Opinion

A.A. v. Attorney General United States

  • 973 F.3d 171
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Sep 2, 2020
Status
Published
Cited by
8 cases
Authority
More cited than 68.7%

“We ‘presume[] that Congress expresse[d] its intent through the ordinary meaning of its language,’ so ‘every exercise of statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the plain language of the statute.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295 , 302 (3d Cir. 2011))

How later courts described this case

  • “We ‘presume[] that Congress expresse[d] its intent through the ordinary meaning of its language,’ so ‘every exercise of statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the plain language of the statute.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295 , 302 (3d Cir. 2011))

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 17-1176

_____________

A.A.,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

Respondent

____________

On Petition for Review of a Final Order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency Number: A208-056-809

Immigration Judge: Mirlande Tadal

______________

Argued: October 15, 2019

______________

Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit

Judges

(Filed: September 2, 2020)

Anwen S. Hughes [ARGUED]

Human Rights First

75 Broad Street

Floor 31

New York, NY 10004

Counsel for Petitioner

Joseph H. Hunt

Ethan B. Kanter

Paul F. Stone [ARGUED]

Office of Immigration Litigation, Appellate Section

United States Department of Justice

P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Respondent

_____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_____________

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

A.A. is a Syrian citizen and national who fled

involuntary military service in a government-controlled militia

called Jaysh al-Sha’bi (the “Militia”) and sought refuge in the

United States. Upon arriving at New York’s John F. Kennedy

International Airport, A.A. gave himself up to United States

Customs and Border Protection and applied for asylum,

2

withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted A.A.’s application

for deferral of removal under the CAT because the IJ found

that A.A. was likely to be tortured if he returned to Syria. But

the IJ denied A.A.’s applications for asylum and for

withholding of removal. The IJ determined that the Militia is

a “Tier III,” or “undesignated,” terrorist organization under 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (the “Tier III provision”)

because it is “a group of two or more individuals . . . which

engages in [terrorist activity]” as defined in the Immigration

and Nationality Act (“INA”). Any alien who provides

“material support” to a Tier III organization is statutorily

barred from receiving asylum and withholding of removal. 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). The IJ concluded that A.A.

provided material support to the Militia because, during the

course of his service, A.A. trained to use an assault weapon,

carried out guard duty, and performed errands for his superiors.

Although A.A. secured CAT protection, he pursued his

applications for asylum and withholding of removal before the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). A.A. argued before

the BIA that the Militia is beyond the scope of the Tier III

provision because it is a state actor controlled by a foreign

government. The BIA disagreed and dismissed A.A.’s appeal.

A.A. makes the same argument in his petition for review. For

the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.

I.

A.A. was conscripted into the Syrian military in 2011.

He initially refused to report for duty because he had heard that

3

the Syrian military was engaging in human rights violations

while prosecuting the Syrian Civil War. A.A. was eventually

captured by Syrian military police and forced into service.

A.A. testified that the military conscription office sent him for

various medical tests and examinations over the course of

approximately one year. The examining doctors concluded

that A.A. suffered from “a chronic infection in the middle ear”

and that he should be assigned to “stationary services” rather

than active service. Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 92. He

was assigned to the Militia, which “is controlled by the Syrian

government,” 1 Gov’t Br. 5 (citing A.R. 1793), and which has

“been instrumental in the Assad regime’s campaign of terror

and violence against the citizens of Syria,” id. 5–6 (quoting

A.R. 1792).

A.A. testified that, despite the doctors’ medical

assessment, the Militia put A.A. through basic training, where

he learned how to use an AK-47 rifle. He was first assigned to

guard duty at a power station, then transferred to a soccer field

in Damascus, and later reassigned to Tishreen Stadium in Al-

Bariqah. At each duty station, A.A. served as an unarmed

guard and performed errands for his superiors, who physically

1

Both parties agree that the Militia is controlled by the Syrian

government. See A.A. Br. 4–5 (“There is no dispute . . . that

[the Militia] was a Syrian state actor and under the control of

the Syrian government.” (citing A.R. 18)); Gov’t Br. 5 (“Jaysh

Al-Sha’bi is a militia controlled by the Syrian government.”

(citing A.R. 1793)). Neither party addresses whether a foreign

government’s control (and what degree of control) is sufficient

to make an entity a “state actor.” We assume, without

deciding, that the Militia is controlled by the Syrian

government and is a state actor.

4

and verbally abused him because A.A. repeatedly reminded

them that he was only fit for stationary, non-active service.

A.A. testified that, while at Tishreen Stadium, he

suffered a “nervous breakdown” and was hospitalized. A.R.

1985. He obtained a one-year medical discharge effective

January 1, 2013. Fearing that he would be forced to re-join the

Militia or another armed group after his temporary discharge

expired, A.A. fled Syria in September or October of 2013 and

eventually arrived in the United States.

A.A. was placed in expedited removal proceedings. On

September 30, 2019, he passed his credible fear interview. On

the same date, he received a Notice to Appear charging that he

was inadmissible to the United States. Before an IJ, A.A.

conceded inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)

(lack of documentation required for admission) and applied for

asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under

the CAT.

The IJ granted A.A.’s application for deferral of

removal under the CAT but denied his applications for asylum

and for withholding of removal. The IJ noted that the

Government submitted evidence that the Militia is “controlled

by the Syrian government”; “has conducted . . . operations with

[the] Syrian military”; and has “been instrumental in the Assad

regime’s campaign of terror” against the Syrian people. A.R.

106 (quotation marks omitted). The IJ also noted that the

Militia receives support from Iran and that the Treasury

Department has blocked the Militia’s assets. The IJ credited

A.A.’s testimony about the Militia’s use of “abusive and

violent military tactics.” A.R. 106. A.A. testified that he saw

reports about government soldiers killing civilians and that he

5

heard a story about military police persecuting the family of a

deserter, including raping and murdering members of the

deserter’s family.

The IJ determined that the Militia’s killing and injuring

opposition members and use of terror and violence against

Syrian civilians constituted “terrorist activity” under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)–(VI). As a result, the IJ concluded that

the Militia “constitutes a Tier III terrorist organization.” A.R.

