Romey Green, III v. Kasandra Cherry Green

04/12/2021

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

January 19, 2021 Session

ROMEY GREEN III v. KASANDRA CHERRY GREEN

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Tipton County

No. 30748 Martha B. Brasfield, Chancellor

___________________________________

No. W2019-01416-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

In this divorce case, Wife takes issue with how the trial court distributed the possessory

interest in the marital home and Husband’s Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System

(“TCRS”) benefits. Because the trial court did not assign values to all of the relevant

property subject to division, we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the trial court

for additional findings.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated

and Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B.

GOLDIN and CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JJ., joined.

Cornelius K. Bostick, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kasandra Cherry Green.

Jeffery L. Stimpson, Drummonds, Tennessee, for the appellee, Romey Green, III.

OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Romey Green, III (“Husband”) and Kasandra Cherry Green (“Wife”) were married

in 1984. Husband filed a complaint for divorce on July 3, 2013 in the Chancery Court of

Tipton County (“the trial court”). Wife filed an answer and counter-complaint, and after a

protracted pre-trial and discovery process, a trial was held over the span of three days—

January 18, 2018, February 6, 2018, and March 1, 2018.

At trial, the parties testified, along with their two adult daughters1 and one of Wife’s

friends. Over sixty exhibits were introduced in evidence, including tables that each party

prepared, listing the division of the marital property and marital indebtedness. The bulk of

the parties’ assets consist of a marital home in Tipton County, an adjoining unimproved

lot, another unimproved lot purchased by Wife in Shelby County, and various

retirement/financial accounts.

At the time of trial, Wife was fifty-three years old and Husband was sixty-three

years old. Each testified regarding their health issues. Husband joined the military in 1972

and retired in 1995. He has an Associate’s degree, taught Reserve Officer Training Corps

from 1996 to 2012 in the Memphis school system, and testified that he was serving as a

part-time minister. However, the parties stipulated at trial that Husband is unable to work.

Wife has a Bachelor’s degree and a diverse employment history, including working for the

United States Navy and part-time at Dillard’s department store at the time of trial. At times,

she would work overseas for long periods. Husband bought a home in Tipton County in

1994 and an adjacent lot,2 each of which was paid off by the time of trial. Wife also

purchased a plot of land in Shelby County in 2008.

The trial court entered a final decree of divorce on June 11, 2018.3 Therein, the trial

court found, and the parties agree, that the Tipton County home is worth $145,000.00 and

the adjacent lot is worth $22,000.00. The trial court also found that Wife’s plot of Shelby

County land is worth $45,000.00, with an outstanding indebtedness of $16,802.00. Those

are the only monetary values the trial court assigned to the property at issue in the divorce.

Otherwise, the trial court found, in pertinent part, that the parties separated in 2006 but had

been living in the same home until Wife left in 2014; that both parties had grounds for

divorce; that Wife, by her own admission, was guilty of adultery; and that the parties were

declared divorced pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-129. The trial court

considered the following facts, pursuant to section 36-4-121, in equitably dividing the

marital property:

a) The parties have been separated a [] while;

b) The value of the property and debt;

c) What the parties accumulated themselves;

d) The age of the parties and that the Husband is ten (10) years older than

the Wife;

1

It is unclear from the record if the younger daughter is Husband’s biological child.

2

According to his brief, Husband purchased the lot in 2011, but it appears that the warranty deed for the

lot is dated 1995.

3

The trial court incorporated a large portion of the trial transcript into its written order, parts of which

contain dialogue between counsel and the court. We note that we have previously held, in the context of

party-prepared orders, that such “matters not a proper part of the [court’s] determination [should not be]

included” in the written order. Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., No. W2011-02405-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL

210250, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2013) (citations omitted), aff’d, 439 S.W.3d 303 (Tenn. 2014).

-2-

e) The parties accumulated a lot of their debt after their separation in 2006;

f) That most of the parties’ debts are in their respective separate names;

g) That the Wife did not have a profession during their children’s minority;

h) That Husband is retired with income from Social Security retirement,

military retirement, VA disability, and Tennessee Retirement System

Retirement and that these incomes are all he is going to be able to receive

because he is, by stipulation of the parties, unable to work;

i) That Wife has the ability to earn income and has additional years to

increase her salary and retirement;

j) Wife accumulated money funds from her income earned in the Middle

East while she was younger but she should not be required to return to

the Middle East to work;

k) Wife earns approximately the same as what the Husband is receiving as

income from his retirement and other benefits;

l) That relative to division of property, including the Husband staying in the

house [rent-free], Wife has significant retirement accounts which she is

going to keep and will not be divided with the Husband.

