Timothy Cronin v. Chris Peterson

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 19-1054

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Timothy Cronin

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Chris Peterson, in his individual capacity;

Tonya Peters, in her individual capacity; William Koepke, in his individual

capacity; Daren Reynolds, in his individual capacity

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln

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Submitted: September 24, 2020

Filed: December 18, 2020

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Before KELLY, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

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WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

The Lincoln, Nebraska, Police Department received allegations that Lincoln

police officer Timothy Cronin had purchased illegal steroids and interfered with

another police department’s investigation of a nutritional supplement purveyor in

Ohio. Cronin was thereafter interviewed; his home, police locker, police cruiser, and

wife’s vehicle were searched; and his blood and urine were taken and analyzed.

Cronin later filed suit, alleging several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As relevant

to this appeal, the district court1 dismissed Cronin’s claim that Sergeant William

Koepke had unlawfully detained Cronin in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Cronin’s Fourth

Amendment claims that Koepke had unlawfully arrested Cronin; that Captain Chris

Peterson and Legal Advisor Tonya Peters had omitted material facts from their

warrant application; and that Sergeant Daren Reynolds had searched Cronin’s wife’s

vehicle, which was not the vehicle identified in the search warrant. We affirm.

I. Background

In September 2015, the Lincoln Police Department received a complaint from

the Nebraska Crime Commission alleging that a detective in Ohio believed that

Cronin was interfering with the detective’s investigation into alleged illegal steroid

sales by a nutritional supplement store owner in Powell, Ohio. The Ohio detective

had seized the store owner’s cellphone and discovered extensive text messages

between the owner and a phone number associated with Cronin. Based on these text

messages, the detective believed that Cronin had purchased illegal steroids for

himself and a coworker and was impeding the detective’s investigation by advising

the store owner on how to frustrate interactions with the police. When Lincoln’s

assistant police chief contacted Cronin to advise him of the complaint, Cronin

confirmed that he had a friend in Ohio whom Cronin had instructed to contact an

attorney about issues with a search warrant related to the friend’s business.

Meanwhile, Lincoln’s police chief received the same complaint. He referred

the matter to the internal affairs department, which contacted the Ohio detective. The

1

The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska.

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detective described his investigation and provided copies of the text messages at

issue. The text messages used terms that the detective believed showed the exchange

of both legal and illegal steroids between Cronin and the store owner. The police

chief then directed internal affairs to obtain an opinion on the text messages from

Peterson, the Lincoln narcotics unit captain. Although Peterson’s only steroid-

specific training occurred prior to 1997 and totaled fewer than 5 hours, he had 25

years of police experience, which included 13 years of general narcotics experience.

Peterson agreed with the Ohio detective, believing that the text messages’ terms,

“ana,” “anavar,” “var,” “pct,” “clomid,” “nolvadex,” “juice,” and “light steroid,” were

associated with anabolic steroids, which are controlled substances under Nebraska

law. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-405, 28-416(3). Peterson also believed that Cronin’s text

messages about avoiding “gyno risk” by using “clomid” and “novadex” referred to

steroids’ effect on testicle size.

Peterson, Legal Advisor Peters, the police chief, and the assistant police chief

met to discuss Peterson’s assessments. The police chief then directed the Lincoln

narcotics unit to conduct a criminal investigation. Peterson met with two narcotics

investigators, Sergeants Reynolds and Koepke, to begin the investigation. Reynolds

went to Cronin’s home to await consent to search it or the issuance of a warrant.

Koepke headed to Cronin’s substation to interview him. With Peters’s assistance,

Peterson began to draft search warrant affidavits for use if Cronin denied consent to

various searches.

Koepke met with Cronin in a conference room at the substation. Although the

exact timeline is disputed, the following events occurred during the next few hours:

Koepke interviewed Cronin; the police obtained warrants to search Cronin’s home,

personal and police vehicles, police locker, and person based on affidavits prepared

by Peterson and Peters; the police obtained Cronin’s blood and urine samples; and

Reynolds and another officer searched Cronin’s home and Cronin’s wife’s Ford

Escape. Although Cronin drove the Ford Escape to work every day and parked it in

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the police department lot, it was not the car identified in the search warrant. The

police also later obtained a warrant and warrant extensions to search Cronin’s

cellphone. The investigation continued over the next few months, but no charges

were ever brought against Cronin and he remained employed by the Lincoln Police

Department.

