W.E. Webster III v. Lehigh CCP

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William E. Webster III, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 687 M.D. 2019

: SUBMITTED: August 28, 2020

Lehigh County Court of Common :

Pleas, et al., :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: October 8, 2020

Petitioner William E. Webster III (Webster), an inmate at the State

Correctional Institution - Somerset (SCI-Somerset) has filed a “Verified Complaint

and Attached Exhibits” (Complaint) in our original jurisdiction. Therein, Webster

names the following as respondents in this matter: Lehigh County Court of Common

Pleas, Honorable President Judge Edward Reibman, and Honorable Judge Douglas

G. Reichley (collectively, County Judiciary); Lehigh County District Attorney’s

Office, District Attorney James B. Martin, Chief Deputy District Attorney Heather

Gallagher, and Senior Deputy District Attorney Christine F. Murphy (collectively,

District Attorney); Official Court Reporter Elizabeth Rocchino, RPR (Rocchino);

and Attorney General Josh Shapiro (Attorney General). Webster claims that

Gallagher, Murphy, and Rocchino have each improperly sent legal mail to him

through an intermediary service, rather than to him directly, and seeks declaratory,

injunctive, and other relief as a result. The County Judiciary, the District Attorney,

and Rocchino have filed preliminary objections to the Complaint. After thorough

review, we conclude we lack jurisdiction to consider Webster’s Complaint. We

therefore transfer this matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County.

I. Facts and Procedural History

As recounted by Webster in his Complaint, the Department of Corrections

(Department) instituted new mail handling policies in August 2018, ostensibly to

help control the influx of illicit substances into the Pennsylvania state prison system.

Complaint, ¶7. Under these policies, regular, non-legal mail addressed to inmates

was diverted to Smart Communications in Tampa, Florida. Id. Smart

Communications would open these items, scan and copy them, and then send the

copies (rather than the originals) to the intended recipients. Id. By contrast,

the [Department] would confiscate all incoming legal

mail, open it in front of the inmate, copy the original, and

provide the inmate with a copy. The [Department] would

then confidentially store the legal mail for 45 days. At the

expiration of this 45-day period, the original would be

destroyed “confidentially,” outside of the inmate’s

presence, by a third-party vendor outside of the

[correctional] institution’s premises.

Id., ¶8.

The Department’s legal mail policy was subsequently challenged in federal

court, leading to a consent decree barring the Department from photocopying legal

mail and permitting inmates to both directly receive and maintain possession of such

mail. Id., ¶9. As of April 5, 2019, Department policy now requires “attorneys, courts,

and federal, state, and local elected officials” to obtain what is known as an

“Attorney Control Number” from the Department, which is used by the Department

to assist in properly identifying and processing legal mail. Id.; see id., Ex. 3, App. C

(document detailing “Changes to Department [P]olicy DC-ADM 803, ‘Inmate Mail

and Incoming Publications’”).

2

On December 12, 2019, Webster filed his Complaint in our Court. Webster

alleges that, on a number of occasions between September 25, 2018, and November

20, 2019, Gallagher, Murphy, and Rocchino each improperly sent certain items of

Webster’s legal mail to Smart Communications, rather than to Webster himself at

SCI-Somerset. Complaint, ¶¶10-27. In addition, Webster claims that “[they] have

sent, and continue to send [Webster’s] legal mail to Smart Communications, despite

the fact that they are fully capable of obtaining an Attorney Control Number from

the [Department].” Id., ¶30. Webster seeks a declaratory judgment that this behavior

violated a number of his rights secured by the Pennsylvania and United States

Constitutions and an injunction mandating that his legal mail be henceforth sent to

him directly, as well as punitive damages, reimbursement for costs and expenses,

and other, unspecified relief. Id., ¶¶32-37. In response, the District Attorney, the

County Judiciary, and Rocchino have each respectively filed preliminary objections

to Webster’s Complaint, to which Webster has replied in opposition.

II. Discussion

Upon review of Webster’s Complaint, we conclude that we do not have

jurisdiction to consider this matter, because Webster has failed to assert that any of

the respondents over whom we could have had such jurisdiction perpetrated

actionable conduct against him.1

1

Though the District Attorney, the County Judiciary, and Rocchino each argue in their

respective preliminary objections that we do not have jurisdiction over them in this matter, they

do not put forth this precise argument. See District Attorney’s Br. in Support of Preliminary

Objections at 7-9; County Judiciary’s Br. in Support of Preliminary Objections at 8-10; Rocchino’s

Br. in Support of Preliminary Objections at 8-9.

In addition, the Attorney General has thus far failed to file anything in response to

Webster’s Complaint or enter an appearance in this matter. The Attorney General is under no

obligation to do so at this juncture, given that Webster’s Complaint does not contain a notice to

defend. Pa. R.C.P. No. 1026(a) (“Except as provided by [Pennsylvania] Rule [of Civil Procedure]

(Footnote continued on next page…)

3

Section 761 of the Judicial Code provides, in relevant part, that

[t]he Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction

of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) Against the Commonwealth government,

including any officer thereof, acting in his official

capacity, except:

....

