Stephanie Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep't of Corrections

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 20a0344p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

STEPHANIE TROUTMAN, Administratrix of the Estate of ┐

Charles R. Troutman, Jr., │

Plaintiff-Appellant, │

│

> No. 20-5290

v. │

│

│

LOUISVILLE METRO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., │

Defendants, │

│

LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT; │

MARK E. BOLTON, individually and in his official │

capacity as Director, Louisville Metro Department of │

Corrections; JAMES COX, Prison Classification │

Interviewer, individually and in his official capacity, │

│

Defendants-Appellees.

│

┘

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.

No. 3:16-cv-00742—David J. Hale, District Judge.

Argued: October 6, 2020

Decided and Filed: October 29, 2020

Before: DAUGHTERY, DONALD, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, GERHARDSTEIN & BRANCH CO. LPA, Cincinnati,

Ohio, for Appellant. J. Denis Ogburn, JEFFERSON COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,

Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, M. Caroline

Hyatt, GERHARDSTEIN & BRANCH CO. LPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, Larry D. Simon, Louisville,

Kentucky, for Appellant. J. Denis Ogburn, JEFFERSON COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,

Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellees. David M. Shapiro, RODERICK & SOLANGE

MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER, Chicago, Illinois, for Amici Curiae.

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. In this case, Charles Troutman, a pretrial

detainee at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (“LMDC”), committed suicide after

jail officials placed him in solitary confinement despite a recent suicide attempt. Plaintiff

Stephanie Troutman (“Stephanie”), Charles’ daughter and administrator of his estate, filed this

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the various defendants—(1) the classification

officer, James Cox (“Cox”); (2) the LMDC Director, Mark Bolton (“Bolton”); and (3) the

municipality itself, Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government (“Louisville Metro”)—were

deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of her father. Stephanie appeals the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of all three defendants. For the reasons explained

below, we REVERSE and REMAND the district court’s order granting summary judgment in

favor of Cox. We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor of Bolton and Louisville-

Jefferson County Metro Government.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Charles Troutman’s Arrest and Suicide Attempt

The Louisville Metro Police arrested Charles for various drug offenses on November 12,

2015. His intake paperwork showed that he was a daily user of heroin and methamphetamine,

including use on the date of his arrest. Early on November 13, Charles first attempted suicide

inside the holding cell. According to the deposition testimony of Sergeant Eric Schmitt

(“Schmitt”), another officer found Charles “with gauze tied so tightly around his neck that

[Charles] was choking.” Charles’ “inmate notes” prepared by Cox, show that Charles attempted

to hang himself on the booking floor. The officer who discovered Charles said that the gauze

was so tight that he could not get a finger in. Charles also allegedly asked the responding officer

why he did not leave Charles for a few more minutes.

The reported reasons for the suicide attempt vary. Charles told Schmitt that he “was a

junkie and had no reason to live because he was going to get 20 years for his charges,” but

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 3

Dr. Donna Smith (“Smith”) later testified that Charles told her he was upset at being in holding

and felt like staff was ignoring him and that Charles knew if he did “something like that, that he

would get moved out of there immediately.” Smith did not consider the attempt to be serious

because he did not hang from anything and did not have any mark on his neck. Bolton thought

that “the attempt was really nothing more than attention getting.”

That same day, November 13, jail staff placed Charles on Level 1 suicide observation and

detox. A nurse conducted a medical screening soon after the suicide attempt. That screening

showed that Charles attempted suicide three to four times in the past, and that he was “currently

thinking about suicide” and had “a plan or suicide instrument in [his] possession.”1

Additionally, that report noted that Charles showed signs of depression; expressed feelings of

hopelessness; appeared anxious, afraid, or angry; and appeared embarrassed or ashamed. The

report also noted that the screener did not “feel that the subject [wa]s capable of understanding

all questions being asked.”

A November 14 report described Charles as distractible, agitated, and irritable with

tangential thought processing and pressured speech. Charles explained that he had no head

injuries within the prior six months, although Stephanie called the jail to report that he recently

experienced a traumatic brain injury that required hospitalization.2 No one in the jail conveyed

that information to the medical staff, according to Smith’s deposition testimony. Nonetheless, a

behavioral health psychiatric evaluation conducted by Correct Care Solutions on November 16

noted that Charles experienced a traumatic brain injury the prior year which left him in a coma

for nine days.

That November 14 report shows that Charles told medical staff “I’m not good at all, I’m

dying! The nurses don’t like me because I’m a junkie.” The report also indicated sleep

disturbance and minimal appetitive. A report from the following day, however, showed

1

The paperwork is unclear as to when each of those attempts took place, aside from noting that at least one

of them occurred in 2015 (which, presumably, was his attempt days before).

2

Stephanie asserts that she made this call in response to her father’s complaint that the jail counselor was

disinterested in him. She attempted to get ahold of the counselor but was only able to leave a message with whom

she thinks was a general jail receptionist.

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 4

improvement. Charles denied any suicidal intent, remarking that “I love myself the most.” The

reports also showed improvement in appetite and interaction with peers, though they did note

continued significant sleep disturbances, presumably related to his detox.

On November 16, Charles first met with Smith. Under relevant past medical history,

Smith’s evaluation indicated the traumatic brain injury the prior year as well as stuttering and

hypertension. Smith wrote that Charles denied his attempt was an actual suicide attempt and

noted that he was calm and cooperative during the evaluation. The two spoke about Charles’

traumatic brain injury, but Smith did not further investigate that injury. Nor did she speak with

any of the officers present at the scene of the attempt, and thus she only later learned the extent

to which Charles tightened the gauze around his neck or the condition in which the officers

found Charles—“spitting and jerking.” According to Smith, during these three days of

observation, “not one person said that [Charles] was suicidal, saw him crying, saw him sad, [or]

saw him with a flat affect.”

