DEREK WARREN LOGUE v. LAUREN FRANCES BOOK

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

DEREK WARREN LOGUE,

Appellant,

v.

LAUREN FRANCES BOOK,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-1112

[June 24, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

Broward County; Michael G. Kaplan, Judge; L.T. Case No. DVCE17-5746.

Gary S. Edinger of Benjamin, Aaronson, Edinger & Patanzo, P.A.,

Gainesville, and James S. Benjamin of Benjamin, Aaronson, Edinger &

Patanzo, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

J. David Bogenschutz and Jaclyn E. Broudy of J. David Bogenschutz &

Associates, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

KLINGENSMITH, J.

We grant the motion for rehearing en banc, vacate our prior opinion,

and substitute the following in its place.

The appellant Derek Warren Logue (“Respondent”) appeals a final

injunction for protection against stalking. He argues, among other things,

that the trial court erred in entering the injunction because the appellee

failed to prove the statutory requirements for an injunction and because

the injunction is a prior restraint on his free speech. We agree on both

points and reverse.

This case provides our court the opportunity to address whether First

Amendment freedoms have limits when applied to 21st century

communications. The appellee Lauren Frances Book (“Petitioner”) is a

public figure—an elected official occupying the office of Florida State

Senator. In addition to her duties in public office, she also runs a non-

profit organization called “Lauren’s Kids” whose purpose is a laudable

one—to assist survivors of sexual abuse and to prevent its occurrence. In

both roles, she has been a longtime public advocate for laws that support

and maintain sex offender registries, and place residency restrictions on

convicted offenders.

Respondent is also a public figure—the co-founder of what is described

as the Anti-Registry Movement which opposes sex offender laws. 1 In that

capacity, he travels to, organizes, and participates in various

demonstrations and counter-demonstrations around the nation opposing

the type of sex offender laws for which petitioner advocates. In furtherance

of this role, he maintains an online presence using both Facebook and

Twitter accounts, as well as internet websites. One website relevant to

this case is titled, “Floridians for Freedom: Ron and Lauren Book

Exposed.” Ron Book is Petitioner’s father.

Petitioner filed for an injunction alleging that Respondent was

harassing and cyberstalking her. The trial court held a hearing and took

testimony from the parties and witnesses, after which the court entered

the injunction against Respondent. That injunction is the basis for this

appeal.

“A trial court has broad discretion to grant an injunction, and we review

an order imposing a permanent injunction for a clear abuse of that

discretion.” Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142, 1143-44 (Fla. 1st DCA

2018).

In support of her injunction request, Petitioner cited three primary

instances of offending conduct as “threatening” to her: (1) the

Respondent’s protest at the end of a march in Tallahassee; (2) his

appearance and conduct at a New York film festival; and (3) his social

media postings on his website, blog, and other social media platforms.

At the injunction hearing, Petitioner testified about these three

instances. She expressed her fear of Respondent and testified about

contacting law enforcement to ensure her safety and that of her young

children.

The First Instance–The Tallahassee Protest

1In 2001, an Alabama court convicted Respondent of improper relations with a

minor.

2

Petitioner cited to Respondent’s presence at what was, by all accounts,

a peaceful demonstration in Tallahassee during a 2015 event called the

“Walk in My Shoes.” This event predated Petitioner’s election to public

office. The undisputed evidence presented at the injunction hearing

showed that Respondent attended and had also encouraged others to join

in his protest against the march. During the event, Respondent stood at

the side of the road across the street from the State Capitol holding a three-

by-three-foot handwritten sign protesting Petitioner’s advocacy of sex

offender registration laws. Respondent’s protest also included a diorama

of a homeless camp and a commode chair bearing the title, “King Ron’s

Throne,” a reference to Petitioner’s father. By all accounts, the protest

included no threats or threatening activity whatsoever. Law enforcement

had been notified of the protest in advance, and there were no untoward

incidents reported regarding the Respondent’s conduct. While this event

may have been displeasing or even embarrassing to Petitioner, there is

nothing from the testimony presented to the court about Respondent’s

activities at this protest that would in any way support the issuance of an

injunction.

The Second Instance–The Film Festival

Petitioner also recounted an incident that occurred at the Tribeca Film

Festival in 2016 during a screening of the film, “The Untouchables”—a

documentary film about sex offenders and the use of registries. The film

includes interviews and footage of Petitioner, Petitioner’s father, and

Respondent. The evidence at the hearing showed that Petitioner knew in

advance from a variety of sources that Respondent would be there and

chose to attend anyway, albeit, with security in place. The undisputed

testimony revealed that Respondent sat several rows behind Petitioner

during the movie. No interaction occurred between them whatsoever

either before or during the film. At the end of the movie, Petitioner walked

to the front of the theater to take questions. After several audience

members were given the opportunity to ask questions, the microphone was

given to Respondent who asked Petitioner a question along the lines of

“how can you sit there and talk about how people on the registry don’t

deserve a second chance when your father . . . is a convicted criminal and

he got [a] second chance?” Taking the encounter in the light most

favorable to Petitioner, Respondent was “aggressive and shouting” and

pointed his finger as he asked the question. Petitioner answered the

question and, following the interaction, exited the theater. At no time did

Respondent attempt to approach Petitioner or initiate any other contact

with her. Witnesses confirmed that Respondent never left his seat in the

auditorium before he was handed the microphone to ask his question, nor

did he ever approach Petitioner in any way. Respondent was not ejected

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from the theater and did not follow Petitioner outside. As with the first

incident, there is nothing about this interaction that would support the

issuance of an injunction.

The Third Instance–Respondent’s Website and Social Media

Lastly, Petitioner highlighted certain content found on Respondent’s

“Ron and Lauren Book Exposed” website as well as other social media

platforms as cause for concern. One is a picture of Petitioner’s home along

with her address posted on Respondent’s website. The second is a video

for a song containing an obscene title, with lyrics that are “Not Safe For

Work” posted on his Twitter page. The third is a cartoon depicting a

headstone with a vulgar insult (undoubtedly referring to Petitioner) and

the phrase, “Died of Natural Causes.”

