Opinion

Bob's Tire Co., Inc. v. NLRB

  • 980 F.3d 147
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Nov 20, 2020
Status
Published
Cited by
3 cases
Authority
More cited than 52.6%

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 21, 2020 Decided November 20, 2020

No. 19-1174

BOB'S TIRE CO., INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL 328,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 19-1204

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement

of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board

Gregory J. Koldys argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner.

David A. Seid, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board,

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were

Peter B. Robb, General Counsel, Ruth E. Burdick, Acting

Deputy Associate General Counsel, David Habenstreit,

Assistant General Counsel, and Julie Brock Broido,

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Supervisory Attorney. Meredith Jason, Supervisory Attorney,

entered an appearance.

Before: WILKINS and RAO, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Section 8(d) of the

National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”) requires an

employer and a union representative of the employees “to meet

at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to

wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,

or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising

thereunder, and the execution of a written contract

incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either

party.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). This duty to bargain covers

situations in which an employer decides to “replace[] existing

employees with those of an independent contractor to do the

same work under similar conditions of employment.” See

Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213

(1964).

This case involves an unfair labor practice charge filed by

the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) against Bob’s

Tire Company, Inc. (“Petitioner” or “Bob’s”). The charge

alleged that Bob’s had violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) and (1), by failing to notify and

bargain with the United Food and Commercial Workers,

International Union, Local 328 (“Union”), the employees’

bargaining agent, before subcontracting bargaining unit work

and unilaterally implementing and discontinuing a

performance-based employee bonus program. Following a

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and

3

review by the Board, the Board issued a Decision and Order,

largely in agreement with the ALJ, finding that Bob’s had

violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Bob’s Tire Co.,

Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 33, at 1 (July 31, 2019). The Board

ordered Bob’s to cease and desist from unfair labor practices,

to make bargaining unit employees whole for any lost earnings,

to bargain on request with the Union before subcontracting

bargaining unit work or implementing any further changes in

terms and conditions of employment, and to restore the

performance-based bonus program pending the Union

requesting its rescission or the parties negotiating an agreement

on modifications to the program. Id. at 2. However, contrary to

the ALJ, the Board found that Bob’s did not violate the Act by

failing to pay its employees a Christmas bonus in 2015 without

giving the Union prior notice and an opportunity to bargain. Id.

Bob’s now petitions for review of the Board’s Order.

Bob’s argues that the subcontracted work was not bargaining

unit work and that, even if it was, the unit employees are owed

no remedy because the subcontracting did not cause the loss of

any jobs or hours of employment. In the alternative, Petitioner

contends Bob’s and the subcontractor Masis were joint

employers, and, therefore, the subcontractor’s employees

should have been considered part of the bargaining unit. Bob’s

also argues the Board erred in adopting the ALJ’s finding that

Bob’s violated the Act by unilaterally implementing and

terminating a performance-based employee bonus program.

The Board, joined by the Union, cross-petitions for

enforcement of its order.

We agree with the Board that there is substantial evidence

in the record supporting its findings that Petitioner failed to

bargain with the Union before subcontracting bargaining unit

work. Furthermore, we agree that an employer’s duty to

bargain over subcontracting “is not limited to situations in

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which employees are laid off or replaced.” Acme Die Casting,

315 N.L.R.B. 202, 202 n.1 (1994). We express no view as to

whether the employees affected by Bob’s unfair labor practices

are due any backpay. Questions regarding remedies can be

resolved during the Board’s compliance proceedings. See Sure-

Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 902 (1984). We also reject

Petitioner’s “joint-employer” argument as specious. Finally,

we find we are without jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s

arguments regarding the performance-based bonus program, as

Petitioner failed to present the issue before the Board. We

therefore deny the petition for review and grant the cross-

motion for enforcement of the Board’s order.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Background

Under the NLRA, an employer commits an unfair labor

practice if it “refuse[s] to bargain collectively with the

representatives of [its] employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). As

noted above, “[t]he obligation to ‘bargain collectively’ requires

an employer to ‘confer in good faith with respect to wages,

hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.’” Regal

Cinemas, Inc. v. NLRB, 317 F.3d 300, 309 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)). “An employer thus violates [the

Act] by unilaterally changing an existing term or condition of

employment without first bargaining to impasse.” Id. (citing

Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991)).