106. The IJ further found that A.A. provided “material

support” to the Militia through his military service, including

taking part in weapons training, performing guard duties, and

providing food and laundry services to superior officers. A.R.

106–08. The IJ held that A.A.’s provision of material support

to a terrorist organization rendered him statutorily ineligible

for asylum and withholding of removal. A.A. appealed to the

BIA. 2

On December 30, 2016, the BIA dismissed A.A.’s

appeal in an unpublished decision by a single member. A.A.

did not challenge the IJ’s determination that the Militia

engaged in terrorist activity or that he had provided the Militia

with material support. Instead, A.A. argued that the Militia

cannot be a Tier III organization because it is a state actor. The

BIA rejected this argument. It agreed with the IJ that, to be a

Tier III organization, an entity need only be “a group of two or

more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in,

2

Although A.A. was granted deferral of removal under the

CAT and therefore cannot be removed to Syria at this time, this

form of relief is more restrictive than asylum or withholding of

removal under the INA. A.A. points out, for example, that he

is ineligible to receive a travel document.

6

or has a subgroup which engages in” terrorist activity. A.R. 3

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)). The BIA

concluded that the Militia “is a group of two or more

individuals,” which engages in “terrorist activity”; that A.A.

provided material support to the Militia; and that nothing in the

relevant provisions of the INA limited the material support bar

to non-state actors. A.R. 3–5 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)).

On January 20, 2017, A.A. filed a petition for review.

Proceedings were held in abeyance while United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) considered

whether to grant A.A. a discretionary duress exemption from

the material support bar because A.A. was forced to serve in

the Militia. USCIS later issued a decision declining to grant

A.A. a duress exemption.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). The

BIA had jurisdiction to review the IJ’s decision under 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(b)(3). A.A. timely filed this petition for review

within thirty days of the BIA’s decision, see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(1), and the IJ completed proceedings in Elizabeth,

New Jersey, so venue is proper, id. § 1252(b)(2).

Where, as here, the BIA adopted the findings of the IJ

and discussed some of the bases for the IJ’s decision, we

review both decisions. Saravia v. Att’y Gen., 905 F.3d 729,

734 (3d Cir. 2018). A.A.’s petition for review is based on an

issue of law, over which we exercise plenary review. Id.

7

The BIA’s legal determinations involving the INA are

entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See

Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014). Here,

however, “Chevron deference is inappropriate because we are

asked to review an unpublished, non-precedential decision

issued by a single BIA member.” Id. As a result, the BIA’s

decision is, “[a]t most,” entitled only to deference based on its

persuasive authority. Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323

U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).

III.

A.A. argues that Congress never intended the Tier III

provision “to extend the concept[s] of a terrorist organization[,]

and of ‘material support’ to a terrorist organization[,] to the

military forces and governments of foreign states.” A.A. Br.

8. For support, A.A. advances a series of arguments based on

the text of the Tier III provision; the structure, context, and

revision history of the INA; the executive branch’s own

policies and past abstention from designating government-

controlled entities as terrorist organizations; and the United

States’ treaty obligations. We address each argument in turn,

and we conclude that each is unavailing.

A.

1.

We begin with relevant legal background. Pursuant to

the INA, “an alien seeking asylum must demonstrate either (i)

proof of past persecution, or (ii) a well-founded fear of future

persecution in his home country ‘on account of race, religion,

8

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion.’” Sesay v. Att’y Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 218–

19 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). A well-

founded fear of persecution entitles an applicant to asylum

unless an exception applies. See id. at 219.

An alien’s “application for withholding of removal is

reviewed under a more stringent standard.” Id. For

withholding of removal, “an alien ‘must establish a clear

probability, that is, that it is more likely than not that [his] life

or freedom would be threatened if returned to [his] country’

because of his protected class.” Id. (alterations in original)

(quoting Kaita v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir.

2008)).

The INA contains several exceptions to the mandatory

rules governing asylum and withholding of removal. As

relevant here, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) provides “[s]ecurity and

related grounds” for deeming an alien inadmissible, and

§ 1182(a)(3)(B) specifically provides for terrorism-related

inadmissibility grounds. Even if an alien is otherwise “eligible

for relief, he will be deemed inadmissible and ineligible for

asylum or withholding of removal if he has engaged in terrorist

activities, including the provision of material support for

terrorist groups.” Sesay, 787 F.3d at 219 (citing 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(v), 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), 1231(b)(3)(B), and

1227(a)(4)(B)).

An alien is not entitled to asylum or withholding of

removal if “there are reasonable grounds to believe that [an]

alien is a danger to the security of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv). Further, “an alien who is described in

section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title shall be considered to be an

9

alien with respect to whom there are reasonable grounds for

regarding as a danger to the security of the United States.” Id.

Section 1227(a)(4)(B), in turn, provides that any alien who is

described in § 1182(a)(3)(B) (defining “terrorist activities”)

and (F) is removable. So, an alien described in § 1182(a)(3)(B)

is not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal and is

removable. See McAllister v. Att’y Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 188

(3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]n alien is not eligible for asylum if the

Attorney General determines ‘there are reasonable grounds for

regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the United

States,’ or that ‘the alien is described in . . . section

1227(a)(4)(B) . . . .’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv)–

(v)).

Section 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) defines the term “engage in

terrorist activity,” which includes “to commit an act that the

actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material

support . . . to a terrorist organization described in [the Tier III

provision].” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd). This is

commonly referred to as the “material support bar” because the

alien’s giving material support to a terrorist organization bars

the person from admission to the United States. 3 See, e.g.,

Sesay, 787 F.3d at 220.

The Secretaries of State and Homeland Security have

the power to exempt certain groups and individuals from

3

The material support bar also applies where an alien provides

material support to Tier I and Tier II organizations. See 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc).

10

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)’s national security inadmissibility grounds. 4

However, the Secretaries’ exemption authority is subject to a

number of statutory exceptions. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(3)(B)(i). And the Secretary of State may not

exercise the exemption power with respect to an alien who is

the subject of pending removal proceedings under § 1229a.