Respondent’s website is essentially a blog that primarily republishes

news articles about Petitioner and her father, detailing what Respondent

describes as “their questionable activity.” As a result, most of the website’s

content is culled from various third-party sources and contains

information published in other media. It is undisputed that Respondent

never directly communicated with Petitioner about any of the posts, nor

did he ever send them to her or any of her associates. According to one

witness who testified at the injunction hearing, Petitioner and her group

only learned of the posts from third-parties, and became concerned

because “it seemed to be the language was maybe more inflammatory and

very opinion based, using language that was . . . kind of angry or

derogative, insulting, personally insulting in addition to being just kind of

a disagreement of opinions and ideas.” Even in the light most favorable to

Petitioner’s view of the content and assuming that description to be

accurate, none of the posts are sufficient to support an injunction, because

none of them constitute either a threat or harassment under the

cyberstalking statute.

The picture of Petitioner’s home placed on Respondent’s website was a

Google snapshot of the structure found at the address listed in the public

records as belonging to “Lauren’s Kids,” the advocacy group and political

action committee (PAC) founded and operated by Petitioner. This fact was

revealed to the court at the injunction hearing. It was also undisputed

that all the information posted about the house, including its address,

purchase price, and photo, was obtained entirely from publicly accessible

records. Respondent violated no privacy laws or other confidentiality

restrictions by republishing that information.

Other Testimony at the Hearing & Grant of the Injunction

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Law enforcement witnesses testified that they viewed Respondent as a

credible threat to Petitioner and described steps undertaken to ensure her

safety. The FBI investigated Respondent while local and state law

enforcement provided Petitioner with protection. Respondent’s criminal

history was learned during the investigation as was the existence of a

domestic violence injunction entered against him.

The trial court considered each of these instances and granted the

injunction against Respondent without identifying which of the various

occurrences supported it. The court ordered Respondent to have no

contact with Petitioner either directly or through a third party, or with

“anyone connected with Petitioner’s employment or school to inquire about

Petitioner or to send any messages to Petitioner” and to refrain from

“publish[ing] any statement threatening the Petitioner.” The trial court

also ordered Respondent “not go to, in, or within 500 feet of the Petitioner’s

residence or place of employment,” “100 feet of the Petitioner’s vehicle,” or

“1,000 feet of the Petitioner.”

On appeal, Respondent argues the trial court erred in issuing the

injunction for three statutorily required reasons. First, he argues his

actions served a legitimate purpose in advocating against restrictive

legislation adversely affecting sex offenders. Second, he claims that his

social media activities do not constitute “a course of conduct directed at a

specific person” as required by section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2016).

And third, Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s subjective fear does not

satisfy the objective “reasonable person” standard required by the statute.

Petitioner claims that: Respondent’s actions are threats that served no

legitimate purpose; Respondent’s actions were clearly “directed” at her; his

postings threatened her safety; and her fear is reasonable because

Respondent is a convicted child molester with a domestic violence

injunction previously issued against him. She also asserts that

Respondent’s post containing pictures of her home and its address have

placed her and her children in fear for their safety.

“Section 784.0485 . . . allows an injunction against stalking, including

cyberstalking.” David v. Textor, 189 So. 3d 871, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

Section 784.048, Florida Statutes (2016), defines stalking, which by its

express language includes both harassment and cyberstalking: “[a] person

who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks

another person commits the offense of stalking.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat.

(2016). “A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows,

harasses, or cyberstalks another person and makes a credible threat to

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that person commits the offense of aggravated stalking.” § 784.048(3), Fla.

Stat. (2016) (emphasis added).

Section 784.048(1) provides definitions for the terms utilized within

that section:

(a) “Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed

at a specific person which causes substantial emotional

distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.

(b) “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct

composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however

short, which evidences a continuity of purpose. The term does

not include constitutionally protected activity such as

picketing or other organized protests.

(c) “Credible threat” means a verbal or nonverbal threat, or a

combination of the two, including threats delivered by

electronic communication or implied by a pattern of conduct,

which places the person who is the target of the threat in

reasonable fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her

family members or individuals closely associated with the

person, and which is made with the apparent ability to carry

out the threat to cause such harm. It is not necessary to prove

that the person making the threat had the intent to actually

carry out the threat. The present incarceration of the person

making the threat is not a bar to prosecution under this

section.

(d) “Cyberstalk” means:

1. To engage in a course of conduct to communicate, or to

cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or

through the use of electronic mail or electronic

communication, directed at a specific person; or

2. To access, or attempt to access, the online accounts or

Internet-connected home electronic systems of another

person without that person’s permission, causing substantial

emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate

purpose.

§ 784.048(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphases added).

This court previously articulated the requirements to obtain an

injunction to protect against stalking:

In order to be entitled to an injunction for stalking, the

petitioner must allege and prove two separate instances of

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stalking. “Each incident of stalking must be proven by

competent, substantial evidence to support an injunction

against stalking.” When considering the sufficiency of the

evidence, “[c]ourts apply a reasonable person standard, not a

subjective standard, to determine whether an incident causes

substantial emotional distress.”

David v. Schack, 192 So. 3d 625, 627-28 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citations

omitted) (emphases added).

A. “A Course of Conduct Directed at a Specific Person”

None of Respondent’s posts were sent directly to Petitioner. The

question that remains, however, is whether those posts were directed at

her. Decisions by our sister courts in the Second and Third Districts on

whether “a course of conduct [is] directed at a specific person” have been

interpreted to exempt social media messages from qualifying as the type

of conduct covered by section 784.048, Florida Statutes. See Horowitz v.

Horowitz, 160 So. 3d 530, 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (reversing injunction

because posts were not directed at a specific person); Chevaldina v.

R.K./FL Mgmt., Inc., 133 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (reversing

injunction against cyberstalking for internet posts). This court has also

previously expressed general agreement with that view. See Textor, 189

So. 3d at 875.

As with any case of statutory construction, we begin with the “actual

language used in the statute.” Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So.

2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006). Where such statutory language is “clear and

unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no

occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and

construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.”

Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc.

v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)).