II. Analysis

Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability in a § 1983

action unless the official’s conduct violates “clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Blazek v.

City of Iowa City, 761 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity involves the following inquiries:

(1) whether the facts, when “viewed in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff],

establish[] a violation of a constitutional or statutory right,” and (2) whether “the right

was clearly established at the time of the violation, such that a reasonable official

would have known that his actions were unlawful.” Id. at 922-23 (citing Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)) (qualified immunity standard on summary

judgment); see also Lane v. Nading, 927 F.3d 1018, 1022 (8th Cir. 2019) (qualified

immunity standard on dismissal). For Cronin “to establish a § 1983 claim for a

Fourth Amendment violation, he must demonstrate [that] a search or seizure

occurred[] and [that] the search or seizure was unreasonable.” Clark v. Clark, 926

F.3d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing McCoy v. City of Monticello, 342 F.3d 842, 846

(8th Cir. 2003)).

A. Unlawful Detention Claim Against Koepke

Cronin first argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim that

Koepke violated Cronin’s Fourth Amendment rights when Koepke initially detained

him in the substation conference room.

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We review de novo the district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss.

Alexander v. Hedback, 718 F.3d 762, 765 (8th Cir. 2013). We accept the complaint’s

factual allegations as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff. Id. Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to plead sufficient facts

to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A police officer can “briefly detain a person for

investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by

articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks

probable cause.” United States v. Winters, 491 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007)

(quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). In forming reasonable

suspicion, an officer “may rely on information provided by other officers and all the

information known to a team of officers involved in the investigation.” United States

v. Ortiz-Monroy, 332 F.3d 525, 529 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Robinson,

119 F.3d 663, 666-67 (8th Cir. 1997)).

Cronin’s complaint alleged that his police work involved participating in

narcotics investigations. It stated that the Lincoln Police Department had purportedly

received a complaint alleging that Cronin had interfered with an Ohio investigation

into a supplement store owner’s alleged distribution of illegal steroids. See Kramer

v. City of Jersey City, 455 F. App’x 204, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2011) (granting qualified

immunity to members of the Jersey City Police Department who had taken JCPD

officers into custody and required a urine sample after the New York City Police

Department informed JCPD that some of its officers might be purchasing illegal

steroids); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670

(1989) (“[T]he Government has a compelling interest in ensuring that front-line

[drug] interdiction personnel . . . have unimpeachable integrity and judgment.”). The

complaint further alleged that Peterson had received and reviewed copies of text

messages between Cronin and his friend, the supplement store owner. It stated that

Koepke was assisting Peterson in his investigation of Cronin. See United States v.

O’Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1419 (8th Cir. 1988) (“[When officers] worked closely

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together during the investigation for the warrant[,]. . . we presume that the officers

have shared relevant knowledge which informs the decision to seize evidence or to

detain a particular person, even if the acting officer is unable to completely and

correctly articulate the grounds for his suspicion at the time of the search.” (internal

citations omitted)). Although the complaint characterized the texts as “vague and

ambiguous,” it acknowledged that Cronin had purchased supplements.

Taken together, these facts do not establish that Koepke lacked sufficient

reasonable and articulable suspicion that Cronin might be involved in criminal

activity. We thus conclude that the initial detention was not unconstitutional and that

Koepke was entitled to qualified immunity.

B. Summary Judgment Claims

We also review de novo the district court’s qualified-immunity grant of

summary judgment. Schaffer v. Beringer, 842 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2016). We

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable

inferences in his favor. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

1. Unlawful Arrest Claim Against Koepke

Cronin argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on

Cronin’s claim that Koepke arrested him without probable cause. Cronin contends

that, even if the initial stop and detention were valid, the prolonged detention

eventually turned into an unconstitutional de facto arrest.