An employer’s decision to subcontract bargaining unit

work to an “independent contractor to do the same work under

similar conditions of employment” is subject to mandatory

bargaining. Fibreboard Paper, 379 U.S. at 215. There is a

caveat, however. If an employer’s decision to engage an

independent contractor “involv[es] a change in the scope and

5

direction of the [employer’s] enterprise,” there is a duty to

bargain with the employees’ union representative “only if the

benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-

bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the

conduct of the business.” First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB,

452 U.S. 666, 677, 679 (1981).

B. Petitioner’s Contract with Masis Staffing Solutions

Petitioner operates a tire recycling business in

Massachusetts. Prior to October 2015, Bob’s obtained most of

its workforce from B.J.’s Service Company, Inc. (“B.J.’s”), a

staffing agency that is a joint employer with Bob’s. Most of the

employees at Bob’s perform “yard work” or “general labor.”

Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 34, 143. The workers unload tires from

trucks and separate “good” tires, for resale, from “damaged”

tires, for recycling. Bob’s Tire Co., Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 33,

at 4 (July 31, 2019). Workers recycle damaged tires using

various machines that separate tires from their rims, remove

sidewalls, and shred tires into chips. J.A. 34-35, 37, 57. Bob’s

typically sent shredded tires to a plant in Connecticut, which

converted them into fuel for a paper mill in Maine. Br. for Pet’r

at 4; J.A. 152.

On October 1, 2015, following an election, the Board

certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent for

workers at Bob’s in a unit consisting of the following

employees: “All full time and regular part time loaders,

unloaders, machine operators, yard workers, inspectors, tire

painters and truck helpers employed by [Bob’s] and/or [B.J.’s]

working at [Bob’s] . . . but excluding all other employees,

mechanics, shredder operators, truck drivers, clerical

employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.” J.A. 245.

The unit was composed of 79 employees, most of whom came

from B.J.’s.

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According to Bob’s President, Robert Bates, sometime

before November 2015, the sale price of tire chips declined and

Bob’s began losing money producing and transporting the

chips. Br. for Pet’r at 4-5. In addition, the tire fuel plant in

Connecticut and the paper mill in Maine went bankrupt.

However, Bob’s was approached by an entity in India that was

willing to purchase baled tire treads.

On November 6, 2015, in anticipation of doing business

with the company in India, Bob’s entered into an agreement

with Masis Staffing Solutions (“Masis”) pursuant to which

Masis would furnish Bob’s with workers who would act as

“Light Industrial-Loaders/Unloaders.” J.A. 264, 271-72. The

agreement made clear that the workers would be employees of

Masis, not Bob’s. J.A. 264, 266. As a result, Bob’s did not enter

into a joint-employer relationship with Masis as it had with

B.J.’s.

It is undisputed that Bob’s did not notify the Union about

its staffing agreement with Masis, nor did it offer to bargain

with the Union regarding the work that would be performed by

Masis’s workers. When the Union requested a list of all

bargaining unit employees and information about any service

agreements that Bob’s had with other companies, Bob’s never

mentioned the Masis contract.

Masis employees worked at Bob’s until October 15, 2016.

Generally, between 18 and 24 Masis employees were engaged

at Bob’s each week during the period when Bob’s

subcontracted work to Masis. And the subcontracted work

sometimes included overtime. Between November 2015 and

October 2016, Masis furnished a total of 111 employees to

perform the subcontracted work at Bob’s. Only four of these

employees worked exclusively on cutting and banding tires that

7

were shipped to India. One hundred and one Masis workers

performed “general labor,” clearly the sort of work routinely

performed by bargaining unit employees at Bob’s. Indeed, it is

undisputed that the Masis employees did not perform any work

that B.J.’s employees could not have done. J.A. 170.

In January 2016, Bob’s unilaterally decided to pay some

bargaining unit employees weekly bonuses for being “better

workers.” J.A. 97. The Union never received notice of the

bonus payments and never had an opportunity to bargain over

the matter. In September 2016, Bob’s unilaterally terminated

the bonus program, again without giving the Union an

opportunity to bargain.

C. The Board’s Proceedings

In September 2016, the Union filed a charge with the

Board, alleging that Bob’s had engaged in unfair labor

practices. A complaint was issued, and the case proceeded to a

hearing before an ALJ. The ALJ found that Petitioner had

violated the Act by (1) “failing to notify the [Union] in advance

and offering it an opportunity to bargain about the

subcontracting of unit work to Masis”; (2) “failing to pay unit

employees a Christmas bonus in 2015 as it had in previous

years”; and (3) “unilaterally initiating bonus or incentive

payments to unit employees in January 2016 and then

unilaterally terminating these payments in September 2016.”

Bob’s Tire Co., Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 33, at 6 (July 31, 2019).

Petitioner filed exceptions to the ALJ’s rulings, findings, and

conclusions. Id. at 1.

