noting that “a petition for writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute for a post- conviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) or 3.850”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “a petition for writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute for a post- conviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) or 3.850”
- holding that a challenge to “the procedure that led to the imposition of his minimum mandatory sentence by arguing that he was deprived of his due process right to notice of the potential punishment he faced . . . is not cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed February 17, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D20-892
Lower Tribunal No. 10-31898
________________
Adrian Brown,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from
the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jose L. Fernandez, Judge.
Adrian Brown, in proper person.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and SCALES and LOBREE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Lindo v. State, 981 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
(noting that “a petition for writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute for a post-
conviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) or
3.850”); Zuluaga v. State, 32 So. 3d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); (holding
“habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for an appropriate motion
seeking postconviction relief pursuant to the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure”). See also Martinez v. State, 211 So. 3d 989, 992 (Fla. 2017)
(holding that a challenge to “the procedure that led to the imposition of his
minimum mandatory sentence by arguing that he was deprived of his due
process right to notice of the potential punishment he faced . . . is not
cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion.”)
Affirmed.
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