controlled the

outcome of the case or constituted an abuse of discretion. In

examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict

winner, to reverse the trial court, we must conclude that the

verdict would change if another trial were granted. Further, if the

basis of the request for a new trial is the trial court's rulings on

evidence, then such rulings must be shown to have been not only

erroneous but also harmful to the complaining parties.

Evidentiary rulings which did not affect the verdict will not provide

a basis for disturbing the [factfinder’s] judgment.

Moreover, the admission or exclusion of evidence is within the

sound discretion of the trial court. In reviewing a challenge to the

admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling by the trial

court upon a showing that it abused its discretion or committed

an error of law.

Schuenemann v. Dreemz, LLC, 34 A.3d 94, 98–99 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(internal citation, original brackets, and ellipsis omitted).

Furthermore, we recognize:

Our review in a non-jury case is limited to whether the findings of

the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether

the trial court committed error in the application of law. We must

grant the court's findings of fact the same weight and effect as

the verdict of a jury and, accordingly, may disturb the non-jury

verdict only if the court's findings are unsupported by competent

evidence or the court committed legal error that affected the

outcome of the trial.

It is not the role of an appellate court to pass on the credibility of

witnesses; hence we will not substitute our judgment for that of

the factfinder. Thus, the test we apply is not whether we would

have reached the same result on the evidence presented, but

rather, after due consideration of the evidence which the trial

court found credible, whether the trial court could have reasonably

reached its conclusion.

Wolf v. Santiago, 230 A.3d 394, 399–400 (Pa. Super. 2020) (internal

brackets omitted).

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For clarity and ease of discussion, we will address the issues in a

different order than presented by Appellant. We first address an evidentiary

claim, Appellant’s issue (d) as presented above. Appellant contends that the

trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion in determining

that the medical report from Dr. Paige Van Wirt was not an expert report and

by failing to consider the report’s conclusions in rendering its decision.

Appellant’s Brief at 27-29.

At trial, counsel and the trial court discussed whether the report written

by Dr. Van Wirt (dated March 7, 2018 and based upon an examination of

Mercedes while she resided at Gracedale nursing home) qualified as an expert

report. N.T., 1/28/2020, at 91-94. In her report, Dr. Van Wirt opined that

Mercedes “had the capacity to address the decision about what she wants

done with the house,” however, because Dr. Van Wirt did not state that her

opinions were formed within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the

trial court ruled that it would “not [] accept [them] as [] expert opinion[s].”

Id. at 94. Appellant did not object. Id. Moreover, Appellant agreed to

“submit [the report] as evidence and let the factfinder [] make any inferences

from the report.” Id.

It is settled that the failure to make a contemporaneous objection

waives an issue on appeal. See Parr v. Ford Motor Co., 109 A.3d 692, 709

(Pa. Super. 2014). Further, even if Appellant did raise a contemporaneous

objection, his failure to cite to that objection renders his claim unreviewable

on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e); Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) (where an issue is not

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reviewable unless raised or preserved below, an appellate brief must set forth

specific references to the places in the record where the question was timely

and properly raised below so as to preserve the issue on appeal). Appellant

failed to provide this Court with a citation to the record showing he lodged an

objection contemporaneous to the trial court’s determination that the report

did not qualify as an expert report. We therefore find that Appellant waived

his current contention regarding Dr. Van Wirt’s report.

Next, we address Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred by finding

the trial testimony of Steven and Ronald credible. See Appellant’s Brief at

29-30. Appellant contends “the obvious bias and animosity of Steven and

Ronald [] should not have been ignored by the [trial court] in making [its]

decision on credibility.” Id. at 29. He claims “[b]oth brothers stood to lose

by allowing [Appellant] to have the house.” Id. at 29-30. Appellant, however,

does not cite any legal authority to support this allegation and we find it

waived. We have stated:

The argument portion of an appellate brief must include a

pertinent discussion of the particular point raised along with

discussion and citation of pertinent authorities. This Court will not

consider the merits of an argument which fails to cite relevant

case [law] or statutory authority. Failure to cite relevant legal

authority constitutes waiver of the claim on appeal.

[When an appellant] fail[s] to cite any legal authority to support

[his] single-paragraph argument [such] failure [] waives the issue

for purposes of review. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101 [and] 2119(a).