An investigative detention may become “an arrest if it lasts for an unreasonably

long time or if officers use unreasonable force.” United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d

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946, 953 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). During such

a detention, “officers should ‘employ the least intrusive means of detention and

investigation, in terms of scope and duration, that are reasonably necessary to achieve

the purpose’ of the temporary seizure.” United States v. Maltais, 403 F.3d 550, 556

(8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th

Cir. 1999)).

Cronin contends that his detention was unreasonably lengthy and exceeded the

scope of an investigatory stop. In determining whether a detention is excessively

long, we consider the “law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as

the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.” United States v. Sharpe,

470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). Koepke had reasonable suspicion that Cronin had

purchased illegal steroids and interfered with an investigation. Accordingly, the

purpose of the investigatory stop was to gather information to help the police confirm

or dispel that suspicion, the accomplishment of which Koepke pursued diligently.

While in the substation conference room, Koepke explained the allegations that

Cronin had purchased illegal steroids and had interfered in an Ohio investigation. He

asked whether Cronin would consent to a urine test. Once the warrant for Cronin’s

blood and urine was issued, Koepke took Cronin to the hospital for the tests, returned

him to the substation after the tests were completed, and immediately released him.2

Koepke did not handcuff Cronin and drove him to the hospital in an unmarked

minivan, with Cronin clad in plain clothes and seated in the front seat. See United

States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916–17 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (listing factors,

like handcuffing and confining the suspect within a police car, that can transform a

detention into an unlawful de facto arrest). Although Cronin argues that the detention

should have ended when Koepke began to believe that there was a misunderstanding

2

Cronin claims that Koepke caused him to be fearful and humiliated during the

urine test. The urine was obtained pursuant to a warrant, and we conclude that the

urine collection did not result in a de facto arrest.

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about the illegality of Cronin’s alleged activity, the detention was nonetheless

objectively reasonable. Koepke’s individual, subjective beliefs about Cronin’s guilt

or innocence are not relevant to the reasonableness of Cronin’s detention and alleged

arrest. Bowden v. Meinberg, 807 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 2015).

Despite disputed facts about who caused the alleged delay in obtaining the

blood and urine search warrant, the length of the stop was nonetheless reasonable

because any delay was not within Koepke’s control. Cronin himself partly

contributed to the stop’s length. While in the conference room, Cronin explained his

side of the story and spent time searching the internet for the substances mentioned

in his text messages. He gave and withdrew consent to provide a urine sample. He

also called his wife, called the police union attorney twice, and texted a friend. See

United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542–44 (1985) (describing a

nearly sixteen-hour detention as reasonable because of the nature of the suspected

illegal activity and the suspect’s dilatory actions). Moreover, we conclude that

Cronin has failed to produce evidence sufficient to show that certain delays—the

lengths of time it took for the warrants to issue and for the hospital staff to take and

process the blood and urine samples—were within Koepke’s control. See United

States v. Morris, 910 F. Supp. 1428, 1442 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (concluding, in a motion

to suppress context, that a valid detention “does not become unreasonable in length

as long as the stopping officer uses diligent efforts to process the stop and further

delays are the result of circumstances beyond the officer’s control”).

We therefore conclude that Koepke was entitled to qualified immunity because

the length of Cronin’s detention was not unreasonable under the circumstances.

2. Invalid Search Warrant Claim Against Peterson and Peters

Cronin next argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment

in favor of Peterson and Peters on his invalid search warrant claim. He contends that

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Peterson and Peters violated Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), by omitting

material facts from the warrant applications.

The Supreme Court held in Franks that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs

when “(1) a law enforcement officer knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless

disregard for the truth, include[s] a false statement in the warrant affidavit, and (2)

without the false statement, the affidavit would not have established probable cause.”

United States v. Neal, 528 F.3d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Franks, 438 U.S.

at 155–56). “This rationale also applies to information that the affiant deliberately

or with reckless disregard for the truth omits from the affidavit such that the affidavit

is misleading and insufficient to establish probable cause had the omitted information

been included.” Id. (citing United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1234 (8th Cir.

1993)).

