Opinion

Tennyson v. Saver's Painting and Wallcovering, LLC.

  • 2019 TN WC App. 46
Court
Tennessee Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
Filed
Oct 16, 2019
Status
Published
On the bench
Marshall L. Davidson III, David F. Hensley, Timothy W. Conner
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.5%

The opinion

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

(HEARD OCTOBER 1, 2019, AT NASHVILLE)

Jeffery Tennyson ) Docket No. 2019-07-0218

)

v. ) State File No. 62368-2018

)

Saver’s Painting and )

Wallcovering, LLC, et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Allen Phillips, Judge )

Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded

This interlocutory appeal concerns a discovery dispute. Approximately eight months

after the employee sustained an injury at work, the employer filed a petition for benefit

determination and a motion requesting the court to compel the employee to submit to a

pre-mediation discovery deposition. The employer contended the deposition was needed

because of disputed issues involving causation and the employee’s alleged need for

additional medical care. The employee objected to the deposition but expressed a

willingness to submit to a one-hour deposition. The trial court decided the motion on the

written materials, concluding the employer was entitled to take the employee’s

deposition, but limited the deposition to one hour. The employer has appealed, asserting

the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the deposition to one hour. We affirm the

trial court’s conclusion that the employer is entitled to take the employee’s deposition,

reverse the trial court’s one-hour limitation on the duration of the deposition, and remand

the case.

Judge David F. Hensley delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding

Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined.

Peter Frech, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Saver’s Painting and

Wallcovering, LLC

Charles Holliday, Jackson, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Jeffery Tennyson

1

Factual and Procedural Background

On August 15, 2018, Jeffery Tennyson (“Employee”) suffered injuries when he

fell while working as a commercial painter for Saver’s Painting and Wallcovering, LLC

(“Employer”). Employer accepted the claim as compensable and began providing

medical benefits. 1 Employee received authorized medical care from Dr. John Brophy.

On November 12, 2018, Dr. Brophy signed a Final Medical Report Form C-30A

indicating that Employee had reached maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) on

November 7, 2018; that Employee was able to return to work without restrictions as of

the date he reached MMI; that the doctor did not anticipate the need for future medical

treatment for Employee’s injuries; and that Employee did not sustain a permanent

impairment as a result of his work-related injuries. On December 10, 2018, Dr. Samuel

Chung conducted an independent medical evaluation and stated in his report that

Employee retained fifteen percent impairment as a result of his work injuries.

In February 2019, Employer’s attorney sent interrogatories to Employee, who had

also retained an attorney. The following month, Employee’s attorney advised Employer

that Employee’s interrogatory responses would be coming soon and that Employee was

continuing to experience symptoms and wanted to return to a doctor. Following

Employer’s receipt of Employee’s interrogatory responses in April 2019, Employer

requested Employee’s deposition, advising Employee’s attorney that “based on Dr.

Brophy’s opinions, [Employer] will not consider authorizing further medical care.”

Employer stated that it “would like the opportunity to depose [Employee]” and requested

that Employee’s attorney provide available dates for Employee’s deposition. Employee’s

attorney objected to his client being deposed before the parties engaged in mediation but

agreed “to a [one] hour deposition.” Employer responded on April 24, 2018 by filing a

petition for benefit determination, which stated that “Employee’s counsel will not allow

his client to be deposed and is interfering with the discovery process.” Employer filed a

motion to compel discovery with its petition in which Employer requested that the trial

court compel Employee “to attend a deposition upon oral examination.”

In a response to Employer’s motion, Employee’s attorney stated that he had

requested mediation in January 2019, after which he was advised of the involvement of

Employer’s attorney in the claim, which was followed by Employer’s submission to

Employee of the written discovery requests. Employee’s response to the request for his

deposition asserted the purpose of mediation is “to limit time and expense for both

parties,” and the response further stated that a deposition should not be allowed, but that

“Employee stands by a willingness to submit to a limited one hour deposition for

pertinent issues as may be deemed necessary by Employer’s counsel.”

1

The trial court has not conducted an evidentiary hearing. We have gleaned the pertinent facts from the

parties’ pleadings, attachments to their pleadings, and their briefs on appeal.

