Thomas John Pitera v. Samantha Pitera

11/06/2020

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 1, 2020

THOMAS JOHN PITERA v. SAMANTHA PITERA

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sullivan County

No. C42683C E. G. Moody, Chancellor

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No. E2020-00063-COA-R3-CV

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This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. Husband is a resident of Connecticut with

no ties to Tennessee. Wife and minor child, also former residents of Connecticut, have

resided in Tennessee since December of 2018. Wife filed for divorce in Tennessee in May

of 2019 and personally served Husband in Connecticut. Husband moved to dismiss the

complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court thereafter entered a final decree

of divorce in favor of Wife. Because we find that Wife was not a resident of Tennessee for

six months preceding the filing of the complaint for divorce, the trial court did not have

subject matter jurisdiction to grant the divorce. The judgment of the trial court is vacated

and dismissed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Vacated and

Remanded

ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W. MCCLARTY

and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined.

Thomas John Pitera, Stratford, Connecticut, Pro se.

Nicholas A. Schaefer, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, Samantha Pitera.

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Thomas J. Pitera (“Husband”) and Samantha Pitera (“Wife”) were married in

December, 2007 in Fairfield County, Connecticut. Prior to the dissolution of the marriage,

the parties adopted a minor child. In December, 2018, the parties agreed that Wife could

move to Tennessee with the minor child and that she would have full custody. Wife moved

to Tennessee with the minor child in December, 2018.

On May 21, 2019, Wife filed a complaint for divorce in Sullivan County, Tennessee,

alleging inappropriate marital conduct and/or irreconcilable differences. Husband was

personally served with the complaint in Connecticut. The complaint stated that “Plaintiff

and the Defendant have been residents of Tennessee for more than six (6) months preceding

the filing of this Complaint and the couple last resided together as husband and wife in

Sullivan, County, Tennessee.” Husband, in fact, had never lived in or traveled to

Tennessee. On May 22, 2019, the trial court entered a Temporary Parenting Plan which

provided Husband with no visitation days and, pursuant to state guidelines, the court

assessed Husband with a child support obligation of $543.00 per month, payable to Wife.

Husband filed a motion to dismiss Wife’s complaint, arguing that the trial court had

no personal jurisdiction over Husband and therefore it cannot assess child support

obligations against him, nor distribute marital property not located within the state of

Tennessee. Husband did not appear before the trial court on the noticed trial date, and his

motion was thereafter denied. The trial court entered a final decree of divorce on December

13, 2019 on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. That same day, the trial court

entered a Permanent Parenting Plan providing for the custody, visitation, and support of

the minor child. Husband now appeals the judgment entered by the trial court, arguing that

the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Husband presents a single issue on appeal for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over Husband

in granting a final decree of divorce.

III. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, we must first consider whether it was proper for the trial

court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce action, even though neither

party has raised this issue on appeal. See Born Again Church & Christian Outreach

Ministries, Inc. v. Myler Church Bldg. Sys. of the Midsouth, Inc., 266 S.W.3d 421, 424

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (“At the outset, we must address the trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, even though neither party raised the issue.”). Subject matter jurisdiction vests

a court with authority to adjudicate a particular case or controversy. Osborn v. Marr, 127

S.W.3d 737, 739 (Tenn. 2004). “Tennessee’s courts derive subject matter jurisdiction from

the state constitution or from legislative acts.” Id. (citing Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33

S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000)). Therefore, a court may not exercise subject matter

jurisdiction over a matter to which jurisdictional powers “have not been conferred on [it]

directly or by necessary implication.” Id. (citing First Am. Trust Co. v. Franklin-Murray

Dev. Co., 59 S.W.3d 135, 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). “In the absence of subject matter

jurisdiction, a court cannot enter a valid, enforceable order.” McQuade v. McQuade,

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M2010-00069-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4940386, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2010)

(citing Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 492, 497 (Tenn. 1955)). Subject matter jurisdiction

may, as noted above, be raised by this Court sua sponte. Id. (citing Shelby Cty. v. City of

Memphis, 365 S.W.2d 291 (Tenn. 1963)). This Court reviews a trial court’s exercise of

subject matter jurisdiction de novo without a presumption of correctness. Word v. Metro

Air Servs., Inc., 377 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Tenn. 2012).

Tennessee Code Annotated, section § 36-4-104(a) states that:

A divorce may be granted for any of the causes referenced in § 36-4-101 if

the acts complained of were committed while the plaintiff was a bona fide

resident of this state or if the acts complained of were committed out of this

state and the plaintiff resided out of the state at the time, if the plaintiff or the

defendant has resided in this state six (6) months next preceding the filing of

the complaint.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-104(a) (emphasis added). Upon a clear reading of this statute, a

party may file for divorce in Tennessee where the acts giving rise to the divorce occurred

outside of the state, when the party was a nonresident, provided one party has resided in

Tennessee at least six months prior to the filing of the complaint. See Conley v. Conley,

181 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“[§ 36-4-104(a)] makes Tennessee residency

by at least one of the parties a condition precedent to a court having jurisdiction to grant a

divorce.”) (emphasis added); see also Barnett v. Barnett, No. 01A01-9605-CH-00228,

1998 WL 787043, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1998) (citing Carter v. Carter, 82 S.W.

309, 309 (1904)). As explained below, it is evident from statements in Wife’s own brief

that this prerequisite to jurisdiction was not met.

In her brief, Wife states “the Wife and the parties’ minor child, with the Husband’s

explicit consent, left the state of Connecticut on or about December 12, 2018.” She further

states, citing favorably to the affidavit of Husband that was appended to his motion to

dismiss, that “it is clearly established in the Record by the Husband himself that the Wife

and the child moved to Tennessee on December 18, 2018, which was approximately six

(6) months prior to the commencement of the divorce proceedings.”

It matters not that Wife was a resident of Tennessee for “approximately” six months.

The statute specifies a six-month period, and here, Wife was not a Tennessee resident for

the requisite six-month period prior to filing her complaint for divorce. Wife filed her

complaint on May 21, 2019, clearly before the trial court could exercise subject matter

jurisdiction over the case. The statute plainly requires that at least one party “reside[] in

this state six (6) months next preceding the filing of the complaint.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-

4-104(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, in her brief, Wife states “[b]y Husband’s own

admission, the relevant marital conduct took place in Connecticut.” Consequently, it also

appears that the acts giving rise to the divorce occurred wholly in Connecticut, prior to

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Wife moving to Tennessee. As a result, Wife would need to have met the jurisdictional

requirements set forth in § 36-4-104(a) for the trial court to exercise subject matter

jurisdiction over the divorce action. Because Wife did not meet the statutory requirement

at the time of the filing of her complaint for divorce, the trial court did not have subject

matter jurisdiction over the case. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment is vacated and the

case is dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we vacate the trial court’s judgment for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction and dismiss the case.

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ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JUDGE

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