Opinion

Pool, Ronald v. Jarmon D&Q Transport

  • 2016 TN WC App. 1
Court
Tennessee Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
Filed
Jan 4, 2016
Status
Published
On the bench
Marshall L. Davidson III, David F. Hensley, Timothy W. Conner
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.4%

The opinion

FILED

January 4, 2016

TENNESSEE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

APPEALS BOARD

Time: 1 :35 P. M.

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Ronald Pool ) Docket No. 2015-06-0510

)

v. )

) State File No. 48782-2015

Jarmon D&Q Transport )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers' )

Compensation Claims )

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge )

Vacated and Remanded-Filed January 4, 2016

In this interlocutory appeal, the employee alleges he suffered an occupational disease as a

result of exposure to mold in his employment as a shuttle van driver. The employer

denied the claim, asserting that the employee failed to give timely notice of his alleged

condition and that the employee's condition did not arise primarily out of the

employment. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court concluded that the

employee presented sufficient evidence from which the court determined he would likely

prevail at a hearing on the merits with respect to the notice issue. Thus, the trial court

ordered the employer to authorize medical treatment by a specialist for the purpose of

obtaining a causation opinion. The employer has appealed. Because neither the parties

nor the trial court addressed the statutory notice requirements applicable to a claim for

benefits resulting from an occupational disease, we vacate the trial court's order and

remand the case for the trial court's consideration of the applicable statutory notice

requirements.

Judge David F. Hensley delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board, in which Judge

Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined.

Duane Willis, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Jarmon D&Q Transport

Ronald Pool, Clarksville, Tennessee, pro se

1

Factual and Procedural Background

Ronald Pool ("Employee") is a forty-seven-year-old resident of Montgomery

County, Tennessee, who began working as a shuttle van driver with Jarmon D&Q

Transport ("Employer") in July 2014. For approximately five weeks from September 19,

2014 to October 25, 2014, Employee worked primarily for another company driving

shuttle vans, but he also worked on weekends during this period for Employer.

Thereafter, he returned to full-time work with Employer. He claims he began

experiencing severe headaches and respiratory problems, including frequently recurring

sinus infections, as a result of inhaling mold in the shuttle vehicles he operated for

Employer.

In an affidavit filed in support of his Request for Expedited Hearing, Employee

stated that at the end of 2014 and in January 2015, he began having upper respiratory

symptoms "from mold in the vehicles at work." In February 2015, Employee was

diagnosed with asthma and was prescribed inhalers by providers at the Tennessee

Department of Health ("Health Department") in Clarksville where he was seen with a

complaint of shortness of breath. At a subsequent visit to the Health Department on

March 30, 2015, he complained of shortness of breath and a "sinus infection" for three

weeks. On April 25, 2015, he sought emergency care at Gateway Medical Center

("Gateway") due to complaints of "chest pain [and] shortness of breath." The Gateway

report states that the "[m]ost likely cause of his pain is pneumonia," and that he "does

have cardiac risk factors and I cannot exclude a cardiac source for his pain." Employee

testified that soon after his treatment at Gateway "my fears set in and I started my own

investigation in private."

Employee testified that on June 25, 2015, he "sought help from my immediate

supervisor Tim Hembree," telling him that he "required medical treatment with a

workers' compensation doctor." According to Employee, "I brought to his attention

evidence of mold in a petri tray and - in petri trays and results that I had from my

investigation on the vehicle that I was hired to work in." Employer completed a First

Report of Work Injury on the same date, which described how the "injury" occurred as

follows: "[Employee] came to the supervisor with mold samples that he got from the

vans that is causing [Employee] an allergic reaction to sinus area."

Employer provided a panel of physicians on June 25, 2015, and Employee was

seen the following day by Dr. Giriprasadarao Korivi, whom Employee selected from the

panel. The history of present illness in Dr. Korivi's June 26, 2015 report states that

Employee "has had recurrent 'sinus problems' [and] sinus infections off and on," and

notes that Employee "feels fine when he is not working." The report states that

Employee "says it is an indoor air quality issue at work and is causing his allergies and

repeated sinus infections." Employee was diagnosed at the June 26, 2015 visit with

"[a]llergic rhinitis, cause unspecified." The assessment states "[w]orker in work-related

2

accident," and includes an "allergy & immunology referral." Employee was released to

work, but was instructed to "[a]void allergen exposure."

Employer offered a panel of allergists on July 2, 2015, from which Employee

chose Dr. John Overholt. Before Employee could see Dr. Overholt, Employer denied the

claim on July 7, 2015, stating in a letter to Employee that his claim was not compensable

due to a "[l]ack of [i]njury as defined by [Tennessee Code Annotated] Section 50-6-301."

Employee filed a Petition for Benefit Determination requesting medical and

temporary disability benefits. Following unsuccessful mediation, Employee requested an

expedited hearing, which was conducted on November 10, 2015. The trial court

determined that Employee presented sufficient evidence "from which this . Court

concludes that he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits regarding the sufficiency

of notice." Additionally, the trial court found that although Employee did not establish

by a preponderance of the evidence that his condition was work-related, he met the lesser

standard of proof required in an expedited hearing for medical benefits to be initiated

prior to trial. The court ordered Employer to provide an evaluation by Dr. Overholt, the

allergist Employee selected from the Employer-provided panel. Employer timely filed a

notice of appeal questioning ( 1) whether the evidence preponderates against the trial

court's determination that Employee gave timely notice of his alleged occupational

disease, and (2) whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's conclusion

1

that Employee is entitled to medical benefits.

