The opinion
2020 IL App (3d) 190397
Opinion filed November 30, 2020
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2020
EDWARD SIMS JR. TRUST, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Henry County, Illinois.
)
v. )
) Appeal No. 3-19-0397
THE HENRY COUNTY BOARD OF ) Circuit No. 18-MR-158
REVIEW, THE ILLINOIS PROPERTY )
TAX APPEAL BOARD, and TAMRA S. ) The Honorable
DYNES, ) Jeffrey W. O’Connor,
) Judge, presiding.
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion.
_____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff, the Edward Sims Jr. Trust (Trust), filed a property tax appeal with defendant,
the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB), seeking a reduction in the 2012 assessed value
of certain farm property owned by the Trust. The Trust asserted in the tax appeal that one of the
improvements on the property, a farm building, had been given too high of an assessed value by
the local assessor. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, during which both sides submitted
appraisals of the property, the PTAB denied the Trust’s request for a reduction. The Trust filed a
complaint for administrative review, and the trial court affirmed the PTAB’s ruling. The Trust
appeals. We affirm the PTAB’s decision.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The Trust owned an approximately 224-acre parcel of farmland in Western Township,
Henry County, Illinois. Located on that farmland were two improvements: a large pole barn/farm
building and a grain bin. The farm building, which is the subject of this appeal, was built in
2011. It was approximately 20,700 square feet in size, had walls that were 20 feet high, had steel
siding and a steel roof, and had electrical and water service. The farm building was divided into
two sections. The first section was approximately 7700 square feet in size, was insulated and
heated, had concrete floors, and contained a workshop area and an office area. The second
section was approximately 13,000 square feet in size, was unheated, had gravel floors, and was
used to store farm machinery. Both sections had multiple overhead doors and one or two walk-in
doors.
¶4 The farm building was assessed for the first time by the local assessor in 2012. For that
year, the assessor assigned the entire property (the farmland and the improvements) a total
assessed value of $164,170, which consisted of an assessed value of $67,760 for the farmland
and $96,410 for the two improvements ($93,831 for the farm building and $2579 for the grain
bin). 1 As indicated by the assessed value that had been assigned, the farm building had been
given a contributory value of $281,520 for property tax purposes. See 35 ILCS 200/10-140
(West 2012) (indicating that the assessed value of improvements on farmland is 33⅓% of their
contributory value).
1
Although the assessment information initially provided in the record did not show a separate
assessed value for each of the improvements on the property, that information was later provided in the
hearing before the PTAB.
2
¶5 After the 2012 assessed values were assigned to the property, the Trust filed a property
tax appeal with the Henry County Board of Review (Board) seeking a reduction. The Board
denied the Trust’s request.
¶6 In February or March 2013, the Trust appealed the Board’s ruling to the PTAB and again
sought a reduction in the assessed value of the property. In its appeal, the Trust again asserted
that the farm building had been overvalued by the local assessor. The Board opposed the Trust’s
request for a reduction and asserted that the farm building had been properly assessed. Both sides
submitted appraisal reports in support of their positions.
¶7 The Trust’s appraisal was conducted by Michael Blean, an Illinois certified general real
estate appraiser with 30 years of farming experience. To determine the contributory value of the
farm building, Blean used the cost approach, which consisted of estimating the replacement cost
new of the building and subtracting depreciation from that amount. Using a standard cost guide,
Blean estimated the replacement cost of the Trust’s farm building to be $406,944, not including
the cost of site improvements.
