Pacific Maritime Association v. NLRB

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 22, 2020 Decided August 4, 2020

No. 19-1101

PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 19-1103, 19-1109, 19-1110

On Petitions for Review and Cross-Applications

for Enforcement of an Order of

the National Labor Relations Board

Michael E. Kenneally argued the cause for petitioner.

With him on the briefs were Jonathan C. Fritts, Brigham M.

Cheney, and Thomas A. Lenz.

Eric Weitz, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board,

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were

Peter B. Robb, General Counsel, David Habenstreit, Acting

Deputy Associate General Counsel, and Kira Dellinger Vol,

Supervisory Attorney.

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and RAO,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

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Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by

Circuit Judge RAO.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The National Labor Relations

Board determined that Pacific Maritime Association

(“Pacific”) and Long Beach Container Terminal (“Long

Beach”) committed two distinct unfair labor practices in

violation of the National Labor Relations Act when they

applied disciplinary provisions of one employee’s collective

bargaining agreement for resolving discrimination complaints

to an employee represented by a different union under a

collective bargaining agreement with different procedures and

remedies. Pacific and Long Beach (hereinafter referred to

together as “The Employers”), seek to avoid their statutory

obligations by contending that they reasonably interpreted their

contractual agreement with the disciplined employee to permit

the use of procedures and imposition of penalties that were not

included in this agreement, and their disciplinary action did not

unilaterally change the terms and conditions of the disciplined

employee’s employment. In view of the plain text of the

Employers’ agreement that covered the disciplined employee

and the record before the Board, we deny their petitions for

review and grant the Board’s cross-applications for

enforcement of its Order.

I.

Pacific Maritime Association (“Pacific”) and Long Beach

Container Terminal (“Long Beach”) are involved in shipping,

longshore, and cargo-handling industries at ports on the Pacific

coast. Pacific is a mutual benefit corporation that serves as the

multi-employer bargaining representative for its employer

members, with the primary purpose of negotiating, executing,

and administering collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”).

One of its members, Long Beach, operates a marine container

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terminal at the Port of Long Beach and employs both watchmen

and marine clerks. Each classification of employee is

represented by a different union, and Pacific has entered into

separate agreements with each union. We begin with a

summary of those CBAs.

A.

Watchmen at the Port of Long Beach have long been

represented by ILWU, Warehouse, Processing and Distribution

Workers Union, Local 26 (“Local 26”). Under the

Watchmen’s Agreement, Local 26 and Pacific jointly operate a

dispatch hall that refers watchmen to work for Pacific’s

members. Article 18 establishes a procedure for addressing

disciplinary issues and other disputes arising under the

Agreement. Article 16 of the Agreement broadly prohibits

discrimination against “any person” on the basis of “race,

color, national origin . . . or political beliefs . . . .” Pursuant to

Article 18(C), a Joint Labor Relations Committee of employer

and union representatives establishes the rules and penalties

governing watchmen’s conduct; employers retain an

unrestricted right of discipline for five offenses. Otherwise,

Article 18(D)(1) requires the employer to “attempt to notify

and discuss the alleged incident with the individuals involved”

and Local 26. “Following a good faith discussion with the

Union, or inability to contact the designated Union

representative within a reasonable time period,” the employer

may file a formal complaint, Article 18(D)(1), or request a

meeting with the Joint Committee, Article 18(E). “If a

satisfactory settlement cannot be reached” by the Joint

Committee, then “either party may refer the matter” to the

contractual Watchmen Arbitrator. Id. Rules control the

arbitration process, including the parties’ selection of

arbitrators, and rules also limit appeals.

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Article 18(H) provides that the “grievance machinery” in

the Watchmen’s Agreement “shall be the exclusive remedy

with respect to any dispute arising under [it] and no other

remedies shall be used by the Union, the Employer, or any

covered employee until the grievance procedures have been

exhausted.” Where a disciplinary action affecting a

watchman’s dispatch right is involved, Article 18(I) specifies

that an employer complaint shall only be applicable “to the

terminal where the complaint arose.” Article 21 states that no

provision of the contract “may be amended, modified, changed,

altered or waived, except by a written document executed by

the parties hereto.”

The marine clerks are represented by the International

Longshore and Warehouse Union (“the International”). The

Pacific Coast Longshore and Clerks’ Agreement (“Clerks’

Agreement”) covers approximately 25,000 longshore workers

and marine clerks at Pacific coast ports. This CBA contains its

own mechanism for the signatory unions and employers to

address disputes regarding covered longshore workers and

marine clerks. Notably for present purposes, the Clerks’

Agreement includes Section 13.2, which establishes a special

grievance procedure for resolving allegations of discrimination

or harassment. Under this streamlined procedure, an individual

employee may file a complaint, which will be assigned directly

to an arbitrator. The arbitrator must promptly schedule an

evidentiary hearing to investigate the alleged incident. Within

fourteen days after the hearing, the arbitrator shall issue a

written decision that includes, as necessary, disciplinary

penalties consistent with the guidelines in the Clerks’

Agreement. The arbitrator’s decision is final, with only limited

appeal. In addition to the broad prohibition on discrimination

in Section 13.1, side agreements set forth rules of conduct and

examples of conduct warranting discipline. In July 2014,

Pacific and the International clarified, by letter of

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understanding (“2014 LOU”), that Section 13.2 complaints

may be brought against “other employees of [Pacific’s]

member companies,” but those outside employees may not file

Section 13.2 complaints.

B.

The events giving rise to the Board’s determination that

the Employers had violated the Act began on March 28, 2017.

Demetrius Pleas, a watchman represented by Local 26, and a

marine clerk represented by the International had a work-

related argument during which both men allegedly engaged in

racial name-calling. At the time, Pleas was working for Long

Beach. The two employees resolved the matter informally that

day, but on March 30, 2017, the marine clerk filed a grievance

against Pleas pursuant to Section 13.2 of the Clerks’

Agreement. Long Beach informed Local 26 the next day that

it was investigating the incident and intended, if necessary, to

pursue discipline against Pleas under Article 18(C) of the

Watchmen’s Agreement. Long Beach ultimately concluded

that there was insufficient evidence Pleas engaged in

wrongdoing to warrant filing a formal Article 18 complaint, but

warned Pleas that future incidents would be dealt with through

the Watchmen Joint Committee process.

Meanwhile, the Arbitrator assigned to the Section 13.2

grievance scheduled a hearing for May 3, 2017. Counsel for

Local 26 wrote Pacific that Local 26 was not bound by Section

13.2 and neither Local 26 nor Pleas would participate in the

hearing, and requested that Pacific not take any adverse action

against Local 26 members based on these proceedings. Pacific

responded by letter that Long Beach and the other Pacific

employer members would implement whatever discipline the

Arbitrator determined would be appropriate. Neither Pleas nor

a Local 26 representative attended the arbitration hearing, but

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representatives from Pacific and Long Beach did attend and

actively participated. At the beginning of the hearing the

Arbitrator stated that he did not “really have authority over Mr.

Pleas” pursuant to the Clerks’ Agreement and that “it would be

up to the Employer to enforce any decision if any if action was

needed.” Arb. Hr’g Tr. 19–20 (May 3, 2017). Pacific made a

statement that the “direct employer” (referring to Long Beach)

“is prepared to implement any decision made by the

Arbitrator,” and that Pleas (the watchman) “is subject to

complaints under Section 13.2 of the [Clerks’ Agreement] as

outlined in the 2014 LOU” between Pacific and the

International. Arb. Dec. 3 (June 5, 2017).

The Arbitrator proposed that Pleas be barred from working

at Long Beach until a final decision was rendered. In his final

decision, the Arbitrator found that Pleas had violated Section

13.2 policies and should be suspended from working at all

Pacific employer member terminals for twenty eight days, and

also required to undertake an unpaid training video and to sign

a statement pledging to abide by Section 13.2 policy before

returning to work. See id. at 8. Local 26 appealed; the

Arbitrator’s Order and Decision were sustained, rejecting

Local 26’s jurisdictional argument. In July 2017, Pacific

notified its employer members of Pleas’ suspension from

working at terminals covered by the Clerks’ Agreement.

Local 26 filed unfair labor practice charges against the

Employers in May 2017, alleging that they had violated the Act

by committing two theoretically distinct unfair labor practices

in disciplining watchman Pleas under the Section 13.2

procedure in the Clerks’ Agreement: (1) impermissibly

modifying the Watchmen’s Agreement and (2) unilaterally

imposing a new term and condition of employment without

bargaining. The Board affirmed the decision of an

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) that the Employers had

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violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act under either of the

General Counsel’s alternative theories: when they applied

Section 13.2 of the Clerks’ Agreement, to Pleas, an employee

of the watchmen’s unit represented by Local 26 and covered by

that unit’s Watchmen’s Agreement, and when they disciplined

him pursuant to the Section 13.2 process. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 367

NLRB No. 121, 2019 WL 1977314, at *1, 4–6 (May 2, 2019).

