Opinion

United States v. Timothy Brown

Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Dec 4, 2020
Status
Unpublished
Nature of suit
Non Direct Criminal
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 14.5%

The opinion

Case: 20-30099 Document: 00515662013 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/04/2020

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 4, 2020

No. 20-30099 Lyle W. Cayce

Summary Calendar Clerk

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Timothy D. Brown,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 1:01-CR-10012-1

Before Clement, Higginson, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

In May 2002, Timothy D. Brown was convicted by jury verdict of one

count of drug conspiracy, one count of possession with intent to distribute,

three counts of drug distribution, and three counts of money laundering. The

district court sentenced him to life imprisonment, five years of supervised

*

Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

Case: 20-30099 Document: 00515662013 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/04/2020

No. 20-30099

release, and a $600,000 fine. Brown now appeals from the district court’s

denial of relief under the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA).

On appeal, Brown argues that (1) the discretionary part of the FSA is

unconstitutional because it violates the Equal Protection and Due Process

Clauses; (2) the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him above

the statutory maximum that was applicable based on the jury’s verdict;

(3) the district court should have dismissed this case for lack of jurisdiction

because the Government lacked standing to bring these criminal charges

against him; and (4) the district court failed to provide sufficient reasons

when denying FSA relief. We review the district court’s FSA ruling for an

abuse of discretion. United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir.

2019), cert. denied, 2020 WL 1906710 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020) (No. 19-8036).

To the extent we decide the meaning of, or consider a constitutional

challenge to, the FSA, we use de novo review. United States v. Hegwood, 934

F.3d 414, 416-17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 285 (2019); United States

v. Howard, 766 F.3d 414, 428 (5th Cir. 2014). However, because Brown did

not preserve his first two issues, we review them only for plain error. See

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); Howard, 766 F.3d at 428.

In his constitutional challenge, Brown is essentially arguing that a

sentencing reduction under the FSA should be mandatory for eligible

defendants whose convictions involved cocaine base. We have rejected this

argument in the analogous context of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motions based

on retroactive amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines’ base offense levels

for cocaine base. United States v. Smith, 595 F.3d 1322, 1323 (5th Cir. 2010);

see also Jackson, 945 F.3d at 319 n.2 (recognizing that the FSA is similar to

§ 3582(c)(2)); Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 418 (same). In the FSA context, this

argument is flatly rejected by the text of the FSA, which specifies that

“[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any

2

Case: 20-30099 Document: 00515662013 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/04/2020

No. 20-30099

sentence pursuant to this section.” First Step Act of 2018, § 404(c), Pub. L.

No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018).

Brown’s argument regarding the applicable statutory maximum is not

reliant on the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FAIR). Under the FSA, the

district court properly proceeded “as if all the conditions for the original

sentencing were again in place with the one exception” for the changes

mandated by FAIR. Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 419. The district court also

properly considered Brown’s criminal history and role in the offense when

denying FSA relief. See Jackson, 945 F.3d at 322. Moreover, Brown’s

jurisdictional challenge is barred under the law of the case doctrine because

it was rejected on direct appeal. See United States v. Brown, Nos. 02-30021,

02-30459, 02-30514, 03-30375, 2004 WL 243491, at *6 (5th Cir. Feb. 11,

2004) (unpublished); United States v. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652, 657 (5th Cir.

2002).

AFFIRMED.

3

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