The trial court also considered the fact that Wife depleted money from her accounts after

the issuance of mandatory injunctions prohibiting dissipation of funds.4

The trial court awarded the Tipton County marital home to the parties as tenants in

common, each with a one-half undivided interest. However, the court awarded Husband

the exclusive use of the home (including maintaining its current condition and paying taxes

and insurance, with the requirement of listing Wife as a beneficiary) until he dies or has to

move into assisted living, at which point Wife will be entitled to receive at least one-half

of the current value of the house upon its sale.5 As for the lot next door, the court again

found that the parties should be named as tenants in common, each with a one-half

undivided interest. The trial court found that the lot was subject, however, to the parties’

respective attorneys’ liens for fees incurred in this case, and thus ordered that the lot be

sold and the proceeds paid to counsel for Husband and Wife in equal shares.

Otherwise, Wife was awarded her Shelby County property; her Subaru and any debt

owed thereon; her Federal Employees’ Retirement System (“FERS”) benefits; any personal

property she inherited from her father (with various conditions); twenty-three percent of

Husband’s disposable military retired pay and the Survivor Benefit Plan (“SBP”) coverage

that Husband elected for her as part of his military retirement; the funds in her name in

various accounts; and the debts in her name associated with certain credit cards, loans, and

4

The court did not find that Wife had to repay any portion of that amount, however.

5

The trial court detailed what should happen if the value of the house at the time of sale is different from

the current value of $145,000.00, and other contingencies related to the division of the marital home, but

those are not relevant to the disposition of this case on appeal.

-3-

legal fees. Husband was awarded his TCRS retirement; his Toyota, Jeep, Kubota tractor,

and Rambler RV, and any debt owed thereon; the funds in his name in various bank

accounts; and the debts in his name associated with various banks and other loans. The trial

court stated that even though both parties requested alimony, it was not awarding alimony

“per se,”6 after considering the following factors:

a) The parties make about the same income;

b) Husband’s expenses are somewhat higher and include expenses of his

adult daughter who paid for a trip to Hawaii demonstrating a lack of

financial prioritization; and

c) Wife’s move to a new residence where she is incurring a higher rental

payment[.]

Finally, the court entered an order restraining the parties from following each other for four

months, ordered that each party shall pay their own attorney’s fees and would be

responsible for one-half of the remaining court costs, and ordered Wife to reimburse

Husband $325.00 (half of the cost of the court-ordered appraisal of the Tipton County home

and lot).

Wife filed an initial and then an amended motion to alter or amend or for a new trial.

The trial court denied both motions, except for one amendment that was made to the

divorce decree regarding the amount Wife was to reimburse Husband for the SBP

premium. Wife appealed on August 9, 2019. Subsequently, on January 14, 2021, Wife filed

a motion requesting to supplement her appellate brief with a table listing the marital

property and debts, pursuant to Rule 7 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee,

(a “Rule 7 table”).7 We address this motion infra.

6

There seems to be a disagreement over whether the award of the possessory interest in the marital

residence to Husband constitutes alimony. The trial court stated in its order that it was not awarding alimony

“per se,” but at other times in the same order simply stated that it was not awarding alimony. In the event

of a future appeal, it may be useful to clarify this.

7

Rule 7 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee states, in pertinent part:

(a) In any domestic relations appeal in which either party takes issue with the classification

of property or debt or with the manner in which the trial court divided or allocated the

marital property or debt, the brief of the party raising the issue shall contain, in the

statement of facts or in an appendix, a table in a form substantially similar to the form

attached hereto. This table shall list all property and debts considered by the trial court,

including: (1) all separate property, (2) all marital property, and (3) all separate and marital

debts.

(Emphasis added).

-4-

In contrast to Wife, Husband did attach a Rule 7 table to his appellate brief.