The Employers were ordered to cease and desist, to rescind the

suspension and make Pleas financially whole, and, among

other things, to delete from their records any reference to his

suspension. One Member dissented, arguing the Employers

did not apply the Section 13.2 procedure since they did not file

the complaint, they reasonably believed the Watchmen’s

Agreement did not preclude imposing Section 13.2 discipline,

and they did not unilaterally change the terms and conditions

of Pleas’ employment because there was no consistent

disciplinary practice. Pacific and Long Beach both petitioned

for review of the Board’s Decision and Order. The Board filed

cross-applications for enforcement of its Order.

II.

The Board determined that the Employers committed two

distinct unfair labor practices: contract modification and

unilateral change. These alternative grounds for the Board’s

Decision involve distinct violations of the Act with different

governing standards, defenses, and remedies. Bath Iron Works

Corp., 345 NLRB 499, 501–03 (2005), enforced sub nom. Bath

Marine Draftsmen’s Ass’n v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 14 (1st Cir.

2007). The Board has concluded that it may find an unlawful

unilateral change, in addition or in the alternative, where it has

also found an unlawful contract modification. See, e.g.,

Comau, Inc., 364 NLRB No. 48, 2016 WL 3853834, at *4–6

(July 14, 2016). Its counsel explains that “an employer’s

actions may modify a provision ‘contained in’ a [CBA] while

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also imposing a change to a mandatory bargaining subject

where nothing in the contract ‘covers’ the employer’s right to

act unilaterally.” Resp’ts’ Br. 22 (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has recognized that “the authority of

the Board and the law of contract are overlapping, concurrent

regimes,” and that “the Board may proscribe conduct which is

an unfair labor practice even though it is also a breach of

contract remediable as such by arbitration and in the courts.”

NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 360–61 (1969). But neither the

Supreme Court nor this court has spoken directly to the

question whether the Board has the authority to proceed on

different theories of violation based on the same set of facts.

Nor need we do so today. The Employers challenge the

Board’s findings of both statutory violations but they present

no challenge to the application of both theories to the same set

of facts. Therefore, the court has no occasion to decide whether

both unfair labor practices can be properly found in cases of

this sort and proceeds on the assumption the Board may do so.

Turning to the Employers’ challenges, the scope of the

court’s review of the Board’s decision is limited. As the

Supreme Court has long acknowledged, Congress has

determined that the Board has “the primary responsibility of

marking out the scope . . . of the statutory duty to bargain,”

Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979), and “great

deference” is due to the Board because determining whether a

party has violated this statutory duty is “particularly within” the

Board’s expertise, see Crowley Marine Servs., Inc. v. NLRB,

234 F.3d 1295, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Local 13,

Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic Commc’ns Union v.

NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); see also Ford

Motor, 441 U.S. at 495. Consequently, this court “must sustain

the Board’s decision ‘unless, reviewing the record as a whole,

it appears that the Board’s factual findings are not supported by

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substantial evidence, or that the Board acted arbitrarily or

otherwise erred in applying established law to the facts at

issue.’” S. Nuclear Operating Co. v. NLRB, 524 F.3d 1350,

1355 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Int’l All. of Theatrical & Stage

Emps. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); Universal

Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 488 (1951); 29

U.S.C. § 160(e). Reviewing courts may not “displace the

Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views,” even if

the court “would justifiably have made a different choice” in

the first instance. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488.

Where a challenge is made to the Board’s interpretation of

a contract, however, the court need give “no special deference”

to “ultimate legal conclusions that rest on” the Board’s contract

interpretations and interprets such contracts de novo. Local

Union No. 47, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 927 F.2d

635, 640–41 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The court applies “ordinary

principles of contract law.” M&G Polymers USA, LLC v.

Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 435 (2015). Still, the court’s deference

to the Board’s fact-finding extends to findings necessary to

interpret the meaning of the contract, “including evidence of

intent from bargaining history, and other factual findings on

matters bearing on the intent of the parties,” as long as those

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record

considered as a whole. StaffCo of Brooklyn, LLC v. NLRB, 888

F.3d 1297, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citations and internal

quotations marks omitted).

A.

An employer violates Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act

by modifying terms and conditions of employment established

in a CBA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (5), 158(d). Because the

unfair labor practice question derives from an employer’s

statutory duty to bargain, a midterm modification is unlawful

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only if it involves a mandatory subject of bargaining for which

the employer was required to bargain in the first place. Allied

Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v.

Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 185–88 (1971).

Disciplinary procedures are a mandatory subject of bargaining.

See, e.g., El Paso Elec. Co., 355 NLRB 428, 453 (2010),

enforced, 681 F.3d 651, 662–64 (5th Cir. 2012).

The Board has recognized that an employer has not

violated Section 8(a)(5) by modifying terms and conditions of

employment under a CBA where the employer has a “sound

arguable basis” for its interpretation of a contract and it is not

motivated by animus or bad faith. Bath Iron Works, 345 NLRB

at 502. This exception has limits: no “sound arguable basis”

in support of an employer’s purported interpretation of the

contract can exist where, that interpretation runs “counter to the

clear intention of the parties,” id., or the contract “cannot be

colorably interpreted to permit” the employer’s interpretation,

MV Transp., Inc., 368 NLRB No. 66, 2019 WL 4316958, at

*30 (Sept. 10, 2019).

The Employers contend that they reasonably believed

enforcing Section 13.2 of the Clerks’ Agreement against

watchman Pleas was consistent with the Watchmen’s

Agreement under which Pleas was covered. In their view, they

did not modify the Article 18 procedures because no employer

had filed the complaint as is contemplated by the Watchmen’s

Agreement; rather a marine clerk covered by the Clerk’s

Agreement filed the complaint. So, in their view, it was

reasonable to interpret Article 18(D) regarding exhaustion

requirements to apply only in cases in which an employer files

a complaint. For the same reasons, they contend that there was

no modification of Article 18(H), which provides that Article

18’s grievance procedures are the exclusive remedy with

respect to any dispute arising under the Watchmen’s

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Agreement, because the dispute was initiated by the marine

clerk and arose under the Clerks’ Agreement.

But as the Board concluded, Article 18 of the Watchmen’s

Agreement cannot be colorably interpreted to permit the

Employers to unilaterally impose an alternative disciplinary

procedure contrary to the exclusive procedure in that CBA, or

to affirmatively grant the Employers the right to impose

alternative disciplinary procedures unilaterally. First, the

Employers’ view that Article 18 of the Watchmen’s Agreement

did not limit their ability as employers to discipline Pleas for

racial harassment is implausible on the face of the plain terms

of the CBA. Article 18(H) expressly limits the Employers’

ability to discipline employees “with respect to any dispute

arising under the [Agreement]” unless the “grievance

procedures have been exhausted.” Pleas’ alleged misconduct

arose under the Agreement — specifically, Article 16’s anti-

discrimination provision, which broadly prohibits

discrimination against “any person” on the basis of “race,

color, national origin, religious or political beliefs, sex, age,

Veteran’s status, or disability.” Given the plain express terms

of the Watchmen’s Agreement, an employer who seeks to

discipline a covered employee for conduct prohibited by

Article 16, must exhaust the grievance procedures in Article 18

before pursuing other disciplinary remedies. See Pac. Mar.

Ass’n, 367 NLRB No. 121, 2019 WL 1977314, at *5 & n.18,

20. Such procedures include filing a complaint after attempting

to informally resolve the dispute with Local 26, Article

18(D)(1), or meeting with the Joint Committee and if a

satisfactory settlement cannot be reached, referring the matter

to the Watchmen Arbitrator, Article 18(E). The Employers did

neither, and Long Beach expressly acknowledged the

applicability of Article 18 procedures in declining to file a

complaint against Pleas. The employers, therefore, could not

reasonably conclude that, without first exhausting these

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procedures, enforcing Section 13.2 of the Clerks’ Agreement

against watchman Pleas was consistent with the Watchmen’s

Agreement under which he was covered.

The Employers press on, contending that Article 18(C)

affirmatively grants employers the right to unilaterally

discipline Pleas for racial harassment. This too is facially

implausible. The plain text of Article 18(C) limits the

employers’ unrestricted right of discipline to the specific

offenses involving “intoxication, pilferage, assault,

incompetency, or failure to perform work as directed.” Pleas’

misconduct did not fall within these five offenses. Reading

Article 18(C) to provide the employers an open-ended right to

unilaterally discipline, as the Employers do, would effectively

render the enumeration of offenses superfluous and Article

18’s established disciplinary procedures largely meaningless.