¶8 To determine the amount of depreciation, Blean looked for comparable sales. Blean
found one sale in a different county that he thought was a good comparison because it involved a
farm building of similar size, age, and structure, although the sale had been court-ordered and the
property had been sold through an online auction to one of the owner’s relatives. Using certain
known information from the comparable sale and elsewhere, Blean calculated or estimated the
value of the comparable property’s farmland, the contributory value of the comparable
property’s farm building (the total consideration paid for the comparable property as a whole
minus what Blean had calculated to be the value of the comparable property’s farmland), and the
replacement cost of the comparable property’s farm building. From that information, Blean
3
estimated that the comparable farm building had 87% depreciation (the replacement cost of the
comparable farm building minus what Blean had estimated to be the contributory value of the
comparable farm building with the answer converted to a percentage). Blean allocated that
percentage into the following three categories: 24% physical obsolescence, 40% functional
obsolescence, and 23% external obsolescence. 2 Blean did not state in his report, however, how
he had determined what allocation percentages were appropriate or how he had estimated the
replacement cost of the comparable farm building.
¶9 After determining the depreciation percentages for all three categories of depreciation
with regard to the comparable farm building, Blean used that information to estimate the
depreciation percentages for the Trust’s farm building. Blean estimated that the Trust’s farm
building had 0% depreciation for physical obsolescence because the Trust’s farm building was
new; 40% depreciation for functional obsolescence, mirroring the percentage that Blean had
assigned to the comparable farm building, because the Trust’s farm building was super-adequate
or overbuilt for the size of the parcel and was specifically designed for the current owner’s
operations; and 20% depreciation for external obsolescence, consistent with the percentage that
Blean had assigned to the comparable farm building. Blean converted the depreciation
percentages for the Trust’s farm building to dollar amounts ($162,778 or 40% for functional
obsolescence and $81,389 or 20% for external obsolescence) and subtracted those amounts from
the replacement cost to determine the contributory value, which Blean concluded was $162,778
for the Trust’s farm building. That contributory value represented an assessed value of $54,260
(33⅓% of the contributory value rounded up).
2
The terms, physical obsolescence or physical deterioration, functional obsolescence, and
external obsolescence, have been defined later in this opinion.
4
¶ 10 The Board’s appraisal was conducted by Joyce Webb, who, like Blean, was an Illinois
certified general real estate appraiser. Similar to Blean, Webb used a cost approach to determine
the contributory value of the Trust’s farm building. Using the same cost guide as Blean, Webb
estimated the reproduction cost of the Trust’s farm building to be $375,316, not including the
cost of site improvements. Unlike Blean, however, Webb decided that there was no depreciation
to subtract from the replacement cost of the building. Webb concluded, therefore, that the
contributory value of the farm building was $375,000 (rounded down), which represented an
assessed value of $125,000 (33⅓% of the contributory value).
¶ 11 More specifically as to depreciation, Webb determined that there was no physical
depreciation because the Trust’s farm building was new; that there was no functional
obsolescence because the Trust’s farm building did not have any functional inadequacies,
inefficiencies, or super-adequacies; and that there was no external obsolescence because
economic conditions in the local farm market were reasonably strong and the value of farmland
was appreciating at the time. In making her determination on functional obsolescence, Webb
commented in her report that Sims had told her that he had built the farm building with 20-foot-
high walls so that he could store larger farm equipment when he purchased that equipment.
Webb noted that the assessor’s records indicated that Sims and his wife owned several other
parcels of farmland in Henry County and indicated in her report that it appeared from the amount
of machinery in the farm building that the farm building was built to serve more than just the
parcel on which the building was located.
¶ 12 In April 2017, a hearing was held before the PTAB on the Trust’s property tax appeal. At
the PTAB hearing, Blean and Webb both testified as to their qualifications and as to the
conclusions and opinions contained in their reports. Blean explained that he applied 40%
5
functional obsolescence to the Trust’s farm building because the building was an over-
improvement for the size of the parcel and because it was unfair to assume that a person buying
the property would not already have a building of his or her own or would be willing to pay full
value for the Trust’s farm building as it was constructed. When Blean was asked during his
testimony whether farmers would typically build one building per farm or build one building to
incorporate several farms, Blean responded that it could vary, but typically larger farming
operations had a “base of operations.” As for the comparable sale he used to calculate functional
and external obsolescence, Blean acknowledged that it was a court-ordered sale and agreed that
court-ordered sales were not usually viewed as arm’s-length transactions but commented that he
had very limited information available to develop the cost approach in this case. Blean insisted
that from a buyer’s perspective, the comparable sale he had used had full exposure to the market
because the comparable property was available for inspection and the sale was advertised online.