See id. 5

Since 2005, the Secretaries have announced exemptions

in the Federal Register. There are two types of exemptions.

“Group-based” exemptions cover classes of aliens, such as

those deemed inadmissible because of their association with a

particular Tier III organization. See Terrorism-Related

Inadmissibility Grounds (TRIG), U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.

Servs., https://www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/other-

resources/terrorism-related-inadmissibility-grounds-trig (last

updated Nov. 19, 2019). “Situational exemptions” apply to

aliens subject to certain inadmissibility grounds based on their

individual conduct. Id. USCIS processes exemptions pursuant

to the Secretaries’ delegation of authority.

4

The INA refers to these exemptions as “waivers,” but they

are commonly referred to as “exemptions” to distinguish them

from waivers under § 1182(d)(3)(A). Gov’t Br. 17–18.

5

Removal proceedings conducted under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a

commence with the filing of a Notice to Appear with the

immigration court. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1.

11

2.

The INA defines three types of “terrorist organizations”

in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I) through (III). 6 Clause (I)

6

The full text of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi) provides:

As used in this section, the term “terrorist

organization” means an organization—

(I) designated under section 1189

of this title;

(II) otherwise designated, upon

publication in the Federal Register,

by the Secretary of State in

consultation with or upon the

request of the Attorney General or

the Secretary of Homeland

Security, as a terrorist

organization, after finding that the

organization engages in the

activities described in subclauses

(I) through (VI) of [§

1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (defining

“engage in terrorist activity”)]; or

(III) that is a group of two or more

individuals, whether organized or

not, which engages in, or has a

subgroup which engages in, the

activities described in subclauses

12

describes “Tier I” terrorist organizations that the Secretary of

State formally designates according to the procedures set forth

in 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a). Clause (II) describes “Tier II” terrorist

organizations, which are also designated by the Secretary of

State. Neither the Secretary of State nor the Secretary of

Homeland Security may grant group-based exemptions to Tier

I or Tier II terrorist organizations. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(3)(B)(i). However, the Secretary of State may still

grant situational exemptions to individuals associated with Tier

I and Tier II terrorist organizations.

Clause (III) describes “Tier III,” or “undesignated,”

terrorist organizations. No executive agency formally

designates Tier III organizations; rather, IJs or the BIA

designate them on a case-by-case basis in the course of

reviewing individual aliens’ applications for immigration

relief. As a result, an IJ’s or the BIA’s designation of a Tier III

organization only impacts the alien whose case is before that IJ

or before the BIA.

The Attorney General has the power to review IJ and

BIA decisions designating Tier III organizations. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1103(g)(2) (“The Attorney General shall . . . review such

administrative determinations in immigration proceedings . . .

as the Attorney General determines to be necessary.”); 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(h)(1) (“The [BIA] shall refer to the Attorney General

for review of its decision all cases that . . . (i) The Attorney

General directs the [BIA] to refer to him.”). The Secretary of

State and the Secretary of Homeland Security have the power

(I) through (VI) of

[§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)].

13

to grant group-based exemptions to Tier III organizations and

situational exemptions to Tier III organization members,

subject to some statutory exceptions. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(3)(B)(i) (barring, inter alia, exemptions for groups

that have “purposefully engaged in . . . terrorist activity that is

directed at civilians”). Unlike Tier I and Tier II organizations,

aliens can avoid the immigration consequences of providing

material support to a Tier III organization if they “did not

know, and should not reasonably have known, that the

organization was a terrorist organization.” Id.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(cc), (VI)(dd).

3.

On April 24, 2019, after A.A. filed his opening brief and

before the Government filed its response, the Secretary of State

published a notice under his discretionary exemption power

that exempts all subgroups of foreign governments from Tier

III status. Office of the Secretary; Exercise of Authority Under

the Immigration and Nationality Act, 84 Fed. Reg. 17230-01

(Apr. 24, 2019) (the “Exemption”). The Exemption provides,

in relevant part:

[The Tier III provision] shall not apply to any

ministry, department, agency, division, or other

group or sub-group within any foreign

government; except that this exercise of

authority shall not apply to any group designated

under [8 U.S.C. § 1189] or any group prohibited

from benefiting from an exercise of authority

under [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i)] for having

engaged in terrorist activity against the United

States or another democratic country, or having

14

purposefully engaged in a pattern or practice of

terrorist activity that is directed at civilians. This

waiver applies both retroactively and

prospectively.

84 Fed. Reg. 17230-01. The three exceptions to the Exemption

— (i) groups designated under 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (the Tier I

organization provision); (ii) groups that engage in terrorist

activity against the United States or another democratic

country; and (iii) terrorist groups that target civilians — are

dictated by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i). The Secretary of State

has no power to exempt these groups.7

B.

First, A.A. argues that the Tier III provision does not

include state actors because it only encompasses an

“organization” that meets the Tier III criteria, and the INA’s

general definition of “organization” refers only to non-state

actors. We disagree.

In interpreting a statute, “we must begin with the

statutory text.” United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 259

(3d Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4

7

We assume, without deciding, that the Militia is a terrorist

group that “purposefully engage[s] in a pattern or practice of

terrorist activity that is directed at civilians.” 84 Fed. Reg.

17230-01. As a result, the Exemption cannot apply to A.A.

Further, although the Exemption applies retroactively,

§ 1182(d)(3)(B)(i) prevents it from applying to aliens subject

to pending removal proceedings. The Exemption cannot apply

to A.A. for this reason as well.

15

(1997)). We “presume[] that Congress expresse[d] its intent

through the ordinary meaning of its language,” so “every

exercise of statutory interpretation begins with an examination

of the plain language of the statute.” Murphy v. Millennium

Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 302 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting

Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 585 F.3d 753, 759 (3d Cir.

2009)). “[W]here the text of a statute is unambiguous,” we will

enforce it “as written,” and we will only depart from that

language based on “the most extraordinary showing of

contrary intentions in the legislative history.” Id. (quoting In

re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2010)).