We believe such a narrow interpretation, which exempts social media

messages from coverage under section 784.048, does not align with the

plain language of that statute. The plain words of the statute do not

require that the communications be intended for transmission to the

victim. Section 784.048 only requires that the course of conduct be

directed at a specific person, not necessarily directed to a specific person.

While the statute defines “course of conduct,” it does not define the term

“directed at.”

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In construing statutory terms, Florida courts commonly adopt the plain

meaning of words as contained in dictionaries. See Puy v. State, 2020 WL

1873236 (Fla. 4th DCA April 15, 2020) (using Merriam-Webster online

dictionary to define the word “threat” for its “plain meaning which would

be measured by common understanding and practice.”). One such

dictionary, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 2 gives a

definition of “direct” that includes “to engage in or launch hostilely” and to

“focus”; “these definitions apply when the word ‘direct’ is “used with

‘against’ or ‘at.’” See State v. Ardell, No. 2017AP381-CR, 2018 WL 1176889

at *6 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018). Therefore, a course of conduct “directed at” a

victim can include communications with third parties.

For example, social media postings that are not sent directly to an

individual may nonetheless be directed at an individual in a number of

ways, including by “tagging” that person in a post, or by sufficiently

describing the person in such a way as to make their specific identification

possible. Such posts may also be designed so as to be reasonably likely to

come to the attention of the targeted person, even if indirectly.

Accordingly, a credible threat made on social media can be actionable

under the statute even if that post was not sent directly to the person

targeted. Because the wording of the statute expressly encompasses

communications to third parties, we decline to interpret the statute so

strictly as to defeat its purpose.

A closer look at Horowitz and Chevaldina also do not support excluding

social media posts from the statute’s reach. In Horowitz, the Second

District reviewed a trial court’s injunction for protection against domestic

violence to protect an estranged wife from her husband who claimed she

was a victim of cyberstalking based on two posts placed on the husband’s

Facebook page. 160 So. 3d at 530-31. The first post featured the lyrics to

a song that the wife had recently listened to in the privacy of her home.

Id. at 531. The second post contained private messages between the wife

and a third party via her personal Facebook account. Id. It was alleged

that these posts made the wife fear that the husband “either ‘hacked’ her

computer or was somehow spying on her.” Id.

The court in Horowitz determined that the Facebook posts in that case

did not meet the statutory definition of cyberstalking for two reasons. Id.

First, it reasoned, these posts were not directed at a specific person;

instead, they included information posted to the husband’s own page, the

wife was not tagged or mentioned, and the posts were not otherwise

2WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 640 (Philip Babcock, et al.

eds., 1966).

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directed toward her in any obvious way. The court observed, “[u]nlike

email communication, . . . posts to one’s own Facebook page are not

directed at a specific person but are instead posted for all of the user’s

Facebook ‘friends’ to see, depending on the user’s privacy settings.” Id.

Thus, the court acknowledged that, while the facts were disconcerting, the

incidents did not rise to the level of cyberstalking. Id. at 532.

Although this language could be read as a blanket exclusion for social

media posts, the fact that the court indicated that the wife was not tagged

or mentioned, and that the posts were not obviously aimed towards her,

indicates that the Second District intended to leave the door open to

applying the stalking statute in those types of cases. In fact, in a

subsequent case, Scott v. Blum, 191 So. 3d 502, 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016),

the Second District found that emails sent to 2,200 members of an

organization did not constitute words “directed at a specific person” for

purposes of the cyberstalking statute simply because the emails were

about the petitioner. These emails were not “addressed” to petitioner, and

nothing indicated that he was an intended recipient. Id. at 504-05; cf.

Branson v. Rodriguez–Linares, 143 So. 3d 1070, 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)

(concluding that sending more than 300 emails to the petitioner

constituted evidence of stalking). Cases involving the harassment of

purported victims via third parties as grounds for an injunction under

Chapter 741 indicate that such conduct would not support a finding of

objectively reasonable fear of imminent danger from domestic violence.

See § 741.30(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016); Bacchus v. Bacchus, 108 So. 3d 712,

715 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“Even harassment of the wife through third

parties would be insufficient to warrant the imposition or extension of an

injunction.”); accord Giallanza v. Giallanza, 787 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2001). However, injunctions under Chapter 748 based on allegations

of stalking have different requirements than those sought under Chapter

741 for domestic violence.

The Third District in Chevaldina considered whether certain internet

blog postings constituted “cyberstalking” and were “incidents of violence,”

i.e., stalking, as to justify an injunction pursuant to section 784.046. See

133 So. 3d at 1091. There, the trial court determined that “the Defendants

have blogged extensively about the Plaintiff and many of these blogs are

arguably defamatory,” and subsequently entered a temporary injunction

against the respondent making more defamatory blog posts in the future.

Id. at 1089. In reversing the lower court’s order, the Third District did not

hold that social media posts were exempt from being the basis for an

injunction, it only held that the appellees failed to introduce evidence that

those specific blog posts were being used “to communicate, or to cause to

be communicated, words, images, or language . . . directed at a specific

9

person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving

no legitimate purpose.” Id. at 1091-92 (quoting § 784.048(1)(d), Fla. Stat.).

The Third District also aptly recognized that an injunction should

“never be broader than is necessary to secure to the injured party relief

warranted by the circumstances involved in the particular case.” Id. at

1091 (citing DeRitis v. AHZ Corp., 444 So. 2d 93, 94 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)).

“Entry of an overly broad injunction can constitute a violation of the First

Amendment.” Id. (citing Adoption Hot Line, Inc. v. State, 402 So. 2d 1307,

1308–09 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)).

Finally, the Third District emphasized that, regardless of the forum,

actions designed to harangue or threaten violence are not protected:

Angry social media postings are now common. Jilted lovers,

jilted tenants, and attention-seeking bloggers spew their anger

into fiber-optic cables and cyberspace. But analytically, and

legally, these rants are essentially the electronic successors of

the pre-blog, solo complainant holding a poster on a public

sidewalk in front of an auto dealer that proclaimed, “DON’T

BUY HERE! ONLY LEMONS FROM THESE CROOKS!”

