Johnson, Dorothy v. Pilgrim's Pride, Inc., et al.

FILED

April 27, 2016

TENNESSEE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

APPEALS BOARD

Time: 9:10 A.M.

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Dorothy J. Johnson ) Docket No. 2015-01-0273

)

v. )

) StateFileNo. 26715-2015

Pilgrim's Pride, Inc., et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers' )

Compensation Claims )

Thomas Wyatt, Judge )

Affirmed and Certified as Final -April 27, 2016

In this appeal of an order denying the employee's motion to alter, amend, or set aside an

approved workers' compensation settlement agreement, the employee admittedly signed

an agreement that resolved her claim for workers' compensation benefits on a "doubtful

and disputed basis." The employee wrote below her signature a notation, which

purported to say "stress duress," though she did not bring this notation to the attention of

the trial judge during the approval hearing. After questioning the employee at the

approval hearing, the trial court entered an order approving the settlement. In response to

the employee's subsequent untitled motion seeking to alter, amend, or set aside the

settlement agreement due to "stress, duress and mental anguish," the trial court denied the

motion and the employee appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the

trial court' s decision and certify the trial court's order as final.

Judge Timothy W. Conner delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board, in which Judge

Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge David F. Hensley joined.

Dorothy J. Johnson, Chattanooga, Tennessee, employee-appellant, prose

Cliff Wilson and Michelle Reid, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee,

Pilgrim's Pride, Inc.

1

Factual and Procedural Background

Dorothy Johnson ("Employee"), a resident of Hamilton County, Tennessee,

alleged to have injured her left hand on March 17, 2015, while working at Pilgrim's

Pride, Inc. ("Employer"). Employer provided a panel of physicians, from which

Employee selected Dr. Terry Smith at Occupational Health Services. Dr. Smith's April

2, 2015 report indicated that Employee "bumped her wrist on a piece of machinery." He

noted complaints of left hand pain and occasional numbness, and he diagnosed a left

hand contusion and strain, a possible ganglion cyst, and occasional numbness in her

middle finger. On a document entitled "Statement of Activity Work Status," also dated

April 2, 2015, Dr. Smith recommended that Employee "may need to see PCP if a

ganglion." He did not offer a causation opinion, but commented in his dictated note that

"according to the representative, ganglion cysts are not covered under their Workman's

Compensation. She may need to go and see her PCP."

Thereafter, Employee sought treatment on her own with Dr. Jason Rehm. In an

April 27, 2015 report, Dr. Rehm noted that Employee "struck the left volar wrist against a

hard metal object at work." She noted later that evening the development of a "fairly

large wrist mass." She also reported numbness and tingling in fingers on her left hand.

Following his examination, Dr. Rehm told Employee that she needed "carpal tunnel

release and exploration of the mass with either excision of the cystic mass or . . .

reconstructive surgery on the ulner [sic] artery if an aneurysm is found." With respect to

the issue of medical causation, Dr. Rehm stated, "I have no other reason other [sic] to

think that this mass and subsequent pain and paresthesias are a result of the volar

traumatic blow to the wrist in March."

Employee was also evaluated by Dr. Channappa Chandra at OrthoSouth, who

noted Employee "was picking up a box and was putting it down on the line and hit the

hand." Dr. Chandra diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome and a ganglion cyst. He also

recommended surgery, but did not comment on medical causation. The surgery, though

not authorized by Employer, was completed soon thereafter.

On November 12, 2015, Employee appeared at an office of the Bureau of

Workers' Compensation in Chattanooga to review proposed settlement documents with

counsel for Employer. The settlement entitled Employee to a lump sum payment in

consideration of a full and complete resolution of her claim on a "doubtful and disputed"

basis. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-240(e) (2015). Employee signed the written

settlement agreement, but made a notation beneath her signature which purported to read

"stress duress." 1 Employee also signed a form entitled "Explanation of Workers'

Compensation Benefits" and a Statistical Data Form ("SD-1 "), neither of which had any

additional notations near Employee's signature. Following the questioning of Employee

1

The handwriting is semi-legible and appears to say "stree drustree."

2

by the trial court, during which Employee affirmed her desire to proceed with the

settlement, the court entered an order approving the settlement agreement.