The Board adopted the ALJ’s findings that Bob’s had

violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA by failing to

notify and bargain with the Union before subcontracting

bargaining unit work from November 6, 2015, to October 15,

8

2016. Id. The Board rejected the ALJ’s conclusion regarding

the Christmas 2015 bonuses. Id. at 1-2. In the absence of

exceptions, the Board adopted the ALJ’s finding that Petitioner

violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally

initiating and terminating a performance-based bonus program

for unit employees. Id. at 1 & n.1. The Board ordered Petitioner

to cease and desist from unfair labor practices, directed

Petitioner to bargain on request with the Union before

implementing any further changes in terms and conditions of

employment, and required Petitioner to restore the

performance-based bonus program pending collective

bargaining with the Union. Id. at 2. Finally, the Board ordered

Bob’s to make bargaining unit employees whole for any loss of

earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of Bob’s

subcontracting of bargaining unit work and cessation of

performance-based bonuses. Id.

Bob’s now petitions for review of the Board’s order as to

the subcontracting and 2016 bonus program. The Union does

not contest the Board’s decision rejecting the ALJ’s conclusion

regarding the Christmas 2015 bonuses.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“We will uphold a decision of the Board unless it relied

upon findings that are not supported by substantial evidence,

failed to apply the proper legal standard, or departed from its

precedent without providing a reasoned justification for doing

so.” Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union v. NLRB, 890 F.3d

1100, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting E.I. Du Pont de Nemours

& Co. v. NLRB, 682 F.3d 65, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). “[W]e may

not displace the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting

9

views, even though we would justifiably have made a different

choice had the matter been before us de novo.” Regal Cinemas,

Inc. v. NLRB, 317 F.3d 300, 306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (alterations,

internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

The Board’s construction of the NLRA, including its

classification of “terms and conditions of employment” as

mandatory subjects of bargaining, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), is

afforded “considerable deference” and upheld so long as it is

“reasonably defensible.” Regal Cinemas, 317 F.3d at 307

(quoting Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495, 497

(1979)).

B. Petitioner’s Subcontracting of Unit Work

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that

Bob’s violated the NLRA by subcontracting bargaining unit

work to Masis without notifying or bargaining with the Union.

The record makes clear that Petitioner contracted with Masis to

have Masis’s employees perform work that otherwise would

have been performed by employees in the bargaining unit.

The evidence shows that 101 of the 111 Masis employees

used by Bob’s performed “general labor,” i.e., work of the sort

routinely performed by unit employees. J.A. 276-80. Only four

of the 111 Masis workers exclusively cut and strapped

sidewalls and treads for tires sent to India. Bob’s Tire Co., Inc.,

368 N.L.R.B. No. 33, at 5 (July 31, 2019). Indeed, Bob’s

President, Robert Bates, conceded that he was “sure [the B.J.’s

employees] could have” performed the work performed by the

Masis workers. J.A. 164-65; see also J.A. 170 (agreeing there

was nothing Masis workers did “that one of the BJ’s employees

could not have done”). Bates also acknowledged that he could

have directly hired employees to complete the work done by

Masis workers. J.A. 166. Finally, Bates testified that the Masis

10

workers did not use any special skills and could be trained in

about a day. See J.A 171. The record thus contains substantial

evidence to support the Board’s finding that the Masis workers

completed “the same work” as the bargaining unit members

“under similar conditions of employment.” See Fibreboard

Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964).

Petitioner argues that the subcontracting arrangement with

Masis did not result in a violation of its duty to bargain because

Bob’s engagement in the India project and the resulting work

requirements reflected “a change in the scope and direction of

[its] enterprise.” See First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452

U.S. 666, 677 (1981). This claim is belied by the record.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding, adopted by

the Board, that Bob’s engagement in the India project did not

represent a change in the scope and direction of the company.

Bob’s Tire Co., Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 33, at 5 (July 31, 2019).

As noted above, only four Masis employees worked

exclusively on cutting sidewalls and strapping treads for tires

sent to India. Id. The record is clear that most Masis workers

performed tasks of the sort that were routinely performed by

bargaining unit employees.

C. Applicability of the Duty to Bargain

Petitioner also argues that bargaining unit members

suffered no adverse impact from the Masis subcontract, as if to

suggest that, if true, this fact vitiates the duty to bargain.

Petitioner’s claim is mistaken. First, Board precedent makes

clear that the duty to bargain over arrangements to subcontract

bargaining unit work “is not limited to situations in which

employees are laid off or replaced.” Acme Die Casting, 315

N.L.R.B. 202, 202 n.1 (1994). As the First Circuit has

explained, “[u]nion members have an interest in an employer’s

subcontracting decision in addition to the potential for layoffs.

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This work provides bargaining unit members with the

opportunity to obtain extra shifts (possibly at overtime rates) or

to expand the size of the unit through the hiring of new

employees.” Sociedad Española de Auxilio Mutuo y

Beneficiencia de P.R. v. NLRB, 414 F.3d 158, 167 (1st Cir.

2005).