¶ 13 Webb testified that in conducting her appraisal, she found there was no functional
obsolescence for the Trust’s farm building because the building had been built to suit the needs
of a typical farm in Henry County. In reaching that conclusion, Webb noted that Sims had told
her that he had built the farm building to accommodate his future purchase of a bigger combine
and to store the big equipment that was necessary for “a good-size[d] farm operation.” During
her testimony, Webb confirmed that in conducting her appraisal, she considered that Sims owned
other farm property. Webb commented that it would be “rather narrow sighted” for her to ignore
Sims’s other farm parcels when determining the farm building’s contributory value because most
farmers used a single storage facility to store equipment that serviced multiple parcels. Webb
testified further that she found that there was no external obsolescence for the Trust’s farm
building because there was a good, strong economy in the agricultural sector. When asked about
6
the comparable sale that Blean had used in his appraisal, Webb opined that Blean’s court-ordered
sale was not useful in determining obsolescence because it was not an arm’s-length transaction
and did not have a typically motivated seller.
¶ 14 After all of the evidence had been presented, the parties made their closing arguments.
The Trust argued that the farm building was overbuilt and that the PTAB should not consider the
farm building’s contributory value to Sims’s entire farming operation. In making that argument,
the Trust conceded that the comparable sale Blean had used to calculate obsolescence was “not a
perfect sale” and “maybe not the best comparable” but asserted that it was the only data
available.
¶ 15 The Board argued that the PTAB should consider the farm building’s value to Sims’s
entire farming operation in evaluating the building’s contributory value. The Board also argued
that Webb’s decision to apply no functional obsolescence was supported by the evidence that the
farm building housed larger equipment to service Sims’s entire farming operation in the area.
¶ 16 In May 2017, the PTAB issued a written decision denying the Trust’s request for a
reduction in the 2012 assessed value assigned to the farm building. In its ruling, the PTAB found
that the Trust had failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a reduction in
the assessed value of the farm building was warranted. In reaching that conclusion, the PTAB
indicated in its order that it had given little weight to Blean’s estimate of the contributory value
of the farm building for several reasons, including that Blean had relied on an invalid comparable
sale (not an arm’s-length transaction) and that Blean had used an overinflated land value for the
comparable property’s farmland that caused the contributory value of the comparable farm
building to be artificially low. The PTAB also noted that Blean did not include in his appraisal
report his calculations for determining the replacement cost of the comparable farm building and
7
that he did not adequately explain or support the depreciation percentages that he had used. The
PTAB indicated further in its order that it had found that the best evidence of the contributory
value of the farm building was Webb’s appraisal that had been submitted by the Board and
commented that the cost approach developed by Webb was more detailed than Blean’s and better
reflected all of the individual components that made up the subject property.
¶ 17 Over a year later (the Trust was apparently not properly notified of the PTAB’s decision),
the Trust filed a complaint for administrative review in the trial court. A hearing was held on the
matter. After considering the arguments of the parties, the trial court affirmed the PTAB’s
decision. In so doing, the trial court indicated that it viewed the issue presented as being more of
a legal issue, rather than a factual issue, as to whether the phrase, “contribution to the
productivity of the farm,” contained in section 10-140 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS
200/10-140 (West 2012)) referred only to the parcel in question or to multiple parcels that were
all a part of a taxpayer’s farming operation. The trial court ultimately ruled in the PTAB’s favor,
concluding that the PTAB’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, “short
of a legal definition of how this applies.” The Trust appealed.
¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 On appeal, the Trust argues that the PTAB erred in finding that the Trust failed to meet
its burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the farm building had been
given too high of an assessed value for the 2012 tax year and in denying the Trust’s request for a
reduction on that basis. 3 The Trust asserts that the PTAB’s ruling was erroneous as a matter of
3
At various times in its argument, the Trust refers to errors that were allegedly made by the trial
court. Because on administrative review, we review the ruling of the PTAB and not the trial court (see
Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d 497, 531 (2006); Senachwine Club v.
Putnam County Board of Review, 362 Ill. App. 3d 566, 568 (2005)), we will consider those arguments as
being directed at the PTAB’s ruling where it is appropriate to do so.
8
law because in determining the contributory value of the farm building, the PTAB relied entirely
upon the flawed appraisal of the Board’s appraiser, Webb, who, contrary to section 10-140 of the
Property Tax Code and the relevant case law, failed to consider obsolescence and improperly
considered the value of the farm building to Sims’s other farm property that was not part of the
farm parcel in question. The Trust also asserts that the manner in which the farm building was
assessed in this case violated the equal protection clause of both the United States and Illinois
Constitutions. For all of the reasons stated, the Trust asks, although somewhat implicitly, that we
reverse the PTAB’s ruling.
¶ 20 Defendants (the PTAB, the Board, and the Board’s chairperson) argue that the PTAB’s
ruling was proper and should be upheld. In support of that argument, defendants make numerous
assertions. 4 First, defendants assert that the main issue before this court is a factual issue and that
the PTAB’s ruling should be affirmed because the PTAB’s factual determinations—its
underlying factual findings, its assessment that Blean’s appraisal had numerous flaws and was
entitled to much less weight than the Webb’s appraisal in determining the contributory value of
the farm building, its determination that the Trust had failed in its burden of proof to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the assessed value of the farm building was too high, its
finding as to the farm building’s contributory value, and its ultimate determination that a
reduction in the assessed value of the farm building was unwarranted—were all well supported
by the evidence. In making that assertion, defendants point out that despite the Trust’s contention
to the contrary, the record here shows that Webb considered obsolescence and that she decided
that it did not apply under the circumstances of the present case. Second, and in the alternative,
4
For the convenience of the reader and because it does not affect the outcome of this case, we
have addressed defendants’ arguments collectively here, rather than specifying what each defendant
argued individually.
9
defendants assert that even if we assume for argument’s sake that an issue of statutory
interpretation exists, that the Trust’s interpretation of the statute is correct, and that the Board’s
appraisal was flawed in that Webb should not have considered Sims’s other farm property, the
PTAB’s ruling must still be upheld because the Trust failed to present any reliable evidence to
establish that the farm building’s assessed value was excessive since the Trust’s appraisal was
also flawed and because Webb’s appraisal contained another reason for not applying functional
obsolescence in this case (that the farm building was built to accommodate Sims’s future
purchase of larger farming equipment and was designed to suit the needs of a typical farm in
Henry County), aside from a consideration of Sims’s other farm properties, that the PTAB could
have properly relied upon in making its decision. Third, and also in the alternative, defendants
assert that even if this court rules upon the merits of the Trust’s statutory interpretation argument,
that argument fails because it contradicts the plain language of the Property Tax Code,
precedential authority, and common sense. Fourth and finally, defendants assert that any claim
by the Trust of a constitutional violation has been forfeited on appeal or is otherwise without
merit. For all of the reasons set forth, defendants ask that we affirm the PTAB’s ruling.
¶ 21 In reply to defendants’ assertions, the Trust maintains its statutory interpretation
argument. The Trust also argues, in the alternative, that even if this appeal is decided based upon
the manifest weight of the evidence that was before the PTAB, the Trust should still prevail
because Blean’s estimate of contributory value was credible, despite a few limited shortcomings;
Webb’s estimate was not credible; the Trust satisfied its burden of proof; and the Board
submitted no credible evidence of the contributory value of the farm building. As for its
constitutional claims, the Trust asserts that defendants’ forfeiture argument should not be
followed here because this court has a duty to maintain a sound body of precedent. For those
10
reasons and the reasons initially stated, the Trust asks this court to reverse the PTAB’s judgment,
although the Trust again does so somewhat implicitly by asking for a reversal of the trial court’s
ruling.
