The opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of: ) No. 81257-2-I
)
MEELA PRIBIC, ) DIVISION ONE
)
Respondent, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
v. )
)
MICHAEL ERICKSON, )
)
Appellant. )
)
HAZELRIGG, J. — In a contempt proceeding, when the facts constitute a plain
violation of a court order, the non-moving party must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the violation was not in bad faith. Michael Erickson appeals from
an order of the superior court, granting Meela Pribic’s motion for revision of a
commissioner’s order holding her in contempt for violating two provisions of the
parenting plan. We conclude that the superior court erred in finding that Pribic did
not act in bad faith by violating the separate residence provision of the parenting
plan, but did not err in finding no bad faith as to Pribic’s violation of the
communication provision. We deny Pribic’s request for attorney fees on appeal.
Citations and pinpoint citations are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
No. 81257-2-I/2
FACTS
Michael Erickson and Meela Pribic are the parents of two sons, ages 12
and 10.1 Erickson and Pribic lived together for more than eight years, but never
married. After the parties separated in May 2016, Erickson remained in his Maple
Valley residence and Pribic moved in with her parents in Kent. Erickson and Pribic
agreed to a residential schedule for their children which granted approximately
equal residential time between the parents each week. In March 2018, Erickson
and Pribic engaged in mediation and entered an agreed parenting plan that
continued the same residential schedule.
On October 31, 2019, Erickson brought a motion for contempt alleging that
Pribic had violated three provisions of the parenting plan.2 The two provisions at
issue in this appeal are as follows:
[Section 14.6]: Mother shall find a home for the children that is not
her parent’s house by August 2019.
....
[Section 14.8]: Parties shall communicate with Our Family Wizard
except for in emergency circumstances.3
Pribic did not deny that she had failed to comply with these provisions. Rather,
she argued that her noncompliance was reasonable under the circumstances.
1
Pribic also has another son from a previous relationship, age 14, who resides
primarily with her.
2
Erickson also asserted that Pribic had violated Section 6 of the parenting plan by
refusing his multiple requests to engage in mediation to settle disputes over the parenting
plan, including Pribic’s failure to move into a new home by August 2019. The
commissioner denied contempt for this assertion on the ground that it was not possible to
“sufficiently parse through the allegations and decide, in retrospect, which issues
[Erickson] raised for mediation which were or were not appropriate for mandatory ADR.”
3
Our Family Wizard is an online and mobile application platform that provides
parents with tools for communication, scheduling, and sharing information about the
children.
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On November 22, 2019, a court commissioner found Pribic in contempt.
The commissioner found that Pribic “offered insufficient evidence for the court to
find that she was literally unable to follow” Sections 14.6 and 14.8 of the parenting
plan. In finding that Pribic had not obeyed Section 14.6, the commissioner stated
that “the parenting plan is quite clear” and that Pribic “has made no attempt to
modify that provision.” In finding that Pribic’s failure to follow Sections 14.6 and
14.8 constituted bad faith, the commissioner further specified:
It appears that Ms. Pribic was unhappy with how the communication
in Our Family Wizard was going, and so she simply opted out rather
than [seeking] modification of [Section 14.8]. It appears that Ms.
Pribic may have not ever intended to comply with the provision in
Section 14.6 based on her assertions in her written materials and her
argument in court today.
The commissioner’s order imposed a civil penalty of $150 and provided that Pribic
could purge the contempt by (1) enrolling in Our Family Wizard within 5 days and
using it to communicate with Erickson as required by Section 14.8 and (2) moving
to a residence which is not her parents’ home, as required by Section 14.6. The
commissioner did not enter an award of attorney fees, noting that no party had
requested it.
Pribic then filed a motion in superior court for revision of the commissioner’s
contempt order. A hearing took place on January 30, 2020. On February 13, 2020,
the superior court granted Pribic’s motion for revision and found that she was not
in contempt for failing to follow Sections 14.6 and 14.8. The court further ordered
that “[g]oing forward, the parties should revisit these two provisions of the parenting
plan.” The superior court denied Erickson’s motion for reconsideration. Erickson
now appeals.