As an initial matter, the first set of search warrant affidavits established

probable cause to search Cronin’s house, person, police vehicle and locker, and

personal vehicle. See United States v. Augustine, 663 F.3d 367, 372 (8th Cir. 2011)

(“For probable cause to be shown, the warrant application and affidavit must describe

circumstances showing that, based on practical experience and common sense, there

is a fair probability that contraband or similar evidence will be found in the targeted

place.” (internal citation omitted)). The affidavits stated that the Ohio detective was

investigating a supplement store suspected of selling illegal steroids; that the

detective had seized from the store suspected illegal steroids; that the detective had

served a search warrant on the supplement store owner; that the warrant uncovered

a series of text messages between the store owner and a phone number belonging to

Cronin; that the store owner was Cronin’s friend; that the text messages appeared to

show Cronin both advising the owner on how to interact with the police and

discussing which substance to use, where to obtain it, and how much it would cost;

that in Peterson’s professional opinion those text messages also outlined the

negotiation, purchase, and use or sale of illegal steroids; and that Cronin had written

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a check to the store owner. The affidavits also stated that Peterson was responsible

for reviewing the officer misconduct complaint; that Peterson had more than twenty-

four years of police experience with thirteen years of narcotics experience; that

Peterson received narcotics training from various local, state, and federal agencies;

that Peterson had spoken with a detective from Ohio about the investigation; that

despite Cronin’s submission of a website from which he had purchased “anabol,”

Peterson could not determine the legality of the product; that Cronin admitted

purchasing products from a friend’s supplement store; that Peterson could not find

a website selling “anavar”; and that Peterson knew that steroids can be manufactured

and purchased through illegal means.

Cronin alleges that Peterson and Peters omitted the following facts from the

affidavits for the first set of search warrants: that Koepke believed that the substances

referred to in the text messages were legal and that the investigation was merely a

misunderstanding; that Cronin stated that there were no substances at his home

because he consumed them all; that Peterson’s steroid investigation training and

experience was brief and dated; and that the nature of the supplement market makes

it difficult to tell if a substance is legal or illegal.3

The inclusion of Cronin’s additional details would not have negated the

existence of probable cause. The affidavits contained corroborated information

received from another police department that indicated a fair probability that evidence

of illegal steroid possession or use would be found.4 See Neal, 528 F.3d at 1072–73

3

Cronin revised his list of alleged omissions over the course of this litigation,

adding the third and fourth omitted facts at the summary judgment stage.

4

Cronin asserts that the alleged omissions were made deliberately or recklessly.

Any asserted intent is immaterial because Cronin has failed to produce evidence

sufficient to show that any omissions were “clearly critical” to a probable cause

determination. Schaffer, 842 F.3d at 594 (internal citation omitted).

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(concluding that in a Franks motion to suppress context, we consider both the

affiant’s actions and “the actions of the local law enforcement officers who provided

information for . . . the affidavit”). Further, even if Peterson and Peters knew that

Koepke, a non-affiant, allegedly believed that the substances were all legal, Peterson

and Peters were not required to include Koepke’s opinion in the affidavits. See

Schaffer, 842 F.3d at 594 (determining that an affiant need not “include everything

he knows about a subject in his affidavit, whether it is material to a finding of

probable cause or not” (quoting Tech. Ordnance, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.3d 641,

649 (8th Cir. 2001)); Johnson v. Schneiderheinz, 102 F.3d 340, 341 (8th Cir. 1996)

(“[I]f an officer acts in a manner about which officers of reasonable competence could

disagree, the officer should be immune from liability.” (internal citations omitted)).

The affidavits also included specific facts that counseled against a probable cause

determination: that certain terms used in Cronin’s text messages might not refer to

controlled substances; that a lab had not yet confirmed the nature of the drugs seized

from the supplement store; that additional evidence from Cronin’s bank and

telephone service provider had not yet been obtained; that Cronin asserted that the

products at issue were legal and able to be purchased online; and that Peterson only

“believe[d]” that the Toyota 4Runner listed in the affidavit was Cronin’s daily

vehicle. These facts do not show a material omission that negates a finding of

probable cause.