¶ 22 A. Standard of Review
¶ 23 Before we address the merits of the parties’ arguments on appeal, we must first determine
the appropriate standard of review. The Trust asserts that the key issue presented in this appeal is
a question of law involving a matter of statutory interpretation, as the trial court indicated,
regarding the manner in which farm buildings are valued for property tax purposes—whether the
contributory value of a farm building should be based upon what the building contributes to the
specific farm parcel in question or based upon what the building contributes to the entire farming
operation, if a multiple-parcel farming operation is involved. Thus, the Trust contends that the
appropriate standard of review for that issue is de novo. As for its constitutional claim, the Trust
argues that de novo review is appropriate for that claim as well.
¶ 24 Defendants argue that the main issue in this appeal primarily involves factual questions
regarding the application of the cost method of valuing the farm building and the appropriate
amount of depreciation to be applied. Thus, defendants contend that the appropriate standard of
review for that issue is the manifest weight standard—that the PTAB’s findings on those factual
questions should not be disturbed on appeal unless they are against the manifest weight of the
evidence. 5 In making that argument, defendants point out that the PTAB did not interpret any
statutory provisions when it ruled upon the Trust’s tax appeal. Defendants acknowledge,
however, that a de novo standard of review would apply to the extent that this court is required to
5
As with defendants’ arguments on the merits, for the convenience of the reader and because it
does not affect the outcome of this case, we have presented defendants’ arguments on the standard of
review collectively here, rather than individually.
11
interpret the language of the relevant statute in resolving the Trust’s arguments here. Finally,
with regard to the Trust’s constitutional claim, defendants argue that if this court reaches the
merits of that claim, either a de novo standard of review or a mixed standard of review should be
applied.
¶ 25 In cases involving administrative review, the appellate court reviews the decision of the
administrative agency—in this case, the PTAB—not the determination of the trial court.
Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 531; Senachwine Club, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 568. Judicial review of a
decision of the PTAB is governed by the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.
(West 2016)) and extends to all questions of fact and law presented by the entire record. See 35
ILCS 200/16-195 (West 2016); 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2016); Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 532
(discussing the standard of review and legal principles that applied to administrative review
cases in general and not in the context of a property tax appeal case); John J. Moroney & Co. v.
Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 2013 IL App (1st) 120493, ¶ 35. The standard of review that
applies on appeal is determined by whether the question presented is one of fact, one of law, or a
mixed question of fact and law. Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 532; Moroney, 2013 IL App (1st)
120493, ¶ 36. As to questions of fact, the PTAB’s decision will not be reversed on appeal unless
it is against the manifest weight of the evidence (the manifest weight standard). Marconi, 225 Ill.
2d at 532; Moroney, 2013 IL App (1st) 120493, ¶ 36. Questions of law, however, are subject to
de novo review, and mixed questions of fact and law are reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard. Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 532; Moroney, 2013 IL App (1st) 120493, ¶ 36.
¶ 26 Having considered the parties’ arguments on the standard of review in the present case,
we find that the appropriate standard to be applied to the key issue here is the manifest weight
standard. In making that determination, we note that the Trust has not asserted in this case that
12
the appraisers or the PTAB used an inappropriate method of valuation in determining the value
of the farm building. See Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 2013 IL App
(2d) 121031, ¶ 44 (recognizing that a de novo standard of review applied when the issue
presented on appeal was whether an inappropriate valuation methodology was used in
determining the value of the property). To the contrary, all of the parties agree, and it is has been
specifically expressed by the Department of Revenue, that the appropriate method for valuing a
farm building is the cost method. See Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, Publication 122 Instructions for
Farmland Assessments, at 37 (Jan. 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/rev/research/
publications/pubs/Documents/pub-122.pdf [https://perma.cc/TDZ4-BL3G]. 6, 7 Indeed, both of
the appraisals that were submitted in the present case used the cost method to estimate the
contributory value of the Trust’s farm building.