In re Est. of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209–210 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal

case citations omitted).

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Even if Appellant did not waive this issue, we have previously

determined:

The credibility of witnesses is an issue to be determined by the

trier of fact. On appeal, this Court will not revisit the trial court's

determinations regarding the credibility of the [witnesses].

Garwood v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 240 A.3d 945, 948 (Pa. Super. 2020),

citing Stephan v. Waldron Elec. Heating & Cooling LLC, 100 A.3d 660,

667 (Pa. Super. 2014). For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant is not

entitled to relief on his credibility claim.

Appellant’s remaining three issues are inter-related and we will examine

them together. Appellant generally contends that “[t]he decision to grant [the

Santos family] specific performance and declare the deed [from Mercedes to

Appellant] null and void ab initio was against the weight of the evidence

presented at the time of trial and constituted an error of law or abuse of

discretion.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. He claims the trial court erred by

determining he interfered with contractual relations, arguing he “was justified

in any actions he took to protect his equitable interest in the property” because

of his status as caregiver.6 Id. at 13; see also id. at 20-21. Additionally,

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6 Appellant claims that 55 Pa. Code § 178.104(e)(ii) and (iv), which he refers

to as the “caregiver exemption,” “gave him the right to receive the house from

[] Mercedes, without penalizing her eligibility for medical assistance to cover

her long term care at Gracedale Nursing home.” Appellant’s Brief at 16-17.

The pertinent subsections of Section 178.104(e) provide for the transfer of

property to:

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Appellant asserts that there was no evidence that he “had actual knowledge

of the existence of the agreement of sale, nor evidence of the prospective

contractual relations between” the Santos family and Mercedes. Id. at 20.

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(ii) The individual's child who is under 21 years of age, or blind or

permanently and totally disabled as determined under § 140.81

(relating to deductions from earned income), or is blind or

disabled based on SSI criteria as specified in 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 1382c(a)(3).

* * *

(iv) A son or daughter of the individual, other than a child

described in subparagraph (ii), who resided in the individual's

home for at least 2 years immediately before the date the

individual became an institutionalized individual and who provided

care to the individual which permitted the individual to reside at

home rather than in an institution or facility.

55 Pa. Code § 178.104(e)(ii) and (iv).

In support of this aspect of this claim, Appellant argues that his “right to have

the property transferred under the caregiver exemption was confirmed by the

Department of Human Services, Estate Recovery Unit after trial.” Appellant’s

Brief at 17 (emphasis added). Appellant attached a copy of “a letter

confirming that [Appellant] qualified for the caregiver exemption” to the

reproduced record for our consideration. For the reasons that follow, however,

we may not consider this evidence.

It is black letter law in this jurisdiction that an appellate court

cannot consider anything which is not part of the record in this

case.

Under our Rules of Appellate Procedure, those documents which

are not part of the ‘official record’ forwarded to this Court are

considered to be non-existent.... And, these deficiencies may not

be remedied by inclusion in a brief in the form of a reproduced

record. It is well settled that an appellate court may consider only

those facts which have been duly certified in the record on appeal.

Bennyhoff v. Pappert, 790 A.2d 313, 318 (Pa. Super. 2001) (internal

citations omitted).

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Appellant argues he was only aware that the Santos family “toured the house”

and that Joseph “told him he would need to leave at some point.” Id. Finally,

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by determining that the agreement

of sale was a valid and enforceable contract. Id. at 22-27. He claims that

Joseph lacked authority, actual or apparent, under the power of attorney in

effect because: (1) there was no indication on the sales agreement that

Joseph was acting as Mercedes’ agent; (2) the power of attorney only became

effective upon a physician’s written determination that Mercedes had become

incapacitated or disabled, which did not occur; (3) the real estate agent, acting

as dual agent for both Joseph and the Santos family, failed to verify and/or

provide written acknowledgment of Joseph’s power of attorney prior to listing

the house and entering the agreement of sale; (4) “title to the property could

never have been transferred to the [Santos family] by Joseph[], as the title

insurance company would not have been able to issue title insurance.” Id. at

23-27. Distilling these arguments, Appellant essentially contends that Joseph

lacked the authority to enter into the sales agreement on behalf of Mercedes

and that Appellant could not have intentionally interfered because he did not

know about the sale and was only protecting his legal interest in the property

under the caregiver exemption.