(v) actions or proceedings in the nature of

trespass as to which the Commonwealth

government formerly enjoyed sovereign or

other immunity and actions or proceedings in

the nature of assumpsit relating to such

actions or proceedings in the nature of

trespass.

42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1)(v). Furthermore, “[t]o the extent prescribed by general rule

the Commonwealth Court shall have ancillary jurisdiction over any claim or other

matter which is related to a claim or other matter otherwise within its exclusive

original jurisdiction.” Id., § 761(c). By statute, “Commonwealth government” is

defined as:

The government of the Commonwealth, including the

courts and other officers or agencies of the unified judicial

system, the General Assembly and its officers and

agencies, the Governor, and the departments, boards,

commissions, authorities and officers and agencies of the

1042.4 or by subdivision (b) of this rule, every pleading subsequent to the complaint shall be filed

within twenty days after service of the preceding pleading, but no pleading need be filed unless

the preceding pleading contains a notice to defend or is endorsed with a notice to plead.”); see Pa.

R.C.P. No. 1018.1(a) (“Every complaint filed by a plaintiff . . . shall begin with a notice to

defend[.]”); Pa. R.A.P. 1516(b) (stating, in relevant part, that “[e]very pleading filed after an

original jurisdiction petition for review shall be filed within 30 days after service of the preceding

pleading, but no pleading need be filed unless the preceding pleading is endorsed with a notice to

plead.”).

Nevertheless, none of this impedes our authority to address the Complaint’s jurisdictional

defects. “[Q]uestions of jurisdiction can never be waived, and may be raised at any time by the

parties or sua sponte by [the] court.” Pennhurst Med. Grp., P.C. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 796

A.2d 423, 425 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

4

Commonwealth, but the term does not include any

political subdivision, municipal or other local authority, or

any officer or agency of any such political subdivision or

local authority.

Id., § 102. In addition, through our case law, we have established “that the term

‘officers,’ for jurisdictional purposes, should encompass only those persons who

perform state-wide policymaking functions and who are charged with the

responsibility for independent initiation of administrative policy regarding some

sovereign function of state government.” Opie v. Glascow, Inc., 375 A.2d 396, 398

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1977).

Both the Attorney General and the County Judiciary could, as named

respondents, theoretically bring this matter within our original jurisdiction. See

Stedman v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 221 A.3d 747, 756 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)

(the Attorney General is a Commonwealth officer); Judges of Court of Common

Pleas of Twenty-Seventh Judicial Dist. v. Cty. of Washington, 548 A.2d 1306, 1307

n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (the courts of common pleas, as part of the Unified Judicial

System, are part of Commonwealth government); Brown v. Taylor, 494 A.2d 29, 31

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (judges of the courts of common pleas are Commonwealth

officers). However, Webster fails to specifically assert in his Complaint that either

the Attorney General or the County Judiciary has sent his legal mail to Smart

Communications or otherwise handled delivery of such mail in an unlawful manner.

See Complaint, ¶¶7-30. While Webster does vaguely “allege[] retaliation by the

court,” which he argues violated his First Amendment2 rights, he never explains what

he means by “retaliation” or precisely to what, or whom, “the court” refers. See id.

Thus, Webster’s naming of these parties as respondents is jurisdictionally

insufficient, as his allegations of unlawful behavior and requests for relief are not

2

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

5

clearly directed towards either the Attorney General or the County Judiciary. See

Miles v. Beard, 847 A.2d 161, 164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (“Merely including in the

caption of the complaint the Commonwealth government or a state-wide officer,

against whom no relief is sought, will not operate to vest this Court with original

jurisdiction.”).3

Nor do the remaining respondents enable us to exert jurisdiction over this

matter. First, neither a district attorney’s office, nor a district attorney or their

subordinates, are part of the commonwealth government or are commonwealth

officers for purposes of our original jurisdiction. Pa. Gamefowl Breeders Ass’n v.

Com., 551 A.2d 361, 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). Second, Rocchino is not a

commonwealth officer because, as a court reporter, she is a court employee and has

no role in “[performing] state-wide policymaking functions . . . [or] independent[ly]

initiati[ng] administrative policy regarding some sovereign function of state

government.” Opie, 375 A.2d at 398; see Forney v. Harrisburg State Hosp., 336

A.2d 709, 711 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975) (“Employees in public service . . . merely exercise

subordinate ministerial functions” and are not Commonwealth officers for

jurisdictional purposes.).