With Article 18(H) so understood, the Employers lacked a

sound arguable basis for interpreting the CBA to permit their

disciplinary action. Stark differences between the exclusive

Article 18 grievance procedures and the Section 13.2 procedure

applied by the Employers compel this conclusion. In a contract

modification case, the dispositive issue is whether the

Employers “had a ‘sound arguable basis’ for [their] actions,”

Bath Iron Works, 345 NLRB at 503. Here, the Employers

interpreted their CBA with Local 26 to permit a marine clerk,

covered by a different CBA, to refer his dispute with Pleas to

arbitrators identified under the special Section 13.2 Grievance

process and to permit the Employers to impose the Arbitrator’s

discipline that exceeded the discipline allowed under the CBA

that covered Pleas, and to do so without first exhausting the

Article 18 procedures. The Employers’ conduct in imposing

discipline was inconsistent with the exclusive provisions of

Article 18, such as Article 18(E), which provides that the

Employers may refer grievances to the “Watchmen Arbitrator,”

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who is jointly selected and appointed by the Employers and

Local 26, if a satisfactory settlement cannot be reached with the

Joint Committee. Even if the marine clerk could properly file

a complaint against watchman Pleas under Section 13.2, that

did not mean the Employers could ignore their CBA with Local

26 that covered Pleas. Therefore, they fail to show that the

Board erred in rejecting their attempt to come within the scope

of the sound arguable basis exception for contract

interpretation.

Second, the Employers maintain that the basic premise of

the Board’s Decision, that they applied Section 13.2 against

Pleas, is belied by the record. It is true that the Section 13.2

procedures were initially invoked and pursued by the marine

clerk, and not initiated by an employer. But the Board’s

finding that the Employers actively participated before, during,

and after the Section 13.2 arbitration hearing is supported by

substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. That

evidence effectively rendered the marine clerk’s complaint the

Employers’ complaint. Long Beach suggests it merely

observed the arbitration proceeding and did not enforce the

Arbitrator’s order. But at the hearing, Pacific represented to

the Arbitrator, without objection, that Long Beach was Pleas’

direct employer and stood ready to carry out any discipline

recommended by the Arbitrator, and that Pleas was subject to

the Section 13.2 procedures under the 2014 LOU between

Pacific and the International. Participating in this Section 13.2

arbitration proceeding was inconsistent with the terms of Pleas’

Watchmen’s Agreement for addressing discrimination

complaints. Furthermore, the Employers “implemented the

resulting discipline,” Pet’rs’ Br. 47, by notifying all member

terminals of Pleas’ suspension. That action, among others,

resulted in penalties beyond those authorized under the

Watchmen’s Agreement. For example, when Pleas was

dispatched in July 2017 for a job at Hanjin Terminal, a covered

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terminal under the Watchmen’s Agreement, he was ordered to

leave.

Third, the parties’ bargaining history and past practice

further support the Board’s conclusion that the plain language

of the Watchmen’s Agreement does not permit or authorize the

Employers to discipline a Local 26 watchman using the special

Section 13.2 procedure. In evaluating an employer’s sound

arguable basis, the Board may examine “both the contract

language itself and relevant extrinsic evidence,” such as

bargaining history or past practice to determine the parties’

intent, Knollwood Country Club, 365 NLRB No. 22, 2017 WL

1088796, at *1 (Mar. 8, 2017), and the Board has repeatedly

relied on extrinsic evidence to support its sound arguable basis

analysis, see, e.g., id. at *1 & n.8; see also ADT, LLC, 369

NLRB No. 31, 2020 WL 996271, at *5 & n.10 (Feb. 27, 2020);

see also Comau, 364 NLRB No. 48, 2016 WL 3853834, at *5

& n.16. The Board’s analysis here is in line with its precedent.

The Board first determined that the “clear language” of Article

18 prohibited the Employers’ disciplinary action and then

explained how the parties’ past practice and bargaining history

supported this finding. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 367 NLRB No. 121,

2019 WL 1977314, at *5.

There is substantial evidence to support the Board’s

finding that Local 26 consistently rejected the Employers’

proposals to incorporate procedures similar to a Section 13.2

procedure into the Watchmen’s Agreement. During

negotiations in 2008 and 2014, the Employers proposed that a

Section 13.2 procedure be added to the Watchmen’s

Agreement and Local 26 repeatedly rejected these proposals.

The Employers suggest that the Board has mischaracterized the

record evidence because the parties never bargained over

whether a non-watchman could use Section 13.2 to accuse a

watchman of workplace harassment. Yet evidence credited by

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the ALJ indicated that in October 2014 Pacific proposed to

amend Article 16 to allow “any employee” to file a Section

13.2 type grievance, General Counsel Ex. 5 (Employer

Proposals: Article 16 (Oct. 8, 2014)) (emphasis added), and

Local 26 rejected this proposal.

There also is substantial evidence to support the Board’s

finding that the parties have historically used Article 18

procedures to resolve complaints of worker-versus-worker

harassment. Sometimes this has been done informally with

Local 26; other times it has been done through the formal

complaint process. In the instant case, Long Beach notified

Local 26 of its investigation into the discrimination allegations,

and later issued Pleas an informal warning that future such

occurrences would be resolved through the Article 18

disciplinary process. Long Beach’s general manager testified

that he had had informally resolved at least two dozen similar

harassment complaints by issuing warning letters. In 2016,

when Long Beach filed a formal Article 18 complaint against

a watchman accused of harassing another watchman in

violation of Article 16, the matter was resolved by the Joint

Committee.

Still, the Employers maintain that the evidence fails to

support the Board’s position that Article 18 is the exclusive

means for addressing these types of complaints. Putting aside

the fact that Article 18(H) clearly states as much, the

Employers point to no record evidence that the parties intended

for the Employers to have a unilateral right to enforce Section

13.2 against covered watchmen accused of discrimination. It

is undisputed that the parties have not previously resolved

worker-versus-worker harassment allegations in this way. The

Board could properly conclude, therefore, that the Employers

had no sound arguable basis to believe that their Section 13.2

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disciplinary action was consistent with the Watchmen’s

Agreement.

Fourth, the Employers maintain that Local 26 is not

entitled to override the Employers’ agreements with other

unions and other workers’ rights under these agreements. They

misconstrue federal labor law and principles of contract law.

The Act establishes a system of exclusive collective-bargaining

representation in which employers are statutorily obligated to

bargain with their employees’ chosen representative over

subjects such as employee disciplinary procedures. See 29

U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a); see generally First Nat. Maint.

Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S 666, 674–79 (1981). The Employers

speculate that if they had refused to enforce Section 13.2, then

the Board would have entertained contract modification

charges from the marine clerk’s union. Even if that were true,

which we need not decide, it does not change the Employers’

statutory and contractual obligations to Local 26.

“[A] contract cannot bind a nonparty.” EEOC v. Waffle

House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002). Local 26, the watchmen

employees’ union, was not a party to the Clerks’ Agreement.

Neither was there evidence that Local 26 had acted in a manner

as would give the Employers reason to conclude that Local 26

had agreed, albeit informally and not in writing as Article 21

contemplated, to the use of Section 13.2 procedures where a

non-watchman files a complaint against a covered watchman,

nor any other evidence that the Agreement permitted this

departure from Article 18 procedures. Local 26 is apparently

the last holdout among unions with which Pacific contracts to

use Section 13.2 procedures, most recently in negotiations for

the 2014-2019 Watchmen’s Agreement. The Employers point

to no conduct by Local 26 that provided a basis for them to

conclude that the Agreement would permit using Section 13.2

procedures against watchman Pleas.

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In sum, this contractual defense, much like the Employers’

others, ignores the plain text of the Watchmen’s Agreement,

the parties’ bargaining history, and their negotiations for the

2014-2019 contract where Local 26 again rejected the

Employers’ proposal to import the special Section 13.2

disciplinary procedure in the Clerks’ Agreement into the

Watchmen’s Agreement. The remainder of the Employers’

challenges to the contract-modification violation fail because

the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in

the record considered as a whole.