Although not strictly required to present such a table in light of the fact that he seeks no

affirmative relief from the trial court’s property decisions, nothing prevents him from filing

his own table in order to facilitate appellate review. Cf. Kirby, 2016 WL 4045035, at *7

(quoting Harden v. Harden, No. M2009-01302-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 2612688 at *8

(Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2010)) (“[T]he trial court’s failure to assign values to all items of

property ‘does not prohibit [the parties] from providing this Court with the value [they]

contend[ ] ought to be assigned and a citation to the record to support such an assertion.’”).

However, we note that Husband’s Rule 7 table contains multiple errors, including citations

to the record that do not support his contentions and, as will be discussed infra, his table

omits some pieces of property that the trial court distributed between the parties. That said,

a flawed Rule 7 table is preferable to no Rule 7 table at all.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Wife raises the following issues for review, which we slightly restate:

1. Whether awarding Husband exclusive use of the marital home until he dies

or has to move into an assisted living facility/nursing home, is an equitable

distribution of marital property pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated

section 36-4-121.

2. Whether denying Wife one-half of the marital interest of Husband’s TCRS

benefits was an equitable distribution of marital property pursuant to

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121.

Husband echoes Wife’s issues, and raises the following additional issues, which we

slightly restate:

1. Whether Wife’s failure to raise the issue of value of Husband’s TCRS

retirement in the trial court precludes her from raising that issue for the first

time on appeal.

2. Whether Wife’s appeal should be dismissed for her failure to comply with

Rule 7 of the Tennessee Rules of the Court of Appeals.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Wife asserts, inter alia, that she should have been awarded more

property by the trial court. Husband asserts instead, inter alia, that the trial court’s

distribution of property was equitable and that Wife’s arguments should be waived because

she failed to timely file a Rule 7 table.8 Because we conclude that the trial court’s order is

deficient, we do not reach the merits of these arguments.

8

As previously discussed, Wife attempted to supplement her brief with a Rule 7 table well after the time

-5-

In divorce cases, “[t]he division of a marital estate necessarily begins with the

classification of the parties’ property as either marital or separate property.” Brown v.

Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted); see Tenn. Code

Ann. § 36-4-121(b)9 (defining “separate property” and “marital property”). “The

classification of particular property as either separate or marital is a question of fact to be

determined in light of all relevant circumstances.” Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d

240, 245 (Tenn. 2009) (citations omitted). This Court has explained that

[a]fter a trial court has classified the parties’ property as either marital or

separate, it should place a reasonable value on each piece of property subject

to division. The parties themselves must come forward with competent

valuation evidence. When valuation evidence is conflicting, the court may

place a value on the property that is within the range of the values represented

by all the relevant valuation evidence. Decisions regarding the value of

marital property are questions of fact. Accordingly, they are entitled to great

weight on appeal and will not be second-guessed unless they are not

supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). “The

value placed on marital property should, as near as possible, reflect the value of the

property on the date that it is divided.” Id. at 487 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-

121(b)(1)(A); Manis v. Manis, 49 S.W.3d 295, 303 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)).

After the property is properly classified and valued, the marital property must then

be divided equitably between the divorcing spouses, without regard to the fault of either

party. Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3d at 246 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1)).

“[D]ivision of the marital estate includes both the division of the marital property and the

allocation of the marital debt. . . . Thus, an examination of the manner in which a trial court

divided the marital property must take into consideration how the trial court allocated the

marital debt.” Owens, 241 S.W.3d at 490. Conversely, “[s]eparate property is not part of

the marital estate and is therefore not subject to division.” Id. (quotation marks and

citations omitted). A trial court’s decision regarding equitable division of marital property

“is not a mechanical one and is not rendered inequitable because it is not precisely equal

or because both parties did not receive a share of each piece of property.” Brown, 913

S.W.2d at 168 (citation omitted). Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-

121(c), a trial court must consider many factors in equitably dividing marital property.

Appellate courts “giv[e] great weight to a trial court’s decisions regarding the division of

marital assets, and we will not disturb [them] unless the distribution lacks proper

for briefing had closed. Because of our resolution of this appeal, however, that request is moot.

9

For purposes of resolving this appeal, we will rely on the version of Tennessee Code Annotated section

36-4-121 that was in effect when this divorce was filed in 2013. See 2011 Tenn. Pub. Laws Ch. 119 § 6

(S.B. 1172) (“This act shall take effect upon becoming a law, the public welfare requiring it.”).