We have previously determined:

Agency is a relationship whereby the principal manifests assent

that another person (the agent) will act on the principal's behalf

subject to the principal's control, and the agent agrees to do so.

An agency relationship may be created by any of the following:

(1) express authority, (2) implied authority, (3) apparent

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authority, and/or (4) authority by estoppel. Agency cannot be

inferred from mere relationships or family ties, and we do not

assume agency merely because one person acts on behalf of

another. Rather, we look to facts to determine whether the

principal expressly or impliedly intended to create an agency

relationship. To that end, family ties may be relevant when

considered with other factors evincing agency. Finally, the party

asserting the agency relationship bears the burden of proving it

by a preponderance of the evidence.

* * *

Apparent agency exists where the principal, by word or conduct,

causes people with whom the alleged agent deals to believe that

the principal has granted the agent authority to act. An agent

cannot simply by his own words, invest himself with apparent

authority. Such authority emanates from the action of the

principal and not the agent.

Wisler v. Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC, 124 A.3d 317, 323-324 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

In this case, the trial court concluded:

Here, Mercedes executed a power of attorney on October 21,

2013. Mercedes was the principal, Joseph was her agent, and

Ronald was successor agent. Joseph believed that the power of

attorney gave him the immediate and unencumbered power to act

on behalf of Mercedes.

Consistent with the apparent authority which Joseph had as the

agent for Mercedes, [the trial] court concluded that Joseph was

not fully aware that the power of attorney was a “springing” power

of attorney. Joseph testified that he obtained [a] power of

attorney form from the internet to save money. The power of

attorney had boilerplate or form language that contained a

condition precedent that Joseph would become the agent only

after Mercedes would be declared incompetent by a physician. []

Joseph expressed not even knowing that [this provision] was in

this power of attorney.

Based on Joseph’s testimony that he held himself out as an agent

and routinely conducted affairs on Mercedes’ behalf, [the trial

court] found Joseph’s testimony credible. It was reasonable[,

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according to the trial court,] to conclude that Joseph and Mercedes

believed that Joseph had the power to act as an agent on her

behalf without the condition precedent of Mercedes being declared

incompetent. Joseph testified to this belief at trial. Again, Joseph

credibly testified that he acted and held himself out as his

mother’s agent on numerous occasions since 2013. Generally, an

express authority is to be strictly construed. However, the instant

matter involves the unique situation where the principal and the

agent intended to enter into a general power of attorney, rather

than a springing power of attorney. Based on those intentions,

Joseph engaged in the ordinary course of activity as an agent

under a general power of attorney. In other words, Joseph[]

believed he had th[e authority to convey the property] under the

concept of apparent authority. Joseph’s actions for years

established a pattern and practice that would be considered

reasonable for a third party to rely upon. Further, there was no

evidence that Mercedes restricted his agency in any way. This

intent was further proven by testimony that after learning there

was a condition precedent in the 2013 power of attorney,

Mercedes and Joseph executed a general power of attorney

without any conditions precedent so that Joseph could continue

to act as an agent.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/2020, at 25-26 (case and record citations and some

quotations omitted; emphasis in original).

We concur with the trial court as the record supports its assessment.

Initially, however, we note that Joseph’s subjective belief that he was acting

as Mercedes’ agent is irrelevant. However, the evidence herein supports the

trial court’s determination that Mercedes granted Joseph authority to act as

her agent. Mercedes was in living in Joseph’s care for the two years prior to

moving into Gracedale nursing home and Joseph handled her financial affairs

throughout that period and until the time of trial. Stephen and Ronald

confirmed these facts. Id. at 4-6, citing N.T., 1/28/2020, at 16-17 and 57.

Joseph acted as Mercedes’ agent beginning in 2013, when the power of

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attorney was executed. Id. at 6. There was no evidence to suggest that

Mercedes objected to Joseph acting on her behalf. Moreover, Mercedes’ intent

to appoint Joseph as her agent, without conditioning the appointment upon a

finding of disability or incapacity, is buttressed by the subsequent execution

of a general power of attorney giving Joseph authority to act as her agent

without those conditions. Taken together, despite the springing provision in

the 2013 power of attorney requiring a finding of disability or incapacity, it is

clear that Mercedes intended that Joseph act as her agent. As such,

Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred by finding Joseph was acting under

apparent authority lacks merit.