Standard of Review

The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court's decision is statutorily mandated

and limited in scope. Specifically, "[t]here shall be a presumption that the findings and

conclusions of the workers' compensation judge are correct, unless the preponderance of

the evidence is otherwise." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2014). The trial court's

decision must be upheld unless the rights of a party "have been prejudiced because

findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of a workers' compensation judge:

(A) Violate constitutional or statutory provisions;

(B) Exceed the statutory authority of the workers' compensation judge;

(C) Do not comply with lawful procedure;

L In the Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal, Employer also asserts that the "granting of benefits in [an]

expedited hearing violates due process." However, Employer does not mention this issue in its brief on

appeal. "It is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant's case or

arguments for him or her, and where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her

contention or merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived." Sneed v. Bd. of Prof'/

Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). Consistent with this settled

principle, we deem this issue waived in this interlocutory appeal.

3

(D) Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or

clearly an unwarranted exercise of discretion;

(E) Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and material

in the light of the entire record."

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(3) (2015). Like other courts applying the standards

embodied in section 50-6-217(a)(3), we will not disturb the decision of the trial court

absent the limited circumstances identified in the statute.

Analysis

In its expedited hearing order, the trial court noted Employer's contention that

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-301 "dictates the non-compensability of

[Employee's] claim because [Employee] cannot show that a causal link exists between

his work and the injury." While agreeing with Employer that "a definitive opinion on

causation has yet to be rendered," the trial court correctly noted that the Workers'

Compensation Reform Act of 2013 "repealed section 50-6-301 in its entirety as of July 1,

2014." Although this section remains in effect as to injuries occurring prior to July 1,

2014, it is not applicable to injuries occurring on or after July 1, 2014.

The trial court relied on Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-20l(b)(l) (2014)

in its analysis of the notice issue, which provides as follows:

In those cases where the injuries occur as the result of gradual or

cumulative events or trauma, then the injured employee ... shall provide

notice of the injury to the employer within thirty (30) days after the

employee ... [k]nows or reasonably should know that the employee has

suffered a work-related injury that has resulted in permanent physical

impairment.

In its brief on appeal, Employer likewise focuses on section 50-6-201 and the reasons

supporting its position that Employee failed to provide timely notice of his alleged

occupational disease. However, neither the parties nor the trial court addressed

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-305(a) (2015), which specifies the time within

which an employee must provide notice of an occupational disease, the type of condition

asserted by Employee in this case. That statute states:

Within thirty (30) days after the first distinct manifestation of an

occupational disease, the employee, or someone in the employee's behalf,

shall give written notice thereof to the employer in the same manner as is

provided in the case of a compensable accidental injury.

Tenn. Code Ann.§ 50-6-305(a) (2015) (emphasis added).

4

Here, neither the trial court nor the parties. addressed when "the first distinct

manifestation" of Employee's alleged occupational disease occurred as contemplated by

section 50-6-305; rather, the trial court, relying upon section 50-6-201, analyzed the

notice requirement based on whether Employee "acted reasonably in waiting until he

possessed what he believed to be objective proof, beyond simply his own suspicion, that

mold in the work vehicles made him sick." Indeed, as far as this record shows, there is

no mention of the occupational disease notice requirement embodied in section 50-6-305.

Consequently, the trial court's decision is vacated and the case remanded for a

determination of whether Employee provided timely notice of his alleged occupational

disease under section 50-6-305.

Before concluding, we note that the trial court stated Employee "has a right to a

causation opinion to determine whether his injury is work-related." We respectfully

disagree. While an injured worker who meets the applicable statutory requirements is

entitled to medical benefits, there is no "right to a causation opinion" as such. See

generally Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(d)(9), (g)(2)(B) (2015). If a trial court determines

that medical benefits are appropriate, the court can order the initiation of such benefits.

However, it is the parties' responsibility to secure expert opinions or other evidence

necessary to address any applicable burden of proof. Nevertheless, in light of our

resolution of the notice issue, it is unnecessary for us to reach the merits of Employer's

issue concerning whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's conclusion

that Employee is entitled to medical benefits.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision is vacated and the case is

remanded.

David F. Hensley, Jud

Workers' Compensation Appeals Board

5

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Ronald Pool ) Docket No. 2015-06-0510

)

v. )

) State File No. 48782-2015

Jarmon D&Q Transport )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the

referenced case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service

on this the 4th day of January, 2016.

Name Certified First Class Via Fax Via Email Address

Mail Mail Fax Number Email

Ronald Pool X X Ronaldleepool@aol.com

Duane Willis X Dwillis@morganakins.com

Kenneth M. Switzer, X Via Electronic Mail

Chief Judge

Penny Shrum, Clerk, X Penny.Patterson-Shrum@tn.gov

Court of Workers’

Compensation Claims

Matthew Salyer

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-1606

Electronic Mail: Matthew.Salyer@tn.gov

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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