Wanda Bowling v. John Roach

Case: 19-41003 Document: 00515434155 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/29/2020

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

No. 19-41003 FILED

Summary Calendar May 29, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

WANDA L. BOWLING,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

JUDGE JOHN ROACH, in his official and individual capacity,

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:19-CV-144

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:*

Appellant Wanda Bowling was involved in divorce proceedings in Texas’s

296th District Court of Collin County. Judge John Roach presided over the

enforcement of Bowling’s divorce decree. Bowling brought this pro se 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action against Judge Roach in his official and individual capacity. 1

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1Bowling brought this suit after a failed attempt to remove her state court divorce

proceedings to federal court. Dahlheimer v. Bowling, No. 4:19-CV-22-ALM-CAN, 2019 WL

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Bowling asserted four counts in her amended complaint: (1) unlawful seizure

of property; (2) lack of due process; (3) conspiracy to interfere with civil rights

by threats and intimidation; and (4) abuse of process. Bowling alleged a wide-

ranging conspiracy among multiple judges to deprive her of notice, due process,

and property in the course of enforcing her divorce decree. 2 Bowling sought

injunctive relief, including “[a]n order placing Plaintiff in the position that she

would have been in had there been no violation of her rights,” along with

damages.

Judge Roach moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). The district court referred the motion to dismiss to

a magistrate judge, who recommended granting the motion for various

reasons. Primarily, the magistrate judge recommended granting the motion

to dismiss because the claims against Judge Roach in his official capacity are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment and because the Younger abstention

doctrine bars claims against Judge Roach in his individual capacity.

Alternatively, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of all claims under

Rule 12(b)(6) because Judge Roach is entitled to judicial immunity. Bowling

filed objections. The district court adopted the recommendations of the

magistrate judge and granted the motion to dismiss. Bowling now appeals,

arguing that the district court erred by relying on Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) to

dismiss her claims. We conclude that Bowling’s arguments lack merit and

affirm the district court’s order dismissing Bowling’s claims.

948046, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2019), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.

Dahlheimer v. Bowling, No. 4:19-CV-22, 2019 WL 937313 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2019).

2 Bowling sued the alleged co-conspirators in separate lawsuits. See, e.g., Bowling v.

McCraw, No. 4:18-CV-610-ALM-CAN, 2019 WL 2517834 (Mar. 7, 2019 E.D. Tex.), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Bowling v. Dahlheimer, No. 4:18-CV-610, 2019 WL

3712025 (Aug. 7, 2019).

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I.

We review de novo dismissals under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6). 3 Bauer v.

Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 356–57 (5th Cir. 2003); Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d

19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). Further, “[o]ur review of subject-matter jurisdiction is

plenary and de novo.” Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2016).

When a district court invokes an abstention doctrine, “we review [that ruling]

for abuse of discretion” but “review de novo whether the requirements of a

particular abstention doctrine are satisfied.” Id. (quoting Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v.

Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 2004)). We accept the factual allegations in

the complaint as true and resolve any ambiguities in the plaintiff’s favor.

Benton, 960 F.2d at 21.

Because Bowling is proceeding pro se, we construe her pleadings

liberally. Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). However, pro se

litigants are not exempt from compliance with the relevant rules of procedure

and substantive law. Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981).

II.

As for Bowling’s claims against Judge Roach in his official capacity, the

district court held that Judge Roach is entitled to immunity under the

Eleventh Amendment. We agree. Absent an exception to or waiver of

sovereign immunity, “Texas judges are entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity for claims asserted against them in their official capacities as state

actors.” Davis v. Tarrant Cty., 565 F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2009); see also

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).

3 Judge Roach argues that certain district court rulings should be reviewed for plain

error because Bowling did not properly object to the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation. Because the standard of review is not determinative, and Bowling’s

pleadings are entitled to liberal construction, we review each issue de novo.