Finally, we turn to Appellant’s contention that the trial court erred by

finding he intentionally interfered with the sales agreement. This Court has

stated:

The requisite elements of a cause of action for interference with

prospective contractual relations are as follows:

(1) a prospective contractual relationship;

(2) the purpose or intent to harm the plaintiff by preventing

the relation from occurring;

(3) the absence of privilege or justification on the part of

the defendant; and

(4) the occasioning of actual damage resulting from the

defendant's conduct.

Further, as this Court has held:

the third element of the tort requires a showing that

defendant's actions were not privileged. Thus, in order to

succeed in a cause of action for tortious interference with a

contract, a plaintiff must prove not only that a defendant

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acted intentionally to harm the plaintiff, but also that those

actions were improper. In determining whether a

defendant's actions were improper, the trial court must take

into account the factors listed in Restatement (Second) of

Torts Section 767.

Section 767 of the Second Restatement, entitled “Factors in

Determining Whether Interference is Improper,” declares []

consideration is given to the following factors:

(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,

(b) the actor's motive,

(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct

interferes,

(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,

(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action

of the actor and the contractual interests of the other,

(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the

interference and

(g) the relations between the parties.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767.

Salsgiver Commc'ns, Inc. v. Consol. Commc'ns Holdings, Inc., 150 A.3d

957, 964–966 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal case citations and original brackets

omitted).

In this case, as set forth above, Appellant contends that he did not know

about the existence of a contractual, or prospective contractual, relationship

between the Santos family and Joseph and that he was otherwise protecting

his legal interest under the caregiver exemption under 55 Pa. Code

§ 178.104(e)(ii) and (iv). We examine each contention in turn.

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First, upon review of the record, Appellant admitted that he knew the

property was for sale, that he was present when the Santos family toured it,

that the tour occurred before Mercedes transferred the deed to him, and that

Joseph subsequently told him he would have to move out. See Trial Court

Opinion, 6/9/2020, at 12-14; N.T., 1/28/2020, at 45-46 and 134-142.

Moreover, the trial court noted that Appellant “arranged for the preparation of

the deed without informing his siblings, and only informed one sibling after

the deed” was executed. Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/2020, at 14. The trial court

further recognized that Appellant’s actions were “not coincidental” where the

deed from Mercedes to Appellant was executed “after the execution of the

agreement of sale [between Joseph and the Santos family], and prior to any

final closing” Id. at 28-29. The trial court ultimately concluded that

Appellant’s actions “were purposeful in preventing the [Santos family] from

pursing settlement in accordance with the settlement agreement [and] were

surreptitious and done in a fraudulent manner[.]” Id. at 29. Thus, the trial

court also considered the requisite factors in determining whether the

interference was improper pursuant to Section 767 of the Second

Restatement, including Appellant’s conduct, motive, interests sought to be

advanced, timing of the interference, and the relations between the parties.

We discern no error. Appellant’s claim that he did not know about the sale is

belied by the record.

Moreover, regarding the caregiver exception, the trial court determined

that “Mercedes and [Appellant] did not live together for three years prior to

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her entering the county nursing home.” Id. at 29. The trial court ultimately

concluded that Appellant testified that “he had nowhere else to live” and “that

this was the primary motivation for his interference with the contract in

question.” Id. We will not disturb the trial court’s credibility determinations.

Moreover, as previously mentioned, 55 Pa. Code § 178.104(e)(iv) provides

for the transfer of property to an individual’s son, under the caregiver

exception, if he “resided in the individual's home for at least 2 years

immediately before the date the individual became an institutionalized

individual and who provided care to the individual which permitted the

individual to reside at home rather than in an institution or facility.” (emphasis

added). Here, the record reflects that although Appellant may have resided

at the subject residence for the two years before Mercedes was

institutionalized, he was not simultaneously providing for her care during that

time period in order to allow her to stay in the home. Instead, Joseph provided

care to Mercedes which permitted her to reside at Joseph’s residence. As

such, we reject Appellant’s contention that he was justified for interfering with

the sales agreement. Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, Appellant is

not entitled to relief.

Judgment affirmed.

Judge Strassburger did not participate in the consideration or decision

of this case.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/15/2021

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