B. Clearance to General Population

On November 17, mental health officials cleared Charles to move to general population.

Bolton indicated that after staff cleared Charles to general population, there was nothing to

indicate that he was acutely suicidal. According to Bolton, “[t]here was nothing to indicate that

[Charles] had--was--was going to kill himself. If--if there was, we would’ve done something

about it.”

The following day, Stephanie called her father and became worried at the extent of

Charles’ crying, which Stephanie says was unusual for him. Consistent with his explanation to

the officers who found him after the suicide attempt, Charles expressed worry that he would

receive a lengthy prison sentence. Stephanie told her father that she thought she had the money

lined up and that he would be out on bail in a couple of days.

C. Move to Solitary

On November 18, Charles got into a verbal altercation with another inmate. Because of

that altercation, jail officials moved Charles to the Community Corrections Center (“CCC”)

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 5

4 North 1. The CCC does not have single segregation cells. Days later, on November 21,

Charles received another disciplinary infraction for a physical altercation with another inmate,

upon which staff moved him back from CCC to the main jail complex.3 Cox was responsible for

Charles’ subsequent placement, and he understood jail policy to require placement in solitary

confinement pending disciplinary proceedings. When Defendant Cox moved Charles to solitary,

Cox knew that Charles had a prior suicide attempt in jail, though he was not privy to all of

Charles’ records from medical.4 Cox himself entered the note on November 13 indicating that

Charles tried to hang himself in a booking cell. Nonetheless, Cox understood Charles’ clearance

to return to general population as authorizing Charles for all movement within the jail.

Cox chose to place Charles in a solitary cell with barred windows. He then decided to

notify Nurse Brown (“Brown”) of Charles’ move to solitary. In his deposition, Cox described

the call to Brown as a “general courtesy” call. Cox stated that his concern at the time was the

risk of seizures from detox, not suicide. Cox spoke with Brown who indicated that she would

pass the message along to the Charge Nurse. Cox entered the following into XJail, the record-

keeping system: “INMATE MOVED TO H5D9 PENDING DISCIPLINARY. NOTIFIED

NURSE BROWN OF SINGLE CELL USE AND WAITING TO HERE [sic] BACK FROM

MEDICAL ON THAT.” Cox stated in his deposition that he would expect to hear back if there

were any problems with Charles going to that particular cell.5

3

At this point, Defendants state in their response that Charles was in a single cell in this interim period, i.e.

that he was already in a solitary cell before officials moved him to the cell in which he committed suicide. The

record reveals, however, that staff moved Charles from CCC to a general population dorm within the main jail,

which held around thirty men.

4

In his deposition, Cox explained that he would have been present on the booking floor during Charles’

suicide attempt but that because of the configuration of desks, he did not physically see the attempt. Nonetheless, he

entered that attempt into Charles’ jail records.

5

According to Cox, since Charles’ suicide, jail policy has changed. No longer do officials move detainees

into solitary pending disciplinary proceedings in most cases. Further, detainees with a prior suicide attempt receive

the “no bars” alert that would prevent any placement in a cell with bars like the one in which Charles killed himself.

The jail instituted these changes two to three months after Charles’ suicide, although Ernst (the jail’s classification

coordinator) testified that the no-bar policy was in place as early as 2012 but changed throughout the years. Cox

believes these changes resulted from Charles’ death “[a]long with many others.” Cox further notes that if the jail

had implemented these changes on November 24, 2015, they would not have moved Charles to solitary

confinement.

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 6

Later, however, Cox stated in his deposition that he understood jail policy to require at

minimum verbal clearance from medical before placing someone like Charles in a solitary cell.

In response to a 2014 suicide in a barred solitary cell,6 the jail classification coordinator Kyle

Ernst (“Ernst”) circulated an email with a purported policy requiring classification officers to fill

out a form showing explicit approval from medical staff to move an inmate to a single cell. This

procedure required staff to call medical and obtain approval, specifically indicating who in

medical made the approval. Jail staff received training on this clearance procedure: “[a]nytime

anyone is placed in a single cell, they have to call the charge nurse and get clearance.” If the

charge nurse is not immediately available, the nurse is trained to locate the charge nurse and get

single-cell clearance. Classification officers must receive affirmative medical clearance before

making such a transfer. This procedure is not codified as a written policy but rather is

communicated to staff through on-the-job training. Though Ernest and Cox were both aware of

this policy (despite disagreement as to whether written or verbal clearance was required), Bolton

was not familiar with the policy, referring to it not as a policy but rather as a communication

between Ernst and his classification subordinates in an attempt “to mitigate risk.”

Cox understood the procedure as requiring verbal clearance. He also stated that he

believed because of Charles’ recent suicide attempt—which he knew about at the time of

Charles’ placement in solitary—moving Charles to a solitary cell could “harbor a risk” of

suicide, but that despite this “gut reaction” counseling against moving Charles into solitary,

(1) Cox was not the one qualified to make that decision, and (2) his opposition “wouldn’t have

changed [Charles’] placement.” He did note, however, that if he had said “Hey, I think this

guy’s going to commit suicide,” that mental health would have performed another evaluation

6

Stephanie describes six suicides within the two years preceding Charles’ suicide, all in barred solitary

cells. After the fifth suicide, Correct Care Solutions provided an environmental recommendation regarding the bars

in solitary cells. The report noted that the “bars present an easily accessible opportunity for self-harm. It is

recommended that the necessity of these bars be evaluated or an alternative safety implement for windows be

considered.” Dr. Smith signed off on this report. A few months later, a sixth inmate hanged himself in a barred

solitary cell on October 4, 2015, the month before Charles’ suicide.