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ANALYSIS
I. Contempt
All commissioner rulings are subject to revision by the superior court. RCW
2.24.050. The superior court reviews de novo the commissioner’s findings of fact
and conclusions of law based upon the evidence and issues presented to the
commissioner. In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979, 992-93, 976 P.2d 1240
(1999). “On appeal, this court reviews the superior court’s ruling, not the
commissioner’s.” Maldonaldo v. Maldonaldo, 197 Wn. App. 779, 789, 391 P.3d
546 (2017).
We review a superior court’s decision in a contempt proceeding for an
abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d
1362 (1997). A superior court abuses its discretion by exercising it on untenable
grounds or for untenable reasons. In re Marriage of James, 79 Wn. App. 436, 440,
903 P.2d 470 (1995). A trial court’s factual findings regarding contempt will be
upheld on appeal if they are supported by substantial evidence. In re Marriage of
Rideout, 150 Wn.2d 337, 350, 77 P.3d 1174 (2003). Substantial evidence exists
if a rational, fair-minded person would be convinced of the truth of the declared
premise. Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 162 Wn.2d 340, 353, 172 P.3d 688
(2007). “In a contempt case the trial court balances competing documentary
evidence, resolves conflicts, weighs credibility, and ultimately makes
determinations regarding bad faith.” In re Marriage of Williams, 156 Wn. App. 22,
28, 232 P.3d 573 (2010) (citing Rideout, 150 Wn.2d at 350-51). We do not review
credibility determinations on appeal because “trial judges and court commissioners
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routinely hear family law matters” and “are better equipped to make credibility
determinations.” Rideout, 150 Wn.2d at 352.
A. Section 14.6
Erickson first argues that the superior court abused its discretion in finding
that Pribic’s failure to move out of her parents’ residence by August 2019, as
required by Section 14.6 of the parenting plan, did not constitute bad faith. We
agree.
Contempt of court is the intentional disobedience of a lawful court order. In
re Marriage of Humphreys, 79 Wn. App. 596, 599, 903 P.2d 1012 (1995) (citing
RCW 7.21.010(1)). In the context of dissolution proceedings and legal separation,
contempt is governed by RCW 26.09.160. RCW 26.09.160(1) provides in part:
An attempt by a parent . . . to refuse to perform the duties provided
in the parenting plan . . . shall be deemed bad faith and shall be
punished by the court by holding the party in contempt of court.
RCW 26.09.160(2)(b) further provides that a court shall find a party in contempt
when “the court finds after hearing that the parent, in bad faith, has not complied
with the order establishing residential provisions for the child.”
The moving party bears the burden of establishing contempt by a
preponderance of the evidence. James, 79 Wn. App. at 442. “This showing must
include evidence from which the trial court can find that the offending party has
acted in bad faith or engaged in intentional misconduct or that prior sanctions have
not secured compliance with the plan.” Id. If the moving party establishes a prima
facie case, “the responding parent must rebut that showing with evidence of
legitimate reasons for failing to comply with” the relevant order. Id. at 442; RCW
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26.09.160(4). “The trial court will then weigh the evidence” and determine whether
contempt exists. James, 79 Wn. App. at 443. The superior court’s determination
that Pribic did not act in bad faith by failing to move out of her parents’ residence
by August 2019 was based on the following findings:
[2(i)]: Regarding the contempt finding for not moving out of her
parents’ residence by August 2019 as required by the parenting plan
the evidence shows a) the mother’s monthly income is $2900: $1700
from child support and $1200 from part-time employment; b) the
mother qualifies for TANF due to her limited income; c) she is
supporting herself and 3 children; d) rent for a small two bedroom
apartment runs between $1940 and $2168 not including utilities; e)
the mother is attending school and job shadowing to retrain as an
assistant physical therapist because she was not able to earn a living
in her previous line of work having lost those skills due to being a
stay-at-home mom for 8 years.
[2(ii)]: The mother currently does not bring in sufficient monthly funds
to afford an independent residence. As such, she lacks the current
ability to comply with the separate residence provision of the
parenting plan. While theoretically she could work full-time while
attending school, there was insufficient evidence to find that full-time
employment that did not conflict with school, was presently available.
Without such evidence, she is not acting in bad faith.
(Emphasis added).