Existing and prospective customers of the auto dealership

considering such a poster made up their minds based on their

own experience and research. If and when a hypothetical

complainant with the poster walked into the showroom and

harangued individual customers, or threatened violence,

however, the previously-protected opinion crossed the border

into the land of trespass, business interference, and

amenability to tailored injunctive relief. The same well-

developed body of law allows the complaining blogger to

complain, with liability for money damages for defamation if

the complaints are untruthful and satisfy the elements of that

cause of action. Injunctive relief to prohibit such complaints

is another matter altogether.

Id. at 1092.

Here, although the posting of the vulgar song may have been directed

at Petitioner and was certainly intended to be insulting, it was not credibly

or objectively threatening. See Scott, 191 So. 3d at 504; see also Textor,

189 So. 3d at 875 (stating that a murder-related comment “hardly

amount[ed] to an actual and credible threat of violence”); Chevaldina, 133

So. 3d at 1091–92 (“the appellees failed to introduce evidence that specific

blog posts were being used” in violation of Florida’s cyberstalking law,

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section 784.048(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2012)). Regardless, injunctions

are not available to stop someone from uttering insults or falsehoods. See,

e.g., Concerned Citizens for Judicial Fairness, Inc. v. Yacucci, 162 So. 3d

68, 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); Vrasic v. Leibel, 106 So. 3d 485, 486 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2013) (holding that an injunction remedy is not available to prohibit

defamatory or libelous statements). One reason for this is that there is an

adequate remedy at law: an action for damages. See Yacucci, 162 So. 3d

at 72; Vrasic, 106 So. 3d at 486. Political figures can pursue defamation

actions, provided that they are able to prove actual malice on the part of

the defamer. See Barnes v. Horan, 841 So. 2d 472, 479-80 (Fla. 3d DCA

2002) (involving a defamation action by losing candidate for State

Attorney); Dockery v. Fla. Democratic Party, 799 So. 2d 291, 293–94 (Fla.

2d DCA 2001); Pullum v. Johnson, 647 So. 2d 254, 257 (Fla. 1st DCA

1994). But merely tossing insults, as Respondent did in this case, is not

defamation. See Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Early, 334 So. 2d 50, 52

(Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (overturning plaintiff’s libel action where “defendants

characterized [the plaintiff’s] tenure in office as [u]nsuccessful, and stated

that he was unfit to hold the office of Superintendent of Public Instruction

because of his [i]neptness, incompetence and [i]ndecisiveness.”). Even if

it were, an injunction is not the appropriate remedy.

The third instance cited by Petitioner as support for the injunction, the

vulgar cartoon, is similarly insulting to Petitioner as is the song. However,

it is also not credibly or objectively threatening. In fact, when viewed in

context and in consideration of what the tombstone in the cartoon actually

says (“Died of Natural Causes”), the post negates any implication of

violence and appears to be nothing more than an intense expression of

antipathy toward Petitioner. The wording is no more a threat against her

than if it said, “Died by Falling Meteor.” Merely wishing someone ill health

in a public forum, without more, cannot serve as the legal basis for an

injunction.

B. “Conduct That Serves No Legitimate Purpose”

A finding of “no legitimate purpose” to a given action must not only

comport with common sense, it must also be evidenced by a complete lack

of usefulness or utility. See Textor, 189 So. 3d at 875 (“[W]hether a

communication serves a legitimate purpose is broadly construed and will

cover a wide variety of conduct.”).

Considering the various events alleged, we cannot say they were so

devoid of a legitimate purpose as to make them actionable under the

statute. Each party in this case is a vocal advocate for opposite positions

on sex offender laws. Despite Petitioner’s complaints, Respondent’s

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Tallahassee protest was by all accounts peaceful—even if unpleasant to

Petitioner in its scope and message—and non-violent. See § 784.048(1)(b),

Fla. Stat. (2016) (stating that “constitutionally protected activity such as

picketing or other organized protests” are specifically exempted from being

included in the definition of “course of conduct.”). The parties’ opposing

viewpoints on such laws are widely debated within what Justice Oliver

Wendell Holmes once described as the “free trade in ideas.” Abrams v.

U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). True, one side of

this debate has far greater public support than the other, but that does

not make the Respondent’s advocacy illegitimate.

As John Stuart Mill wrote, “even if the world is in the right, it is always

probable that dissentients have something worth hearing to say for

themselves, and that truth would lose something by their silence.” JOHN

STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS

54 (John Gray ed., 1998). In short, Respondent’s protest served a

legitimate purpose even though Petitioner found it objectionable.

Like the Tallahassee protest, Respondent’s appearance at the film

festival also had a legitimate purpose. While Respondent’s presence may

have made Petitioner uncomfortable, he was well within his rights to

attend and to express his opinion on the film’s subject matter—even if it

was done by posing a snide and uncomfortably worded question to

Petitioner. Respondent made no threats nor any threatening gestures

toward her. As a result, Respondent had the same right to express his

views in this public forum as if he had held up a poster complaining about

a business on a public sidewalk outside of that establishment. See

Chevaldina, 133 So. 3d at 1092.

As for Respondent putting information about Petitioner’s home on his

website, in light of the political activities being conducted at this location,

his posting of this public information also had a legitimate purpose which

was entirely within the bounds of lawful public debate. The fact that the

address of Petitioner’s PAC also doubles as her home address is irrelevant.

Unlike a private citizen who might ordinarily take steps to maintain their

privacy, Petitioner voluntarily placed the location of her home into the

ambit of public discourse by operating her PAC from it—one that

Respondent avers (whether accurately or not) earns more than $1 million

a year from contributors that include private prison companies, tobacco

companies, and beer lobbyists. Respondent’s post also included

information supporting his allegation that Petitioner draws a substantial

salary from the PAC. Therefore, reporting and publicizing where

Petitioner’s PAC is headquartered, and information about how it operates,

serves a valid public interest.