¶ 27 In applying the manifest weight standard in this case, we must be mindful of the
following legal principles. The PTAB’s findings and conclusions on questions of fact are deemed
to be prima facie true and correct. See 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2016); Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at
534; Moroney, 2013 IL App (1st) 120493, ¶ 35; Senachwine Club, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 568. For a
reversal to be warranted under the manifest weight standard, it must be clearly evident from the
record that the PTAB should have reached the opposite conclusion. Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 534;
6
It is generally accepted that a court may take judicial notice of the information on a government
website. See, e.g., Ashley v. Pierson, 339 Ill. App. 3d 733, 739-40 (2003) (taking judicial notice, although
somewhat implicitly, of information on the Illinois Department of Corrections website); see also Ill. R.
Evid. 201(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (indicating that a judicially noticed fact must be one that is not subject to
reasonable dispute because it is either generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court
or capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned).
7
A copy of Publication 122 with an effective date of January 2010 (the 2010 version) was
submitted by the Board at the PTAB hearing. The current version of Publication 122 cited here is
essentially the same as the 2010 version with regard to the matters that are relevant in this appeal.
13
Moroney, 2013 IL App (1st) 120493, ¶ 36. That the opposite conclusion is reasonable or that the
reviewing court might have ruled differently if it were the trier of fact is not enough to justify a
reversal. Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 534. Thus, if the record contains some competent evidence to
support the PTAB’s decision, the PTAB’s decision should be affirmed. See Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d
at 534; Moroney, 2013 IL App (1st) 120493, ¶ 36. Furthermore, determining the credibility of
witnesses and weighing the evidence are the responsibilities of the PTAB, not the reviewing
court. See Kraft Foods, 2013 IL App (2d) 121031, ¶ 51. When examining the PTAB’s factual
findings on administrative review, therefore, the reviewing court will not reweigh the evidence
presented in the PTAB hearing, reassess the credibility of the witnesses, make an independent
determination of the facts, or substitute its judgment for that of the PTAB. See Marconi, 225 Ill.
2d at 534; Moroney, 2013 IL App (1st) 120493, ¶ 35; Kraft Foods, 2013 IL App (2d) 121031,
¶ 51. Nor will the appellate court intervene when there is simply a difference of opinion as to the
actual value of the property. Kraft Foods, 2013 IL App (2d) 121031, ¶ 51.
¶ 28 B. Whether the PTAB’s Ruling Was
Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence
¶ 29 Turning to the merits of the parties’ arguments on appeal, we note that under Illinois law,
as a general rule, real property is assessed for property tax purposes based upon its fair market
value (also referred to more simply as market value)—the price the property would bring in a fair
and voluntary sale. See 35 ILCS 200/1-50, 9-145 (West 2012); 86 Ill. Adm. Code 1910.5(b)(5)
(2014); Kraft Foods, 2013 IL App (2d) 121031, ¶ 43. Farm improvements, however, such as the
building in the present case, are an exception to that general rule and are assessed based upon
their contributory value to the farm rather than based upon their market value. See 35 ILCS
200/10-140 (West 2012); O’Connor v. A&P Enterprises, 81 Ill. 2d 260, 267, 275 (1980).
Specifically, section 10-140 of the Property Tax Code provides that improvements on farm
14
property, other than a dwelling, “shall have an equalized assessed value of 33⅓% of their value,
based upon the current use of those buildings and the contribution to the productivity of the
farm.” 35 ILCS 200/10-140 (West 2012). Section 10-140 thus reflects the legislature’s
recognition that certain farm structures may have become obsolete due to changes in farming
methods or practices and may have a greatly diminished value, or no value, in connection with
the farming operation. See O’Connor, 81 Ill. 2d at 267 (discussing a prior version of the statute).