Our dissenting colleague changes the question before the

court. To avoid the plain text of the Watchmen’s Agreement

covering Pleas, the dissent defines the relevant question as

whether the Employers had “a sound arguable basis for

concluding that employee discipline may occur before or apart

from filing an employer grievance under the Watchmen’s

Agreement.” Dis. Op. 13; see also id. 2, 16. The answer

provided distorts the standard adopted by the Board for the

sound arguable basis exception, and it does not meaningfully

engage with the Employers’ disciplinary action against Pleas

nor with Article 18(H)’s exclusivity and exhaustion

requirements, much less Article 18’s provisions on individual

cases of employee discipline. Not only does Article 18(H)

provide that the Article 18 procedures are the “exclusive

remedy with respect to any dispute arising under the

[Watchmen’s Agreement],” id. (emphasis added), but Article

18(D) regarding employer complaints of employee discipline,

provides that Employers “may implement the established

procedures as outlined in Articles 18 and 19 of Agreement,”

Article 18(D)(1). Article 18(D)(1) requires the Employers to

participate in a good faith discussion with Local 26 prior to

implementing the Article 18 procedures, namely referring a

matter to the Joint Committee, Article 18(E), or filing a formal

complaint, Article 18(D); there is no exception to Article

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18(H)’s exclusivity and exhaustion requirements. To the

extent our colleague interprets Article 18(H) to mean that the

Pleas disciplinary incident did not “aris[e] under” the

Watchmen’s Agreement, this interpretation also flounders on

the plain text. And in responding to the dissent by pointing to

the plain text’s statement of what Article 18(H)’s exclusivity

entails, the court does not create a rationale for denying the

petitions other than the Board’s reliance on

Article 18.

Authority involving a different context and different

contract terms does not advance the dissent’s position. See Dis.

Op. 10–11. For example, in Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358,

430 U.S. 243 (1977), the Supreme Court considered whether

an arbitration clause in a CBA that required the parties to

arbitrate “any grievance” arising between the parties applied to

a contractual dispute over severance pay that arose after the

contract’s termination. Id. at 244–45, 248–49. Moreover, even

applying the reasoning in Nolde Brothers to Article 18(H), the

Court’s interpretation of “arising under” supports the Board’s

conclusion that the Employers lacked a sound arguable basis

for their disciplinary action, which was precluded by the plain

text of the Watchmen’s Agreement.

Nor does resolution of whether Pleas’ conduct violated the

no-discrimination provision of Article 16 “hinge[] on the

interpretation ultimately given” by the Arbitrator to the Section

13.2 policy of the Clerks’ Agreement, Nolde Bros., 430 U.S. at

249, because the present dispute does not cease to arise under

the Watchmen’s Agreement simply because the Employers

chose not to determine whether Pleas violated Article 16 of that

Agreement using Article 18 procedures and instead chose to

apply the different procedures and penalties in the Clerks’

Agreement, enforcing Section 13.2 remedies in the Arbitrator’s

order. The Employers did not challenge the Board’s internal

19

operating procedures using three-member panels, see Dis. Op.

19, and consequently that issue is not properly before the court,

see 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).

B.

An employer violates Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) “by

unilaterally changing an existing term or condition of

employment without first bargaining to impasse.” Regal

Cinemas, Inc. v. NLRB, 317 F.3d 300, 309 & n.5 (D.C. Cir.

2003). The General Counsel must show that “there is an

employment practice concerning a mandatory bargaining

subject, and that the employer has made a significant change

thereto without bargaining.” Bath Iron Works, 345 NLRB at

501 (emphasis in original). Disciplinary procedures are a

mandatory subject of bargaining. See, e.g., El Paso Elec., 355

NLRB at 453.

The Employers contend that the Board’s finding that there

was a significant change to an established employment practice

is not supported by substantial evidence. They assert that

allegations of worker-versus-worker discrimination were not

previously addressed in any consistent way and were often

handled outside of Article 18’s process. But the record before

the Board shows that the parties had consistently utilized the

established Article 18 disciplinary procedure in the

Watchmen’s Agreement to discipline bargaining unit

employees and that this included the informal resolution of

disputes prior to the issuance of formal employer complaints.

See, e.g., Bill Carson testimony, ALJ Hr’g Tr. 465–66 (Apr.

17, 2018); Letter of March 31, 2017, from Long Beach General

Manager Bill Carson to Luisa Gratz, Local 26 President; Letter

of April 27, 2017, from Long Beach to Pleas. Indeed, as noted,

even in the present case Long Beach acknowledged that if Pleas

were to be formally disciplined, it would be pursuant to the

20

Watchmen’s Agreement. Although there is no evidence of an

established practice for handling inter-union employee

complaints, the Employers acknowledge that a non-Local 26

employee had never filed a harassment complaint against a

watchman. Pet’rs’ Br. 53. Absent established disciplinary

practices to resolve this type of dispute, the Employers’

decision to enforce Section 13.2 against a covered watchman

was a change in practice and itself a deviation from the status

quo that supports the Board’s determination that there was a

unilateral change without bargaining. See NLRB. v. Katz, 369

U.S. 736, 744–47 (1962); Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co. v. NLRB,

857 F.3d 364, 375–76 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Cf. E.I. Du Pont De

Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 682 F.3d 65, 67–68 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

The Employers’ invocation of the contract coverage

doctrine fares no better. The court has interpreted the “contract

coverage” standard in unilateral-change cases to present the

question whether a union has already “exercise[d] its right to

bargain” by memorializing in a contract the employer’s right to

act unilaterally, thereby removing the covered action from the

range of further mandatory bargaining. NLRB v. U.S. Postal

Serv., 8 F.3d 832, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Local Union

No. 47, 927 F.2d at 640). The evidence does not show that

Local 26 ever “surrendered the[] right to bargain over the . . .

change[] through either waiver or contract.” Wilkes-Barre

Hosp., 857 F.3d at 376 (quoting S. Nuclear Operating, 524

F.3d at 1357).

The Employers maintain that the Board’s ruling must be

vacated because the Board applied a “clear and unmistakable

waiver” standard and the Board recently ruled that the

“contract coverage” doctrine is the appropriate mode of

analysis, MV Transp., 368 NLRB No. 66, 2019 WL 4316958,

at *1. The Board noted that application of the “contract

coverage” standard would not require a different result. Pac.

21

Mar. Ass’n, 367 NLRB No. 121, 2019 WL 1977314, at *6 n.21.

Even so, the Employers maintain that the Board failed to

explain, under the contract coverage doctrine, why procedures

related to employee discipline in the Watchmen’s Agreement

did not encompass the Employers’ decision to apply Section

13.2 to Pleas. Yet after reviewing the text of the Watchmen’s

Agreement, the parties’ bargaining history, and the parties’ past

practice, and concluding that the Employers had no sound

arguable basis for their interpretation of the Agreement, the

Board also concluded that the Agreement did not cover the

Employers’ disciplinary action. Id. at *5–6 & n.21. Given the

overlap between the sound arguable basis and contract

coverage analysis, (as conceded by the Employers, see Oral

Arg. Tape 6:55–8:17 (Jan. 22, 2020)), the Employers fail to

demonstrate that the Board’s explanation was deficient.

To conclude that a CBA covers the challenged unilateral

conduct, the conduct must fall “within the compass or scope of

contract language granting the employer the right to act

unilaterally.” MV Transp., 368 NLRB No. 66, 2019 WL

4316958, at *17; see also Wilkes-Barre Hosp., 857 F.3d at 377.

In the Employers’ view, their conduct falls “within the

compass” of the Watchmen’s Agreement even if the

Agreement does not specifically authorize discipline pursuant

to Section 13.2 because the Agreement grants an “unrestricted

unilateral right to impose discipline for a number of broadly

stated reasons” and “any dispute over the propriety of Pleas’s

discipline falls ‘within the compass’ of the Watchmen’s

Agreement.” Pet’rs’ Br. 59–60. As noted, Pleas was not

disciplined for any of the exempted offenses in Article 18(C),

and disciplinary disputes falling within the terms of Article 16

of the Watchmen’s Agreement are governed by Article 18’s

procedure, which is exclusive and does not encompass Section

13.2. Given the text of the Watchmen’s Agreement and the

Employers’ bargaining history with Local 26, their attempt to

22

stretch the Agreement to cover the Section 13.2 discipline is

implausible at best. Although the contract coverage standard

does not require that the parties’ Agreement “specifically

mention” the disciplinary action at issue, see Wilkes-Barre

Hosp., 857 F.3d at 377 (quoting Enloe Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 433

F.3d 834, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2005)), nor does it mean an employer

can unilaterally change the terms and conditions of

employment without bargaining because they fall within a

broad subject area that the parties’ Agreement had addressed in

other respects, cf. id. at 376–77. The Employers’ interpretation

of the Watchmen’s Agreement would render its long-familiar

and carefully bargained-for terms meaningless by achieving

the modification of the Agreement that Local 26 had repeatedly

rejected during bargaining with Pacific. This approach is

contrary to the Employers’ statutory obligations under Sections

8(a)(5) and (d) of the Act to adhere to the terms of the

Agreement and effectively dismisses the Supreme Court’s

reasoning on the importance of abiding by the parties’

Agreement, see First Nat. Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 674.