A.A. contends that the Tier III provision does not

extend to state actors because the INA’s general definition of

“organization” applies to the prefatory language introducing

the Tier III provision, and so that definition narrows the scope

of the Tier III provision. Specifically, the prefatory language

in § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi) provides: “As used in this section, the

term ‘terrorist organization’ means an organization” that fits

the Tier I, II, or III organization criteria. Id. (emphasis added);

see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(28) (defining “organization”).

A.A. asserts that the INA definition of “organization” should

apply to the phrase “an organization” in § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi).

Section 1101(a)(28)’s definition of “organization” provides:

“The term ‘organization’ means, but is not limited to, an

organization, corporation, company, partnership, association,

trust, foundation or fund; and includes a group of persons,

whether or not incorporated, permanently or temporarily

associated together with joint action on any subject or

subjects.”

A.A. argues that this definition does not encompass

state actors because it only consists of a list of terms that refer

16

to non-state actors, and therefore, the definition of “terrorist

organization” must only encompass non-state actors as well.

A.A. asserts that this is consistent with the dictionary definition

of “organization,” which also does not refer to state actors.

A.A. Br. 13 (citing Organization, Merriam-Webster.com

(defining “organization” as an “(a) association, society” or “(b)

an administrative and functional structure, such as a business

or a political party”)). Finally, A.A. points out that the INA

defines “foreign state” separately, and he argues that this is

evidence that Congress did not intend for the definition of

“organization” to encompass state actors. See A.A. Br. 13

(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(14)).

The Government responds that the Tier III provision

“neither expressly nor impliedly excludes militias” and

“provides that an entity need only be ‘a group of two or more

individuals, whether organized or not.’” Gov’t Br. 25 (quoting

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)). The Government asserts

that this reading is consistent with the ordinary meaning of

“group”: “‘a number of individuals assembled together or

having some unifying relationship’ and ‘military unit[s].’”

Gov’t Br. 26 (quoting Group, Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary (1961)). So, because the Militia

consists of a “group of two or more individuals,” and nothing

in the provision expressly excludes state actors, the Militia fits

the definition of a Tier III organization. As a result, the

Government contends, we need not address whether

§ 1101(a)(28)’s definition of “organization” modifies

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)’s definition of “terrorist organization.”

However, the Government argues that even if we apply

§ 1101(a)(28)’s definition of “organization” to

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)’s definition of “terrorist organization,”

17

A.A.’s interpretation still fails. It reasons that, first,

§ 1101(a)(28) defines “organization” as “an organization,”

followed by additional terms, because Congress wanted the

definition “to be broader than its commonly understood

definition.” Gov’t Br. 29. Second, the definition is not

exhaustive because it includes a catch-all modifier: “means,

but is not limited to, an organization . . . .” Id. at 28 (quoting 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(28) (emphasis added)). Third, the definition

of “organization” “includes a group of persons.” Gov’t Br. 28

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(28) (emphasis added)). So, if the

Militia is a “group” under the Tier III provision, then it is also

an “organization” under § 1101(a)(28). Finally, the ordinary

meaning of “organization” includes “a military command

consisting of two or more units” and “a state or manner of

being organized,” both of which encompass the Militia. Gov’t

Br. 30 (quoting Organization, Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary (1961)).

We agree with the Government that the Tier III

provision encompasses state actors, including the Militia. At

the outset, A.A. alternately frames the issue before us as

whether the Tier III provision encompasses “national military

forces of foreign countries,” A.A. Br. 1, and whether the Tier

III provision applies to “state actors” more generally, A.A. Br.

9. The Government tries to limit the question to whether the

Tier III provision encompasses state-controlled “militias.”

Gov’t Br. 3, 31–32. Neither party presents any limiting

principle for why a state-controlled “militia” is legally

distinguishable in this context from any other state-controlled

armed or unarmed group, and we perceive none. Therefore,

we address the question of whether state actors generally can

be designated as Tier III organizations.

18

The plain text of the Tier III provision answers the

question before us: a Tier III terrorist organization is any

“group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not”

that “engage[s] in terrorist activity” as described in

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv). The ordinary meaning of the term

“group” includes “a number of individuals assembled together

or having some unifying relationship” and “a military unit.”

Group, Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1986);

Group, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/group (last visited Aug. 11, 2020)

(same definition). The Militia is an organized military unit

controlled by the Syrian government. It is a “a group of two or

more individuals,” united in a common purpose, that has

“engage[d] in terrorist activity” as described in

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv). So, by its plain meaning, the Tier III

provision encompasses the Militia.

Even if we read § 1101(a)(28)’s definition of

“organization” to apply to the Tier III provision, the result is

the same. Once again, § 1101(a)(28)’s definition provides:

“The term ‘organization’ means, but is not limited to, an

organization, corporation, company, partnership, association,

trust, foundation or fund; and includes a group of persons,

whether or not incorporated, permanently or temporarily

associated together with joint action on any subject or

subjects.” The definition is non-exhaustive, includes a catch-

all modifier, and does not expressly exclude state actors. The

ordinary meaning of “organization” is similarly expansive and

in no way excludes state actors. See, e.g., Organization,

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“A group . . . formed

for a particular purpose.”); Organization, Oxford English

Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/132452 (last

visited Aug. 11, 2020) (“An organized body of people with a

19

particular purpose, as a business, government department,

charity, etc.”). And as the Government points out, the

definition of “organization” includes the term “group.” So, if

the Militia is a “group,” then it must also be an “organization”

under § 1101(a)(28). Finally, the fact that the INA includes a

separate definition of “foreign state,” without more, does not

suggest that the definition of “organization” or the Tier III

provision does not encompass state actors.

The ordinary meaning of the terms “group” and

“organization” both include multiple individuals organized

into military units. A.A. asks us to categorically exclude state

actors from the scope of the Tier III provision and

§ 1101(a)(28)’s definition of “organization” based solely on

the fact that the general definition of “organization” does not

specifically refer to state actors. The plain text of these

provisions simply does not support A.A.’s position.

C.

A.A. next argues that the structure, context, and revision

history of the INA is inconsistent with reading the Tier III

provision to encompass state actors. Again, we disagree.

1.