The subsequent warrant and warrant extension affidavits also established

probable cause to search Cronin’s cellphone. In these affidavits, Peterson mostly

restated the facts included within his prior affidavits but also included the following

updated facts, which further supported a finding of probable cause: that Cronin’s

bank had provided a copy of a $430 check from Cronin to the supplement store

owner; that Cronin’s telephone company records confirmed text messages and voice

calls between Cronin’s phone and the supplement store owner’s phone; and that the

product “anavar” had not yet been found.

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Cronin claims that Peterson and Peters omitted the following material facts

from the cellphone warrant affidavits: that the previous warrants had been served

without revealing anything incriminating; that officers searched Cronin’s wife’s

vehicle, even though it was Cronin’s vehicle that was specified in the search warrant;

and that a substance called “anabol” had been seized from another Lincoln officer and

had tested negative for controlled substances.5

The inclusion of Cronin’s additional details would not have negated the

existence of probable cause. Although Cronin argues that Peterson omitted the

results of the earlier-executed warrants, those results could be inferred plainly from

the new affidavits: Peterson stated that prior warrants had been executed, resulting

in the search of “several locations” including Cronin’s locker, his police cruiser, and

himself; that Cronin had turned over the product “anabol”; and that the product

“anavar” had not yet been located—thereby implying that the warrant executions had

not uncovered the suspected products. See Tech. Ordnance, 244 F.3d at 650

(“Imprecision in the affidavit may show that [the agent] was careless in drafting some

of the language, but careless error does not show reckless or intentional

misconduct.”). The affidavits already contained facts that counseled against probable

cause: that Cronin had turned over one product, “anabol,” to Lincoln police; that pre-

testing indicated anabol might not be a controlled substance; and that further testing

was being conducted. Thus, even if the warrant execution results had been made

more explicit in these affidavits, the text messages from the Ohio detective, the new

corroborating information from Cronin’s phone company and bank, and the

affidavit’s other contents were nonetheless sufficient to establish probable cause that

evidence of illegal steroid possession or use would be found in Cronin’s cellphone.

5

The district court did not address the warrant extensions in its order granting

summary judgment to the appellees. Cronin raised the issue of the extensions

consistently throughout his briefing, however, including at the summary judgment

stage, and thus we address his arguments.

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We therefore conclude that because inclusion of the additional details would

not have negated the existence of probable cause, any omissions were immaterial and

Peterson and Peters were entitled to qualified immunity.

3. Improper Search Warrant Execution Claim Against Reynolds

Finally, Cronin argues that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment in favor of Reynolds on Cronin’s claim that Reynolds unlawfully executed

the vehicle search warrant. Cronin contends that Reynolds violated his Fourth

Amendment rights by searching Cronin’s wife’s vehicle, a Ford Escape, which was

not the Toyota 4Runner listed in the warrant but which Cronin drove to work daily.

We accordingly address whether Reynolds had independent probable cause to

conduct a warrantless search of Cronin’s vehicle under the automobile exception.

Although a warrantless search usually constitutes a per se Fourth Amendment

violation, the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement

permits the warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle by officers possessing probable

cause to do so. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51–52 (1970). “Probable cause

exists when, given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person could believe

there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in

a particular place.” United States v. Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407, 418 (8th Cir.

2017) (quoting United States v. Wells, 347 F.3d 280, 287 (8th Cir. 2003)). Because

“[p]robable cause is a practical and common-sensical standard,” “an officer may draw

inferences based on his own experience” to determine whether probable cause exists.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Based on the Ohio detective’s allegations that Cronin had purchased illegal

steroids for a coworker, Reynolds developed probable cause to believe that the

vehicle that Cronin drove to work daily would contain evidence of illegal steroids.

When Reynolds failed to uncover the supplement “anavar” in Cronin’s home, he had

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all the more reason to believe that the sought-after substances would instead be in

Cronin’s vehicle. Reynolds inferred that the Ford Escape was the vehicle that would

contain such evidence of illegal substances when Sergeant Destry Jaeger, who knew

Cronin personally, identified it in the police department’s parking lot as the vehicle

that Cronin drove to work daily.

Although Reynolds may very well have not been the exemplar of a careful

officer, his search of the Ford Escape was authorized under the automobile exception

to the warrant requirement, and he was thus entitled to qualified immunity on

Cronin’s unlawful warrant-execution claim.

The district court’s order is affirmed.

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