In sum, assuming that both of the theories for violation can

be applied, the court sustains the Board’s determinations that

the Employers made both a midterm contract modification and

a unilateral change to the terms and conditions of Pleas’

employment. The Board could properly conclude, in view of

the plain text of the Watchmen’s Agreement, that there was no

“sound arguable basis” for the Employers to apply the Clerks’

Agreement Section 13.2 procedures and enforce the

Arbitrator’s order against Pleas, who was covered under the

Watchmen’s Agreement. And, by so doing, the Employers

unlawfully unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of

Pleas’ employment. Accordingly, the court denies the petitions

for review and grants the Board’s cross-applications for

enforcement of its Order.

RAO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part: The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the

Board”) found the employers in this case violated federal law

by committing two unfair labor practices: first, unlawfully

modifying a collective bargaining agreement without union

consent; and second, unilaterally imposing new terms and

conditions of employment without providing the union notice

and an opportunity to bargain. While the majority enforces both

unfair labor practices, I would vacate the contract modification

finding. The Board may find a contract modification only when

an employer violates a specific contractual term that plainly

bars the actions taken. Because the relevant collective

bargaining agreement is silent or at least ambiguous as to the

discipline imposed in this case, the employers had reasonable

grounds for their disciplinary actions under the “sound

arguable basis” standard. This well-established standard

ensures that the Board does not overreach into ordinary labor

contractual disputes that Congress placed firmly within the

jurisdiction of the federal courts. Because the majority relaxes

longstanding standards for contract modification, I respectfully

dissent from Part II.A of the court’s opinion.

I.

The majority carefully sets out the relevant facts, Maj. Op.

2–7, but I would frame this contractual dispute in a somewhat

different way. The Long Beach Container Terminal and the

Pacific Maritime Association (“the Employers”) entered into

a collective bargaining agreement known as the Watchmen’s

Agreement with ILWU, Warehouse, Processing and

Distribution Workers’ Union, Local 26 (“the Union”). The

Union represents watchmen at the Employers’ port facilities.

Demetrius Pleas was a member of the Union and thus subject

to the Watchmen’s Agreement. Marine clerks at the port

facilities are represented by a different union operating under

a different contract, the Pacific Coast Longshore and Clerks’

Agreement (“Clerks’ Agreement”). When Pleas made racially

2

insensitive comments in the workplace, a marine clerk filed

a complaint under Section 13.2 of the Clerks’ Agreement,

which sends discrimination complaints to an arbitrator to

resolve factual disputes and recommend appropriate discipline.

The Employers allowed the clerk’s complaint against Pleas to

proceed under Section 13.2 and imposed the arbitrator’s

recommended discipline. Both the Board and the majority

emphasize that the Employers used the wrong mechanism

when disciplining Pleas because they should have filed

a grievance under Article 18 of the Watchmen’s Agreement

rather than use the Section 13.2 process. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 367

NLRB No. 121, at *5–6 (May 2, 2019); see Maj. Op. 9–19.

The distinction between Section 13.2 of the Clerks’

Agreement and Article 18 of the Watchmen’s Agreement,

however, is a red herring. The contract modification charge

does not turn on whether the Employers disciplined Pleas

pursuant to the Section 13.2 process. Rather, the dispositive

issue is whether the Watchmen’s Agreement allows the

Employers to impose discipline at their discretion or instead

requires the Employers to discipline Union members

exclusively through an Article 18 grievance. Thus, my analysis

focuses on whether the Employers justified disciplining Pleas

under a reasonable interpretation of the Watchmen’s

Agreement—a burden they readily carried here—and whether

the Board respected limitations on its jurisdiction by

adjudicating this case under the appropriate legal standard.

Understanding the Board’s limited authority over

contractual matters requires recollecting the distinction

between unfair labor practices under the National Labor

Relations Act of 1935 (“NLRA”) and breaches of contract

under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947

(“LMRA”), a distinction the majority overlooks. The NLRA

creates public rights related to collective bargaining and

3

empowers the Board to adjudicate unfair labor practices

infringing those rights. Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA

make it unlawful for an employer to “refuse to bargain” with

employee representatives on wages, hours, and other

mandatory subjects of bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (1).

Section 8(d) protects the integrity of the collective bargaining

process by prohibiting parties from “terminat[ing] or

modify[ing]” provisions “contained in” a collectively

bargained agreement. Id. § 158(d), (d)(4). The Board’s

authority over matters of contract extends only as far as

adjudicating unfair labor practices. Traditional contractual

disputes, by contrast, are reserved for the federal courts under

Section 301 of the LMRA, which recognizes that collective

bargaining agreements are voluntary contracts between

employers and unions giving rise to private rights when

breached. To vindicate contractual rights, the LMRA grants

district courts broad jurisdiction over “[s]uits for violation of

contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” 29

U.S.C. § 185(a); see Dist. No. 1 v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 933 F.3d

751, 756–58 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

The jurisdictional division between the NLRA and the

LMRA means the Board interprets contracts only “so far as [is]

necessary” to determine whether an unfair labor practice

occurred. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 119, 124

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting NLRB v. C&C Plywood Corp., 385

U.S. 421, 428 (1967)). “But the federal courts, not the Board,

are legislatively empowered to be the primary interpreters of

contracts.” Id. (citing Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501

U.S. 190, 202–03 (1991)). Under prevailing standards for

contract-related unfair labor practices and associated defenses,

the Board performs a “limited review” of a labor contract’s

plain language to determine whether to assert jurisdiction. MV

Transp., Inc., 368 NLRB No. 66, at *17 (Sept. 10, 2019).

Resolving contractual ambiguity by reaching beyond the plain

4

meaning, however, is a task reserved for the courts. As the

agency freely admits, “the Board is not an expert in contract

interpretation, nor was it intended to be.” Id. at *9 (cleaned up).

When contractual obligations are in dispute, “[t]he Board is not

the proper forum for parties seeking an interpretation of their

collective-bargaining agreement.” Vickers, Inc., 153 NLRB

561, 570 (1965). That much flows from the bargaining

structure of the NLRA, which leaves employers and unions free

to set the terms and conditions of employment by mutual

consent rather than administrative fiat. Orders of the Board are

“ineffective to determine any private rights of the employees

and leave[] them free to assert such legal rights as they may

have acquired under their contracts.” Nat’l Licorice Co. v.

NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 366 (1940); cf. Stern v. Marshall, 564

U.S. 462, 484 (2011) (“[I]n general, Congress may not

‘withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its

nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity,

or admiralty.’”) (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land &

Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856)).

Jurisdictional considerations thus operate in the

background of the Board’s adjudication of contract

modification charges under Sections 8(a)(5) and (d). Judicial

review of such cases ensures the Board respects limits on its

authority and does not decide breach of contract claims that

Congress assigned to the courts. Accordingly, we review the

Board’s contract interpretation de novo while according

substantial evidence deference to the agency’s findings of fact.

StaffCo of Brooklyn, LLC v. NLRB, 888 F.3d 1297, 1302 (D.C.

Cir. 2018). To determine whether the Board misapplied

governing law in an arbitrary and capricious manner, “we must

identify the standard at issue, examine its application in prior

adjudications, and then determine whether the instant case is

a faithful application of existing law or instead a sub silentio

5

revision.” Circus Circus Casinos, Inc. v. NLRB, 961 F.3d 469,

476 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

II.

As the Board has explained on multiple occasions, contract

modification and unilateral change unfair labor practices “are

fundamentally different in terms of principle, possible

defenses, and remedy.” ADT, LLC, 369 NLRB No. 31, at *3

(Feb. 27, 2020); MV Transp., 368 NLRB No. 66, at *27–28;

Bath Iron Works Corp., 345 NLRB 499, 501 (2005). In this

case, the Board found that the Employers both unilaterally

changed established practice and modified the Watchmen’s

Agreement by imposing terms from Section 13.2 of the Clerks’

Agreement. Pac. Mar., 367 NLRB No. 121, at *5–6. In doing

so, the Board contradicted precedents that foreclose finding

both unilateral change and contract modification based on the

same underlying employer conduct.1 Because the Employers

1

Although our court has yet to definitively address the issue, the

Board’s precedents have long treated contract modification and

unilateral change as mutually exclusive. Contract modification

charges “require greater proof” because their remedy—specific

performance of the contract’s terms—is more severe than that

assessed for the “lesser allegation” of unilateral change. ABF Freight

Sys., Inc., 369 NLRB No. 107, at *4 & n.8 (June 19, 2020) (citing

Bath Iron Works, 345 NLRB at 502–03). In rare situations, the Board

has found both violations when an employer imposed multiple rules

at the same time, some of which modified an existing contract and

some of which altered established practice. See, e.g., Comau, Inc.,

364 NLRB No. 48, at *4–6 (July 14, 2016). Since deciding this case,

the Board has reaffirmed that the findings are mutually exclusive:

“Unlike an employer that unlawfully modifies a contract, an

employer that implements an unlawful unilateral change only needs

to restore the status quo ante until the parties reach an impasse in

bargaining. Because the remedies are mutually exclusive, an

allegedly unlawful employer decision cannot be both a unilateral

6

failed to challenge the joint nature of the findings, however, we

cannot vacate the Board’s order on this basis. 29 U.S.C.