A.A. contends that various amendments to the INA

exhibit Congress’s intent to treat state and non-state actors

differently, at least with respect to the INA’s terrorism

provisions. A.A. points out that the Uniting and Strengthening

America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept

and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the “USA PATRIOT

Act”) “eliminated from the definition of ‘engage in terrorist

20

activity’ . . . the reference to providing material support to ‘any

individual, organization or government in conducting a

terrorist activity.’” A.A. Br. 17 (emphasis added) (citing USA

PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411, 115 Stat.

272, 346; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000) (prior definition

of “engage in terrorist activity”)). Although A.A. does not

mention it in his briefing, the USA PATRIOT Act also

eliminated a reference to “terrorist government” in what was

then § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V) (2000). A.A. argues that

Congress excised these references to “government” because it

intended to exclude state actors from the definition of “terrorist

organization” in § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi), and that Congress passed

the USA PATRIOT Act to address the threat of terrorism from

non-state actors. See A.A. Br. 23–26 (quoting statements by

Senators Leahy, 147 Cong. Rec. S10990, S11014 (daily ed.

Oct. 25, 2001), Graham, id. at S11017, Hatch, id. at S11016,

and Kyl, id. at S11050, emphasizing the importance of

addressing terrorist threats emanating from non-state actors).

The Government claims that Congress’s elimination of

the INA’s references to “government” and “terrorist

government” actually broadened the scope of the term

“terrorist organization” “to ‘account for the complex and often

mutating nature of terrorist groups by expanding the class of

inadmissible’” aliens. Gov’t Br. 34 (quoting 147 Cong. Rec.

S10990-2, S11016 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen.

Hatch)). In the Government’s view, the USA PATRIOT Act

did nothing to narrow the terrorism-related inadmissibility

provisions generally and did nothing to exclude state actors

specifically.

We agree. A.A. focuses too narrowly on the USA

PATRIOT Act’s removal of references to “government” from

21

the definition of “engage in terrorist activity.” That Act did

much more than excise the word “government” from

§ 1182(a)(3)(B) — it completely overhauled the definition of

“engage in terrorist activity,” refining and expanding it, as well

as adding the subsection that defines “terrorist organization.”

Moreover, a primary purpose of the Act was to broaden and

deepen penalties for engaging in or supporting terrorist

activity. See USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-

56, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (“An Act [t]o deter and punish terrorist

acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law

enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.”).

Reading the Tier III provision to exclude state actors on the

ground that the USA PATRIOT Act struck references to

“government” and “terrorist government” would sharply cut

against the broader purpose of the Act. Other than noting that

the Act removed the term “terrorist government” from

§ 1182(a)(3), A.A. cannot point to any affirmative evidence

that Congress intended to exclude state actors from the scope

of the Tier III provision.

2.

A.A. also asserts that, if the Tier III provision

encompasses state actors, then designating a state actor

controlled by a foreign government as a Tier III organization

effectively designates that entire foreign government as a

terrorist organization. For support, A.A. points to the language

of the Tier III provision, which encompasses “any organization

of two or more persons, whether organized or not, that engages

in or has a subgroup that engages in” terrorist activity. A.A.

Br. 17 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)). According to

A.A., under the subgroup clause, “unlawful violence by a

country’s” military forces, if “authorized” by the government,

22

“would turn the entire national government into a Tier III

terrorist organization.” A.A. Br. 18. A.A. implies that

Congress could never have intended to empower IJs and the

BIA to designate entire foreign governments as terrorist

organizations.

The Government responds that the BIA’s power to

designate foreign governments as Tier III organizations should

not impact the plain meaning of the Tier III provision. It

asserts that the subgroup clause is further evidence that

Congress desired to broaden the definition of “terrorist

organization.” In any case, the Government claims that the

Secretary of State’s Exemption for subgroups of most foreign

governments “diminishes the impact of a determination” that

such a subgroup is a Tier III organization. Gov’t Br. 50 (citing

84 Fed. Reg. 17230-01).

A.A.’s arguments are unavailing. First, until an IJ or the

BIA designates an organization as a Tier III organization, that

organization is not covered by the Tier III provision, even if

the provision’s text appears applicable to it. And designating

a subgroup as a Tier III organization does not infect the

controlling, parent entity with the same label. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). So while the BIA had the power to

designate the entire Syrian government as a Tier III

organization based on the conduct of its subgroup, the Militia,

the BIA did not do so. Instead, the BIA designated only the

subgroup — the Militia itself — as a Tier III organization, and

that designation does not apply to the Syrian government as a

whole.

Second, at base — both here, and in other parts of his

brief — A.A. argues that our interpreting the Tier III provision

23

in a way that permits IJs and the BIA to designate state actors

as Tier III organizations will inject IJs and the BIA into the

conduct of foreign policy, which is firmly the president’s

constitutional prerogative. A.A. asserts that Congress could

not have intended such “absurd results.” A.A. Reply Br. 1.

The Government responds that Congress created the Tier III

provision, delegated the power to make Tier III determinations

to IJs and the BIA, and vested the Secretaries of State and

Homeland Security with the power to exempt sub-entities of

foreign governments from Tier III status — and if Congress

wants to change that regime, it is free to do so.

Although “it is . . . a ‘basic tenet of statutory

construction . . . that courts should interpret a law to avoid

absurd or bizarre results,’” Encompass Ins. v. Stone Mansion

Rest. Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2018) (second alteration

in original) (quoting In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d

328, 338 (3d Cir. 2006)), our interpretation of the Tier III

provision does not “def[y] rationality or render[] the statute

nonsensical and superfluous,” id. (quoting United States v.

Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2013)). A.A.’s argument

has surface-level appeal, but ultimately founders when

examining the Tier III provision in the context of the INA as a

whole.

The INA empowers the Secretaries of State and

Homeland Security and the Attorney General to intervene in

immigration proceedings to prevent absurd or bizarre results.

As the Government points out, because the Exemption clearly

applies to most subgroups of foreign governments, it will

significantly narrow IJs’ powers to apply the Tier III provision

to foreign governments at all. See 84 Fed. Reg. 17230-01. And

the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security can expand on

24

these exemptions if they deem it necessary to further the United

States’ international interests. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B).

In any case, the Attorney General, and by extension, the

President, retains ultimate control over BIA determinations.