-6-

evidentiary support, misapplies statutory requirements or procedures, or results in some

error of law.” See Snodgrass, 295 S.W.3dat 245 (citation omitted). Thus, our caselaw

mandates that a trial court faced with marital property division make a number of factual

findings to support its ruling.

This requirement is fully consistent with the mandates of Rule 52.01 of the

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “In all

actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and shall

state separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.”

Therefore, “[i]n bench trials, trial courts must make findings of fact and conclusions of law

to support their rulings.” Hardin v. Hardin, No. W2012-00273-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL

6727533, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2012). While there is no bright-line rule for the

adequacy of a trial court’s order, “the findings of fact must include as much of the

subsidiary facts as is necessary to disclose to the reviewing court the steps by which the

trial court reached its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue.” Lovlace v. Copley, 418

S.W.3d 1, 35 (Tenn. 2013). A trial “‘court must go beyond mere summation by linking the

evidence to its clearly stated findings of fact and conclusions of law.’” Rosebrough v.

Caldwell, No. W2018-01168-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 6898218, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec.

18, 2019) (quoting In re S.S.-G., No. M2015-00055-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 7259499, at

*12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2015)). “‘Without such findings and conclusions, this [C]ourt

is left to wonder on what basis the [trial] court reached its ultimate decision.” Babcock v.

Babcock, No. E2014-01670-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1059003, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar.

9, 2015) (quoting In re K.H., No. W2008-01144-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 1362314, at *8

(Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2009) (quoting In re M.E.W., No. M2003-01739-COA-R3-PT,

2004 WL 865840, at *19 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2004))).

Generally, the proper remedy when the trial court fails to make sufficient findings

of fact and conclusions of law is to vacate and remand for the entry of a more detailed

order. Lake v. Haynes, No. W2010-00294-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 2361563, at *1 (Tenn.

Ct. App. June 9, 2011). Specifically in the context of divorce cases, this Court has stressed

the importance of trial courts making appropriate findings and conclusions under Rule

52.01, including the values of marital property. See Kirby v. Kirby, No. M2015-01408-

COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4045035, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2016) (citing Tenn. R.

Civ. P. 52.01) (“In the absence of sufficient findings and conclusions regarding the

valuation of all property at issue and the statutory factors contained in Tennessee Code

Annotated § 36-4-121, we cannot determine whether each party was awarded an equitable

portion of the marital estate. Accordingly, we must vacate the trial court’s property

distribution and remand this matter to the trial court for the entry of appropriate findings

of fact and conclusions of law.”).

In this appeal, the parties’ main dispute centers around the distribution of property.

Therefore, in order for us to determine whether the trial court equitably divided the marital

property at issue, the relevant threshold inquiries involve (1) what property is marital

-7-

versus separate; and (2) how the trial court valued the marital property. The trial judge

acknowledged these requirements multiple times at trial. For example, the trial judge

stated, “I still want to know the amounts. . . . I can’t decide how anything is equitable or

what it is and how to divide it until I have the numbers.” But, unfortunately, the trial court

failed to provide us with this same information.

As an initial matter, we note that other than the Shelby County land and the Tipton

County home, which the trial court explicitly characterized as marital, no other property is

classified as marital or separate in the trial court’s order. This omission is troubling in light

of the fact that at least some of the property awarded to Wife appears to have been inherited,

and therefore is arguably separate. Although the parties have not raised the trial court’s

failure to classify each piece of property as an issue in this appeal, we must note that our

ability to determine whether an equitable division of marital property was made is

hampered when we are unable to discern whether any of the property at issue did not

actually constitute marital property subject to division.

Even more importantly for this particular case, the trial court only assigned dollar

values to three pieces of property that it distributed: Wife’s Shelby County land (including

the debt owed thereon), the marital home in Tipton County, and the lot adjacent to the

marital home. These pieces of real property, however, were not the only pieces of property

divided by the trial court. Rather, the parties presented evidence at trial showing that they

also owned a fairly significant amount of other property. Specifically, the trial court

awarded to Wife her Subaru (and any debt owed thereon), FERS benefits, personal property

she inherited from her father, funds in her name in various accounts, and debts in her name

associated with certain credit cards, loans, and legal fees. Husband was awarded his

disposable military retired pay and SBP coverage, TCRS retirement, Toyota, Jeep, Kubota

tractor, and Rambler RV (and any debt owed thereon), the funds in his name in various

bank accounts, and the debts in his name associated with various banks and other loans.