¶ 30 Although there are different methods for estimating the value of real property, the
Department of Revenue, which is responsible for issuing guidelines and recommendations for
valuing farmland, has clarified that the contributory value of a farm building (or other farm
improvement) should be determined using the cost approach or cost method of valuation.
Publication 122, supra at 37. Under the cost approach, contributory value is calculated by first
estimating the reproduction or replacement cost new of the building in question and then
subtracting depreciation from the replacement cost amount. See id. at 38. There are three types of
depreciation that must be considered when using the cost approach: physical deterioration (a loss
in the physical ability of a building to withstand normal use due to wear and tear, structural
defects, and/or decay), functional obsolescence (a loss in value due to the characteristics of the
building—such as poor design, surplus capacity, and/or changes in farming techniques—that
cause a failure of the building to serve its intended purpose), and economic obsolescence (a loss
in value due to changes in the economic environment of the farm, which results from external
influences, such as land-use changes, government regulations, and/or farm market conditions).
Id. at 37.
¶ 31 In a hearing before the PTAB, the PTAB’s role is to determine the correct assessed value
of the property based upon the facts, evidence, exhibits, and briefs that have been submitted to
15
the PTAB. 86 Ill. Adm. Code 1910.10(b) (1997); 1411 North State Condominium Ass’n v.
Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 2016 IL App (1st) 143757, ¶ 6 (1411 North State). A
taxpayer who appeals an assessment to the PTAB has the initial burden of going forward—the
burden of production—and must present substantive documentary evidence or legal argument
that is sufficient to challenge the correctness of the assessment. See 86 Ill. Adm. Code
1910.63(a), (b) (2000); 1411 North State, 2016 IL App (1st) 143757, ¶ 8; Peacock v. Property
Tax Appeal Board, 339 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1068 (2003). If the taxpayer satisfies that burden, the
burden of production shifts to the county board of review to present substantive documentary
evidence or legal argument to support the assessed value that the board of review assigned to the
property (or an alternative value). See 86 Ill. Adm. Code 1910.63(c) (2000); 1411 North State,
2016 IL App (1st) 143757, ¶ 8; Peacock, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 1068. Although the burden of
production may shift between the taxpayer and the board of review, the ultimate burden of
persuasion throughout the proceedings remains on the taxpayer to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the assessed value assigned to the property is excessive. See 86 Ill. Adm. Code
1910.63(e) (2000); 1411 North State, 2016 IL App (1st) 143757, ¶ 9; Peacock, 339 Ill. App. 3d
at 1071.
¶ 32 In the present case, the PTAB ultimately found following an evidentiary hearing that the
Trust had failed in its burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the farm
building had been given too high of an assessed value for the 2012 tax year. After having
reviewed the record of the PTAB proceedings, we conclude that the PTAB’s finding on the
Trust’s failure to satisfy its burden of proof was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
See Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 532-34; Moroney, 2013 IL App (1st) 120493, ¶ 36. At the heart of the
PTAB’s decision was its determination that the appraisal submitted by the Trust in support of its
16
position (Blean’s appraisal) was flawed and that it was entitled to little weight. That credibility
determination was in the PTAB’s province to make (see Kraft Foods, 2013 IL App (2d) 121031,
¶ 51 (recognizing that determining the credibility of witnesses and weighing the evidence are the
responsibilities of the PTAB, not the reviewing court)) and was well supported by the evidence.
Most notably, Blean’s written appraisal report and his testimony before the PTAB established
that Blean had relied on only one comparable sale in determining the amount of functional and
external obsolescence to apply to the Trust’s farm building and that the comparable sale that
Blean had used was invalid for comparison purposes because it did not involve an arm’s-length
transaction. The PTAB also noted and documented in its written order other flaws that it had
found in Blean’s appraisal/opinion as to the contributory value of the farm building, including,
among other things, that Blean had used an overinflated value for the farmland of the comparable
property, which resulted in a higher level of depreciation being attributed to the comparable farm
building and to the Trust’s farm building by extrapolation; that Blean had failed to set forth in his
appraisal his calculations for determining the replacement cost of the comparable farm building;
and that Blean had failed to specify in his appraisal why he allocated the depreciation
percentages in the manner that he did for the comparable farm building.