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Respondent did not drive by Petitioner’s home, take a picture of her

private residence, and then disseminate that information. Petitioner’s

home address as an elected official is a matter of public record for the

purposes of validating her residency. Additionally, Petitioner chose to use

her home for business and politics. While she is certainly free to do so,

she cannot then obtain an injunction against someone who elects to

further publicize that widely available information. Respondent did not

unjustifiably expose her private residence address to the public as

Petitioner contends; he merely republished the corporate address of

Petitioner’s PAC along with other information about it culled from public

disclosures. See Palm Beach Newspapers, LLC, 183 So. 3d at 483 (“Where

matters of public concern are involved, privacy interests give way to the

First Amendment right to publish lawfully obtained, truthful information

about such matters.”). Unless Petitioner’s home address was otherwise

private or confidential, and it was not, her actions conducting her public

advocacy from the residence placed it well into the public domain. When

Petitioner chose to have her non-confidential home address double as her

business address, thereby voluntarily combining certain aspects of her

private life with her public one, she lost the ability to claim a concurrent

privacy interest in the areas that overlapped. Therefore, Respondent had

the constitutional right to republish that unprotected information.

C. The Objective Reasonable Person Standard

Petitioner alleged that she was in fear of Respondent due to his actions,

but her subjective fear cannot be the basis for the injunction’s issue.

“[C]ourts apply a reasonable person standard, not a subjective standard,

to determine whether an incident causes substantial emotional distress.”

Schack, 192 So. 3d at 628 (quoting Touhey v. Seda, 133 So. 3d 1203, 1204

(Fla. 2d DCA 2014)). However, we need not make any determination about

whether Petitioner’s fear was objectively reasonable because the

Tallahassee protest, Respondent’s attendance at the film festival, and the

social media posts did not satisfy the statute’s requirements to support

the injunction.

D. The First Amendment

This case presents an issue that goes to the foundation of our country—

freedom of expression under the First Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution. The First Amendment guarantees “the freedom of speech . .

. [and] the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress

of grievances.” Amend. I, U.S. Const. These rights are “implicit in ‘[t]he

very idea of government, republican in form.’” McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S.

13

479, 482 (1985) (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552

(1876)). While courts must be vigilant in reviewing petitions such as the

one filed in this case, they must also adhere to the Constitution and the

laws enacted by our legislature.

While the record indicates that Petitioner was irritated by Respondent’s

actions, the Constitution protects the right of the political irritant to voice

his opinions as much as it protects any citizen’s right to do so. See E.R.R.

Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961)

(“In a representative democracy . . . the[] branches of government act on

behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of

representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes

known to their representatives.”). Though her frustration is

understandable, expressions of opposing views, even as insults, are not

the same as harassment or threats.

This exchange from the injunction hearing, a colloquy between counsel

for Respondent and a law enforcement officer witness, sums up the case

well:

[Respondent’s counsel]: What intentions and threats can you

articulate that were made by Derek Logue against Lauren

Book?

[Officer]: Not one specific, sir.

[Respondent’s counsel]: Okay. How about any?

[Officer]: The use of the song to communicate his feelings and

thoughts.

[Respondent’s counsel]. Other than the song.

[Officer]: His anger that he has expressed, which I understand

is okay to do.

Simply put, the officer was correct. Publicly expressing anger toward

an elected official is not a basis for entry of an injunction. In public debate,

elected officials must tolerate insulting remarks—even angry, outrageous

speech—to provide breathing room for the First Amendment. See Fox v.

Hamptons at Metrowest Condo. Ass’n, 223 So. 3d 453, 456 (Fla. 5th DCA

2017). Respondent’s methods and posts, as boorish, crude, and crass as

they may be, must also be considered “against the background of a

profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public

14

issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well

include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on

government and public officials.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,

270 (1964); see also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J.,

concurring in the judgment) (“The mere fact that expressive activity causes

hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression

unprotected.”). Respondent’s actions and comments, while distasteful, are

precisely the kind of “vehement, caustic, and . . . unpleasantly sharp”

political speech which has historically been protected by the First

Amendment and which fall outside the Florida harassment statutes. See

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.

Courts have acknowledged that what may be actionable in the context

of interactions between private individuals are viewed differently in the

context of political debate by public actors. See Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S.

705, 708 (1969). For example, the defendant in Watts was convicted of

violating a federal statute making it illegal to threaten the life of the

President of the United States for telling a small group at a political rally

“[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights

is L.B.J.” Id. at 706. In finding no “threat” occurred, the Supreme Court

stated in part:

We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged

in by petitioner fits within that statutory term. For we must

interpret the language Congress chose ‘against the

background of a profound national commitment to the

principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,

robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement,

caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on

government and public officials.’ The language of the political

arena, like the language used in labor disputes, is often

vituperative, abusive, and inexact. We agree with petitioner

that his only offense here was ‘a kind of very crude offensive

method of stating a political opposition to the President.’

Taken in context, and regarding the expressly conditional

nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners, we

do not see how it could be interpreted otherwise.

Id. at 708 (internal citations omitted).

Additionally, Petitioner’s subjective response to Respondent’s speech

does not change the fact that, even though both she and law enforcement

considered him “threatening,” he neither made a credible threat against

her nor did his actions constitute harassment. Viewing someone as a

15

“threat” does not mean the person can be subject to an injunction as if he

or she actually made one. Whether Petitioner has understandable

concerns is not the debate. The standard for obtaining an injunction is

not lessened in cases involving delicate complainants, nor is every

statement or action that causes a listener fear, discomfort,

embarrassment, annoyance or offense transformed as a result into a

“threat” providing the basis for an injunction. See Horowitz, 160 So. 3d at

533 (“[T]he allegations regarding Mr. Horowitz’s ‘finger-gun’ gesture, his

habit of ‘routinely’ blocking Mrs. Horowitz’s path, and her statement that

she was afraid he would eventually hurt her, although troubling, are too

vague to provide competent, substantial evidence supporting the

injunction.”); Titsch v. Buzin, 59 So. 3d 265, 266–67 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)

(finding that defendant’s alleged behavior of driving by plaintiff’s home,

stopping his car, exiting his vehicle, making hand gesture imitating a gun

and saying “bang your [sic] dead—I’m going to Fu[--ing] kill you” fell short

of the legal requirements of statute governing injunctions for protection

against repeat violence; mere shouting and obscene hand gestures,

without an overt act that placed plaintiff in fear, did not constitute the type

of violence required for an injunction against repeat violence); Moore v.