In addition to the clearance required before removal to solitary, LMDC had another purported policy in

which certain inmates with a history of suicide attempts received a “no bars” alert. Whereas before medical staff

made the no-bars determination, LMDC shifted to using a committee that met weekly to decide whether an inmate

merited a no-bars alert. This “no-bar” alert procedure was available at the time that Charles was released from

observation into general population. It is unclear why Charles received no such alert.

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 7

before moving Charles. Smith later testified that if she had received such a call, she “would

[have] recommend[ed] Charles not be placed in a single cell” based on his recent suicide attempt.

Another nurse supervisor testified that he would have recommended Charles be placed in a cell

with no bars because of concern a barred cell presents “ligature points” and that “[t]hey were not

supposed to move him until they heard back from medical.”7 Cox himself agreed that placing an

inmate with a bedsheet in a barred solitary cell presented an opportunity for a suicidal inmate to

commit suicide.

Despite noting that he was waiting to hear back from medical, Cox did not wait. Cox

moved Charles to a solitary cell with bars. Less than two hours after his move to that solitary

cell, Charles hanged himself. At 10:47 P.M. on November 24, an officer found Charles hanging

from a bedsheet tied to the bars in his cell. Jail staff immediately began CPR and transported

Charles to the University of Louisville Hospital. Charles never regained brain function, and on

November 28, 2015, his family took him off life support.

D. Procedural History

Stephanie Troutman, as personal representative of Charles Troutman’s estate, initially

brought suit against several defendants, including: Louisville Metro Department of Corrections,

Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government, Mark Bolton, seven correction officers, Correct

Care Solutions, four Correct Care Solutions nurses, and several John and Jane Does. Troutman

asserted claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983 against the officers, the Department of Corrections, and

the municipality for deliberate indifference and failure to train. Troutman also asserted wrongful

death and gross negligence claims under Kentucky state law. After several amended complaints

and extended discovery, she voluntarily dismissed most of those defendants. Later, Stephanie

settled with Brown, Smith, and Correct Care Solutions.

Subsequently, Defendants Bolton, Cox, and Louisville-Jefferson County Metro

Government moved for summary judgment, and to exclude portions of the expert testimony of

Dr. Glindmeyer. On March 3, 2020, the district court granted that motion for summary judgment

7

That nurse, Nurse Schindler, also testified that if Charles were in a solitary cell, he would have placed a

“watcher” with Charles.

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 8

for all defendants on all counts. The district court dismissed Stephanie’s § 1983 claims with

prejudice, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims

(thereby dismissing them without prejudice), and denied the motion to exclude as moot. The

district court found that Cox was not subjectively aware of Charles’ suicide risk, that Bolton had

not “completely abdicated” his responsibilities, and that Stephanie showed no direct causal

connection between Louisville Metro’s policies and customs and her father’s constitutional

injury. On that same day, the district court entered a final judgment in favor of Defendants Cox,

Bolton, and Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government. On March 16, 2020, Stephanie

filed her timely notice of appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Romans v. Mich.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 668 F.3d 826, 835 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Blackmore v. Kalamazoo

County., 390 F.3d 890, 894 (6th Cir 2004)). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A “[d]efendant bears the burden of

showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to at least one essential element of

Plaintiff’s claims.” Romans, 668 F.3d at 835 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986)). A genuine dispute exists when a plaintiff presents “sufficient evidence from which a

jury could reasonably find in [her] favor.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 249 (1986)). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, we

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. (citing Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d

510, 516 (6th Cir. 2008)). In so doing, we must determine “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law.” In re Calumet Farm, Inc., 398 F.3d 555, 558-59 (6th Cir.

2005) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52).

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 9

We review the district court’s analysis of state law de novo. Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire

Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225,

231, (1991)).

B. Section 1983 Claim for Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Troutman asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cox and Bolton for deliberate

indifference to Charles’ serious medical needs, and against the Louisville Metro Government on

its policies and procedures which allegedly were the “moving force” behind the denial of

adequate medical care for her father. To bring a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must “identify a

right secured by the United States Constitution and the deprivation of that right by a person

acting under color of state law.” Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir.

2001) (quoting Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992)).

Though the basis for this claim for convicted prisoners arises under the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

104 (1976), for pretrial detainees like Charles, “this right to adequate medical treatment attaches

through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which affords pretrial detainees

rights ‘analogous’ to those of prisoners.” Linden v. Washtenaw County, 167 F. App’x 410, 415

(6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Watkins, 273 F.3d at 685-86). A prison official violates that right to

adequate medical treatment when he or she acts with “deliberate indifference” to a pretrial

detainee’s “serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; see also Perez v. Oakland Cty.,

466 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir. 2006). Psychological needs may constitute such “serious medical

needs” particularly when those psychological needs “result in suicidal tendencies.” Horn v.

Madison Cty. Fiscal Ct., 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994). Inmates do not have a guaranteed

Eighth Amendment right “to be screened correctly for suicidal tendencies,” however, “prison

officials who have been alerted to a prisoner's serious medical needs are under an obligation to

offer medical care to such a prisoner.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001);

Perez, 466 F.3d at 423.