¶ 33 By contrast, the PTAB found that the Board’s appraisal (Webb’s appraisal) was the best
evidence of the contributory value of the farm building, noting that the cost approach developed
by Webb was more detailed than Blean’s and better reflected all of the individual components
that made up the subject property. Although the Trust attacks that finding here, claiming that
Webb failed to consider obsolescence, the record does not support that claim. To the contrary,
the record shows that Webb considered obsolescence and that she determined that it did not
apply in this case. Webb explained the reasons for her decision in that regard in both her written
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appraisal report and her testimony. Therefore, based upon the PTAB’s factual findings as to the
credibility/weight to be given to each of the two appraisals—findings that were not against the
manifest weight of the evidence—we must conclude that the PTAB correctly determined that the
Trust failed to satisfy its burden of proof to show that a reduction in the assessment was
warranted. See 86 Ill. Adm. Code 1910.63(e) (2000); 1411 North State, 2016 IL App (1st)
143757, ¶ 9; Peacock, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 1071.
¶ 34 C. The Trust’s Statutory Interpretation Argument
¶ 35 Having concluded that the PTAB’s ruling was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence and must be affirmed, we find is unnecessary to rule upon the merits of the Trust’s
statutory interpretation argument. As defendants correctly point out in this appeal, even if the
Trust’s statutory interpretation argument was correct and Webb’s appraisal was flawed, we
would still have to uphold the PTAB’s determination because the Trust failed to present any
credible evidence to establish that the Trust’s farm building had been over-assessed. See 86 Ill.
Adm. Code 1910.63(e) (2000) (indicating that the taxpayer/contesting party has the burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property has been over-assessed); 1411 North
State, 2016 IL App (1st) 143757, ¶ 9 (same); Peacock, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 1071 (same). As we
indicated above, the PTAB’s specific factual finding—that Blean’s appraisal was flawed and was
entitled to little weight—was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and must be upheld
here. See Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 534; Moroney, 2013 IL App (1st) 120493, ¶ 36.
¶ 36 D. The Trust’s Constitutional Claim
¶ 37 Finally, with regard to the Trust’s claim that the assessment method used in this case
constituted a violation of the Trust’s equal protection rights, we believe that the Trust’s claim in
that regard has been forfeited since the Trust did not assert that claim when the matter was before
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the PTAB. See Board of Education, Joliet Township High School District No. 204 v. Board of
Education, Lincoln Way Community High School District No. 210, 231 Ill. 2d 184, 205 (2008)
(stating that any issue not raised before the administrative agency, even constitutional issues that
the agency lacks authority to decide, will be forfeited). Furthermore, because our decision in this
appeal turns upon the PTAB’s factual findings and the applicable standard of review, we do not
agree with the Trust’s assertion that the Trust’s forfeiture should be ignored in this case to
maintain a sound body of precedent.
¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the PTAB.
¶ 40 Affirmed.
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No. 3-19-0397
Cite as: Edward Sims Jr. Trust v. Henry County Board of Review,
2020 IL App (3d) 190397
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry County, No. 18-MR-158;
the Hon. Jeffrey W. O’Connor, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Jerry J. Pepping and Jennifer L. Kincaid, of Pepping, Balk,
for Kincaid & Olson, Ltd., of Silvis, for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys Matthew Schutte, State’s Attorney, of Cambridge (Stephanie
for Barrick, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for appellees
Appellee: Henry County Board of Review and Tamra S. Dynes.
Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz,
Solicitor General, and Carson R. Griffis, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel), for other appellee.
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