§ 160(e); see Maj. Op. 8.

On these facts, I join the majority in enforcing the Board’s

unilateral change finding because the Employers imposed new

terms and conditions of employment without giving the Union

notice and an opportunity to bargain. Pac. Mar., 367 NLRB

No. 121, at *6; see Maj. Op. 19–22. Unilateral changes to prior

practices violate Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) by circumventing the

Section 8(d) procedural protections meant to promote

collective bargaining. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).

To prove a unilateral change, the Board must show (1) “an

established past practice” and (2) “‘a material, substantial, and

significant change’” to that practice without bargaining. ABF

Freight Sys., Inc., 369 NLRB No. 107, at *2 (June 19, 2020)

(quoting MV Transp., 368 NLRB No. 66, at *4). Substantial

evidence supports the Board’s view that the Employers had

established past practices of investigating discrimination

allegations against watchmen informally and imposing less

severe penalties than those levied against Pleas. By

participating in and adopting the results of procedures from

Section 13.2 of the Clerks’ Agreement, the Employers made

material changes to employee discipline, an employment term

recognized as a mandatory subject of bargaining. See El Paso

Elec. Co., 355 NLRB 428, 453 (2010).

Yet these same facts do not support a contract modification

violation, which turns on matters of contract interpretation for

which the Board has considerably less prerogative and enjoys

change and a contract modification.” ADT, 369 NLRB No. 31, at *3

(citing Bath Iron Works, 345 NLRB at 503). While the NLRB’s

general counsel may allege both theories in the alternative, the Board

will not find both violations simultaneously. Id.

7

no judicial deference. Contract modification is an unfair labor

practice under Sections 8(a)(5) and (d) because failing to

adhere to agreed-upon terms undermines collective bargaining

and a union’s role as the employees’ chosen representative. To

find contract modification, the Board must (1) identify

“a specific term ‘contained in’ the contract” to which a party

failed to adhere without the consent of the counterparty, United

Auto. Workers v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1985)

(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4)), and (2) assess the four corners

of the agreement to determine whether the charged party has

a “sound arguable basis” for interpreting the contract to support

its actions, Bath Iron Works, 345 NLRB at 502. Under the

“sound arguable basis” standard, an alleged breach of contract

is not an unfair labor practice if the party acted under

a “reasonable” interpretation of the contract. MV Transp., 368

NLRB No. 66, at *28. “[W]hen ‘an employer has a sound

arguable basis for ascribing a particular meaning to his contract

and his action is in accordance with the terms of the contract as

he construes it,’ the Board will not enter the dispute to serve

the function of arbitrator in determining which party’s

interpretation is correct.” NCR Corp., 271 NLRB 1212, 1213

(1984) (quoting Vickers, 153 NLRB at 570). In other words,

only clear violations of an unambiguous term rise to the level

of an unlawful contract modification.

In finding contract modification on these facts, the Board

departed from longstanding precedent in three ways. First, the

Board failed to identify a specific contract provision “contained

in” the Watchmen’s Agreement that the Employers modified.

Second, the Board misapplied the “sound arguable basis”

standard by rejecting the Employers’ reasonable interpretation

of the Watchmen’s Agreement as allowing employee discipline

outside the Article 18 grievance process. Third, by relying on

extrinsic evidence of bargaining history, the Board

transgressed the limitations on its contract interpretation

8

authority. In my view, any one of these errors requires vacating

the contract modification finding. Taken together, they

represent a troubling departure from applicable standards and

undermine the clarity and predictability of federal labor law.

A.

To determine whether the Employers unlawfully modified

the contract, the Board was required first to identify a specific

term “contained in” in the Watchmen’s Agreement that the

Employers ignored without the Union’s consent. United Auto.

Workers, 765 F.2d at 179; see also St. Vincent Hosp., 320

NLRB 42, 42 (1995); Milwaukee Spring Div., 268 NLRB 601,

602 (1984). The Board concluded the Employers modified

Articles 18(D) and (H) by disciplining Pleas after arbitration

under Section 13.2 of the Clerks’ Agreement rather than filing

an employer grievance under Article 18 of the Watchmen’s

Agreement. Pac. Mar., 367 NLRB No. 121, at *5–6. Although

employee arbitration under Section 13.2 was a departure from

prior practice and thus an unlawful unilateral change, this does

not necessarily mean the Employers modified Article 18 when

they adopted the results of arbitration. Instead, the ultimate

question is whether the Watchmen’s Agreement requires the

Employers to discipline Pleas exclusively through Article 18’s

“Grievance Machinery.” Watchmen’s Agreement at 33

(“W.A.”). For the following reasons, the Watchmen’s

Agreement provisions identified by the Board do not require

the Employers to discipline employees exclusively through an

employer grievance under Article 18.

As an initial matter, “grievance” is a term of art in the

collective bargaining context that means more than

a “complaint” or “dispute.” As the Supreme Court has

explained, “[t]he processing of disputes through the grievance

machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content

9

are given to the collective bargaining agreement.” United

Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574,

581 (1960). The Watchmen’s Agreement grievance machinery

is a specific type of complaint process that covers some, but

not all, disputes arising between employees and the Employers.

Article 18(D) requires the Employers to attempt informal

resolution with affected parties before submitting

a “grievance” to the joint Labor Relations Committee.2 If the

Committee is unable to negotiate a resolution, the matter may

proceed to arbitration between the Employers and the Union.

W.A. at 33–34; see also Art. 18(E)–(G), W.A. at 34–35.

Nothing in Article 18(D) requires or suggests that the

2

Article 18(D) reads, in relevant part:

Prior to a complaint being filed by the Employer or the

Union, the following procedures shall apply:

(1.) (A.) The Employer shall notify and discuss the alleged

incident with the individuals involved and president and/or

a steward of [the Union] and attempt to resolve the matter.

Whatever evidence the parties have or have relied upon

relating to the discharge and/or grievance shall be provided

to the Union at the time of request. … Following a good faith

discussion with the Union, … the Employers may implement

the established procedures as outlined in Articles 18 and 19

of the Agreement.

(B.) The Union shall notify and discuss the alleged incident

with management and attempt to resolve the matter. …

Following a good faith discussion with the Employer, … the

Union may implement the established procedures as outlined

in Article[s] 18 and 19 of the Agreement.

(2.) In cases of discipline and/or discharge, the Employer

shall identify, specifically, and describe in detail the

violation committed by the watchman. The Employer shall

specify the company procedure and/or Contract provision

violated.

10

Employers must file a contractual grievance before

investigating employee misconduct or imposing discipline.

Similarly, Article 18(H) speaks to the scope of the

grievance procedure but does not require prior Labor Relations

Committee approval of employee discipline: “This grievance

machinery shall be the exclusive remedy with respect to any

dispute arising under the Collective-Bargaining Agreement

and no other remedies shall be used by the Union, the

Employer, or any covered employee until the grievance

procedures have been exhausted.” W.A. at 35. Article 18(H)

says nothing about employee discipline. Yet the Board and the

majority would insert new language into the Watchmen’s

Agreement by reading Article 18(H) to “expressly limit[] the

Employers’ ability to discipline employees ‘with respect to any

dispute arising under the [Agreement].’” Maj. Op. 11

(emphasis added). There is simply no textual basis for claiming

that Article 18(H) makes any provision, express or otherwise,

regarding the discipline of employees. Accord Pac. Mar., 367

NLRB No. 121, at *12 (Kaplan dissenting).

The Watchmen’s Agreement subjects only those disputes

“arising under” its terms exclusively to the Article 18 grievance

process. Grievances “aris[e] under” a contract provision when

“the resolution of that claim hinges on the interpretation

ultimately given the contract clause.” Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local

No. 358, 430 U.S. 243, 249 (1977). Despite containing detailed

rules on many aspects of the employment relationship, the

Agreement is generally silent on matters of discipline. The

Employers’ decision to discipline in this case does not “arise

under” the Agreement because no term speaks to Pleas’s

conduct or the resulting consequences. Grievance procedures

like those in Article 18 cannot be read expansively to cover

matters outside the contract without undermining the freedom

of contract policies embedded in federal labor law. Cf. Dep’t of

11

Navy v. FLRA, 962 F.2d 48, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“Because of

the fundamental policy of freedom of contract, the parties are

generally free to agree to whatever specific rules they like, and

in most circumstances it is beyond the competence of the …

National Labor Relations Board or the courts to interfere with

the parties’ choice.”). Without any indication that the parties

intended to do so, we have no basis for assuming a contractual

grievance process covers individual cases of employee

discipline.3

In reaching a contrary reading of Articles 18(D) and (H),

the Board stated only that “article 18’s plain language

establishes that the parties intended to prohibit all other

mechanisms—including, a fortiori, one set forth in a different

contract covering a different bargaining unit—for addressing

alleged watchman misconduct.” Pac. Mar., 367 NLRB No.

