Opinion

Higgins, Darrius v. Big K Food Market & Liquors, Inc.

  • 2014 TN WC App. 3
Court
Tennessee Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
Filed
Dec 8, 2014
Status
Published
On the bench
Marshall L. Davidson III, David F. Hensley, Timothy W. Conner
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.4%

"In the absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence, we must conclusively presume that every fact admissible under the pleadings was found or should have been found in favor of the Appellee."

How later courts described this case

  • "In the absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence, we must conclusively presume that every fact admissible under the pleadings was found or should have been found in favor of the Appellee."

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

TENNESSEE DIVISION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Employee: Darrius Higgins ) Docket No. 2014-01-0007

)

Employer: Big K Food Market and Liquors, Inc. ) State File No. 68130-2014

In accordance with Rule 0800-02-22-.02(6), please find attached the Workers’

Compensation Appeals Board’s Order and Opinion Affirming and Remanding

Interlocutory Order of Court of Workers' Compensation Claims in the referenced case.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Order and Opinion Affirming and

Remanding Interlocutory Order of Court of Workers' Compensation Claims was sent to

the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 8th day of

December, 2014.

Name Certified First Class Via Fax Via Email Address

Mail Mail Fax Number Email

Carmen Ware, X cyware@thewarelawfirm.com

Employee's Attorney

Big K Food Market and X X Mail c/o Hasem Kaddoura,

Liquors, Inc. 8 Trenton Street, Red Bank, TN 37415

Thomas L. Wyatt, Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, X Via Electronic Mail

Chief Judge

Penny Shrum, Clerk, X Penny.Patterson-Shrum@tn.gov

Court of Workers’

Compensation Claims

Compliance Program X WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov

Matthew Salyer

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-1606

Electronic Mail: Matthew.Salyer@tn.gov

TENNESSEE DIVISION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Employee: Darrius Higgins ) Docket No. 2014-01-0007

)

Employer: Big K Food Market & Liquors, ) State File No. 68130-2014

Inc. )

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Thomas L. Wyatt, Judge )

Affirmed and Remanded – Filed December 8, 2014

ORDER AND OPINION AFFIRMING AND REMANDING INTERLOCUTORY

ORDER OF COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

This interlocutory appeal involves an employee who alleges work-related injuries to his

right knee and neck when a vehicle struck his employer’s building on August 6, 2014.

The employer asserted that the employee was not working within the course and scope of

his employment at the time of the incident and is therefore not entitled to workers’

compensation benefits. At the expedited hearing, the employee did not appear but his

attorney did. The employer, a corporation, was not represented by legal counsel at the

expedited hearing. Counsel for employee called as witnesses several representatives of

the employer. Upon completion of the expedited hearing, the trial court entered an order

denying the employee’s request for temporary disability and medical benefits. The

employee has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the decision of

the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims.

Judge Timothy W. Conner delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board, in which Judge

Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge David F. Hensley, joined.

Carmen Ware, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the employee-appellant, Darrius Higgins

Big K Food Market and Liquors, Inc., Chattanooga, Tennessee, pro se

1

Factual and Procedural Background

Darrius Higgins ("Employee") is a 42 year old resident of Hamilton County,

Tennessee. On August 6, 2014, he was newly employed by Big K Food Market and

Liquors, Inc. ("Employer") as a third-shift stock person for a two-week trial period. His

supervisor had requested that he come to work at approximately 10:00 a.m. on the

morning of the incident to observe deliveries of product made to the store. At

approximately 11 :00 a.m. the deliveries were completed and Employee was advised that

he could leave the premises and return when his shift started that evening at 6:00p.m.

At approximately 1:37 p.m., Employee was apparently on Employer's premises

when a third party drove a vehicle through the parking area and struck an ice box located

adjacent to the store building, causing the building to jolt. Employee alleges that he

suffered neck and right leg injuries due to the incident. According to medical records

admitted into evidence during the expedited hearing, Employee appeared at Memorial

Health System's emergency room at approximately 2:30 p.m., about one hour after the

incident. He was diagnosed with right knee pain and cervicalgia. Three days later, he

appeared at Baroness Erlanger Emergency Department, this time complaining of left neck

and left shoulder pain. The medical report includes a description of the incident and

noted Employee's statement that the collision "just made him jump and pulled muscle in

neck." He was diagnosed with cervical pain and left shoulder pain.