Hall, 786 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that trial court

erred in finding that the verbal statement from the respondent, “I should

have killed her,” made to a process server provided the petitioner with an

objectively reasonable fear of imminent violence); see also Giallanza, 787

So. 2d at 165 (stating that the general harassment of petitioner and/or her

children was insufficient to constitute domestic violence). The law requires

that before an injunction such as this can be granted there must be legal,

articulable acts of harassment, stalking, or credible threats pursuant to

section 784.048. Here, Respondent’s actions do not rise to that level.

Clearly, Respondent seeks to bring about political and social policy

change. It is immaterial whether he enjoys significant public support for

his positions. While his methods may be bombastic and extreme—

particularly his many unfortunate and insulting references to Petitioner

and her father—this type of political hyperbole does not take the

communication out of the protections of the First Amendment.

As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated:

[O]ne of the costs of the First Amendment is that it protects

the speech we detest as well as the speech we embrace.

Though few might find respondent’s statements anything but

contemptible, his right to make those statements is protected

by the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech and

expression.

16

U.S. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 729–30 (2012). The right to petition

government officials was included in the First Amendment along with the

guarantee of freedom of speech and freedom of press “to ensure the growth

and preservation of democratic self-governance.” McDonald, 472 U.S. at

489 (Brennan, J., concurring). “[S]peech concerning public affairs is more

than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” Id. (quoting

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)). “The First and

Fourteenth Amendments embody our ‘profound national commitment to

the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,

and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and

sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public

officials.’” Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270).

As tempting as it might be to force some civility into the matter by

stanching Respondent’s speech against Petitioner with a court order, to do

so would ignore the protections of the First Amendment and the wording

of the stalking statute. There was no evidence presented to the trial court

that Respondent incited action by urging people to threaten harm to

Petitioner or her family. Claims of threatening speech or harassing action

are actionable if the speaker threatens, harasses or intimidates, and

intended targets would reasonably perceive that intent. Merely posting

public information, or potentially embarrassing and annoying content,

without more, is not conduct within the stalking statute and does not

entitle Petitioner to an injunction.

Rather than being harassing or threatening, Respondent’s online

speech was more of a rant, that is, a hyperbolic rhetorical response to the

opposing views of a political actor. There is a real danger, from a First

Amendment perspective, that questionable speech by speakers from sub-

communities perceived as deviant could become hyper-critiqued, and over-

sanctioned. But in analyzing both intent and effect, context matters.

Because Petitioner is a public figure and not a private citizen seeking

quiet contentment while going about her day-to-day life, the calculus

about what constitutes harassment, credible threats, or even defamation

against her is different. Public officials, by the very nature of their

positions, are sometimes required to endure the passions and pleas of the

public as they do the people’s work. On occasion, civility takes a backseat

to those passions. While most advocates are respectful, others are uncivil

and do little to advance their cause, often undermining their efforts with

uncontrolled emotions and actions. Although regrettable, legislators and

other public officials sometimes receive intemperate attacks from some of

the citizens they represent when advocating for issues others may

17

strenuously oppose. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. Yet they are all

nonetheless part of our political process. That has been the nature of

elected office and a fact of political life since the founding of the Republic.

No one likes being the target of the kind of disgusting invective hurled

by Respondent against Petitioner. And given Petitioner’s personal history,

she may indeed have a heightened sensitivity to the content of these posts.

But the Constitution requires that public figures, including both elected

and non-elected officials, have thicker skin in their response to insults or

republication of unfavorable news articles by political gadflies when they

choose—voluntarily—to enter the public arena. “The law expects a

political candidate to accept republication of previous newspaper stories

‘as their lot. . . . [T]he first amendment demands a hide that tough.’”

Yacucci, 162 So. 3d at 73 (citing Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1005

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (concerning a private defamation

suit against newspaper columnists for statements made during a political

controversy)). Nothing in the First Amendment requires that constituents

be kind, or even polite, in communications with or about their elected

representatives and public officials. Its protections ensure the right of

citizens in the body politic to dissent and express their opinions and

desires, even in less-than-genteel ways, on matters of public interest

without the threat of prosecution, an injunction, or some other legal

action.

Respondent’s offensive vulgar and insulting posts are part of that

friction and grist of public discourse intended by our Founders when

forming this nation. Petitioner may feel discomfort by Respondent’s anger

as expressed in his postings, but discomfort is not tantamount to being

threatened or harassed. His speech advocates for citizen-led political

change and seeks to influence the legislative process. Though his words

may be base and insulting at times, it is also pure, political, and protected

protest deserving of the broadest possible First Amendment protections.

E. Conclusion

The injunction process was not intended for use in punishing mere

offensive incivility, or statements that in isolation may appear far more

menacing than when considered in their true context. Injunctions should

be reserved for cases of harassment, stalking or actual threats of imminent

harm as the Legislature intended, not to silence annoying political

opponents. Although we do not hold that an elected official can never be

the victim of stalking, these statutes cannot be used to chill the merely

bombastic and caustic communication alleged by Petitioner. The First

Amendment forbids that, and such speech must be protected even when

18

the message—or the messenger—is unpopular or controversial. See

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)

(“Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment

stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints.”).

The injunction in this case prohibited Respondent from having direct

or indirect contact with Petitioner “by mail, email, fax, telephone, through

another person, or in any other manner, including electronic means or use

of social media.” An injunction directed to speech is a classic example of

prior restraint on speech triggering First Amendment concerns. See

Vrasic, 106 So. 3d at 486. Because the injunction seeks to prohibit such

speech, the overbroad nature of the injunction prohibits Respondent from

posting anything related to Petitioner, even statements that would

unquestionably constitute pure political speech. 3

In sum, not only did Respondent’s actions fail to meet the requirements

of stalking under Florida Statute 784.048, the trial court’s injunction also

improperly restrained Respondent’s exercise of his constitutional rights.

For these reasons, we reverse the injunction.

Reversed.

LEVINE, C.J., GROSS, DAMOORGIAN, GERBER, CONNER, FORST, and KUNTZ, JJ.,

concur.

GROSS, J., concurs specially with opinion.

GERBER, J., concurs specially with opinion, in which CONNER and FORST,

JJ., concur.