Here, the ALJ concluded, and the Board agreed, that “[a]

bargaining unit is adversely affected whenever bargaining unit

work is given away to nonunit employees regardless of whether

the work would have been done by employees already in the

unit or by employees who would have been hired into the unit.”

Bob’s Tire Co., Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 33, at 6 (July 31, 2019).

In addition, the Board found in this case that there “appear[ed]

to have been opportunities for increased overtime for unit

employees that were adversely affected by the influx of Masis

employees.” Id.; see also J.A. 76 (employee Tomas Ventura)

(testifying that his hours were modified during the time when

Masis workers were hired); J.A. 165-66 (Bob’s President

Robert Bates) (conceding that Bob’s could have hired

additional unit employees, but chose to subcontract with Masis

instead).

The simple point here, which is dispositive of the duty to

bargain charge, is that Bob’s failed to give notice to the Union

or discuss any of the details regarding a subcontracting

arrangement with an outside contractor to furnish workers to

perform bargaining unit work. The Union obviously had an

interest in understanding, discussing, and possibly objecting to

the use of non-unit employees to perform bargaining unit work.

Indeed, the Union might have claimed that the Masis

employees should have been treated as part of the existing

bargaining unit pursuant to the Board’s accretion doctrine. See

Recology Hay Rd., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 32, at 2 (Feb. 27, 2019)

(explaining that the Board finds an accretion “when the

12

additional employees have little or no separate group identity

and thus cannot be considered to be a separate appropriate unit

and when the additional employees share an overwhelming

community of interest with the preexisting unit to which they

are accreted” (quoting Safeway Stores, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 918,

918 (1981))). In other words, the Union had good reasons to

secure its bargaining rights under the NLRA, and there were

issues amenable to bargaining. And there is no doubt that Bob’s

had a legal obligation to give notice to the Union and then

bargain with the employees’ agent before subcontracting their

unit work.

Bob’s unlawful failure to bargain is distinct from the

question of whether employees in the bargaining unit are due

any backpay under the Board’s order. That remedy question

can be properly raised during the Board’s compliance

proceedings. It is well understood that “compliance

proceedings provide the appropriate forum where the Board

and petitioners will be able to offer concrete evidence as to the

amounts of backpay, if any,” to which employees are entitled.

Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 902 (1984); see also

Chevron Mining, Inc. v. NLRB, 684 F.3d 1318, 1330 (D.C. Cir.

2012). Whether or not back pay is due, however, in no way

affects the efficacy of the Board’s cease and desist order

against Bob’s for its unlawful refusal to bargain.

D. Petitioner’s Remaining Arguments

As an alternative argument, Petitioner contends that Bob’s

and Masis are joint employers, such that Masis workers should

have been considered part of the bargaining unit. This is a

specious claim. Petitioner concedes that the Board adopted the

ALJ’s finding that workers supplied by Masis were not Bob’s

employees. See Bob’s Tire Co., Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 33, at 1

(July 31, 2019). Substantial evidence in the record supports this

13

finding. The November 2015 staffing agreement provided that

Masis had the sole right to hire, discipline, fire, assign, and

reassign workers. J.A. 264. Furthermore, Bob’s did not include

the Masis workers in a list of unit employees when the Union

requested this information. Bob’s Tire Co., Inc., 368 N.L.R.B.

No. 33, at 4-5 (July 31, 2019). And, tellingly, if Bob’s was

confused over whether Masis’s employees should have been

included in the bargaining unit, it could have filed a timely

clarification petition with the Board. See, e.g., St. Francis

Hosp., Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 950, 951 (1987); see also Dixie Elec.

Membership Corp. v. NLRB, 814 F.3d 752, 756-57 (5th Cir.

2016).

Finally, we are without jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s

argument regarding the 2016 bonus program because Bob’s

failed to raise the matter with the Board before filing a petition

for review with this court. The ALJ found that Bob’s violated

section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally implementing

a performance-based employee bonus program in January

2016, then unilaterally discontinuing it in September 2016.

Bob’s Tire Co., Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 33, at 6 (July 31, 2019).

Bob’s never raised an exception to this finding with the Board.

Id. at 1 n.1. In the absence of any exceptions, the Board adopted

the ALJ’s finding that Bob’s violated the Act by unilaterally

implementing and rescinding the performance-based bonuses.

Id. at 1. There are no extraordinary circumstances justifying

Bob’s failure to pursue this issue with the Board. Therefore, we

are without authority to consider the matter. See Advancepierre

Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 966 F.3d 813, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see

also 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (“No objection that has not been urged

before the Board . . . shall be considered by the court, unless

the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused

because of extraordinary circumstances.”).

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we deny the petition for

review and grant the cross-motion for enforcement of the

Board’s order.

So ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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