A Petition for Benefit Determination was filed on behalf of Employee on August

29, 2014. Following unsuccessful mediation efforts, a Dispute Certification Notice was

issued September 30, 2014. Thereafter, counsel for Employee filed a Request for

Expedited Hearing on October 6, 2014. At the expedited hearing, conducted on

November 3, 2014, Employee did not appear, but his attorney did. Representatives of

Employer appeared at the hearing, apparently at the request or subpoena of Employee's

attorney. During the course of the hearing, Mr. Hasem Kaddoura was designated as the

"company representative" and allowed to remain in the hearing room during the

proceedings. Other witnesses were subject to the sequestration rule. Employer, a

corporate entity, did not have counsel at the expedited hearing.

Following the hearing, the trial court issued an Order Denying Medical and

Temporary Disability Benefits on November 14, 2014. A Notice of Appeal was filed

November 19, 2014. Employee's counsel also filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on

November 19, 2014. On December 1, 2014, the trial court denied the Motion to

Withdraw. The record on appeal was submitted to the Appeals Board and a docketing

notice was issued on December 2, 2014. For the reasons explained below, the trial

court's decision is affirmed.

2

Standard of Review

The standard of review to be applied by this Board in reviewing a trial court's

decision is statutorily mandated and limited in scope. Specifically, "[t]here shall be a

presumption that the findings and conclusions of the workers' compensation judge are

correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-

6-239(c)(7) (2014). The trial court's decision must be upheld unless "the rights of the

party seeking review have been prejudiced because findings, inferences, conclusions, or

decisions of a workers' compensation judge:

(A) Violate constitutional or statutory provisions;

(B) Exceed the statutory authority of the workers' compensation

judge;

(C) Do not comply with lawful procedure;

(D) Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of

discretion, or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(E) Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and

material in the light of the entire record."

Tenn. Code Ann.§ 50-6-217(a)(2) (2014).

In applying this standard, courts have construed substantial and material evidence

to mean "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a rational

conclusion and such as to furnish a reasonably sound basis for the action under

consideration." Clay County Manor, Inc. v. State of Tennessee, 849 S.W.2d 755, 759

(Tenn. 1993 )(quoting Southern Railway Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 682 S. W.2d

196, 199 (Tenn. 1984)). Like other courts applying the standard embodied in section 50-

6-217(a)(2), we will not disturb the decision of the trial court absent the limited

circumstances identified in the statute.

Analysis

A. Record on Appeal

It is well-settled in Tennessee that the appealing party has the burden to ensure

that an adequate record is prepared on appeal. As the Supreme Court's Special Workers'

Compensation Appeals Panel explained in Vulcan Materials Co. v. Watson, No. M2003-

00975-WC-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 451 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel May 19,

2004):

The appellant has the duty of preparing a record that conveys a fair,

accurate and complete account of the proceedings in the trial court with

respect to the issues on appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). We are provided

3

with only the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law rendered

from the bench and the exhibits introduced at the trial of this cause, which

include three doctor's depositions. We do not have a record of the lay

testimony presented to the trial court. In the absence of an adequate record

on appeal, this Court must presume the trial court's rulings were supported

by sufficient evidence. Manufacturers Canso/. Service v. Rodell, 42 S.W.3d

846, 865 (Tenn. App. 2000).

!d. at *6-7.

Including a transcript or statement of the evidence as part of the record on appeal

promotes meaningful appellate review and, in turn, public confidence in the integrity and

fairness of the process. As one court has explained, "[ fJull appellate consideration of a

trial court's determination ... is part of the process designed to achieve an accurate and

just decision." In reAdoption of J.D. W., No. M2000-00151-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn.

App. LEXIS 546, at* 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2000). Indeed, "[w]ithout a transcript

or a statement of the evidence, the appellate court cannot know what evidence was

presented to the trial court, and there is no means by which we can evaluate the

appellant's assertion that the evidence did not support the trial court's decision." Britt v.

Chambers, No. W2006-00061-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 38, at *8 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2007). Accordingly, "it is essential that the appellate court be provided

with a transcript of the trial proceedings or a statement of the evidence." !d. See also

Whitesell v. Moore, No. M2011-02745-COA-R3-CV, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 894, at *7

(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2012) ("[w]ithout a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we

cannot review the evidence"); Estate of Cockrill, No. M20 10-00663-COA-R3-CV, 2010

Tenn. App. LEXIS 754. at* 11-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2010) ("[W]here no transcript

or statement of the evidence is filed, the appellate court is required to presume that the

record, had it been properly preserved, would have supported the action of the trial

court."); Leek v. Powell, 884 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) ("In the absence of

a transcript or statement of the evidence, we must conclusively presume that every fact

admissible under the pleadings was found or should have been found in favor of the

Appellee."). In short, "[a]n incomplete appellate record is fatal to an appeal," Piper v.