On December 9, 2015, Employee filed an untitled motion alleging she had signed

her name "under stress, duress and mental anguish, there by [sic] reneging [sic] the

agreement making [it] null and void." In a handwritten statement admitted during the

motion hearing, Employee further alleged that counsel for Employer had "withheld

doctor's report." She also wrote that "undue influence is a milder form of duress than

physical harm or threats" and "the contract is voidable by the party who has been unfairly

persuaded." In support of this statement, she cited a case decided by the South Carolina

Supreme Court.

On January 12, 2016, the trial court entered an order declining to set aside the

settlement order, reasoning that Employee "did not come forward with evidence

establishing that she was incompetent to make a legally binding decision on November

12, 2015." Moreover, the court determined that Employee "has not shown sufficient

grounds to entitle her under Rule 60.02 to set aside the settlement into which she

entered." Employee timely appealed this order.

Standard of Review

The standard of review to be applied by this Board in reviewing a trial court's

decision is statutorily mandated and limited in scope. Specifically, "[t]here shall be a

presumption that the findings and conclusions of the workers' compensation judge are

correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-

6-239(c)(7) (2015). The trial court's decision must be upheld unless the rights of a party

"have been prejudiced because findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of a

workers' compensation judge:

(A) Violate constitutional or statutory provisions;

(B) Exceed the statutory authority of the workers' compensation judge;

(C) Do not comply with lawful procedure;

(D) Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or

clearly an unwarranted exercise of discretion;

(E) Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and material

in the light of the entire record."

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(3) (2015). Like other courts applying the standards

embodied in section 50-6-217(a)(3), we will not disturb the decision of the trial court

absent the limited circumstances identified in the statute.

3

Analysis

Settlements

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-240 governs the settlement of workers'

compensation claims with dates of injury on or after July 1, 2014. The statute authorizes

a workers' compensation judge to approve a settlement if two criteria are met: (1) the

settlement agreement has been signed by the parties and (2) the judge "has determined

that the employee is receiving, substantially, the benefits provided by this chapter or, in

cases subject to subsection (d), if the workers' compensation judge has determined that

the settlement is in the best interest of the employee." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-240(a)

(2015). Subsection (e) of this statute provides as follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if there is a dispute

between the parties as to whether a claim is compensable, or as to the

amount of compensation due, the parties may settle the matter without

regard to whether the employee is receiving substantially the benefits

provided by this chapter; provided, that the settlement is determined by a

workers' compensation judge to be in the best interest of the employee.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-240(e) (2015). In this case, the parties sought and received

approval from the trial court to settle the case consistent with the statute.

Post-Judgment Motions

There are several ways in which a party may seek relief following the entry of an

order or judgment. One such way is Rule 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure,

which provides a party the opportunity to ask a court to alter or amend a judgment. Such

motions must be filed within thirty days of the entry of the order that is the subject of the

motion. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 (2015).

In Savage v. Hildenbrandt, No. M1999-00630-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App.

LEXIS 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2001), a party filed several post-judgment motions,

including a "motion to reconsider." The trial judge treated the latter as a motion to alter

or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59.04. Id. at * 11. The same party then filed

another motion pursuant to Rule 60.02 for relief from the judgment. Id. at *30. In

considering the various post-judgment motions on appeal, the Court of Appeals explained

that "Tenne~see's rules governing civil and appellate procedure promote the use of Tenn.

R. Civ. P. 59 motions because they prevent needless appeals by providing trial courts

with an opportunity to correct errors before a judgment becomes final." Id. at *33. The

court further explained that "a timely filed Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion suspends the time

for filing a notice of appeal." Id. The court determined that the trial court was correct

when it construed the "motion to reconsider" as a Rule 59.04 motion. Id. at *27-28. The

4

court then concluded that the "denial of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion in a non-jury

case brings up the underlying judgment for review." Id. at *39.

A second avenue for post-judgment relief can be found in Rule 60.02, which

specifies the reasons a court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order or

proceeding 2 :

( 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;

(2) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of the adverse party;

(3) the judgment is void;

(4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged ... ; or

(5) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 (2015). Although, in this case, Employee's filings on appeal are

silent as to the precise basis for her claim for relief, her statements can reasonably be

interpreted to allege "fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct of the adverse party," or

"any other reason justifying relief," as noted in Rule 60.02. See Bemis Co. v. Hones, 585

S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tenn. 1979) (courts must consider motions by their substance rather

than their title).