2

There was no discovery plan and no scheduling order in place when the trial court

ruled on Employer’s motion. The court concluded that it did not need to hear arguments

to decide the discovery dispute and entered an order granting Employer’s motion to

compel a deposition. The court limited the deposition to one hour, explaining that

Employer “already has answers to its written discovery that should provide guidance for

a focused examination” of Employee. Employer has appealed.

Standard of Review

A trial court’s decision regarding pretrial discovery is discretionary and an

appellate court’s review of such a decision applies an “abuse of discretion” standard of

review. Doe 1 ex rel. Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, 154 S.W.3d 22, 42

(Tenn. 2005); Benton v. Snyder, 825 S.W.2d 409, 416 (Tenn. 1992); Loveall v. Am.

Honda Motor Co., 694 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tenn. 1985). An abuse of discretion is found if

the trial court “applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its

decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employ[ed] reasoning that

causes an injustice to the complaining party.” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton

Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008). “Whether a court applied an

incorrect legal standard is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.” Funk v. Scripps

Media, Inc., 570 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Tenn. 2019). We are required to “review a [trial]

court’s discretionary decision to determine (1) whether the factual basis for the decision

is properly supported by the evidence in the record, (2) whether the [trial] court properly

identified and applied the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision, and

(3) whether the [trial] court’s decision was within the range of acceptable alternative

dispositions.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524-25 (Tenn. 2010) (internal

citations omitted). The abuse of discretion standard does not permit us to merely

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. See Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363

S.W.3d 479, 487 (Tenn. 2012).

Analysis

Employer raises a single issue on appeal, contending the trial court abused its

discretion by limiting Employee’s deposition to one hour.2 Employer asserts that, absent

an adequate showing from Employee of specific facts justifying such a limitation, the

limitation was inappropriate and an abuse of the court’s discretion. We agree.

When the trial court ruled on Employer’s motion, the discovery process in the

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims was governed by Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg. 0800-

02-21-.16 (2018). 3 The regulation provided that when efforts to achieve discovery

2

Whether it is appropriate for Employer to depose Employee has not been raised as an issue on appeal.

3

The regulations were amended effective August 2019. The regulation governing the discovery process

is now located at Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.17 (2019).

3

informally failed, “discovery shall be sought and effectuated in accordance with the

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure unless these rules provide an alternate procedure.”

Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.16(1). Addressing depositions, the regulation

stated that “[a]ll depositions shall be taken within the timeframe provided by the

discovery plan in the scheduling order.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.16(5). 4

Further, the regulation provided that depositions “may be taken on oral examination or

upon written questions in the manner provided by the Tennessee Rules of Civil

Procedure,” and that “[n]o oral deposition shall continue for more than four (4) hours.”

Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.16(5)(a), (c).

Employee’s position on appeal is that “a one hour deposition . . . is entirely

appropriate under the circumstances and is in no way an abuse of discretion.” We begin

our analysis of whether the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the deposition to

one hour with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 26.02 contemplates that a

trial court may limit the scope of discovery and provides that the “frequency or extent” of

the discovery methods

shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is

unreasonably cumulative or duplicative or is obtainable from some other

source that is more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive; (ii) the

party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the

action to obtain the information sought; or, (iii) the discovery is unduly

burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the

amount in controversy, limitations on the parties’ resources, and the

importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 26.02(1).

Rule 26.03 authorizes the court in which the action is pending to “make any order

which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,

oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Importantly, the rule provides for such

protections “[u]pon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought,

and for good cause shown.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 26.03. In the instant case, Employee did

not file a motion or other pleading requesting a protective order as contemplated in Rule

26.03. Rather, Employee’s response to the motion to compel stated that Employer was

“requesting essentially all of the same discovery methods that would take place after a

claim is filed,” and the response asserted “there is no legitimate basis for an open ended

deposition . . . prior to a[n] initial mediation even taking place.” In the trial court,

Employee contended the applicable discovery regulation “dictates that discovery may not

4

The regulation was amended to provide that “[a]ll depositions must be taken within the timeframe in the

schedulLQJ order, or if no scheduling order exists, within the time allowed by the Tennessee Rules of

Civil Procedure.”