MAY, J., dissents with opinion, in which WARNER and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

GROSS, J., concurring specially.

I concur fully in the majority opinion and write separately to emphasize

why I believe the case is appropriate for en banc treatment.

3 As further indication that the injunction here constitutes a prior restraint on

Respondent’s free speech, we note the distance from which he was ordered to

stay away from the Petitioner’s place of employment (500 feet). Here, that

employment includes Florida’s Capitol Building, which effectively denied him

access to a key means of political and constitutional expression—the ability to

petition Florida’s government officials. See Frandsen v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 829

So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

19

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(a) declares that an appellate

court may consider a case en banc if it is “necessary to maintain uniformity

in the court’s decisions” or if a case or issue is of “exceptional importance.”

The First Amendment issue presented by this case is of exceptional

importance.

Recently, cases have surfaced where politicians have attempted to use

the court system to stifle political opposition. See, e.g., WPB Residents for

Integrity in Gov’t, Inc. v. Materio, 284 So. 3d 555 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019);

Concerned Citizens for Judicial Fairness v. Yacucci, 162 So. 3d 68 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2014). There have also been the similar cases involving the right to

petition the government, see, e.g., Hurchalla v. Lake Point Phase I, LLC,

278 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), 4 and a quasi-government seeking to

discourage journalistic coverage. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Times Publ’g

Co., 780 So. 2d 310, 316-17 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

Lies, misrepresentations, and misdirection have long been a staple of

politics. In earlier times, lies slithered locally, without the means to attract

a larger audience. Today, social media distributes lies worldwide without

any vetting for veracity. It is understandable that in the heat of a

campaign, a politician might seek to divert an attack before the ballot

boxes are open for business.

While the drafters of the First Amendment did not conceive of the

Internet, they know the paramount importance of freedom of speech.

Since the dawn of the Republic, it has been the responsibility of voters to

exercise political judgment, to examine political speech and to separate

truth from fiction in casting a vote. If the First Amendment stands for

anything, it is that courts should rarely, if ever, interfere with the political

process by punishing or penalizing political speech. “[T]he First

Amendment assures the broadest tolerable exercise of free speech, free

press, and free assembly, not merely for religious purposes, but for

political, economic, scientific, news, or informational ends as well.”

Douglas v. City of Jeannette (Pennsylvania), 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943)

(Jackson, J., concurring in result).

As Justice Jackson wrote over 75 years ago,

If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,

it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be

4In Hurchalla, the defendant/appellant failed to preserve a significant First

Amendment issue for presentation to the jury.

20

orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of

opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith

therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an

exception, they do not now occur to us.

W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

GERBER, J., concurring specially.

I fully concur with the majority opinion. I write separately only to

emphasize a point not raised until the majority opinion’s conclusion: “[W]e

do not hold that an elected official can never be the victim of stalking.”

Maj. op. at 18.

None of the four statutes currently addressing stalking – sections

784.048, 784.0485, 784.0487, and 784.049, Florida Statutes (2019) –

exclude an elected official from being the victim of stalking or from seeking

an injunction for protection against stalking. Further, while section

784.048(1)(b) provides the term “course of conduct,” as used in the

stalking statutes, “does not include constitutionally protected activity such

as picketing or other organized protests,” that exclusion should not be read

to suggest an elected official can never be the victim of stalking under the

foregoing statutes.

As the majority opinion indicates, “[t]he law requires that before an

injunction such as this can be granted there must be legal, articulable acts

of harassment, stalking, or credible threats pursuant to section 784.048.

Here, Respondent’s actions do not rise to that level.” Maj. op. at 16. I

agree with that conclusion in this case, even though I also recognize the

disturbing nature of certain of Respondent’s postings about Petitioner.

However, one day a case may appear in which a person’s verbal or

nonverbal threats to an elected official places the official “in reasonable

fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family members or

individuals closely associated with the person, and which is made with the

apparent ability to carry out the threat to cause such harm,” thus

qualifying as a “credible threat” under section 784.048. Judges must be

cognizant about such a possibility existing, so that we may provide the

official facing such a threat with the protections which the law permits.

CONNER and FORST, JJ., concur.

MAY, J., dissenting.

21

We join in the majority’s decision to recognize that social media can

qualify as the type of conduct covered by section 784.048, Florida

Statutes. We depart from the majority when it mistakenly holds that the

evidence was insufficient to support the injunction in this case.

The majority’s position boils down to the following:

• The respondent’s postings are vulgar “rants” insufficient to

satisfy the statute’s requirement of stalking.

• The respondent’s vulgar “rants” serve a legitimate purpose.

• The First Amendment protects the respondent’s vulgar

“rants.”

• Because the petitioner is a public figure, she is somehow

exempt from the same protections as other citizens.

• And, she could sue for defamation damages as an adequate

remedy.

We disagree with all of them.

“A trial court has broad discretion to grant an injunction, and we review

an order imposing a permanent injunction for a clear abuse of that

discretion.” Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142, 1143–44 (Fla. 1st DCA

2018). In our view, the majority did not give the trial court that discretion.

An injunction may issue when a person stalks another individual. See

§748.048, Fla. Stat. “A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly

follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person commits the offense of

stalking . . . .” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. “Harass” is defined as “engag[ing]

in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes

substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate

purpose.” Pickett, 236 So. 3d at 1144. 5

The majority agrees the social media postings were “directed” at a

specific person—the petitioner. So, the issue is whether the respondent

willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly harassed the petitioner through a

course of conduct which caused her substantial emotional distress and

served no legitimate purpose. The trial court found he did and we agree.

5 The majority cites David v. Schack, 192 So. 3d 625, 627–28 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)

to suggest the petitioner must prove two instances of stalking. See Maj. op. at 6-

7. However, the statute does not require two incidents of stalking. Rather it

requires “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ing], harass[ing], or

cyberstalk[ing],” which constitutes stalking. § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat.