See id. § 1103(g)(2) (“The Attorney General shall . . . review

such administrative determinations in immigration

proceedings . . . as the Attorney General determines to be

necessary . . . .”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(i), 1003.1(h) (“The

[BIA] shall refer to the Attorney General for review of its

decision all cases that . . . (i) The Attorney General directs the

[BIA] to refer to him.”). These provisions empower executive

branch officials to prevent Tier III designations that could have

potentially sensitive foreign policy implications, and therefore,

avoid the absurd or bizarre results that A.A. warns us against.

Finally, we note that the BIA already rules on issues that

could impact the United States’ relations with other countries.

See, e.g., Matter of Vides Casanova, 26 I. & N. Dec. 494, 495,

501–02 (BIA 2015) (recognizing that the Salvadoran military

and related militias were responsible for civilian killings and

torture). And, at least in the past, the BIA has refrained from

ruling on issues that go to the very heart of a foreign state’s

legitimacy. See, e.g., Matter of S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 940

(BIA 2006) (declining to “determine that a foreign sovereignty

would not be recognized by the United States Government”).

So our interpretation of the Tier III provision does not thrust

IJs or the BIA into any unintended new or greatly expanded

role of influence over American foreign policy. 8

8

A.A. similarly argues that applying the Tier III provision to

state actors would force federal courts to rule on the legitimacy

of foreign states. But, as the Government points out, federal

courts already examine the conduct of foreign states in other

25

3.

A.A. further claims that applying the Tier III provision

to state actors would render the extrajudicial killing and child

soldier inadmissibility grounds superfluous. A.A. Br. 18–20

(citing Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 575 (2011)

(noting that courts should avoid interpreting statutes in ways

that render provisions superfluous)).

The extrajudicial killing inadmissibility ground,

enacted in 2004, bars aliens who have committed “under color

of law of any foreign nation, any extrajudicial killing.” 8

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(iii)(II). For comparison, according to

A.A., the relevant portion of the terrorist activity

inadmissibility ground bars aliens from immigration relief

based on “[t]he use of any . . . (b) explosive, firearm, or other

weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal

monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly,

the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial

damage to property.” Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V). A.A. thus

argues that if the Tier III provision encompasses state actors,

then it applies in any situation in which the extrajudicial killing

contexts, such as under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,

without issue. Gov’t Br. 40–41 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605A

(terrorism exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign

state), 1605B (responsibility of foreign states for international

terrorism against the United States); Bank Markazi v. Peterson,

136 S. Ct. 1310, 1328 (2016) (holding that statute for enforcing

judgments against foreign states does not violate separation of

powers principles); Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F.

Supp. 2d 52, 73–90 (D.D.C. 2010) (awarding damages against

Iran based on its support for terrorism).

26

ground would apply. A.A. also notes that the extrajudicial

killing ground targets state actors, and was enacted in 2004,

after Congress created the Tier III provision.

The Government responds that actions can be “under

the color of law even where [state officials] act without state

sanction.” Gov’t Br. 53 (quoting Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder,

574 F.3d 893, 901 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that the use of

official authority does not require state sanction)); see also

Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A private

individual acts under color of law within the meaning of

section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with

significant state aid.”)). According to the Government, the

alien “need not commit the act in association with an

organization” and need not have “organizational

authorization” for it. Gov’t Br. 53 (citing Uddin v. Att’y Gen.,

870 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that “Tier III status

cannot be assigned to a group” unless “the specified terrorist

acts were actually authorized” by that group)). As a result, the

Government contends, applying the Tier III provision to state

actors would not result in the terrorism grounds swallowing the

extrajudicial killing ground because the latter would apply

where an alien commits a killing, under color of law, without

authorization from the foreign state.

A.A. also argues that if state militaries can be Tier III

organizations, then the child soldier inadmissibility ground

would be superfluous. Enacted in 2008, the child soldier

provision bars aliens who have “engaged in the recruitment or

use of child soldiers.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(G). The

Government responds that if a sovereign country used child

soldiers in its military in otherwise legitimate armed combat,

“that military would not be an undesignated terrorist

27

organization and the members of the organization would not

be committing or supporting terrorism.” Gov’t Br. 54–55. In

that situation then, the terrorism ground would not swallow the

child soldier ground.

A.A.’s arguments are unpersuasive. The Government

has identified plausible situations in which either the

extrajudicial killing or child soldier inadmissibility ground

could apply, and the terrorism inadmissibility grounds through

the Tier III provision would not. As a result, neither the

extrajudicial killing ground nor the child soldier ground would

be made redundant by interpreting the Tier III provision to

encompass state actors. Further, because Congress

deliberately drafted the inadmissibility grounds broadly,

invalidating or narrowing one ground because it overlaps with

another would cut against Congress’s intent. See, e.g., Uddin,

870 F.3d at 285 (“Terrorist activity is defined broadly by the

statute . . . .”); Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 777 (9th Cir.

2009) (“[T]he statute defines ‘engag[ing] in terrorist activity’

broadly. . . . The statute also defines ‘terrorist organization’

broadly.”). It is not apparent from the reach of other

inadmissibility grounds that Congress intended to carve out a

safe harbor for state actors that otherwise meet the definition

of a Tier III organization and whose conduct otherwise meets

the definition of engaging in terrorist activity.9

9

A.A. also contends that “a group may be designated as a

[foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary of State] under

[8 U.S.C. § 1189] if it engages in terrorist activity as defined

in [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)] or terrorism as defined in 22

U.S.C. § 2656[f(d)(2)].” A.A. Br. 16 & n.2 (emphasis added).

Section 2656f(d)(2) defines “terrorism” as “premeditated,

politically motivated violence perpetrated against

28

D.

A.A. then argues that the executive branch’s own

actions cut against the Government’s argument that the Tier III

provision should apply to state actors. First, A.A. argues that

terrorism law and policy treat state actors differently, so we

should restrict the Tier III provision to non-state actors as a

means of abiding by this general norm of differential treatment.

A.A. specifically points to the United States’ sanctions against

Syria as evidence that it does not treat the Syrian government

as a terrorist organization, but rather as a state sponsor of

terrorism.

