explaining that “[j]urisdiction must be expressly given to the courts of appeals in a statute”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[j]urisdiction must be expressly given to the courts of appeals in a statute”
- stating that criminal defendant’s right of appeal “is a statutorily created right.”
- dismissing appeal because it was not authorized by law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-20-00273-CR
Darrell J. Harper, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 147TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-DC-11-904087, THE HONORABLE CLIFFORD A. BROWN, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Darrel J. Harper filed a notice of appeal in this Court giving written
notice of appeal of an order denying a post-conviction “motion to forgive unpaid fines/court
costs” that he filed in the trial court.1
In Texas, appeals in a criminal case are permitted only when they are specifically
authorized by statute. State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011);
see Bayless v. State, 91 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that criminal
defendant’s right of appeal “is a statutorily created right.”). Thus, the standard for determining
1 Appellant was convicted of terroristic threat and retaliation, see Tex. Penal Code
§§ 22.07(a)(6), 36.06, and sentenced to six years in prison for each offense, see id. § 12.34. This
Court affirmed appellant’s convictions on appeal. See Harper v. State, No. 03-12-00075-CR,
2014 WL 1801747, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 30, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication). The record reflects that the district clerk sent appellant a Notice of Unpaid
Fines/Court Costs seeking payment of the court costs imposed in connection with his conviction
for terroristic threat. Appellant filed the above-described motion. The trial court signed an order
denying the motion.
whether an appellate court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a case “is not whether the
appeal is precluded by law, but whether the appeal is authorized by law.” Blanton v. State,
369 S.W.3d 894, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Abbott v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694, 696–97
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)); see Tex. Const. art. V, § 6(a) (providing that courts of appeals have
appellate jurisdiction “under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law”);
Ragston v. State, 424 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (explaining that “[j]urisdiction must
be expressly given to the courts of appeals in a statute”). We find no statutory authority granting
appellant the right to appeal the denial of a post-conviction motion seeking forgiveness of unpaid
statutorily mandated court costs imposed upon conviction. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.16
(requiring trial court to “adjudge the costs against the defendant, and order the collection
thereof” when punishment imposed is “any other than a fine”).
We hold that we lack jurisdiction in this appeal because there is no statutory
authority for the appeal that appellant attempts here. See, e.g., Staley v. State, 233 S.W.3d 337,
338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (dismissing appeal because it was not authorized by law).
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).
__________________________________________
Edward Smith, Justice
Before Justices Goodwin, Triana, and Smith
Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
Filed: August 28, 2020
Do Not Publish
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