22

• Respondent’s Postings Constitute Stalking

As the majority explains, the petitioner alleged three types of offending

conduct: (1) the respondent’s Tallahassee protest; (2) his appearance and

conduct at a New York film festival; and (3) his multiple postings on his

website, blog, and other social media platforms. We agree with the

majority that the first two conduct types are protected under the First

Amendment and do not constitute harassment. However, unlike the

majority, we view the multiple incidents of social media postings as willful,

malicious, and repeated harassment sufficient to satisfy the statute.

A “‘[c]ourse of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of a series

of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity

of purpose.” §784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. That is precisely what happened

here.

The respondent posted the petitioner’s address and a picture of her

home on a website he entitled “Ron and Lauren Book Exposed.” He posted

a video of a song containing an obscene title, with lyrics that include: “I

am going to ‘f___ up your face’”, and “[y]ou maniac, gonna get you back.”

He posted a cartoon depicting a headstone with three lines—“R.I.P.,”

“Annoying C___,” and “Died of Natural Causes.” He then tweeted about

the song. This was a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over

a period of time that evidenced a continuity of purpose—harassment of the

petitioner.

The majority suggests the respondent’s “rants” were simply vulgar

expressions that he is entitled to make under the First Amendment. 6 We

disagree. When such rants are posted on social media, they take on a

more global reach. In short, the petitioner proved the respondent willfully,

maliciously, and repeatedly harassed her.

• The Rants Served No Legitimate Purpose

The respondent’s multiple vulgar postings and tweets also served no

legitimate purpose. In them, he did not advocate against tough sex

offender laws. Instead he engaged in name-calling, vulgar language, and

disclosure of the petitioner’s home and address for those who visited his

website to see. There was no legitimate purpose to them. They were meant

to harass the petitioner and occurred on multiple occasions. While his

6 “Rather than being harassing or threatening, Respondent’s online speech was

more of a rant, that is, a hyperbolic rhetorical response to the opposing views of

a political actor.” Maj. op. at 17.

23

advocacy against restrictive legislation may serve a legitimate purpose, his

vulgar, demeaning postings do not. His advocacy does not give him license

to harass the petitioner.

Nevertheless, the majority suggests that because the petitioner’s home

and address were obtained from public sources that somehow makes their

posting on the respondent’s website immune from consideration as a type

of harassment. Of course, the majority cites no authority for that

proposition. While the petitioner chose to use her home address for a PAC,

she did not choose to have it posted on a website dedicated to sex

offenders.

The majority then suggests there was no evidence that respondent

incited action by urging people to threaten harm to the petitioner or her

family. That may be true, but the statute doesn’t require such evidence.

Must we wait until someone commits some violent act before our system

can protect its citizens? Haven’t we witnessed enough tragedies to know

that our failure to address precursors of violence often leads to a more

egregious tragedy?

Today we live in a culture where social media postings, like those

involved here, have led people to lash out and wreak havoc on our children,

families, friends, and communities. Social media posts, which direct

attention and can motivate others to act, are threatening and dangerous.

In fact, perhaps more so as the subject of the postings has no way of

knowing who reads or may act upon them.

Indeed, we have witnessed a man arrested for sending pipe bombs to

several legislators allegedly as a result of social media postings that

inspired him. International terrorists have been radicalized through social

media. And, our elections have now fallen prey to manipulated social

media.

The respondent’s “rants” served no legitimate purpose.

• The Petitioner Had an Objective Reasonable Fear.

The petitioner pled and proved she was in fear of the respondent due to

his social media postings. Law enforcement testified the respondent was

a credible threat, so much so that they provided security for her. The

majority references it, but gives no weight to, this testimony. Instead, the

majority relies on what is perceived as the petitioner’s failure to prove

“stalking” and avoids the reasonable fear issue.

24

And, the majority fails to mention the psychologist’s testimony.

Although he did not evaluate the respondent, he testified, over the

respondent’s objection, to the factors used to assess risk.

So if you have all those factors together, someone with an

agenda, somebody who affiliates with others with that same

agenda, somebody who increases their approach, somebody

who’s angry or has angry outbursts, somebody who

announces their intentions in terms of what they’re going to

do, all of those things together can significantly increase an

individual’s risk potential.

The majority glosses over the respondent’s conviction as a child

molester and someone who has had a domestic violence injunction issued

against him for making violent threats against a woman. In short,

competent substantial evidence established the respondent’s posts would

cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person—and did so

in this case to the petitioner.

The petitioner’s fear was real and reasonable. The respondent’s actions

have placed her and her children in fear for their safety. Law enforcement

recognized as much. And, so did the trial court.

The majority also suggests that “[p]ublic officials, by the very nature of

their positions, are sometimes required to endure the passions and pleas

of the public as they do the people’s work” and that civility takes a

backseat to those passions. Maj. op. at 17. But the statute doesn’t

differentiate between ordinary citizens and public figures. Nor should we.

This is not a defamation case where the petitioner’s status as a public

figure changes the rules. Florida’s stalking statute does not discriminate.

It does not create a different heightened standard for public figures, as

noted by Judge Gerber in his concurrence.

And last, the majority suggests that a defamation action is an adequate

remedy for the petitioner. In doing so, the majority overlooks the reality

that money does not compensate a reasonable person for having to live in

fear due to harassment that serves no legitimate purpose.

CONCLUSION

We live in times where violence occurs all too frequently and an

ordinary day may turn into a horrific tragedy. Must we wait for a tragedy

to occur before the judicial system recognizes the threat? There are

25

already too many examples in this country where failure to act has

resulted in significant harm. So, it is necessary for courts to be vigilant in

reviewing petitions such as the one filed in this case. Courts must also

adhere to the Constitution and the laws enacted by our legislature. Given

the discretion afforded the trial court, we would affirm. 7

WARNER and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

* * *

7 The respondent also argues the injunction was a prior restraint on his free

speech. We disagree. The injunction was aimed at keeping him a safe physical

distance away from the petitioner. We do however acknowledge the unique issue

raised by the distance from which the respondent was ordered to stay away from

the petitioner’s place of employment. Here, that employment includes Florida’s

Capitol Building, which effectively denied him access to a key means of political

and constitutional expression—the ability to petition Florida’s government

officials. See Frandsen v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 829 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1st DCA

2002). We would therefore remand the case to the trial court to modify the

injunction to more narrowly provide the protection deserved.

26