In Furlough v. Spherion At/. Workforce, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 114 (Tenn. 2013), a

workers' compensation claimant sought to set aside a settlement pursuant to Rule 60.02.

The trial court had granted the employee's motion, finding that, although an attorney

attended the mediation with the employee at which the settlement was reached, the

employee had not received proper legal counsel concerning the benefits to which he was

entitled. Id. at 121. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court

improperly granted the motion. Id. at 137. The Court first explained that relief under

Rule 60.02 is "rare and disfavored" and is "an exceptional remedy." Id. at 127. With

respect to subparagraph (5), the Court further reasoned that Rule 60.02(5) "does not

relieve a party from his or her free, calculated, and deliberate choices." Id. at 128.

Moreover, "the rule affords relief in the most extreme, unique, exceptional, or

extraordinary cases." Id.

In another case, Hooper v. Kathy Freeman Trucking, Inc., No. M2007-00794-WC-

R3-WC, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel Apr. 22, 2008), the

Tennessee Supreme Court's Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel addressed an

employee's Rule 60 motion to set aside a court-approved settlement agreement. In

addition to his Rule 60 motion, the employee filed affidavits alleging that he

misunderstood the nature of the settlement and did not appreciate that a "disputed"

2

A final order or judgment is one that resolves all the issues in the case, "leaving nothing else for the trial

court to do." In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Tenn. 2003).

s

settlement would result in the termination of medical benefits. Id. at * 14-15. The

employee's Rule 60 motion was based on "mistake or excusable neglect." Id. at* 14. In

affirming the trial court's decision to set aside the settlement, the Appeals Panel

reasoned, "the absence of any explanation of the nature of the alleged dispute regarding

compensability is significant." Id. at 15. The Appeals Panel then concluded that, without

some explanation of the nature of the compensability dispute, the trial court properly

granted the motion. Id. at *15-16.

Finally, in Henderson v. SAIA, Inc., 318 S.W.3d 328 (Tenn. 2010), the Tennessee

Supreme Court addressed a similar motion. The employee in Henderson settled her

claim for workers' compensation benefits and then later attempted to have the settlement

set aside pursuant to Rule 60.02. Id. at 331. Unlike in the present case, the employee in

Henderson had not appeared personally before the judge for the approval hearing, but had

submitted an affidavit for the judge's review. Id. at 333.

In considering the employee's motion to set aside the judgment in Henderson, the

Supreme Court explained, "[t]he general purpose of Rule 60.02 is 'to alleviate the effect

of an oppressive or onerous final judgment."' Id. at 336 (quoting Black v. Black, 166

S.W.3d 699, 703 (Tenn. 2005)). The Court cautioned that "relief under Rule 60.02 is not

meant to be used in every case in which the circumstances of a party change after the

entry of a judgment or order, nor by a party who is merely dissatisfied with a particular

outcome. Instead, relief is appropriate only in those relatively few instances that meet the

criteria of the rule." Id. (citation omitted). The Court further reasoned as follows:

Rule 60.02 has been described as an "escape valve from possible inequity

that might otherwise arise from the unrelenting imposition of the principle

of finality imbedded in our procedural rules." "Out of respect for the

finality afforded to legal proceedings, this 'escape valve' should not be

easily opened." Accordingly, a party seeking relief from a judgment under

Rule 60.02 bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to relief by clear

and convincing evidence.

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 3 Thus, an employee seeking to set aside an

order approving a workers' compensation settlement agreement in accordance with Rule

60.02 must present clear and convincing evidence supporting a basis to set aside the

order. Moreover, on appeal, a trial court's decision to grant or deny such a motion will

be upheld unless the appellate court determines that the trial court abused its discretion.

Id. at 335.

3

In her brief filed on appeal, Employee cites several cases, including Crocker v. Schneider, 683 S.W.2d

335 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984), and Johnson v. Ford, 245 S.W.531 (Tenn. 1922). These cases involve

agreements between parties to real estate transactions and/or construction contracts and are not applicable

to a court-approved workers' compensation settlement agreement.