121, at *5. The majority now adopts this finding by relying on

an argument the Board did not: that this dispute “arose under”

Article 16 of the Watchmen’s Agreement, which “broadly

prohibits discrimination against ‘any person’ on the basis of

‘race, color, national origin, [and] religious or political

beliefs.’” Maj. Op. 11, 18–19. The Board, however, relied

exclusively on its reading of Article 18 to find an unlawful

contract modification. See Pac. Mar., 367 NLRB No. 121, at

3

The grievance provision of the Clerks’ Agreement, by contrast,

explicitly specifies that a joint labor relations committee shall

“investigate and adjudicate any complaint against any clerk whose

conduct on the job … causes disruption of normal harmony in the

relationship of the parties hereto or the frustration and/or violation of

the provisions of the working or dispatching rules or of this

Agreement.” Clerks’ Agreement § 17.125, at 59. The contrast

between this language and Article 18(H) demonstrates the

Employers and the Union had alternative language readily available

but instead left discipline outside the scope of matters subject

exclusively to the grievance process in the Watchmen’s Agreement.

12

*5–6.4 We cannot sustain an agency’s decision on a different

basis than the one relied upon below. See SEC v. Chenery

Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196–97 (1947); Point Park Univ. v.

NLRB, 457 F.3d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Nor can our Court

fill in critical gaps in the Board’s reasoning. We can only look

to the Board’s stated rationale.”).

Because the Board cannot identify a specific term in the

Watchmen’s Agreement that subjects employee discipline to

the grievance procedure, the Employers did not modify specific

terms and conditions contained in the Agreement. The Board

failed to establish an unlawful contract modification.

B.

Even if Article 18 addressed the question of employee

discipline, the Board cannot sustain a contract modification

charge if the Employers had a “sound arguable basis” for

interpreting the Watchmen’s Agreement to permit their

disciplinary actions. Reading the Watchmen’s Agreement as

a whole, the Employers clearly had a “sound arguable basis”

for their conduct because the Agreement was at least

ambiguous with respect to employee discipline outside the

contractual grievance procedures of Article 18.

As discussed above, nothing in the plain terms of Article

18 requires discipline to proceed through an employer

grievance. Moreover, despite relying heavily on Article 18(D),

the Board and the majority ignore clear references to employee

4

The Board referred to Article 16 to reject an argument by one of the

Employers that the provision, if applicable, would allow the

Employers to investigate and discipline based on such complaints.

See Pac. Mar., 367 NLRB No. 121, at *6 n.20. But the Board never

found the Employers filed a complaint under Article 16 or that the

dispute turned on interpreting this provision.

13

discipline arising outside the grievance machinery. For

instance, Article 18(D)(1) presupposes that a discharge and

a grievance are distinct employer actions: “Whatever evidence

the parties have or have relied upon relating to the discharge

and/or grievance shall be provided to the Union at the time of

request.” W.A. at 33–34 (emphasis added); see Encino

Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141 (2018)

(“‘[O]r’ is ‘almost always disjunctive.’”) (citation omitted).

Moreover, Article 18(D) uses the past tense when referring to

employee discipline, suggesting review of discipline under the

grievance process could occur post hoc. See W.A. at 33–34.

These provisions at a minimum support a sound arguable basis

for concluding that employee discipline may occur before or

apart from filing an employer grievance under the Watchmen’s

Agreement.

Next, the Board and the majority fail to consider the

broader structure of the Labor Relations Committee as

reflected in Articles 18(A) and (J). Article 18(A) establishes

the Committee “to resolve grievances, secure conformance to

the terms of the Agreement, maintain current employee

registration rosters, maintain dispatch procedures, and

generally administer the Agreement.” W.A. at 33. None of

these roles for the Committee include employee discipline, and

the term “grievance[]” is not naturally read to include

allegations of employee misconduct. Supra at 8–10. Article

18(J) includes an extensive list of topics the Committee must

discuss on at least a monthly basis. W.A. at 35.5 Yet despite

5

Article 18(J) reads:

There shall be designated monthly [Labor Relations

Committee] meetings for the following purposes:

(1.) Two (2) regularly scheduled meetings each month

exclusively for general LRC issues

14

containing significant detail, the list does not include matters

of employee discipline. If the Committee were intended as the

sole adjudicator of misconduct allegations for hundreds of

employees at a large shipping terminal, one would expect this

responsibility to be explicit.

Finally, the Employers offer a persuasive interpretation of

Article 18(C), which includes the Agreement’s only reference

to disciplinary rules.6 This provision instructs the Labor

Relations Committee to “establish rules and regulations

governing the conduct of watchmen as well as penalties for the

breach of these rules and regulations,” and provides further that

“nothing herein shall restrict the Employer’s existing right to

discipline or discharge” for five enumerated offenses not

implicated in this case. W.A. at 33. According to the

(2.) One (1) meeting exclusively for Registered Watchmens’

complaints (non-dispatch issues)

(3.) One (1) meeting exclusively for Dispatch Violations

(4.) One (1) meeting exclusively for Emergency watchmen

complaints

(5.) One (1) Dispatch Committee meeting exclusively for

Time Books and Emergency Watchmen Dispatch Audit

(6.) One (1) meeting exclusively to audit Registered guards

Dispatch Records and Reports

(7.) One (1) meeting exclusively for Watchmen Safety.

6

Article 18(C) reads:

The Labor Relations Committee shall establish rules and

regulations governing the conduct of watchmen as well as

penalties for the breach of these rules and regulations.

However, nothing herein shall restrict the Employer’s

existing right to discipline or discharge men for intoxication,

pilferage, assault, incompetency, or failure to perform work

as directed, but any man who considers that he has been

improperly disciplined or discharged may appeal to the

Labor Relations Committee.

15

Employers, Article 18(C)’s reference to an “existing right”

means they retain the right to discipline for an offense unless

the Committee issues rules and penalties applicable to that

offense. The five enumerated offenses represent carve-outs for

which the Committee cannot preempt the Employers’

discretion. Read together, “a reasonable interpretation is that

[Article 18(C)] is limited to granting the [Committee] the

power to make disciplinary rules, so long as those rules do not

restrict the employers’ right to discipline for the five

enumerated offenses, but does not limit the Employer’s ability

to discipline employees in the absence of any controlling

[Committee] rule.” Pac. Mar., 367 NLRB No. 121, at *12

(Kaplan dissenting). The majority says this interpretation

renders the enumeration superfluous, Maj. Op. 12, but the

Employers’ interpretation of Article 18(C) preserves a role for

the grievance process to resolve complaints by the Union and

the Employers, to channel disputes into binding arbitration, and

to allow grievances to be filed after discipline if its imposition

conflicts with the Agreement.

The majority’s “sound arguable basis” analysis does not

square with precedent. Rather than engage de novo with the

plain meaning of the contract, the majority seeks to squeeze its

interpretation into substantial evidence deference whenever

possible. See Maj. Op. 13–16. Yet disputed evidence of past

practice and bargaining history cannot supplant plain meaning,

which, as discussed further below, is the lodestar of the sound

arguable basis analysis. At most, the majority demonstrates that

Article 18 may be interpreted to cover individual cases of

employee discipline. But one plausible interpretation does not

foreclose the Employers’ interpretation as fundamentally

unsound.

To defeat this contract modification charge, the Employers

needed only a “sound arguable basis” to argue the Watchmen’s

16

Agreement allowed disciplining Pleas for racial harassment

without filing an Article 18 grievance. Because the Agreement

is at a minimum ambiguous on employee discipline outside the

contractual grievance procedure, the Employers had a “sound

arguable basis” for their disciplinary actions.

C.

The Board further erred by supporting its contract

modification finding with extrinsic evidence that the Union

rejected terms like those in Section 13.2 of the Clerks’

Agreement and that the parties had not previously applied such

procedures to discrimination allegations. The Board concluded

that “the parties’ past practice and bargaining history” meant

that the Employers “could not have mistaken or misunderstood

[the Union’s] intent that no such [Section 13.2] procedure be

applicable to watchmen.” Pac. Mar., 367 NLRB No. 121, at

*5–6, *16. Under the “sound arguable basis” test, however, the

Board’s authority to interpret contracts ends where ambiguity

begins. Rather than dismiss the charge in the face of ambiguity,

the Board reached beyond the four corners of the Watchmen’s

Agreement by looking to the evidence it used to find

a unilateral change violation. Yet as noted earlier, the contract

modification analysis does not turn on whether the Employers

applied Section 13.2 to Pleas, or whether the Union would have

consented to amending Article 18 to include such procedures.