Piper, No. M2005-02541-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 70, at * 11 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Feb. 1, 2007), and a reviewing court "must conclusively presume that the evidence

presented supported the facts as found by the trial court." Whitesell, 2012 Tenn. App.

LEXIS 894, at *10.

In the present case, as in Vulcan Materials, the Appeals Board was provided with

no record of any testimony taken during the expedited hearing. Moreover, no statement

of the evidence was offered by the appellant. Under the circumstances, the Appeals

Board will presume that the trial court's rulings were supported by sufficient evidence.

4

B. Burden of Proof

For dates of injury after July 1, 2014, "this chapter shall not be remedially or

liberally construed but shall be construed fairly, impartially, and in accordance with basic

principles of statutory construction." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2014). An employee

has the burden of proving each element of his or her workers' compensation claim by a

preponderance of the evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6); Elmore v. Travelers

Ins. Co., 824 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tenn. 1992). This includes the burden of proving that an

alleged "injury by accident" occurred in the "course and scope of employment." Tenn.

Code Ann. § 50-6-1 02(13) (20 14 ). In the present case, the trial court determined that "at

the time the vehicle struck Employer's store, Employee was not engaged in activity in the

course and scope of his employment with Employer." As noted above, without a

transcript or statement of the evidence, we presume the trial court's conclusion is correct.

C. Representation of Corporations

On the Notice of Appeal form, counsel for Employee added a handwritten

addendum, stating:

Employee renews his objection to the allowing of Hasem Kaddoura to

present and introduce evidence, particularly the video surveillance, and the

examination and/or cross examination of witnesses on behalf of the

corporate Defendant/Employer, Big K Food Market and Liquors, Inc. in

violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3-101 et seq.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 23-3-103(a) provides that "[n]o person shall

engage in the practice of law ... unless the person has been duly licensed and while the

person's license is in full force and effect, nor shall any association or corporation

engage in the practice of law . ... " Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3-103(a) (2014) (emphasis

added).

Rule 0800-02-21-.05 of the Rules of the Tennessee Department of Labor and

Workforce Development likewise addresses representation of parties. Subparagraph

(1 )(c) specifically provides that "[a]ny corporation or other artificial person may

participate through a duly authorized representative such as an officer, director or

appropriate employee, but must be represented by counsel in all proceedings occurring in

the court of workers' compensation claims and the board of workers' compensation

appeals." Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs., 0800-02-21-.05(1)(c) (2014) (emphasis added).

In the present case, counsel for Employee chose to present testimony from several

representatives of Employer during Employee's case-in-chief. The record is devoid of

information as to what actions, if any, were taken by a representative of Employer to

introduce evidence, or examine (or cross-examine) witnesses, beyond the scope of what

5

was asked during the direct examination by Employee's counsel. Likewise, the record is

devoid of any objections to the admissibility of any such evidence. 1 If such evidence was

offered for admission by a representative of Employer beyond the scope of what was

asked by Employee's counsel during direct examination, it was error to allow the

introduction of such evidence. Similarly, if a representative of Employer was allowed to

examine or cross-examine witnesses, this was error. In compliance with Tennessee Code

Annotated section 23-3-103 and Rule 0800-02-021-.05(l)(c), Employer corporation

cannot practice law, cannot represent itself in the Court of Workers' Compensation

Claims and cannot seek to introduce evidence or examine a witness through a "duly

authorized representative." However, because the trial judge specifically held that his

decision was based "primarily on the testimony of Nimat Kaddoura," a witness called by

Employee's counsel, and because Employee apparently failed to offer any testimony to

show that he was on the premises in his capacity as an employee at the time of the

incident, any error in the introduction of evidence was harmless.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against

the trial court's decision that Employee did not meet his burden of proving that he

sustained an injury by accident occurring in the course and scope of his employment.

Further, we find that the trial court's decision does not prejudice the rights of the parties

or otherwise violate the standards set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-

217(a)(2). Accordingly, the trial court's decision is affirmed and the case is remanded for

any further proceedings which may be necessary.

); W. Conner, Judge

s' Compensation Appeals Board

1

The Order Denying Medical and Temporary Disability Benefits discusses the testimony of the witness who

authenticated the surveillance video and includes a description of what was depicted on the video viewed by the trial

judge, but does not specify at what point the video was offered as an exhibit and/or whether an objection was made

to its introduction.

6

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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