Com. v. Rainelli, D.

J-A28024-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

:

DAVID RAINELLI, JR. : No. 1853 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered December 17, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-02-CR-0000012-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED JANUARY 12, 2021

The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing the

charges filed against Appellee, David Rainelli, Jr. (Rainelli), for lack of

jurisdiction. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the procedural posture of this case as

follows:

[Rainelli] was charged on September 21, 2018 with two

counts of Aggravated Assault, two counts of Terroristic Threats,

one count of Resisting Arrest, two counts of Harassment, and one

count of Disorderly Conduct as a result of [an] incident that

occurred at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in O’Hara

Township in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania [(VA Medical

Center)].[1]

On July 8, 2019, [Rainelli’s] original trial counsel filed a

motion to dismiss the charges based on improper venue and

jurisdiction. This [c]ourt denied that motion on September 18,

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(3), 2706(a)(1), 5104, 2709(a)(1), and 5503(a)(1).

J-A28024-20

2019. [Rainelli] then file a pro se Petition for Habeas Corpus on

October 11, 2019, which this [c]ourt subsequently denied. On

October 16, 2019, this [c]ourt granted a motion filed by original

trial counsel to withdraw her appearance in this case and this

[c]ourt appointed Corrie Woods, Esquire to continue the

representation of [Rainelli]. On November 20, 2019, [Rainelli]

filed a counseled Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Over

Federal Enclave raising new factual and legal issues. The

Commonwealth filed a response on December 16, 2019. After

hearing argument on the motion, on December 17, 2019, this

[c]ourt granted the motion to dismiss. The Commonwealth appeal

followed.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/20, at 1-2 (footnote added).

Both the Commonwealth and the trial court have complied with

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. On appeal, the

Commonwealth presents a single issue for review:

Whether the Trial Court erred in concluding that proper

procedures were not followed by the Commonwealth to establish

concurrent jurisdiction over the federal Veterans Affairs property

at issue where: (1) the federal government agreed to the

retrocession of jurisdictional authority over the property at issue;

(2) the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted legislation giving the

Executive the authority to accept the federal government’s offer

of jurisdiction over the property and; (3) the federal government’s

offer and grant of jurisdiction were accepted by the

Commonwealth?

Commonwealth Brief at 4.

The Commonwealth claims the trial court erred “in concluding that there

was insufficient evidence that Pennsylvania had established concurrent

jurisdiction over the federal [VA] Medical Center where [Rainelli] was alleged

to have committed his crimes.” Commonwealth Brief at 13. The

Commonwealth argues:

-2-

J-A28024-20

In the [c]ourt below, the Commonwealth demonstrated that

the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted legislation consenting to the

retrocession of jurisdiction from the federal government over this

property and giving the Executive the authority to accept that

retrocession. The Commonwealth also demonstrated that the

federal government acknowledged the Commonwealth’s consent

to the retrocession of jurisdiction over this property, and, in

response, manifested its own unequivocal intent to divest itself of

exclusive jurisdiction and to establish concurrent jurisdiction with

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania over this property. Finally,

the Commonwealth demonstrated that the Executive signed a

public notice stating that he intended to accept jurisdiction

following a 30-day period for public commentary and the

Commonwealth also demonstrated that, following that 30-day

period, agents of the parties engaged in actions that are

consistent with the transfer of jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the Commonwealth produced sufficient

evidence in the [c]ourt below for the [t]rial [c]ourt to conclude

that Pennsylvania accepted the retrocession of jurisdiction from

the federal government and established concurrent jurisdiction

over the property where [Rainelli] was alleged to have committed

his crimes. Thus, the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in dismissing [Rainelli’s]

charges prior to trial based upon a perceived lack of jurisdiction of

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Id. at 13-14.

Rainelli counters that this Court “should affirm the trial court’s order”

because “the Commonwealth failed to establish that Governor Shapp actually

accepted the retrocession.” Rainelli’s Brief at 18.

As the issue before us presents a factual inquiry, we apply a deferential

standard of review. See Commonwealth v. Neysmith, 192 A.3d 184, 192

(Pa. Super. 2018) (applying a deferential standard where factual aspects

predominate). Thus, “we . . . shall reverse only for an abuse of discretion.

We have long held that mere errors in judgment do not amount to abuse of

discretion; instead, we look for manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,

-3-

J-A28024-20

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous.”

Id. (citations omitted).

Pertinently, the Pennsylvania Crimes Code states that “a person may

be convicted under the law of this Commonwealth of an offense committed by

his own conduct . . . if . . . the conduct which is an element of the offense or

the result which . . . occurs within this Commonwealth[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

102(a)(1).

However, the federal enclave doctrine grants exclusive jurisdiction to

the federal government when land has been purchased by the United States:

Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o exercise exclusive Legislation

. . . over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of

the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,

Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings[.]

U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 17.