6

Application ofLaw to Facts

In the present case, Employee's untitled post-settlement motion did not specify the

type of motion being filed. Regardless of whether Rule 59.04 or Rule 60.02 applies, we

conclude that Employee is not entitled to relief.

With respect to Rule 59.04, Employee does not allege an error in the order, a

mistake of fact, or an error in the application of the law. Her motion alleged that she

signed her name "under stress, duress and mental anguish." She did not allege, however,

that she was mentally incompetent to enter into the settlement agreement or that she was

somehow forced to do so. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial

court abused its discretion in denying her motion to set aside the settlement when

analyzed pursuant to this rule.

With respect to Rule 60.02(1), Employee does not allege that she failed to

understand the terms of the settlement, that there was a mistake in the settlement

documents, or that she inadvertently entered into the settlement agreement. To the

contrary, it is apparent from the face of the settlement documents that Employee signed

the Settlement Agreement, the Explanation of Workers' Compensation Benefits, and the

SD-1. Both the settlement agreement and the SD-1 clearly reflected the terms of the

settlement. In addition, the agreement expressly referenced section 50-6-240(e) and

described the settlement terms as "doubtful and disputed." The agreement also reflected

the parties' mutual acknowledgment that "this compromised settlement of Employee's

doubtful and disputed claim is in her best interest." Further, the trial court's order

approving the settlement stated that "the Employee has reached a compromise settlement

of this doubtful and disputed claim, which is in Employee's best interest." Thus, we

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Employee

failed to establish sufficient legal grounds supporting her motion to set aside the order

based on Rule 60.02(1).

Moreover, we agree with the trial court that there was no evidence of fraud,

misrepresentation, or misconduct on the part of the adverse party as contemplated in Rule

60.02(2). While Employee alleged that she was not shown certain medical records at the

settlement approval hearing, she admitted that she did not ask Employer's counsel for

medical records at or prior to the settlement hearing. She offered no evidence that she

asked for her medical records from any physician's office or that she requested a delay in

the settlement approval hearing to give her an opportunity obtain any such records.

Finally, we see nothing in the record evidencing "any other reason justifying relief

from the operation of the judgment" as reflected in Rule 60.02(5). Employee informed

the trial court during the settlement approval hearing that she was "in financial distress,"

which is consistent with her claim that she added the notation "stress duress" under her

signature on the settlement agreement. However, she acknowledged she had the right to

7

"walk away from the proposed settlement if she wished" and, even after the issue of her

financial distress was discussed, she affirmed to the court that she wanted to proceed with

the settlement. She also told the court that she understood the terms of the settlement and

that she understood she was waiving her right to a trial.

Upon a careful review of this record, we find no basis to conclude that the trial

court abused its discretion in declining to relieve Employee of the terms of the settlement

agreement and order approving the settlement. Despite Employee's contention that she

was under "stress" and "duress," this, standing alone, does not negate an individual's

ability to make a reasoned decision to proceed with a settlement.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its direction in

denying Employee's motion to alter, amend, or set aside the approved settlement

agreement. We further find that the trial court's decision does not violate any of the

standards set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-217(a)(3). Accordingly,

the trial court's decision is affirmed and the Order Denying Motion to Aside Settlement

Order is certified as final.

y . Conner, Judge

'Compensation Appeals Board

8

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Dorothy J. Johnson ) Docket No. 2015-01-0273

)

v. )

) State File No. 26715-2015

Pilgrim’s Pride, Inc., et al. )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the

referenced case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service

on this the 27th day of April, 2016.

Name Certified First Class Via Fax Via Email Address

Mail Mail Fax Number Email

Dorothy J. Johnson X jdorothy2010@gmail.com

Cliff Wilson X cwilson@howardtatelaw.com

Michelle Reid X mreid@howardtatelaw.com

Thomas Wyatt, Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, X Via Electronic Mail

Chief Judge

Penny Shrum, Clerk, X Penny.Patterson-Shrum@tn.gov

Court of Workers’

Compensation Claims

Matthew Salyer

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-1606

Electronic Mail: Matthew.Salyer@tn.gov