Under our traditional analysis, the deliberate indifference standard at issue has both an

objective and subjective component. Downard for Est. of Downard v. Martin, 968 F.3d 594, 600

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 10

(6th Cir. 2020).8 Under the objective standard, a pretrial detainee must show an objectively

“sufficiently serious” medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To show

that the medical need was sufficiently serious, the plaintiff must show that the conditions of

incarceration imposed a “substantial risk of serious harm.” See Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.

3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). An inmate’s “psychological needs may

constitute serious medical needs, especially when they result in suicidal tendencies.” Comstock,

273 F.3d at 703 (citing Horn, 22 F.3d at 660). A plaintiff meets the objective prong of the

Eighth Amendment analysis by showing that the inmate showed suicidal tendencies during the

period of detention or that he “posed a strong likelihood of another suicide attempt.” Perez,

466 F.3d at 424; Linden, 167 F. App’x. at 416.

Under the subjective standard, “an inmate must show both that an official knew of her

serious medical need and that, despite this knowledge, the official disregarded or responded

unreasonably to that need.” Downard, 968 F.3d at 600 (citing Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703).

Under this standard, a plaintiff “must show both that a prison official ‘subjectively perceived

facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner’ and that he ‘did in fact draw the

inference’” but disregarded that risk. Id. (citing Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703); see also Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834. The failure to alleviate a significant risk that an officer “should have perceived

but did not” is insufficient for a claim of deliberate indifference, id. at 838, but such subjective

knowledge may be inferred from the fact that a pretrial detainee’s “substantial risk” of harm was

“obvious.” Id. at 842.

For prison suicide cases, the subjective standard requires that it was “obvious that there

was a ‘strong likelihood’ that an inmate would attempt suicide.” Downard, 968 F.3d at 600

(quoting Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005)). It is insufficient to show

that an official “acted with deliberate indifference to some possibility of suicide, or even a

likelihood of suicide.” Galloway v. Anuszkiewicz, 518 F. App’x 330, 336 (6th Cir. 2013)

(emphasis in original). This distinction is critical “because a finding of deliberate indifference

8

Plaintiffs and their amici assert that we should adopt the standard used by the Second, Seventh, and Ninth

Circuits which applies Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015) to claims of inadequate medical treatment

claims raised by pretrial detainees. This case does not present the opportunity to do so, though the question remains

open whether Kingsley applies beyond excessive-force claims.

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 11

requires a sufficiently culpable state of mind, which the Supreme Court has equated with

criminal recklessness.” Id. (citing Weaver v. Shadoan, 340 F.3d 398, 410 (6th Cir. 2003)). The

official’s “state of mind must evince ‘deliberateness tantamount to intent to punish.’” Miller,

408 F.3d at 813 (quoting Horn, 22 F.3d at 660).

Knowledge of the “strong likelihood” of suicide is a “question of fact subject to

demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Farmer,

511 U.S. at 842. Demonstrating such knowledge is a “high bar” and typically requires evidence

that the inmate was already on suicide watch, previously attempted suicide under similar

conditions, or recently expressed a desire to self-harm. Downard, 968 F.3d at 601 (citing

Grabow v. County of Macomb, 580 F. App’x 300, 309 (6th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases)).

Despondency after an arrest, even if coupled with other stressors like drug withdrawal, does not

itself lead to a “strong likelihood” of suicide, at least if the inmate expressly denies feeling

suicidal. Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 239-40 (6th Cir. 1992); Baker-Schneider v.

Napoleon, 769 F. App’x 189, 193-94 (6th Cir. 2019); Nallani v. Wayne County, 665 F. App’x

498, 507-08 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that inmate did not present a “strong likelihood” of suicide

because he denied feeling suicidal, despite indicating previous suicidal thoughts and a history of

self-harm).

i. Defendant Cox

Stephanie alleges that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of

Cox because there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding (1) whether Cox reasonably

relied on the opinions of medical personnel and (2) whether Cox had subjective knowledge that

Charles was at risk of committing suicide. In response, Cox asserts that he did not believe

Charles was suicidal because a nurse previously cleared him from suicide risk. As such, Cox

argues that his reliance on a “presumably competent medical authority” absolves him from

liability for deliberate indifference. In addition to that reliance, Cox asserts that he observed “no

additional signs of suicidal ideation or behavior” following Charles’ clearance to general

population.

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 12

We first consider the objective component of the deliberate indifference standard.

A plaintiff meets the objective component by showing that the pretrial detainee exhibited

suicidal tendencies during his or her detention or that the detainee “posed a strong likelihood of

another suicide attempt.” Perez, 466 F.3d at 424; Linden, 167 F. App’x at 416. When

considering the objective component in Perez, we remarked that “past threats or attempts at

suicide are considered when determining whether an individual is suicidal” even though such

past attempts do not necessarily mean the detainee will do so again. Perez, 466 F.3d at 425.

There, we held that there was a question of fact regarding whether the decedent posed a strong

likelihood of another suicide attempt, even where the decedent “gave no indication of suicidal

intention during his final evaluation” and in fact denied any such suicidal intention. Id.