The Government responds that sanctions against state

sponsors of terrorism are not the executive branch’s exclusive

means of punishing state actors that engage in terrorist activity.

Sanctions are economic and targeted at states, whereas the

INA’s terrorist activity provisions impose immigration

consequences on individuals. A terrorist organization

designation under § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi) only has consequences

for the organization’s members, not for the organization itself.

noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine

agents.” A.A. points to the term “subnational groups” as

indicative of Congress’s intent to target non-state actors. We

are not persuaded. First, § 2656f(d)(2)’s definition of

“terrorism” applies to Tier I designations under § 1189, not

Tier III designations. Second, § 1189 provides that an entity

can be designated a Tier I organization based on either 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(3)(B) or 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2). A.A. offers no

reason why we should defer to § 2656f(d)(2)’s possibly more

restrictive definition, and we see no reason to do so.

29

A.A. also argues that since the USA PATRIOT Act

created the Tier III provision, neither the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”) nor the BIA has applied it to “the

armed forces of a national government,” or any other state

actor. A.A. Br. 26. Instead, A.A. claims, in cases involving

state actors, DHS has pursued the so-called persecutor bar. The

persecutor bar is a statutory exception to the INA definition of

“refugee.” That exception provides: “The term ‘refugee’ does

not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or

otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42)(B). A.A. cites three decisions involving state

actors where DHS pursued the persecutor bar but could have

pursued the material support bar through the Tier III provision.

See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (involving a

Eritrean military conscript); FH-T v. Holder, 723 F.3d 833 (7th

Cir. 2013) (involving a former member of a Eritrean rebel

movement who fled Eritrean national military service, where

the material support bar was raised with respect to his time in

the rebel movement but not his time fighting for the Eritrean

state); Matter of J.M. Alvarado, 27 I. & N. Dec. 27 (BIA 2017)

(involving an individual who served in the Salvadoran

National Guard during the Salvadoran Civil War).

We disagree with A.A.’s argument. In enforcing the

law, DHS has prosecutorial discretion to pursue (or not pursue)

whatever combination of inadmissibility grounds that it

chooses in enforcing the country’s immigration laws. See, e.g.,

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s

decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or

criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an

agency’s absolute discretion.”); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-

30

Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483–84 (1999) (noting

the long history of executive branch discretion to pursue or

abandon removal proceedings); Texas v. United States, 106

F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting the State of Texas’s

concession that 8 U.S.C. § 1103, describing the powers of the

Attorney General in immigration matters, “places no

substantive limits on the Attorney General and commits

enforcement of the INA to her discretion”). We see no reason

why the Government’s exercise of discretion to initiate

removal proceedings based on one inadmissibility ground over

another should impact the scope of the Tier III provision.

A.A. makes a similar argument that the Government has

never classified a state actor as a Tier I or Tier II organization,

and therefore, it would be incongruous to interpret the Tier III

provision to encompass state actors. However, on April 15,

2019, after A.A. filed his opening brief and before the

Government filed its response brief, the Secretary of State

designated the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (“IRG”) as a Tier

I terrorist organization. See In the Matter of the Designation

of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (and Other Aliases)

as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 84 Fed. Reg. 15278-01

(Apr. 15, 2019). And on April 24, 2019, the Secretary of State

published the Exemption from Tier III status for subgroups of

foreign governments. See Exemption, 84 Fed. Reg. 17230-01.

The Government points to the Tier I designation of the IRG as

evidence that the executive branch can and does designate state

actors as terrorist organizations. And the Government claims

that the Exemption “shows the executive branch consider[s]

that groups and subgroups of any foreign government can be

[Tier III] terrorist organizations.” Gov’t Br. 27. A.A. responds

that the “Executive Branch’s assertion of its ability to treat

foreign governments and their agencies as Tier III terrorist

31

organizations . . . is not determinative of whether Congress

ever gave it that authority.” A.A. Reply Br. 3.

We are again unconvinced by A.A.’s argument. A.A. is

correct that the executive’s assertion of statutory authority is

not determinative of whether it has such power. See Rucho v.

Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019) (“[I]t is ‘the

province and duty of the judicial department to say what the

law is.’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177

(1803))). However, the plain meaning of the Tier III provision

encompasses state actors. See supra Part III.B. The

Government has discretion to invoke one ground for removal

over another. Its choices do not narrow the plain meaning of

the Tier III provision, nor limit the Government’s otherwise

lawful powers.

E.

A.A. next claims that interpreting the Tier III provision

to encompass state actors conflicts with the United States’

treaty obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status

of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (the

“Convention”), and the 1967 United Nations Protocol relating

to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (the

“Protocol”), which “[binds] parties to comply with the

substantive provisions of Articles 2 through 34” of the

Convention. Khan, 584 F.3d at 782 (alteration in original)

(quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984)). A.A. argues

that the Protocol only permits exceptions to mandatory asylum

for aliens for whom there are “reasonable grounds for

regarding . . . as a danger to the security of the country where

he is.” A.A. Br. 40 (quoting Convention, Article 33(2)). A.A.

asserts that Congress incorporated the Protocol into domestic

32

law through the Refugee Act of 1980 (the “Refugee Act”),

which added language to § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv) that reflects the

language of Article 33(2). Section 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv) bars

aliens from refugee status where there are “reasonable grounds

to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United

States.” A.A. claims that more recently enacted terrorism

provisions are refracted through this exception, and thus, the

Protocol should guide our interpretation of § 1231(b)(3)(B)

and § 1182(a)(3)(B), including the Tier III provision.

Therefore, he argues, because certain inadmissibility grounds

under § 1182(a)(3)(B) automatically create “grounds” “to

believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United

States,” those inadmissibility grounds destroy the “reasonable”

requirement in § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv) and Article 33(2).

We recognize that “one of Congress’ primary purposes

in passing the Refugee Act was to implement the principles

agreed to in the [Protocol].” INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S.

415, 427 (1999) (quotation marks omitted). But we ultimately

conclude that the Protocol plays no role in our interpretation of

the Tier III provision.