The trial court has a general duty to assign values to the marital property even if the many

of the values are undisputed or the parties do not dispute which spouse should be awarded

the property. See Kirby, 2016 WL 4045035, at *6 (“Although Husband agreed to the

disposition of these [marital] assets and debts, we cannot determine whether the overall

distribution of marital property, including the division of Husband’s military retirement

benefits, is equitable in the absence of evidence regarding the values of all marital assets

and amounts of debts. See, e.g., Morton v. Morton, 182 S.W.3d 821, 834 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2005) (holding that this Court must determine whether the overall property distribution is

equitable rather than focusing on one asset).”). However, this duty becomes even more

important when the parties dispute the value of certain property. While the parties do not

dispute the value of each piece of property at issue in this case, the disputes in this case are

not insignificant enough to ignore.

For example, Wife presented evidence regarding the value of her Subaru and debts

associated with a “USAA American Express” account, a loan from Navy Federal Credit

-8-

Union (“NFCU”), a loan from someone named MG Holmes, and a Kohl’s credit card.

Husband objected to Wife’s evidence of these property values at trial, primarily on the

basis that he was not provided information about them in discovery.10 His objection

regarding the Kohl’s card was sustained because it was undisputed that Wife had not

previously disclosed that account to Husband. Yet, curiously, the trial court still referenced

the Kohl’s card in its written order, ordering Wife to pay it. Although the trial court ordered

Wife to pay these debts, it neither valued the debts nor specifically ruled that they

constituted marital debts for purposes of the equitable division of marital property. And as

for the “USAA American Express” debt, it is unclear how the trial court distributed it. The

trial court expressly ordered Wife to pay the “American Express” debt in her name.

However, it is unclear if the trial court intended this to reference the “USAA American

Express” debt and/or any other American Express accounts, because Wife presented

evidence of multiple American Express accounts in her name that are associated with

different financial institutions.

Husband, on the other hand, presented evidence that he has a debt of approximately

$8,000.00 from a loan his daughters gave him, which Wife apparently disputes. The trial

court nevertheless ordered Husband to pay “the loan from his children,” but again failed to

place a value on this debt or to specifically rule that it was a marital, rather than separate,

debt. On appeal, it also appears that Wife takes issue with the trial court’s failure to make

sufficient findings as to the value of Husband’s possessory interest in the marital home.

While the trial court properly placed a value on the marital home, Wife appears to assert

that the trial court was also required to place a value on the exclusive possession of the

home awarded to Husband by the trial court. As such, this interest is in significant dispute

in this appeal.

These are not all of the instances in this case where clarity regarding the property

values and classification is lacking, but only the more obvious ones. Granted, some of the

lack of clarity is attributable to the parties themselves, who have a duty to provide

competent evidence of the property values.11 See Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 231

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). However, the trial judge may resolve any

disagreement amongst the parties by assigning property values within the acceptable range

of values that the evidence supports. See id. Indeed, the trial court should do so in order to

10

In this appeal, Husband has not raised any specific arguments about the evidence that he objected to at

trial, but he has not placed many of the pieces of property he objected to in his Rule 7 table. We are unable

to discern if these omissions are inadvertent or intentional. Certainly, omitting an asset or debt from a Rule

7 table, without more, does not sufficiently raise an issue as to the propriety of the trial court’s decision as

to that property. See generally Sneed v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Supreme Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn.

2010) (“It is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or

arguments for him or her, and where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention

or merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.”).

11

We also note that the record is missing Exhibits 61 through 64, which were apparently admitted into

evidence, according to the trial transcript.

-9-

aid our appellate review. See id. at 230 (“Our review of this issue has been hampered by

the trial judge’s failure to properly . . . place a value on the property whose value was

disputed.”).

Moreover, because Wife specifically takes issue in this appeal with how the trial

court distributed Husband’s TCRS benefits, the trial court’s failure to value the TCRS

benefits is especially problematic. Here, there is no dispute that Husband acquired his

TCRS retirement benefits from his employment in the Memphis school system throughout

the marriage. Wife asserts that those benefits are therefore marital property and that she is

entitled to fifty percent of them. She further asserts that Husband initially proposed that

she receive fifty percent of his TCRS benefits. Husband, on the other hand, argues that the

trial court’s award of the entirety of his TCRS benefits to him is equitable, in part because

Wife was awarded marital property with a higher net value and allocated marital debt in a

lower net amount than he was.

Wife is correct that marital property includes vested and unvested retirement

benefits that accrue during a marriage. See Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 830 (Tenn.

1996). Our supreme court has provided extensive guidance for how retirement benefits are

to be valued, including that their values “must be determined at a date as near as possible

to the date of the divorce.” Id. Additionally, “[t]he choice of valuation method remains

within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine after consideration of all relevant

factors and circumstances.” Id. at 831. The two valuation techniques used most often by

courts are the “present cash value method” and the “deferred distribution” method (also

known as the “retained jurisdiction” method). See id. (citations omitted).

Here, the trial court awarded Husband the entirety of his TCRS benefits, but did not

place any value on this significant asset. As detailed above, however, the trial judge should

have exercised its discretion to choose the method by which to calculate the value of the

parties’ retirement benefits. Even were we to agree that the trial court did not err in

assigning the entirety of the TCRS benefits to Husband, the trial court’s failure to assign a

value to this asset hinders our ability to determine whether the overall property division is

equitable. Cf. Morton v. Morton, 182 S.W.3d 821, 834 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“Husband,

as is often the case in appeals to this Court concerning a division of marital property,

wishes to focus on whether the division as to particular assets was equitable rather than

whether the overall property distribution was equitable. We decline to do so as the goal is

an overall equitable marital property distribution.”). As when a trial court fails to assign

values to other types of marital property, we typically do not “soldier on” in the face of a

trial court’s failure to assign values to marital retirement benefits. Instead, we typically

vacate and remand for the trial court to make the proper findings and for the parties to

present additional evidence as is necessary to aid the trial court in executing this duty. See

Cohen, 937 S.W.2d at 832 (“Rather than choose the valuation method on this record, we

remand to allow the parties to present additional evidence pertinent to the valuation of the

account. After hearing the evidence, the trial court shall determine the appropriate

- 10 -

valuation method and shall make appropriate orders distributing the portion of the parties’

martial property.”); see also Kirby, 2016 WL 4045035, at *7 (citing Tenn. R. Civ. P.

52.01). Here, the parties provided the trial court with at least some evidence related to their

retirement incomes. For example, Husband provided a statement showing his monthly

TCRS benefits and Wife provided a breakdown of her expected monthly benefits from

FERS upon turning sixty-two years old. However, other evidence may be necessary for the

trial court to properly assign values to all of the relevant retirement assets, depending on

which valuation method is employed. For example, evidence regarding the parties’ life

expectancies is not in the record, and may be necessary. Therefore, should the trial court

need more evidence to properly value the relevant retirement benefits, it is well within its

discretion to order the parties to present such evidence.

In sum, the trial court should have classified and valued all of the relevant property

in this case, because without the trial court’s assigned classifications and values, we are

unable to determine if the property distribution was equitable. This is especially relevant

as to Husband’s TCRS retirement benefits, as the parties dispute whether the trial court’s

division of this property was equitable given the other property divided. In order to

determine this issue, it is essential that the trial court value this property under one of the

methods outlined by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See, e.g., Cohen, 937 S.W.2d at 830–

31, 833; see also Kendrick v. Kendrick, 902 S.W.2d 918, 926, 927–28 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1994). Additionally, even though the value of the marital home and adjoining lot is

undisputed, Wife takes issue with the trial court’s award of the present possessory interest

to Husband and the failure to value this interest. Therefore, upon remand, the trial court

shall enter an order containing sufficient findings and conclusions regarding the

classification and valuation of all relevant property, including the possessory interest in the

marital home, along with its analysis of the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section

36-4-121. See Kirby, 2016 WL 4045035, at *7.

Because we are remanding this case based on the trial court’s failure to properly

classify and assign values to all relevant property, all issues related to Wife’s untimely Rule

7 table are pretermitted, along with all other issues raised in this appeal.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Chancery Court of Tipton County is vacated, and this cause

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Costs of this appeal are

taxed equally to Appellant Kasandra Cherry Green and Appellee Romey Green, III, for

which execution may issue if necessary.

S/ J. Steven Stafford

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

- 11 -