3

Webster makes certain allegations in his response to the County Judiciary’s preliminary

objections, regarding President Judge Reibman’s and Judge Reichley’s putative conduct, which

are not included in his Complaint. See Webster’s Br. in Opposition to the Preliminary Objections

and Br. Filed by Respondents Reibman and Reichley on February 26, 2020 at 5-6. We recognize

that a party should be granted leave to amend a pleading, in the event there is a reasonable chance

that such an amendment would cure the pleading’s defects. Unified Sportsmen of Pa. ex rel. Their

Members v. Pa. Game Comm’n, 903 A.2d 117, 127 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). As explained infra,

however, the jurisdictional defects of Webster’s Complaint extend beyond those posed by the

inadequacy of the averments he makes therein, due to the very nature of the legal claims he puts

forth and the relief he seeks. Consequently, we decline to allow Webster to file an Amended

Complaint in our Court, as he would not be able to fully cure his action’s jurisdictional deficiencies

via amendment.

6

We also lack jurisdiction over this matter due to Webster’s request for punitive

damages, costs, and expenses. As noted above, actions in the nature of trespass are

excluded from our original jurisdiction. 42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1)(v). “An action in

trespass . . . lie[s] ‘for redress in the shape of money damages for any unlawful injury

done to the plaintiff, in respect either to his person, property, or rights, by the

immediate force and violence of the defendant.’” Balshy v. Rank, 490 A.2d 415, 420

(Pa. 1985) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1674 (4th Rev. Ed. 1968)). To that end,

“all actions against the Commonwealth or its officers acting in their official capacity

for money damages based upon tort liability fall outside the scope of the

Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction and are properly commenced in the

courts of common pleas.” Stackhouse v. Com., 832 A.2d 1004, 1008 (Pa. 2003).

However, suits against the Commonwealth government or its officials that seek

purely declaratory relief or an injunction restraining government action are not in

the nature of trespass and, thus, may fall within our original jurisdiction. Fawber v.

Cohen, 532 A.2d 429, 433 (Pa. 1987).

Though Webster requests declaratory and injunctive relief due to respondents’

alleged infringement of his constitutional rights, it remains that he also desires

monetary damages as a remedy for the same putative violations. See Complaint,

¶¶32-34, 36. Webster does not even bother to separate his claims and requests for

redress into separate counts, instead presenting them as a mélange under the

umbrella headings “LEGAL CLAIMS” and “PRAYER FOR RELIEF[.]” See id., §§

V-VI. We conclude, then, that his Complaint also sounds in trespass.

In these circumstances, we do not believe the inclusion of

a count for declaratory or injunctive relief premised upon

the same events can properly be understood to transform

[Webster’s C]omplaint from one sounding in trespass into

the type of matter contemplated by Fawber, or by the

7

Legislature, as belonging within [our] original

jurisdiction.

Stackhouse, 832 A.2d at 1008.

[A]lthough one might argue that what [Webster] really

wants is a mandatory injunction rather than money

damages, he is the one who included a request for money

damages in his [C]omplaint. It is not our function to ignore

a portion of his request for relief so that original

jurisdiction can be vested in this Court, a court of limited

original jurisdiction, rather than in the common pleas

court, a court of broad original jurisdiction.

Miles, 847 A.2d at 165. As such, we have no authority to consider Webster’s

Complaint as an original jurisdiction matter or pursuant to our powers of ancillary

jurisdiction.

III. Conclusion

In line with the foregoing analysis, we conclude we lack original or ancillary

jurisdiction to hear Webster’s Complaint. Rather than dismissing his Complaint

outright, however, we will transfer it to the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh

County for disposition of respondents’ preliminary objections. Stedman, 221 A.3d

at 760-61; 42 Pa. C.S. § 5103(a); Pa. R.A.P. 751.4

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

4

Webster has filed a number of motions in this matter that are currently pending

disposition. As such, we direct the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County to adjudicate these

motions subsequent to ruling upon Respondents’ preliminary objections. Of course, this directive

may become partially or wholly moot, depending on the outcome of these preliminary objections.

8

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William E. Webster III, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 687 M.D. 2019

:

Lehigh County Court of Common :

Pleas, et al., :

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 8th day of October, 2020, it is hereby ORDERED that

Petitioner William E. Webster III’s “Verified Complaint and Attached Exhibits” is

TRANSFERRED to the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County (Common Pleas)

due to lack of jurisdiction.

The Commonwealth Court’s Prothonotary shall transmit the record of the

above-captioned proceedings to Common Pleas’ Prothonotary, together with a copy

of this opinion and order, as well as a certified copy of this matter’s docket entries.

Subsequent to transfer, the assigned Common Pleas judge shall rule upon the

respective preliminary objections filed by Respondents Lehigh County Court of

Common Pleas, Honorable President Judge Edward Reibman, and Honorable Judge

Douglas G. Reichley; Lehigh County District Attorney’s Office, District Attorney

James B. Martin, Chief Deputy District Attorney Heather Gallagher, and Senior

Deputy District Attorney Christine F. Murphy; and Official Court Reporter

Elizabeth Rocchino, RPR and, if necessary thereafter, any pending motions.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge