Opinion

Mitchell, Dwight v. Randstad North America

  • 2016 TN WC App. 37
Court
Tennessee Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
Filed
Aug 11, 2016
Status
Published
On the bench
Marshall L. Davidson III, David F. Hensley, Timothy W. Conner
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.5%

“In the absence of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must conclusively presume that every fact admissible under the pleadings was found or should have been found favorably to the appellee.”

How later courts described this case

  • “In the absence of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must conclusively presume that every fact admissible under the pleadings was found or should have been found favorably to the appellee.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Dwight Mitchell ) Docket No. 2015-06-0954

) 2015-06-0955

v. )

) State File No. 88416-2015

Randstad North America, et al. ) 88417-2015

)

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge )

Affirmed and Remanded—Filed August 11, 2016

This interlocutory appeal involves an employee and employer who reached a settlement

for work-related injuries suffered by the employee on April 9, 2014, prior to the date the

trial court acquired subject matter jurisdiction under the 2013 Reform Act. The

settlement, which closed the employee’s right to future medical treatment, included

language describing two alleged aggravating events occurring after July 1, 2014, as

within the scope of the settlement. The agreement was approved by the Davidson County

Circuit Court. Subsequently, the employee filed petitions for benefit determination

seeking additional benefits for injuries that were identified as the aggravations described

in the settlement documents. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court denied

benefits on the basis that the parties’ prior court-approved settlement encompassed the

injuries for which the employee sought benefits. The employee has appealed. We affirm

the trial court’s decision and remand the case.

Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board, in which

Judge David F. Hensley and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined.

Dwight Mitchell, Madison, Tennessee, employee-appellant, pro se

Troy Hart, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, Randstad North America

1

Opinion

Dwight Mitchell (“Employee”) is a fifty-three-year-old resident of Davidson

County, Tennessee, who was employed by Randstad North America (“Employer”). 1 On

April 9, 2014, Employee suffered injuries that were accepted as compensable and for

which workers’ compensation benefits were provided. Employee alleged that on

September 23, 2014, he suffered an aggravation of his injuries while on light duty and, on

March 12, 2015, suffered a second aggravation while participating in physical therapy

necessitated by the April 9 work injury.

On November 25, 2015, the parties appeared before the Davidson County Circuit

Court for approval of a settlement agreement. The agreement reflected Employee’s

assertion that on April 9, 2014, he was involved in a work-related accident and sustained

injuries to his back, neck, legs, arms, head, hips, and chest. The agreement further

described the alleged aggravations of these injuries on September 23, 2014, and March

12, 2015.

The Davidson County Circuit Court approved the settlement, for which Employee

was paid $25,000 in a lump sum. The court’s order approving the settlement noted that

this payment was for “full, final and complete settlement and discharge of [Employer]

and its insurer from any further liability to [Employee] for any claimed medical condition

or disability . . . by reason of said alleged accident or aggravations.” (Emphasis added.)

The order further reflects that Employer would not be responsible for any “past, present

or future medical expenses” related to the alleged injuries. The joint petition setting out

the terms of the settlement agreement and presented to the judge for approval

acknowledged that the parties “agree that there is always the possibility of later

manifestations of injury, further and additional disability and resulting medical expenses,

nonetheless, in consideration of the foregoing possibility or probability, all parties enter

into this settlement agreement in lieu of any other workers’ compensation . . . benefits.”

Thereafter, Employee filed two petitions for benefit determination with the Bureau

of Workers’ Compensation, seeking additional benefits based on the alleged aggravating

events on September 23, 2014 and March 12, 2015. Following a hearing at which

Employee testified, the trial court found that Employee sustained an injury on April 9,

2014, and sustained aggravations of that injury on September 23, 2014 and March 12,

2015. The trial court went on to observe that “[b]y the plain language of the agreement,

which he testified he read, reviewed, signed and understood ‘at the time,’ [Employee]

expressly acknowledged aggravations of a prior work-related injury on September 23,

2014, and March 12, 2015.” In denying relief, the trial court also noted that Employee

1

The record does not contain a transcript of the proceedings in the trial court or a statement of the

evidence presented at the expedited hearing. Thus, we have gleaned the facts from the documents and

exhibits filed in the trial court, including the trial court’s June 17, 2016 expedited hearing order.

2

accepted a lump-sum payment as a “full, final and complete settlement and discharge of

[Employer] from any further liability . . . by reason of said alleged accident or

aggravations.” Employee has appealed.

To the extent Employee alleges that he suffered distinct, compensable injuries on

September 23, 2014 and March 12, 2015 for which he is owed benefits under post-reform

law, there is nothing in the record beyond Employee’s bare allegations supporting such a

claim. To the extent Employee alleges that he suffered aggravations on September 23,

2014 and March 12, 2015 entitling him to additional benefits under pre-reform law and

that the parties’ court-approved settlement should be set aside, such arguments should be

addressed to the Davidson County Circuit Court. We note that prior to this action,

Employee characterized the incidents at issue as aggravations of the April 9, 2014 injury,

which were specifically addressed in the parties’ court-approved settlement.

We also note that, although a hearing was held in this case and testimony was

presented to the trial court, no transcript or statement of the evidence has been filed.

Thus, the totality of the evidence introduced in the trial court is unknown, and we decline

to speculate as to the nature and extent of the proof presented to the trial court. Instead,

consistent with established Tennessee law, we must presume that the trial court’s rulings

were supported by sufficient evidence. Vulcan Materials Co. v. Watson, No. M2003-

00975-WC-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 451, at *7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel May 19,

2004) (“In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, this Court must presume the trial

court’s rulings were supported by sufficient evidence.”); Leek v. Powell, 884 S.W.2d 118,

121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (“In the absence of a transcript or a statement of the evidence,

we must conclusively presume that every fact admissible under the pleadings was found

or should have been found favorably to the appellee.”).2

Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of the requested benefits is affirmed. The

case is remanded for any further proceedings that may be necessary.

2

Employee has filed motions asking that we consider certain documents that were not admitted into

evidence and that this case be set for oral argument. These motions are denied. Also, while not entirely

clear, Employee appears to raise issues concerning the effect of a lump sum payment on a party’s ability

to set aside a settlement and that he was terminated in retaliation for bringing a workers’ compensation

claim. The argument Employee makes concerning the lump sum payment is not relevant to our review of

the trial court’s order, and neither we nor the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims has jurisdiction to

consider any allegations of retaliatory discharge.

3

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Dwight Mitchell ) Docket No. 2015-06-0954

) 2015-06-0955

v. )

) State File No. 88416-2015

Randstad North America, et al. ) 88417-2015

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the

referenced case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service

on this the 11th day of August, 2016.

Name Certified First Class Via Fax Via Email Address

Mail Mail Fax Number Email

Dwight Mitchell X X Dwightmitchell1222@yahoo.com;

323 Forest Park Rd. 4-5, Madison TN

37115

Charlie Pierce X cepierce@mijs.com

Troy Hart X wth@mijs.com

Kenneth M. Switzer, X Via Electronic Mail

Chief Judge

Penny Shrum, Clerk, X Penny.Patterson-Shrum@tn.gov

Court of Workers’

Compensation Claims

Matthew Salyer

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-1606

Electronic Mail: Matthew.Salyer@tn.gov

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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