First, the Protocol is not self-executing; that is, it does

not have any independent force absent implementing

legislation. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 534 n.2

(2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing a 1992 Senate

declaration of non-self-execution with respect to the Protocol);

United States v. Pinto–Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983)

(“[I]n enacting statutes, Congress is not bound by international

law.”); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 964 n.16 (5th Cir.

1986) (similar). Cf. Khan, 584 F.3d at 783 (discussing

differences between United States law and the Protocol).

Second, because the Protocol lacks independent force in

33

United States courts, we look to the text of the relevant statutes

to determine what Congress intended. Even where one of

Congress’s purposes in enacting a law was to execute one of

the United States’ international obligations, courts are bound

by the relevant statutes, not by sources of international law.

See, e.g., id. at 784 (holding that the INA’s definition of

“terrorist activity” controls in asylum determinations). Section

1227(a)(4)(B) provides that an alien who is inadmissible under

§ 1182(a)(3)(B) is automatically considered to be an alien with

respect to whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as

a danger to the security of the United States. See McAllister,

444 F.3d at 188. There is no evidence that Congress intended

§ 1227(a)(4)(B) to bind the United States to the terms of the

Protocol, and the plain meaning of the Tier III provision clearly

encompasses state actors, including the Militia.

IV.

The INA contains no statutory exception for

individuals, like A.A., who are forced to provide material

support to terrorist organizations. Sesay, 787 F.3d at 222–24

(“Congress has ‘delegat[ed] to the Secretary the sole authority

to waive the applicability of terrorist-related bars, . . . paid

specific attention to duress waivers,’ and ‘has appreciated the

distinction between voluntary and involuntary conduct.’”

(quoting Annachamy v. Holder, 733 F.3d 254, 263–64 (9th Cir.

2013))). The only recourse for aliens forced to serve a terrorist

organization and ensnared by the material support bar is a

possible administrative duress exemption. A.A. was denied

such an exemption. We asked the parties to submit

supplemental briefing on how the exemption process works

and why A.A. did not qualify for one.

34

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i), the Secretaries of

State and Homeland Security “may determine in such

Secretary’s sole unreviewable discretion that subsection

(a)(3)(B) shall not apply with respect to an alien within the

scope of that subsection or that subsection (a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)

shall not apply to a group within the scope of that subsection

[subject to limitations].” In 2007, the Secretary of Homeland

Security defined and implemented the duress exemption to the

material support bar. Exercise of Authority Under Sec.

212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 72

Fed. Reg. 9958-01 (Mar. 6, 2007). To receive a duress

exemption, an alien must first satisfy four threshold

requirements — that he or she:

a) Is seeking a benefit or protection under the

[INA] and [but for the material support bar] has

been determined to be otherwise eligible for the

benefit or protection;

b) Has undergone and passed relevant

background and security checks;

c) Has fully disclosed, in all relevant applications

and interviews with U.S. Government

representatives and agents, the nature and

circumstances of each provision of such material

support; and

d) Poses no danger to the safety and security of

the United States.

Id. USCIS also “may . . . consider[]” the following factors:

“whether the applicant reasonably could have avoided, or took

steps to avoid, providing material support”; “the severity and

type of harm inflicted or threatened, [and] to whom the harm

was directed”; “the perceived imminence of the harm

35

threatened[,] and the perceived likelihood that the harm would

be inflicted”; “the amount, type and frequency of material

support provided, the nature of the activities committed by the

terrorist organization, the alien’s awareness of those activities,

the length of time since material support was provided, the

alien’s conduct since that time, and any other relevant factor.”

Id. All of these factors are discretionary and, ultimately,

USCIS decides whether or not to grant an exemption based on

the “totality of the circumstances.” Id.

USCIS will only consider whether an alien should

receive an exemption after the alien’s order of removal

becomes final. See Department of Homeland Security

Implements Exemption Authority for Certain Terrorism-

Related Inadmissibility Grounds for Cases with

Administratively Final Orders of Removal, U.S. Citizenship

and Immigr. Servs. (Oct. 23, 2008),

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/TRIG/

USCIS_Process_Fact_Sheet_-

_Cases_in_Removal_Proceedings.pdf (explaining the

exemption process and exemption eligibility requirements).

Cases “in which the applicant appears eligible for the benefit

sought[,] but for the provision of material support[,] will be

subject to two levels of review and concurrence with the

adjudicating office’s recommendation.” USCIS Implementing

Memorandum, Gov’t Supp. Br. Ex. B, at 9. Further, USCIS

headquarters retains “authority to review each application and

will take appropriate steps to ensure agency-wide consistency

in application of the discretionary exemptions.” Id. There is

no administrative appeals process, and exemption decisions are

not subject to judicial review. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B)(i)

(exemptions granted in the “sole unreviewable discretion” of

the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security),

36

§ 1252(a)(2)(D) (judicial review of final orders of removal

limited to constitutional claims and questions of law).

A.A.’s removal order became administratively final on

December 30, 2016. His case was then submitted to USCIS

for evaluation. On December 18, 2018, USCIS declined to

grant A.A. an exemption. USCIS concluded that A.A. failed

to “fully disclose in all relevant applications and interviews . . .

the nature and circumstances of each provision of material

support to the” Militia. Notice of Determination, Gov’t Supp.

Br. Ex. C, at 3 (Dec. 18, 2018). USCIS noted that A.A.

“initially lied about [his] travel pattern out of fear that [he]

would have been immediately deported.” Id. at 6. USCIS also

noted that A.A. provided more comprehensive information to

the immigration court than he did during his interview at the

airport immediately after he arrived in the United States.

Because of these purported inconsistencies and USCIS’s

uncertainty about the details of A.A.’s military service, and

because A.A.’s “positive factors are insufficient to overcome

the negative factors,” USCIS refused to grant A.A. an

exemption. Id. at 7. As a result, while the administrative

duress exemption might have afforded A.A. the relief he

desired, it ultimately did not, and A.A. has no right to judicial

review of this decision.10

V.

For these reasons, we will deny A.A.’s petition for

review.

10

We have examined A.A.’s remaining arguments and have

found them unavailing.

37

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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