Erickson contends that the superior court erred in failing to place the burden
of proof on Pribic, as the non-moving party, to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that her failure to follow Section 14.6 of the parenting plan was not bad
faith. We agree. Although Pribic provided sufficient evidence to show that she
could not currently afford an independent residence, she provided no evidence
that she had attempted to comply with this provision by seeking employment that
would allow her to increase the money available to her while attending school. The
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superior court appeared to recognize this fact at the revision hearing when it
stated:
So, I guess I’d like to know a little bit more about where’s the
evidence that shows she is, in fact, attending school and/or meeting
her requirements to get to that recertification that’s taking her 40
hours a week; that she is not in a position to perhaps go to school at
night or to take one class during [one hour a day] and then go to a
job. I don’t see the evidence here that shows she’s in a position
where she cannot actually work fulltime and increase the money
available to her in record. . . . [L]ots of parents work—have children
and they work fulltime, their children are either in school or daycare,
and they then also deal with getting their children to extracurricular
activities and going to night school.
(Emphasis added). In nevertheless concluding that “there was insufficient
evidence to find that full-time employment that did not conflict with school, was
presently available,” the court improperly placed the burden on Erickson to show
by a preponderance of the evidence why Pribic’s actions were not bad faith.
We hold that the moving party has the burden of proving contempt
by a preponderance of the evidence. This showing must include
evidence from which the trial court can find that the offending party
has acted in bad faith or engaged in intentional misconduct or that
prior sanctions have not secured compliance with the plan. Once the
moving party has established a prima facie case, the responding
parent must rebut that showing with evidence of legitimate reasons
for failing to comply with the parenting plan. The trial court will then
weigh the evidence in the traditional manner and determine whether
the moving party has met his or her burden.
James, 79 Wn. App. at 442-43 (emphasis added).
Parents are deemed to have the ability to comply with orders establishing
residential provisions and the burden is on a noncomplying parent to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that he or she lacked the ability to comply with
the residential provisions of a court-ordered parenting plan or had a reasonable
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No. 81257-2-I/8
excuse for noncompliance.” Rideout, 150 Wn.2d at 352-53 (citing RCW
26.09.160(4)).
We conclude that Pribic did not meet her burden to establish a reasonable
excuse for noncompliance with Section 14.6 of the parenting plan. Pribic did
establish that she currently lacked the financial resources to afford her own
residence. She also established that she had resumed school in January 2019 to
eventually re-enter the workforce in the physical therapy field. On this basis, Pribic
asserts that as long as she is taking substantive action towards eventual compliance
with Section 14.6, she cannot be found in contempt. But Section 14.6 of the agreed
parenting plan clearly and unequivocally requires Pribic to move out of her parents’
residence by August 2019, not at her convenience. The evidence established that
she was not attending school full-time. Rather, she took one class winter quarter,
two classes totaling six credits in spring quarter, and volunteer shadowing of a
professional during summer. And there was no evidence that she attempted to
increase her income so that she could comply with Section 14.6.
In explaining why her noncompliance is reasonable, Pribic claims that
Erickson “bullied” her into accepting Section 14.6 of the parenting plan “under
immense pressure without any basis whatsoever.” She further claims that the
current arrangement is good for her and the children and that Erickson is acting
unreasonably in seeking to enforce the parenting plan:
When Mike brought up the clause to move out of my parent’s
house by a certain deadline at the settlement conference January
2018, I thought it was absurd that Mike would dictate for me when
and how to live my life especially since my career was outdated, I
have no income besides child support, no spousal support, or any
savings. I voiced my “strong disapproval” to those clauses but time
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No. 81257-2-I/9
was rushed and I figured it wouldn’t hurt to be optimistic with a
genuine intention to aim to rebuild my life piece by piece by the
August 2019 deadline. However, I am more proud of my decision to
switch careers and I am proud of my academic success so far.
....
[W]hen signing the [parenting plan], I never thought Mike would take
advantage of this, be so unreasonable and disregard any exception
to the rule. Life is not always predictable, in fact there are turns and
curves before reaching your destination.
....
I would like to but can not guarantee an exact date to move, life takes
many unexpected turns and that day will come when the timing is
right. I don’t believe my living arrangement should rest on my ex’s
decision. My move out day depends greatly on the economy, our
health, and many other variables that is unpredictable from a
distance. I have every intention to do my best for my children and I.
In many cultures living with parents/grandparents is desirable and
encouraged, it is not viewed as a weakness but as strength in family
unity and support.
(Emphasis omitted).
Erickson stated that he asked for this provision in the parenting plan
because he feels that Pribic’s parents’ home is unsuitable for the children. Pribic
did not agree to move out of her parents’ home “when the timing is right.” Rather,
following their mediation, Pribic voluntarily agreed to move out by August 2019,
which was 20 months after entry of the parenting plan. Pribic has not
demonstrated that she lacked capacity to enter into the agreement. If she is
permitted to take as long as she likes to comply with this provision, it is rendered
illusory. If Pribic wishes to change the terms of the agreement, the proper
procedure is to move to modify the parenting plan or to seek to renegotiate its
terms. When the superior court asked why modification was not the proper
recourse, counsel for Pribic explained that it “takes money . . . to hire an attorney.”
This is not a reasonable excuse for choosing not to follow the parenting plan.
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When a contempt ruling is based on an incorrect view of the law or an
incorrect legal analysis, it is an abuse of judicial discretion and we must reverse the
trial court’s finding of contempt. In re Estates of Smaldino, 151 Wn. App. 356, 364,
212 P.3d 579 (2009). The superior court erred in placing the burden of proof on
Erickson to demonstrate that Pribic was acting in bad faith. The court’s finding that
Pribic’s actions did not amount to bad faith amount to a de facto modification of the
parenting plan that allows her to live at her parents’ home as long as she likes. This
was an abuse of discretion. We therefore reverse the superior court’s order on
revision regarding Section 14.6 of the parenting plan.
B. Section 14.8
Erickson also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that
Pribic was not in contempt for discontinuing her use of Our Family Wizard.
Erickson argues that the superior court’s order improperly delegates to Pribic the
unilateral authority whether or when to use Our Family Wizard. He contends that
she should have sought the court’s permission via a motion to modify the parenting
plan or an anti-harassment order.
The superior court found:
[2(iii)]: Regarding the contempt finding for the mother’s discontinued
use of Our Family Wizard, the Court finds as follows: (a) while the
mother did not continue to use Our Family Wizard, she did not do so
in bad faith, which the Court must find to make a finding of contempt;
(b) the evidence establishes that the use of Our Family Wizard was
used as a mechanism to inundate and harass the mother when [its]
use was intended to lessen the harassment experienced by the
mother; (c) the mother continued to communicate with the father via
e-mail.
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[2(iv)]: The mother was under no obligation to continue to pay for and
use a tool when the use of such tool had become abusive. There was
no bad faith in stopping the use of OFW while continuing to
communicate via email.
To support her claim that she reasonably discontinued using Our Family
Wizard because Erickson was using it to harass her, Pribic submitted copies of
their communications via Our Family Wizard, as well as emails and text messages.
This evidence amply demonstrates that the parties’ communication is rife with
conflict regardless of which platform they utilize. Even if there are several
reasonable interpretations of the evidence, it is substantial if it reasonably supports
the finding. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Ctr. v Holman, 107 Wn.2d 693,
713, 732 P.2d 974 (1987). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Pribic was not in contempt for communicating with Erickson via email instead of
Our Family Wizard.
II. Attorney Fees
Pribic requests an award of attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal
under RAP 18.1(a), which authorizes such an award if provided by other applicable
law. Pribic cites RCW 26.09.140 and RCW 26.09.160(7) as the basis for her
request. RCW 26.09.140 permits an award of fees in consideration of “the financial
resources of both parties.” RCW 26.09.160(7) provides that “if the court finds the
[contempt] motion was brought without reasonable basis, the court shall order the
moving party to pay to the nonmoving party, all costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees,
and a civil penalty of not less than one hundred dollars.” Determining whether a
fee award is appropriate requires the court to consider the parties’ relative ability
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No. 81257-2-I/12
to pay and the arguable merits of the issues raised on appeal. In re Marriage of
Leslie, 90 Wn. App. 796, 807, 954 P.2d 330 (1998). Erickson’s appeal was brought
on a reasonable basis. We decline Pribic’s request for an award of attorney fees
on appeal.
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
WE CONCUR:
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