Here, Stephanie meets the objective component insofar as her father “exhibited suicidal

tendencies” during his detention. Charles first attempted suicide on November 14. Such an

attempt itself exhibits suicidal tendencies sufficient to meet the objective component. See, e.g.,

Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2006). Even though that past attempt did not

necessarily demonstrate that Charles would re-attempt suicide, we have previously held that a

prior attempt alone is sufficient to raise a dispute as to the objective component. Perez, 466 F.3d

at 425. In addition to the attempt, Charles exhibited numerous other suicide risk factors

according to the factors set forth by Defendants’ own witness, Dr. Smith. In addition to a prior

suicide attempt, Dr. Smith testified that other suicide risk factors include: (1) a history of alcohol

and substance abuse, (2) feeling of hopelessness, (3) impulsive or aggressive tendencies,

(4) isolation,9 (5) access to methods for suicide, (6) a history of mental illness, particularly

clinical depression, and (7) prior traumatic brain injuries.

9

The Supreme Court, as far back as 1890, has “expressed concern about the mental anguish caused by

solitary confinement.” Apodaca v. Raemisch, 139 S. Ct. 5, 6 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., writing respecting the denial of

writ of certiorari) (citing In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890)). In Medley, the Supreme Court wrote that “experience

demonstrated that there were serious objections to [solitary confinement]. A considerable number of prisoners fell,

after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them,

and others became violently insane; others, still, committed suicide, while those who stood the ordeal better were

not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service

to the community.” In re Medley, 134 U.S. at 168; see also Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 289 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (citing Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 325

(2006) (describing side effects of solitary confinement as anxiety, panic, withdrawal, hallucinations, self-mutilation,

and suicidal thoughts and behaviors)). One study found that “[i]nmates punished by solitary confinement were

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 13

Charles exhibited each of these suicide risk factors: (1) he showed a history of drug

abuse, including use up to the day of his imprisonment; (2) in interactions with staff and

telephone calls with Stephanie, Charles repeatedly showed hopelessness at his pending charges

and possible prison time, and the intake nurse specifically noted Charles showed such signs;

(3) he showed impulsive or aggressive tendencies in two disciplinary infractions in only a few

days, one verbal and one physical altercation;10 (4) he was isolated when placed in solitary

confinement on November 24; (5) he had access to the means to commit suicide by his

placement in a barred cell with bedsheets; (6) the intake nurse noted Charles exhibited signs of

depression and shame; and (7) Charles had a previous traumatic brain injury. Given Charles’

recent suicide attempt and the litany of suicide risk factors present in the summary judgment

record, that record reveals a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Charles exhibited

a “serious medical need” insofar as there was a “strong likelihood” that he would attempt

suicide. Downard, 968 F.3d at 600.

Considering next the subjective component, we have previously held that a plaintiff

demonstrated deliberate indifference sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment

when “a prison official moved an inmate from suicide watch even though the official knew the

inmate threatened and attempted suicide on several occasions within the same month in jail and

had previously been placed on behavior and suicide watches during multiple prior incarcerations

at the same jail.” Grabow, 580 F. App’x at 308–09 (citing Perez, 466 F.3d at 424-26). In Perez,

the official decided to move the detainee into single-cell housing without first requesting a

medical judgment from the jail doctor as to whether that placement was appropriate for the

inmate, particularly where the official knew of prior suicide attempts. Perez, 466 F.3d at 425. In

addition to his prior suicide attempts, the official also knew that the detainee was refusing to take

his medication and “was experiencing problems getting along with other inmates.” Id. We

noted that the evidence was not conclusive as to the subjective deliberate indifference—

approximately 6.9 times as likely [as those in general population] to commit acts of self-harm” after controlling for

length of jail stay. Tatos Kaba et al., Solitary Confinement and Risk of Self-Harm Among Jail Inmates, 104 AM. J.

PUB. HEALTH 442, 445 (2014).

10

To the extent a suicide attempt is an act of impulsivity or aggression, Charles also reported to the intake

nurse of previous suicide attempts that very year.

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 14

particularly where the detainee explicitly expressed no suicidal ideation—but held that the

evidence nonetheless raised a genuine issue of material fact whether the official “demonstrated

deliberate indifference by disregarding a risk of known serious harm to [the detainee] by making

housing decisions for him without consulting a medical professional.” Id. at 426.

The facts here are similar; a reasonable jury could find that Cox was subjectively aware

of the substantial risk to Charles. Cox knew of Charles’ suicide attempt in booking. Cox knew

that placing Charles in solitary confinement “harbor[ed] a risk” given Charles’ prior suicide

attempt. Cox knew that barred solitary cells presented a risk of suicide to the extent they

provided detainees with means of suicide. Cox knew that he at least needed to get verbal

clearance from medical before placing Troutman in a single barred cell. Indeed, in XJail, Cox

wrote “INMATE MOVED TO H5D9 PENDING DISCIPLINARY. NOTIFIED NURSE

BROWN OF SINGLE CELL USE AND WAITING TO HERE [sic] BACK FROM MEDICAL

ON THAT.” Yet despite that knowledge, and despite his own statement that he was waiting to

hear back from medical, Cox did not wait to receive confirmation—written or verbal—from

medical allowing Cox to place Charles in a barred single cell. Instead, Cox disregarded his

knowledge of the serious risk and placed Charles in a single, barred cell where Charles took his

life. Cox’s failure to follow the jail policy of waiting to receive clearance from medical may

itself be considered as circumstantial evidence of Cox’s subjective knowledge. Bonner-Turner v.

City of Ecorse, 627 F. App’x 400, 407 (6th Cir. 2015).11

Taken together, these facts raise a genuine dispute as to whether Cox knew or understood

there to be a “strong likelihood” that Charles would commit suicide if placed in solitary

confinement. Downard, 968 F.3d at 600 (describing the “strong likelihood” standard and noting

that evidence of a previous suicide attempt may suffice to show subjective knowledge).12

11

To satisfy the clearance policy, an officer must “contact medical, medical has to contact [the officer] back

and say this inmate is cleared for a single cell.” There is no dispute that in this case, medical did not contact Cox

back before Cox moved Charles to the single cell.

12

The district court distinguishes this case from Linden, in which we found that a reasonable jury could

have found the defendant officer deliberately indifferent given the “numerous inconsistent and improbable elements

within [the officer’s] testimony and his intimate involvement with the events culminating in [the decedent’s]

suicide.” Linden, 167 F. App’x at 424. The district court contrasted Cox’s involvement here, explaining that, unlike

the defendant officer in Linden, Cox was only “peripherally involved in Charles’s case as a classification officer,

moving Charles throughout the jail complex.” The relevant defendant in Linden, however, was himself also a

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 15

This evidence—Cox’s knowledge of the risks and disregard thereof—raises a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether he demonstrated deliberate indifference by placing Charles in solitary

confinement without hearing back from medical. Perez, 466 F.3d at 426. This, of course, is not

conclusive evidence of deliberate indifference; rather “the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury . . . .” Calumet Farm, 398 F.3d at 558-59.

We note that Cox’s reliance argument—that he reasonably relied on the medical

judgment that Charles no longer presented a suicide risk—does not make summary judgment

appropriate. In Perez, the prison official proffered a similar argument—asserting that the official

relied on a doctor’s assessment that the detainee was not suicidal—but we found that such

reliance was ineffective when the doctor made the assessment ten days prior to the official’s

decision to move the inmate. Perez, 466 F.3d at 425. We also noted that “the situation did not

remain stable between” the date of the doctor’s assessment and the date the jail official moved

the detainee to a single cell, considering that the detainee refused to take medication and began

experiencing problems with other inmates. Id.

The same is true here. The situation did not remain stable between Charles’ initial

clearance from medical on November 17 and his suicide on November 24. For one, Charles, like

the detainee in Perez, was “experiencing problems getting along with other inmates” in that he

was involved in two separate altercations, the final of which merited his removal to isolation. Id.

Further, Charles was cleared “from detox and for GP,” i.e., general population. Medical

clearance to return Charles to general population is not the same as medical clearance to place

Charles—who recently attempted suicide—in solitary confinement with access to bedsheets and

barred windows. A jury may find that such clearance “for GP” does not shelter Cox from a

claim that he was deliberately indifferent in moving Chares to solitary.13 Indeed, Cox’s own

classification officer. Id. at 423. The officer there knew of the decedent’s suicidal tendencies (as did Cox, who was

present for the suicide attempt and input that attempt into XJail), and the officer there nonetheless moved the

decedent into maximum security after the decedent had an altercation with another inmate (as did Cox, who moved

Charles to solitary confinement after an altercation with another inmate). Id. We see no reason to hold, at this point,

that Cox’s involvement with Charles was any less “intimate” than was the defendant officer’s involvement with the

decedent in Linden.

13

Defendants assert that Cox “relied upon the medical assessment that [Charles] could be transferred to a

single cell.” Nowhere in the record can we find any such clearance to a single cell.

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 16

actions before moving Charles to solitary contradict his argument that he relied on a previous

medical assessment that Charles was free for placement anywhere in the jail. Cox himself noted

in jail records that he was waiting to hear back from medical to move Charles to a single barred

cell.

On appeal Cox argues that he relied on the initial medical clearance, but jail records (and

his deposition testimony) reveal that he himself was waiting on a new assessment from medical

regarding Charles’ placement in solitary. If Charles were relying on a previous medical

assessment, he would have no need to wait on a new one. Like the testimony of the defendant

classification officer in Linden, 167 F. App’x at 424, such inconsistent testimony at minimum

raises a genuine dispute as to whether Charles’ reliance was reasonable such that he did not

“disregard” a known serious medical risk. The evidence regarding Cox’s subjective awareness is

not “so one-sided” that Cox must prevail as a matter of law. Calumet Farm, 389 F.3d at 558-59.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s granting summary judgment in favor of Cox.

ii. Defendant Bolton

Stephanie next argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor

of Defendant Bolton, the jail warden. Though Bolton was not involved in the events leading up

to Charles’ suicide, Stephanie asserts that Bolton abandoned the duties of his position, in the face

of actual knowledge of the risk of suicide by “fail[ing] to establish policies that would protect

inmates at risk of suicide from harm, [fail]ing to train and supervise his staff on how to protect

inmates at risk of suicide from harm, and fail[ing] to act on the recommendation that would have

effectively mitigated the risk posed by the single barred isolation cells.” Defendants respond that

Bolton cannot be found deliberately indifferent because there is no allegation that he “completely

abdicated” any of his responsibilities but rather merely allegations that he inadequately took

steps to mitigate the risk of detainee suicide.

A supervisor may not be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a respondeat

superior theory. Winkler v. Madison County, 893 F.3d 877, 898 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Bellamy

v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)). A supervisor may, however, be liable if he or she

“abandon[s] the specific duties of [his or her] position . . . in the face of actual knowledge of a

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 17

breakdown in the proper workings of the department.” Id. (citing Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,

69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1995)). The supervisor must have abdicated his or her job responsibility,

and the “active performance of the [supervisor’s] individual job function” must have directly

resulted in the constitutional injury. Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 752 (6th Cir.