4

take place prior to a Petition for Benefit Determination being filed.” Although Employee

has not filed such a petition, Employer filed a petition on April 24, 2019, simultaneously

with its motion to compel discovery. Employee’s response to the motion in the trial court

asserted that “no deposition should be allowed,” but further contended that “Employee

stands by a willingness to submit to a limited one hour deposition for pertinent issues as

may be deemed necessary by Employer’s counsel.”

Employee’s response to the motion to compel discovery made no effort to show

“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” as contemplated in

Rule 26.03. The response did not suggest or show that the deposition should be limited

for any of the reasons specified in Rule 26.02(1). Instead, Employee argued that

permitting pre-mediation discovery was inconsistent with the general goals of the

workers’ compensation system. On appeal, Employee asserts “[i]t is only if a claim is

not resolved [in the initial mediation stage with the Bureau] that a claim is essentially

transferred to the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims,” and that “[t]o allow

protracted discovery even before the initial mediation takes place would defeat the entire

purpose of the workers’ compensation act in attempting to limit parties[’] litigation costs

and expenses.”

Neither the Bureau’s regulations addressing discovery nor the Tennessee Rules of

Civil Procedure condition depositions or any other method of discovery on the parties

having participated in mediation. Indeed, both the regulations in effect at the time the

trial court ruled on Employer’s motion to compel discovery and the regulations currently

in effect provide that interrogatories may be served on any party at any time after a

petition for benefit determination has been filed. The regulations do not condition the

taking of depositions on the parties having participated in mediation and provide that

depositions are to be taken in the manner provided by the Tennessee Rules of Civil

Procedure. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg. 0800-02-21-.16(5)(a) (2016); 0800-02-21-

.17(3)(a) (2019). The 2016 regulation requiring depositions to be taken within the

timeframe of a scheduling order was intended to prohibit depositions from being taken

after the expiration of the deadline provided in the scheduling order, which is consistent

with the regulation as amended in 2019. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg. 0800-02-21-

.17(3)(a) (2019) (“All depositions must be taken within the timeframe in the scheduling

order, or if no scheduling order exists, within the time allowed by the Tennessee Rules of

Civil Procedure.”). Moreover, with certain exceptions specifically addressed in Rule

30.01, the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure allow depositions to be taken “[a]fter

commencement of the action,” and, under certain circumstances, both before an action is

commenced and pending appeal. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 27.01 and 27.02.

The Bureau’s regulations provide a four-hour limit on the length of oral

depositions. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg. 0800-02-21-.16(5)(c) (2016); 0800-02-21-

.17(3)(c) (2019). In its order granting Employer’s motion to compel discovery, the trial

court noted that “[t]he only limitation on the length of a deposition is four hours.”

5

Nonetheless, the court limited Employer’s examination of Employee to one hour, stating

that “[i]n so holding, the Court considers that [Employer] already has answers to its

written discovery that should provide guidance for a focused examination of

[Employee].” Absent specific findings by the trial court constituting “good cause shown”

to protect Employee from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or

expense” as contemplated in Rule 26.03, we hold that the trial court’s reasoning for

imposing the one hour limitation on Employee’s deposition without identifying a

sufficient factual basis for the limitation resulted in an injustice to Employer and

constituted an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.5

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s decision to allow Employer to take Employee’s

deposition and reverse the trial court’s one-hour limit placed on the deposition. The case

is remanded. Costs on appeal are taxed to Employee.

5

If, as is argued by Employee, restrictions should be placed on pre-mediation discovery, it is the role of

either the General Assembly to enact such restrictions or the Bureau’s Administrator to promulgate rules

addressing the restrictions.

6

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

(HEARD OCTOBER 1, 2019, AT NASHVILLE)

Jeffery Tennyson ) Docket No. 2019-07-0218

)

v. ) State File No. 62368-2018

)

Saver’s Painting and )

Wallcovering, LLC, et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Allen Phillips, Judge )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced

case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 16th day

of October, 2019.

Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:

Mail Mail Fax Email

Charles L. Holliday X chuckh@garretylaw.com

ghayes@garretylaw.com

Jay DeGroot X jdegroot@garretylaw.com

Peter Frech X ppfrech@mijs.com

Christopher R. Brooks X crbrooks@mijs.com

Allen Phillips, Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov

Workers’ Compensation Claims

Jeanette Baird

Deputy Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-0064

Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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