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Bowling argues that the Ex Parte Young doctrine—which permits suit

against state officials in their official capacities so long as it seeks prospective

relief to redress an ongoing violation of federal law—applies here. Ex parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167–68 (1908); Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex., Dep’t of Ins.,

Div. of Workers’ Comp., 851 F.3d 507, 515–16 (5th Cir. 2017). In order to apply

Ex Parte Young, the “court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into

whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks

relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv.

Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe

of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and

concurring in judgement)); see also Warnock v. Pecos Cty., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th

Cir. 1996).

Ex Parte Young does not apply here. Though Bowling does seek

prospective injunctive relief, 4 she does not allege “an ongoing violation of

federal law.” Verizon Md., Inc., 535 U.S. at 645. Bowling does not identify any

federal statute or provision of the United States Constitution that Judge Roach

is currently violating. Therefore, Bowling has not alleged facts that would

allow this court to infer any ongoing violation of federal law.

For these reasons, Bowling’s claims against Judge Roach in his official

capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

III.

As for Bowling’s claims against Judge Roach in his individual capacity,

the district court held that the Younger abstention doctrine bars this court

from considering those claims. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971);

4Specifically, Bowling seeks “[a]n Injunctive order permanently enjoining/restraining

Judge Roach from further acts of discrimination or retaliation.”

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Middlesex Cty. Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423

(1982). We agree, to the extent Bowling’s claims seek injunctive relief.

Younger “applies to suits for injunctive and declaratory relief.” Google,

822 F.3d at 222. “Younger established that federal courts should not enjoin

pending state criminal prosecutions unless the plaintiff shows ‘bad faith,

harassment, or any other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable

reliefs,’ such as a ‘flagrantly and patently’ unconstitutional state statute.” Id.

(quoting Younger, 401 U.S at 53–54). “Younger has been expanded beyond the

criminal context” and also applies to “pending civil proceedings involving

certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state court’s ability to perform

their judicial functions.” Id. (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S.

69, 78 (2013)); see also Middlesex Cty., 457 U.S. at 432 (applying Younger “to

non-criminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are

involved”). Where Younger applies, federal courts must abstain if “there is ‘(1)

an ongoing state judicial proceeding, which (2) implicates important state

interests, and (3) . . . provides an adequate opportunity to raise federal

challenges.’” Id. (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc., 571 U.S. at 81). Notably,

“requests for monetary damages do not fall within the purview of the Younger

abstention doctrine.” Allen v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry, 835 F.2d 100, 104 (5th

Cir. 1988).

The first prong of Younger is satisfied here because there is “an ongoing

state judicial proceeding.” Google, 822 F.3d at 222 (citation omitted). “The

initial frame of reference for abstention purposes is the time that the federal

complaint is filed. If a state action is pending at this time, the federal action

must be dismissed.” DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1984).

“In the most basic sense, a state proceeding is pending when it is begun before

the federal proceeding is initiated and the state court appeals are not

exhausted at the time of the federal filing.” Id. At the time Bowling filed her

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federal complaint, Judge Roach had scheduled a hearing regarding the sale of

certain property outlined in her divorce decree. And not long before this suit

was filed, Judge Roach was issuing orders directed at Bowling, including an

order to appear. Clearly, at the time Bowling filed suit, the state action seeking

enforcement of her divorce decree had begun but was not yet complete.

Therefore, at the time of suit, there was “an ongoing state judicial proceeding.”

Google, 922 F.3d at 222 (citation omitted).

The second prong of Younger is satisfied because the ongoing state

judicial proceeding “implicates important state interests.” Id. (citation

omitted). “Family relations are a traditional area of state concern.” Moore v.

Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979). Likewise, the division of marital assets in the

course of enforcing a divorce decree falls within the ambit of important state

interest. See Estate of Merkel v. Pollard, 354 F. App’x 88, 94 (5th Cir. 2009)

(“[T]he importance of Texas’ interest in its own domestic-relations law is

obvious.”); Jasper v. Hardin Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:11-CV-408, 2012 WL

4480713, at *9–10 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2012), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 1:11-CV-408, 2012 WL 4472261 (Sept. 26, 2012). Indeed, the

Texas Family Code contains clear instructions for Texas judges enforcing

property division in divorce decrees, signaling Texas’s strong interest in the

matter. See, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code §§ 9.001, 9.002; cf. Estate of Merkel, 354 F.

App’x at 95 (finding it relevant to the Burford abstention doctrine that Texas

had “created ‘a special state forum for judicial review’ of divorce actions”

(quoting Tex. Gov. Code Ann. § 24.601).

The third prong of Younger is satisfied because the state judicial

proceeding “provides an adequate opportunity to raise federal challenges.”

Google, 822 F.3d at 222 (citation omitted). “[A]bstention is appropriate unless

state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.” Moore,

442 U.S. at 425–26. Where “a litigant has not attempted to present his federal

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claims in related state-court proceedings,” we “assume that state court

procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous

authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987).

Bowling has not alleged any defect in the state court proceedings or in Texas

law that “clearly bars” her ability to raise her constitutional claims. 5

Therefore, we assume that the divorce decree enforcement proceedings below,

and the proceedings that led to the original divorce decree, provided “an

adequate opportunity” to raise federal challenges. Google, 822 F.3d at 222

(citation omitted).

For these reasons, the district court correctly abstained from

adjudicating Bowling’s equitable claims against Judge Roach in his individual

capacity under Younger.

IV.

As for Bowling’s damages claims against Judge Roach, judicial immunity

shields the judge from those claims. “Judicial immunity is an immunity from

suit and not just from the ultimate assessment of damages.” Ballard v. Wall,

413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005). Judicial immunity can be pierced in two

circumstances: (1) “a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions,

i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity”; and (2) “a judge is not

immune from actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence

of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991).

Bowling argues that Judge Roach engaged in a “nonjudicial action[]”

when he allegedly instructed his court reporter to delay the release of

5Bowling has not exhausted the state appellate process. Cf. Jasper, 2012 WL 4480713,

at *10 (noting the availability of a right to appeal the state court’s decision when assessing

whether the state court proceedings afforded an adequate opportunity for plaintiff to raise

constitutional challenges). Given this further avenue for relief, any argument that Bowling

cannot obtain relief from Judge Roach because of his alleged bias is unavailing.

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transcripts in order to delay or thwart Bowling’s ability to appeal.

Communications Judge Roach had with his court reporter regarding courtroom

management and administration fall within his judicial capacity. Therefore,

Judge Roach’s judicial immunity withstands this attack.

Bowling also argues that Judge Roach acted “in the complete absence of

all jurisdiction” when he ordered the entire proceeds of a property sale to be

awarded to her ex-husband (rather than half of the proceeds). Bowling

contends that Judge Roach exceeded the bounds of the divorce decree and

thereby exceeded his jurisdiction. Bowling’s arguments are unpersuasive.

“Where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient

jurisdiction for immunity purposes.” Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1125

(5th Cir. 1993). Here, the court made a finding that the disputed property was

within its jurisdiction. And Texas has given its courts the power to enforce

divorce decrees. See Tex. Fam. Code. §§ 9.001, 9.002; Pearson v. Fillingim, 332

S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011). Even assuming that Judge Roach “‘acted in

excess of his authority,’ []he is still protected by judicial immunity.” Ballard,

413 F.3d at 517 (quoting Malina, 994 F.2d at 1125). That is because “a judge

is not deprived of immunity” merely “because the action he took was in error,

was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be

subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction.” Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 373 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation

omitted).

For these reasons, Judge Roach is judicially immune to Bowling’s

damages claims and those claims are properly dismissed.

V.

Finally, although Bowling devotes significant portions of her briefing to

qualified immunity and the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the

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district court’s dismissal order did not rest on either of those legal precepts.

Therefore, we need not address whether they apply.

VI.

We affirm.

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