Rather, the issue is whether the Employers had a “sound

arguable basis” for disciplining Pleas without filing a grievance

under the Watchmen’s Agreement. Relying on extrinsic

evidence caused the Board’s decision to run crosswise with

longstanding precedent.

To begin with, the Board’s use of extrinsic evidence to

rebut the Employers’ otherwise “sound arguable basis” rests on

a misreading of prior cases. For example, the Board cites

17

Knollwood Country Club, 365 NLRB No. 22 (Mar. 8, 2017),

for the proposition that plain meaning and extrinsic evidence

stand on equal footing when interpreting a contract. In

Knollwood, however, the Board rejected an employer’s

interpretation as unreasonable because the employer failed to

read the contract as a whole and merely noted that extrinsic

evidence “also” was consistent with the plain meaning of the

contract. Id. at *1 & n.8. This holding is consistent with

ordinary principles of contract interpretation embracing the

plain meaning approach. Moreover, Knollwood relied in

relevant part on Mining Specialists, Inc., 314 NLRB 268, 268–

69 (1994), a unilateral change case emphasizing that

“contractual language … is always paramount.” Neither the

Board nor the majority cite to a single case in which extrinsic

evidence supported a finding of contract modification when the

provision in question was ambiguous. In fact, both the agency’s

precedents and the law of this circuit are clear that plain

meaning governs when adjudicating unfair labor practices

arising from contract.7 The Board’s limited statutory authority

7

See, e.g., Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc., 367 NLRB No. 116, at *4–5

(Apr. 17, 2019) (dismissing charge where employer had

a “colorable” argument that “conforming to applicable law”

provision allowed it to stop deducting union dues pursuant to state

law); MV Transp., 368 NLRB No. 66, at *28–34 (dismissing several

charges where employer had a “sound arguable basis” for

interpreting contract to allow new company policies); see also Am.

Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. FLRA, 470 F.3d 375, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(“Interpretation of a contract, like statutory and treaty interpretation,

must begin with the plain meaning of the language.”). Evidence of

prior practice and bargaining history, if mentioned at all, are cited

only to note its consistency with plain meaning. See, e.g., ADT, 369

NLRB No. 31, at *5 & n.10 (concluding plain language required

dismissing modification charge and then noting the parties’ past

practice “further supports” the interpretation offered by the

employer); Comau, 364 NLRB No. 48, at *5 & n.16 (in the absence

of an applicable contract provision, prior practice demonstrated the

18

over contract disputes necessarily means it cannot use extrinsic

evidence to refute plain meaning or resolve ambiguity, which

is a role reserved for the courts.

Perhaps the fundamental problem of the Board’s approach

here is that it sought to revise the contract modification

standard sub silentio. By deploying extrinsic evidence in

a “sound arguable basis” inquiry, the Board failed to adhere to

governing law setting out distinct evidentiary standards for

contract modification and unilateral change. For example, in

Bath Iron Works, the Board distinguished between contract

modification and unilateral change and rejected arguments to

apply the same standard to both charges. See 345 NLRB at

501–02. Instead, the Board reaffirmed that the “sound arguable

basis” test governs contract modification charges—a policy the

Board continues to follow. See MV Transp., 368 NLRB No. 66,

at *13–17, *28 (emphasizing the Board’s limited authority to

interpret contracts and declining to go beyond plain meaning

when adjudicating unfair labor practices). Here, rather than

assess the Employers’ “sound arguable basis” against the plain

meaning of the Agreement, the Board held the Employers to

a different standard by faulting them for not proving the Union

would have accepted procedures like those in Section 13.2 of

the Clerks’ Agreement.8

contract applied to employees in question); Hosp. San Carlos, Inc.,

355 NLRB 153, 153 & n.5 (2010) (concluding plain meaning

foreclosed employer’s interpretation before observing that testimony

regarding the parties’ intent also supported the conclusion).

8

To determine whether an employer unilaterally changed an

established prior practice, the Board often looks to evidence of

conduct and bargaining history—typically a mix of testimony and

non-contractual written records. See, e.g., ABF Freight, 369 NLRB

No. 107, at *2–3 (discussing evidence of employer’s past actions).

Similarly, extrinsic evidence is relevant when an employer raises

19

This intermingling of legal frameworks for contract

modification and unilateral change, however, has never been

adopted by the Board as a whole and has been previously

advanced only in dissenting opinions.9 Yet in this case, two

members of a three-member panel conflated the evidentiary

standard for contract modification with those for unilateral

change and waiver. Unlike many multi-member agencies, the

NLRB decides cases by delegating to three-member panels as

a matter of course. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b); NLRB, Guide to

Board Procedures § 3.8(a) (Apr. 2017). As a consequence of

this practice, a position held by a two-member minority of the

five-member Board may prevail on a panel in a manner

inconsistent with the Board’s governing precedents.10

a waiver defense, which requires showing the union clearly and

unmistakably waived its statutory right to bargain on the contested

issue. See, e.g., Provena Hosps., 350 NLRB 808, 811 (2007).

9

Over the years, a persistent minority of the Board has questioned

whether Bath Iron Works was wrongly decided and advocated for

limiting the “sound arguable basis” standard or imposing a different

standard that falls within the scope of the Board’s substantial

evidence deference for factfinding. See, e.g., Metalcraft, 367 NLRB

No. 116, at *15 (McFerran dissenting); MV Transp., 368 NLRB No.

66, at *41 (McFerran concurring in part and dissenting in part);

Knollwood, 365 NLRB No. 22, at *1 n.5 (separate footnote by Pearce

and McFerran); Comau, 364 NLRB No. 48, at *4 n.14 (separate

footnote by Pearce and Hirozawa); Bath Iron Works, 345 NLRB at

504 (Liebman dissenting); see also Pac. Mar., 367 NLRB No. 121,

at *5 n.15 (separate footnote by McFerran) (reserving the question

of whether Bath Iron Works was wrongly decided).

10

The question is not whether the procedure is permissible under the

NLRA, or whether the Employers challenged its use in this case. Cf.

Maj. Op. 18–19. Rather, the question is whether this panel of the

Board followed the agency’s announced standards. Given the

unexplained break with precedent evident in this case, I would

answer that question in the negative.

20

Although the NLRA authorizes decisions by delegated panels,

those panels must follow the Board’s announced standards in

order to satisfy the reasoned decisionmaking requirement

applicable to all administrative action. See Allentown Mack

Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998). As

a reviewing court, we must ensure the Board adheres to its

announced standards, not the preferred interpretations of

individual members. See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FERC, 839 F.3d

1165, 1169–70 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (applying the “almost

universally accepted common-law rule” that “only a majority

of a collective body is empowered to act for the body”)

(cleaned up).

The majority endorses the Board’s use of extrinsic

evidence by taking a myopic view of governing law. When

reviewing an adjudicatory standard, we must examine its

application in prior cases and then determine whether the

instant case is a faithful application of existing law. See Circus

Circus, 961 F.3d at 476. Instead, the majority relies on

a selective reading of the Board’s decision in Knollwood, see

Maj. Op. 14, and fails to engage with cases like Bath Iron

Works and MV Transportation that set out a clear plain

meaning requirement. It is a fundamental principle of

administrative law that prior departures from announced

standards do not excuse an agency’s duty to acknowledge and

justify a change in policy. “It is hard to imagine a more violent

breach of that requirement than applying a rule of primary

conduct or a standard of proof which is in fact different from

the rule or standard formally announced. And the consistent

repetition of that breach can hardly mend it.” Allentown Mack,

522 U.S. at 374; see, e.g., ABM Onsite Servs.-West, Inc. v.

NLRB, 849 F.3d 1137, 1144–46 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (vacating

order when the Board improperly applied the applicable

standard over the course of four years). Without a reasoned

revision by the Board of the “sound arguable basis” standard,

21

this court must reject individual decisions departing from those

standards. The Board in this case was wrong to dislodge the

employer’s reasonable interpretation using extrinsic evidence.

* * *

Contract modifications are breaches of contract that rise to

the level of offending public rights by undermining the

collective bargaining process. The “sound arguable basis”

standard provides a means of separating unfair labor practices

from contractual disputes reserved for the courts. See

Honeywell, 253 F.3d at 123–25; Int’l Union, United Mine

Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

By finding a contract modification in these circumstances, the

Board departed from precedent in an arbitrary and capricious

manner and exceeded its limited jurisdiction over contract

disputes. I therefore respectfully dissent from enforcing the

Board’s contract modification finding.