2006) (emphasis in original). At minimum a plaintiff “must show that a supervisory official at

least implicitly authorized, approved[,] or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct

of the offending subordinate.” Bellamy, 729 F.3d at 421. The supervisor need not have known

of the substantial risk to the injured party but rather must have possessed knowledge of potential

danger to a particular class of persons. Taylor, 69 F.3d at 81.

Two cases highlight the extent to which the supervisor must have been personally

responsible for the constitutional injury for § 1983 liability to apply. In Taylor, the warden was

personally responsible for transferring all prisoners, but he (1) was aware that “his direct

designees were redelegating his authority over transfers to lower echelon prison staff without any

explicit authorization to do so,” (2) was unsure of his own transfer procedures, and (3) “had no

review procedures to determine whether his authority was being abused.” Id. at 80. Given those

factors, “a reasonable jury could conclude that [the warden’s] own testimony indicates that the

operating procedures in reviewing and authorizing transfers were defective and that [the warden]

was aware of his subordinates’ failure to review prison files before authorizing a transfer.” Id.

In other words, the warden actively abandoned his specific duties in the face of actual knowledge

that his department was not properly working, and this abandonment directly led to the harm at

issue. See Winkler, 893 F.3d at 898. In another case in which we held a supervisor liable under

§ 1983, the supervisor defendant personally ignored the inmate’s complaint that he was not

receiving his tuberculosis medicine. Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209, 1213 (6th Cir. 1992).

Moreover, the defendant had previously referred other inmates’ complaints to the head nurse

despite knowing that the nurse was “wrongly altering and destroying some of the inmates’

prescriptions.” Id. We therefore found that the defendant “personally had a job to do, and he did

not do it,” thus violating the plaintiff’s Eight Amendment rights. Id. (emphasis in original).

Stephanie does not claim that Bolton encouraged a specific incident of misconduct,

directly participated in that misconduct, or abandoned the specific positions of his duty in the

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 18

fact of actual knowledge of a breakdown in the proper workings of the jail. Bellamy, 729 F.2d at

421; Taylor, 69 F.3d at 81. Rather, Stephanie claims that Bolton inadequately performed his

responsibilities—for instance, by failing to put in writing the policy of requiring medical

clearance before transfer to solitary—but such allegations of inadequate performance fall short of

the requirements to impose supervisory liability. Winkler, 893 F.3d at 899 (distinguishing

allegations of inadequate performance from complete abdication of responsibility). Indeed, there

was a standing “no bars” policy in place that medical would place on an inmate’s XJail if

medical determined the inmate was a suicide risk. Even if we are to assume a “breakdown in the

proper workings” of this policy—which is plausible, considering the suicide at issue here—

Stephanie does not allege that Bolton knew the policy was not working and nonetheless

completely abdicated his responsibilities. She has not shown that Bolton “either encouraged the

specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it” nor has she

shown that Bolton “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the

unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874

(6th Cir. 1982); see also Nallani, 665 F. App’x at 512. Rather, Stephanie claims that Bolton

inadequately performed his duties, but such claims are insufficient for § 1983 supervisory

liability. Winkler, 893 F.3d at 899.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

Defendant Bolton.

iii. Louisville Metro Government

Finally, Stephanie seeks to hold the Louisville Metro Government liable because its

“policies and procedures were the moving force behind the denial of adequate medical care to

Mr. Troutman.” She argues first that Bolton, as an official with final decision-making authority,

failed to ensure that LMDC operated with adequate policies, training, and supervision, and that

he failed to adopt a recommendation that he make bars inaccessible in solitary cells. She also

argues that Louisville Metro Government is liable based on a custom of inaction insofar as the

pattern of suicides put the municipality on notice that the failure to correct the problem would

place future inmates at risk of harm. Finally, she argues that inadequate policies, training, and

supervision were the “moving force” behind Charles’ suicide.

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 19

A municipality “cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its

employees or agents.” Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Rather, a municipality may be liable

under § 1983 “only where its policies are the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutional

violation.’” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at

694). Such liability “must rest on a direct causal connection between the policies or customs of

the city and the constitutional injury to the plaintiff; ‘[r]espondeat superior or vicarious liability

will not attach under § 1983.’” Gray, 399 F.3d at 617 (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 385). A

municipality may be liable under an inadequate training theory “where the risks from its decision

not to train its officers were ‘so obvious’ as to constitute deliberate indifference to the rights of

its citizens.” Id. at 618. In the prison suicide context, our “case law imposes a duty on the part

of municipalities to recognize, or at least not to ignore, obvious risks of suicide that are

foreseeable. Where such a risk is clear, the municipality has a duty to take reasonable steps to

prevent the suicide.” Id.

However, “[v]ery few cases have upheld municipal liability for the suicide of a pre-trial

detainee,” id., and our cases clearly distinguish between deliberate indifference and negligence.

Id. at n.1 (“Deliberate indifference remains distinct from mere negligence. Where a city does

create reasonable policies but negligently administers them, there is no deliberate indifference

and therefore no § 1983 liability.”); see also Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240, 247 (6th

Cir. 1988). In Molton, we held a municipality could not be held liable where there was no

showing that the municipality’s policymakers—as opposed to the individual officers directly

involved in the inmate’s suicide—ignored a known or apparent risk; while those policymakers

may have been negligent, “[n]egligence does not establish a § 1983 claim.” Molton, 839 F.3d at

246-47 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06).