“Thus if the United States acquires with the ‘consent’ of the state

legislature land within the borders of that State by purchase or condemnation

for any of the purposes mentioned in Art. I, [§] 8, cl. 17 . . . the jurisdiction

of the Federal Government becomes ‘exclusive.’” Paul v. United States, 83

S.Ct. 426, 438 (1963); see also Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 50 S.Ct. 455,

457 (1930) (“[I]t long has been settled that, where lands for such a purpose

are purchased by the United States with the consent of the state legislature,

the jurisdiction theretofore residing in the state passes, in virtue of the

constitutional provision, to the United States, thereby making the jurisdiction

of the latter the sole jurisdiction.”). “The power of Congress over federal

-4-

J-A28024-20

enclaves that come within the scope of Art. I, [§] 8, cl. 17, is obviously the

same as the power of Congress over the District of Columbia.” Paul, 83 S.Ct.

at 437. Accordingly, “Pennsylvania’s criminal statutes do not apply” to federal

enclaves “any more than to a sister state.” Commonwealth v. Mangum,

332 A.2d 467, 468 (Pa. Super. 1974).

Instantly, the trial court explained that it dismissed the charges against

Rainelli because it “was not presented with sufficient evidence to determine

that the retrocession of jurisdiction was properly completed, [and was thus]

unable to rule that the Commonwealth properly obtained concurrent

jurisdiction over the VA property. Accordingly, this [c]ourt ruled that, under

the record before it, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania does not have

jurisdiction to prosecute [Rainelli] for any state court offenses that occurred

on that property.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/20, at 8 (emphasis added). Upon

review, we discern no error in the trial court’s determination “that the credible

and competent evidence of record did not establish that the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania enjoyed concurrent jurisdiction over the VA [Medical Center]

nor did it establish that the federal government had ‘retroceded’

jurisdiction[.]” Id. at 2.

The facts established in the trial court are largely undisputed. On

January 26, 1923, the United States purchased the property for the VA Medical

Center. See Rainelli’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, 11/20/19, at

Exhibit B; Commonwealth Brief at 18. The General Assembly passed Act 407

of 1923 which provided:

-5-

J-A28024-20

The consent of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is hereby

granted to the purchase by the Government of the United States

of a certain tract of land, containing approximately one hundred

and forty-seven and five hundred and forty-three thousandths

acres, for use in the care and treatment of discharged sick and

disabled soldiers, or for other uses of the United States: said tract

of land being situate in O’Hara Township, Allegheny County,

Pennsylvania, and bounded and described as follows . . .

74 P.S. § 91 (legal description of land omitted); see also Schwartz v.

O’Hara TP. School Dist. et al., 100 A.2d 621, 622 (Pa. 1953) (“By Act of

July 2, 1923, P.L. 74 P.S. §§ 91, 92, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ceded

exclusive jurisdiction of some 147 acres of land situate in O’Hara Township to

the United States for the construction thereon of a veterans hospital under

the control and supervision of the Veterans Administration.”).

By ceding jurisdiction, the General Assembly rendered the VA Medical

Center a federal enclave within Pennsylvania:

Exclusive jurisdiction over the lands so purchased is hereby ceded

to the United States by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and

said lands shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes, State

and local: Provided, That the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania shall

retain a concurrent jurisdiction with the United States, over the

lands so acquired by the United States, for the purpose of serving

of all civil processes: And provided further, That such criminal

processes as may issue under the authority of the Commonwealth,

against any person or persons charged with crimes committed

without the area so acquired, may be executed therein, in the

same manner as though this cession had not been granted.

74 P.S. § 92; see also Schwartz, 100 A.2d at 622 (“The only reservation to

the Commonwealth was of concurrent jurisdiction within the ceded area for

the service of civil process and of criminal process for crimes committed

without the area.”).

-6-

J-A28024-20

In 1977, United States VA Administrator Max Cleland wrote a letter to

Pennsylvania Governor Milton Shapp expressing the federal government’s

desire to retrocede jurisdiction over the VA Medical Center to Pennsylvania.

On August 5, 1977, the General Assembly gave its consent to Governor Shapp

to accept the retrocession of jurisdiction and mandated procedures for

acceptance:

The consent of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is hereby given

to the retrocession of jurisdiction by the United States over land

within the boundaries of the Commonwealth. The Governor is

hereby authorized to accept for the Commonwealth such

retrocession to partial, concurrent, or exclusive jurisdiction.

* * *

Retrocession of jurisdiction shall be effected upon the completion

of the following procedure:

(1) Written notice shall be filed with the Governor by the United

States, or any department or agency thereof, in accordance with

applicable acts of Congress.

(2) The Governor shall give public notice of retrocession of

jurisdiction by publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin.

(3) Written acceptance shall not be made less than 30 days after

public notice of retrocession.