If the plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation by any individual officer, the

municipality itself cannot be held liable under § 1983. Watkins, 273 F.3d at 687. That is to say,

“where there exists no constitutional violation for failure to take special precautions to prevent

suicide, then there can be no constitutional violation on the part of a local government unit based

on its failure to promulgate policies and to better train personnel to detect and deter jail

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 20

suicides.” Crocker ex rel. Est. of Tarzwell v. County of Macomb, 119 F. App’x 718, 724 (6th

Cir. 2005) (citing Barber, 953 F.2d at 240). Therefore, liability must rest, if at all, on the actions

of Cox in the context of the municipality’s policy, since we find that only Cox disputably

violated Charles’ constitutional rights. See Perez, 466 F.3d at 431.

We agree with the district court in granting summary judgment in favor of the Louisville

Metro Government. Stephanie’s allegations against the municipality may support the conclusion

that it was negligent, but a “finding of negligence does not satisfy the deliberate indifference

standard.” Id. (citing Gray, 399 F.3d at 618 n.1; Molton, 839 F.2d at 246). Our holding that Cox

was arguably deliberately indifferent rests in large part on his failure to follow the prison’s

policy regarding obtaining clearance from medical staff before placing an inmate in solitary

confinement. That is to say, underlying our finding of potential liability on Cox is a finding that

Cox deliberately ignored jail policy; Stephanie’s arguments suggest that if another employee had

properly followed the jail’s policy, then Charles’ suicide could have been prevented. In Perez,

we found a similar tension between the arguments against an individual officer and against the

municipality. Id. at 432. There, the plaintiff argued that placing the decedent in a single cell

before his suicide “wholly disregarded jail policy” which requires such inmates indicating

potentially suicidal behavior be placed in a “multiple cell with appropriate supervision.” Id.

Though we found that the individual officer was arguably deliberately indifferent in his disregard

of the risk of moving the decedent into solitary, see id. at 425, we found that those same

arguments counseled against finding the municipality liable. Id. at 432. In other words, the

arguments against the individual officer—that he failed to follow jail policy—itself implies the

existence of a policy which, if followed adequately, would have prevented the suicide. See also

Linden, 167 F. App’x at 420 (“It appears Plaintiff cannot decide whether the policies or their

execution was at fault.”).

Here, the municipality did have policies in place. It is plausible that the municipality was

negligent in enacting and enforcing those policies, but “[d]eliberate indifference remains distinct

from mere negligence. Where a city does create reasonable policies, but negligently administers

them, there is no deliberate indifference and therefore no § 1983 liability.” Perez, 466 F.3d at

430. Stephanie has not shown that “through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 21

‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Gregory, 220 F.3d at 442. She has not shown “that

the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability” nor has she demonstrated

“a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Id.

(citing Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997)). Rather, she

points to things that the municipality could have done to prevent the suicide, but “[i]n virtually

every instance where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city

employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city ‘could have done’ to

prevent the unfortunate incident.” Gray, 399 F.3d at 619 (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 392).

Moreover, “[p]retrial detainees do not have a constitutional right for cities to ensure,

through supervision and discipline, that every possible measure be taken to prevent their suicidal

efforts.” Id. Though we find that Cox was arguably deliberately indifferent in executing jail

policies, such a finding of individual liability cannot—without more—support a finding of

municipal liability because a municipality “cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an injury

inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Gregory, 220 F.3d at 441 (citing Monell, 436 U.S.

at 694).14 The facts here are tragic, and we have written before to note the troubling statistics

regarding suicides in jail, see Grabow, 580 F. App’x at 313 (Donald, J., concurring), but

deliberate indifference is a “stringent standard of fault,” Perez, 466 F.3d at 430, and under that

stringent standard, “[v]ery few cases have upheld municipal liability for the suicide of a pre-trial

detainee.” Gray, 399 F.3d at 618. So too here, where the evidence shows that one of the

municipality’s officers was at least arguably deliberately indifferent but does not show that the

“deliberate conduct” of the municipality was itself a “moving force” behind the violation of

Charles’ constitutional rights, nor that there is a “direct causal connection” between the

municipality’s policies or customs and Charles’ constitutional injury. Gregory, 220 F.3d at 442;

Gray, 399 F.3d at 617.

14

To the extent Stephanie seeks to hold the municipality liable on a failure-to-adequately-train theory, such

“[i]nadequate training of officers may serve as a basis for liability under § 1983 only where the failure to train

amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of individuals with whom the officers come into contact.” Tarzwell,

119 F. App’x at 724 (citing Canton, 489 U.S. at 388). We reiterate that the facts here support a finding that the

municipality was negligent—for example, negligent in ensuring sufficient training such that employees like Cox

adequately carried out jail policies—but such negligence on the part of the municipality cannot form the basis of

§ 1983 liability. Molton, 839 F.2d at 247.

No. 20-5290 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections Page 22

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the

Louisville Metro Government.

C. State Law Claims

Finally, Stephanie asserts that the district court erred in declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims for gross negligence and wrongful death. The

district court declined such jurisdiction because it dismissed all of Stephanie’s federal claims.

Because we have revived some of her federal claims, it is appropriate to reinstate the state-law

claims to the extent they are relevant to the remaining federal claims against Cox. See Glazer v.

Chase Home Fin. LLC, 704 F.3d 453, 465 (6th Cir. 2013) (distinguished on other grounds).

III. CONCLUSION

Because there remains a genuine dispute concerning whether Defendant Cox was

deliberately indifferent, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

him, as well as reinstate the state-law claims to the extent they are relevant to Cox. As to Bolton

and the Louisville Metro Government, we affirm.