74 P.S. §§ 3, 4.2

On January 14, 1978, Governor Shapp published the following notice in

the Pennsylvania Bulletin:

____________________________________________

2 The parties agree that the Commonwealth met its burden as to the first two

requirements for retrocession of jurisdiction; the dispute is whether the

Commonwealth presented evidence as to the third requirement regarding that

written acceptance of retrocession after 30 days of publication.

-7-

J-A28024-20

In accordance with the Act of August 5, 1977, P.L. — No.

47, notice is hereby given that I intend to accept concurrent

jurisdiction over certain lands in which the United States has an

interest. I intend to accept this jurisdiction by signing and dating

a letter to me from Max Cleland, Administrator of Veterans Affairs,

Washington D.C., which reads in pertinent part:

Dear Governor Shapp:

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Public

Law 93-82, 38 United States Code 5007, on behalf of

the United States, I hereby retrocede and relinquish

to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, such measure

of legislative jurisdiction as is necessary to establish

concurrent jurisdiction over the following lands

comprising the eight Veterans Administration

Hospitals in Pennsylvania which are under the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government:

Exclusive jurisdiction vested in the United

States over the lands of the Veterans Administration

Hospitals at Aspinwall . . . at the time of acquisition

by virtue of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the

Constitution. Exclusive jurisdiction of the Aspinwall

property was ceded by Pennsylvania Act of Cession,

July 2, 1923 (P.L. 987, section 2, Purdon’s

Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, title 74, section

92). . . . .

Retrocession to concurrent jurisdiction over said

lands shall become effective upon your written

acceptance. Consent of the Commonwealth is

embodied in the Act of August 5, 1977, P.L. No. 47 of

the Pennsylvania General Assembly. It is requested

that the original of this letter be returned duly

executed for Veterans Administration records.

Sincerely,

MAX CLELAND

Administrator

-8-

J-A28024-20

I do not intend to accept this retrocession of jurisdiction less

than 30 days after publication of this notice in the Pennsylvania

Bulletin.

Interested persons are invited to submit written comments,

suggestions or objections regarding this retrocession of

jurisdiction to The Governor’s Office 225 Capitol Building,

Harrisburg, PA 17120, within 30 days after the date of publication

of this notice in the Pennsylvania Bulletin.

[Governor Shapp’s Signature]

Governor

Commonwealth Response to Motion to Dismiss, 12/16/19, Exhibit 1.

Consistent with the foregoing, the Commonwealth had to produce

evidence of Governor Shapp’s written acceptance 30 days after the public

notice in the January 14, 1978 Pennsylvania Bulletin in order to establish

jurisdiction. See 74 P.S. § 4(3). The trial court determined that the

Commonwealth failed to do so, and thus dismissed Rainelli’s charges for lack

of jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion. Neysmith, 192 A.3d at 192.

In response to Rainelli’s motion to dismiss, the Commonwealth

submitted copies of Governor Shapp’s notice in the January 14, 1978

Pennsylvania Bulletin and the relevant Pennsylvania statutes. See

Commonwealth Response to Motion to Dismiss, 12/16/19, Exhibits 1 & 2. The

only other evidence the Commonwealth proffered was a May 17, 1978

Pennsylvania State Police Special Order concerning retrocession of

jurisdiction. See id., Exhibit 3. However, the Commonwealth did not

authenticate the Special Order and “merely put [it] in as persuasive

-9-

J-A28024-20

authority.” N.T., 12/17/19, at 29;3 see also Commonwealth Response to

Motion to Dismiss, 12/16/19, at ¶ 17 (“[A]ttached is persuasive evidence that

concurrent jurisdiction was accepted.”).

Given this record, and mindful of our deferential standard of review, we

conclude that the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion.

Specifically, the trial court did not err in finding that because “written

acceptance was required by the Pennsylvania legislature before the

retrocession became official,” and “nowhere in the record . . . is the required

written acceptance of retrocession executed by the governor ‘not less than 30

days after public notice of retrocession (after February 13, 1978).’” Trial Court

Opinion, 5/21/20, at 8. Our review reveals the court was “not presented with

sufficient evidence to determine that the retrocession of jurisdiction was

properly completed[.]” Id.

In sum, we agree with the trial court in this case that the Commonwealth

did not produce evidence of Governor Shapp’s written acceptance of

____________________________________________

3 The assistant district attorney stated:

As it relates to Exhibit Three, I merely put that in as persuasive

authority. If Your Honor does not want to take that into

consideration, that is of your choosing. I didn’t intend to

authenticate a document from 197[8] which at this point qualifies

it as an ancient document. I would simply be relying on Exhibits

One and Two as the correct law in this case which does not need

to be authenticated for purposes of the proceedings.

N.T., 12/17/19, at 29.

- 10 -

J-A28024-20

retrocession as mandated by the General Assembly to establish concurrent

jurisdiction. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of Rainelli’s charges.

Order affirmed.

Judge McCaffery joins the memorandum.

Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/12/2021

- 11 -